Sixth Circuit reaffirms: limited weight to caregiving, plain-error barrier to factual challenges, and permissible use of the non–career-offender range to guide a downward variance

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in United States v. Duke (No. 24-5338, Dec. 3, 2024), affirming a below-guidelines sentence for a defendant who qualified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. The case presents a familiar array of sentencing issues: the distinction between procedural and substantive reasonableness; the high bar for overturning a below-guidelines sentence; the treatment of unpreserved factual objections under plain-error review; the evaluative weight due to post-offense rehabilitation and caregiving responsibilities; and the proper role of the career-offender guideline when a district court varies downward.

Defendant-Appellant Keadrick Duke pled guilty to two crack-cocaine distribution counts. The district court calculated a career-offender guidelines range of 151–188 months and imposed a 70-month sentence—anchored to the low end of the non–career-offender range (70–87 months)—plus three years of supervised release. On appeal, Duke argued (1) the district court committed a factual error by asserting that crack cocaine is more addictive than powder cocaine, (2) the court undervalued his post-offense rehabilitation and caregiving for a severely disabled sister, and (3) the court overvalued the career-offender range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standard of Review: The court reviewed the sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard (United States v. Fugate). Because Duke did not object to the alleged factual error at sentencing, the court applied plain-error review (United States v. Vonner; United States v. Bostic).
• Factual assertion about crack cocaine: The Sixth Circuit held there was no clear error in the district court’s observation that crack is more addictive than powder cocaine, citing its own precedent (United States v. Simmons) and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2007 report.
• Rehabilitation and caregiving: The district court expressly credited Duke’s post-offense rehabilitation and compliance, which drove a substantial downward variance. It reasonably gave limited weight to caregiving responsibilities to avoid disparities based on familial status and to honor deterrence goals, consistent with United States v. Nunley and the “not ordinarily relevant” policy of USSG § 5H1.6.
• Career-offender range: The district court correctly calculated the career-offender range as the starting point (Gall v. United States) but found it too high for Duke’s circumstances. It used the non–career-offender range as a helpful reference point and imposed a 70-month sentence, which the Sixth Circuit deemed reasonable (see United States v. Pineda).
• Substantive reasonableness: Given the below-guidelines sentence, Duke faced a particularly demanding burden to show the sentence was “greater than necessary.” He failed to meet that burden (see United States v. Curry; United States v. Greco).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Sets out that the Guidelines calculation is the required “starting point and initial benchmark,” and outlines procedural reasonableness, including that reliance on “clearly erroneous facts” is error. Gall also frames the overarching abuse-of-discretion standard, which informed the Sixth Circuit’s deferential review of the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors and the downward variance.
• United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) and United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004): These decisions require parties to state objections after sentencing to preserve procedural claims. Duke’s failure to object meant the court reviewed the alleged factual error only for plain error—a very high bar. This procedural posture essentially controlled the outcome on the crack/powder factual point.
• United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2017): Reinforces that using clearly erroneous facts can render a sentence procedurally unreasonable. The panel cited Adams to explain why Duke’s challenge, though styled as substantive, also implicated procedural reasonableness. But given plain-error review and supporting authorities, there was no reversible error.
• United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Crews, 417 F. App’x 450 (6th Cir. 2011): Simmons recognizes that crack is a more concentrated form of powder cocaine and more addictive; Crews upheld a sentence where the district court made similar observations. Together with the Sentencing Commission’s 2007 report, these cases foreclosed the claim that the district court’s statements were clearly erroneous.
• U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (May 2007): The report explains pharmacological and administration-mode differences between crack (typically smoked) and powder (typically snorted), supporting higher addiction risk from crack’s quicker onset, more intense but shorter highs, and more frequent dosing. This evidence undercut Duke’s factual challenge.
• Substantive reasonableness precedents:
  • United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748 (6th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir. 2019): A sentence’s substantive reasonableness turns on whether the court overweighted or underweighted § 3553(a) factors.
  • United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2020): A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it is greater than necessary—simply, too long.
  • United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Greco, 734 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2013): Establish that within-guidelines sentences carry a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness and that challenging a below-guidelines sentence as unreasonably long is an even steeper climb. These authorities supplied the doctrinal backdrop for affirmance here.
• United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824 (6th Cir. 2022): Supports the district court’s limited reliance on family responsibilities; the Sixth Circuit approved the concern that favoring caregivers can create disparities based on familial status and noted that family ties are generally not a basis for significant leniency.
• USSG § 5H1.6 (Family Ties and Responsibilities): States that family ties and responsibilities “are not ordinarily relevant” to departures. Because Duke did not move for a § 5H1.6 departure, the panel found no procedural error in the district court’s not engaging that framework, while also confirming the district court could consider caregiving as part of the broader § 3553(a) analysis.
• United States v. Pineda, 755 F. App’x 543 (6th Cir. 2018) (per curiam): Endorses use of the career-offender guideline as the starting point. The court’s reference to the non–career-offender range as a helpful benchmark to choose the ultimate sentence aligns with Pineda and Gall: calculate correctly, then vary as warranted by § 3553(a).

Legal Reasoning

• Procedural reasonableness and plain error:
  • Because Duke did not object to the district court’s statements about crack/powder disparity when the court invited objections (Bostic procedure), the panel reviewed only for plain error. To prevail, he had to show an “obvious or clear” error that affected his substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
  • The panel found no error, much less plain error. Simmons and the Sentencing Commission’s 2007 report affirm that crack’s addiction risk can be greater due to pharmacokinetics and mode of use. The district court’s statements therefore were not based on clearly erroneous facts.
• Substantive reasonableness: weighing § 3553(a) factors:
  • Rehabilitation: The district court explicitly credited Duke’s post-offense rehabilitation—compliance on release, employment, no new criminal conduct—and found diminished need for incapacitation. That recognition materially supported the substantial downward variance.
  • Caregiving responsibilities: The court acknowledged its discretion to consider family obligations but assigned them limited weight for two reasons:
    • Parity concerns under § 3553(a)(6). Favoring defendants with dependents risks unwarranted disparities based on familial status; some defendants without dependents might be treated more harshly for the same conduct.
    • Deterrence under § 3553(a)(2)(B). The court reasoned that specific deterrence of caregivers is appropriate; engaging in criminal conduct when others rely on them could be seen as more culpable.
    These reasons closely track Nunley and the policy in § 5H1.6, which deems family ties and responsibilities “not ordinarily relevant” to departures. The district court considered the factor but articulated a principled basis for assigning it modest weight.
  • Career-offender framework: The district court correctly used the career-offender range (151–188 months) as the starting point, as required by Gall. It then concluded the range overstated Duke’s culpability in light of “lack of aggravating circumstances” and turned to the non–career-offender range (70–87 months, at Offense Level 21, CHC V) as a helpful reference. Selecting the low end of that range (70 months) produced a variance exceeding 50% from the career-offender minimum—an outcome the Sixth Circuit deemed reasonable.
  • Bottom line: For a below-guidelines sentence, the defendant bears a heavy burden to show the sentence is “greater than necessary.” The panel found the district court’s weighing of factors balanced, reasoned, and well within its discretion.
• USSG § 5H1.6 procedural claim:
  • Duke argued the district court failed to follow § 5H1.6’s commentary regarding family responsibilities. Because he never moved for a departure under § 5H1.6, the panel rejected this as an unpreserved procedural complaint. Even on the merits, § 5H1.6 declares such considerations “not ordinarily relevant,” and the district court did consider caregiving but reasonably assigned it modest weight.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Nonprecedential but clarifying: Though “not recommended for publication,” the decision synthesizes established Sixth Circuit principles that will be persuasive in the circuit:
  • Factual assertions about crack’s relative addictiveness, when grounded in existing precedent and Commission reports, do not constitute clear error.
  • Family caregiving rarely supports major leniency absent extraordinary circumstances; district courts may cite parity and deterrence to justify limited weight.
  • Sentencing courts should calculate and “respect” the career-offender range as the starting point but may reference the non–career-offender range when explaining a tailored downward variance.
  • Below-guidelines sentences are especially difficult to upset on appeal as substantively unreasonable.
• Practice pointers for defense counsel:
  • Preserve objections. After pronouncement, respond to the Bostic inquiry. Unpreserved factual objections face the steep plain-error standard.
  • If seeking leniency based on caregiving, consider both a policy-based argument under § 3553(a) and, where appropriate, a formal § 5H1.6 departure motion. Be prepared to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances and lack of available alternative care to distinguish the case from the “not ordinarily relevant” baseline.
  • To challenge career-offender overstatement, offer robust case-specific reasons and, if warranted, a policy disagreement backed by empirical evidence. Propose the non–career-offender range as an alternative benchmark with principled support.
  • When contesting “crack vs. powder” statements, bring contemporary scientific literature or Commission materials and object contemporaneously to preserve procedural review beyond plain error.
• Guidance for district courts:
  • State on the record that the career-offender range is the starting point and explain any variance with reference to specific § 3553(a) considerations.
  • It is permissible to use the non–career-offender range as a reference point when determining the extent of a variance, especially when the career-offender range overstates culpability in the particular case.
  • If discussing crack/powder differences, citing the Sentencing Commission’s 2007 report and circuit precedent helps insulate the record from factual-error claims.
  • When considering family responsibilities, articulate parity concerns and deterrence rationales to explain limited weight, consistent with Nunley and § 5H1.6 policy.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
  • Procedural reasonableness asks: Did the court follow the right steps (correctly calculate the Guidelines, consider § 3553(a) factors, rely on accurate facts)?
  • Substantive reasonableness asks: Is the length of the sentence reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors—i.e., not “greater than necessary”?
• Plain-error review:
  • Applies when a party did not object at sentencing. The appellant must show an obvious error affecting substantial rights and the integrity of proceedings. It is a demanding standard rarely met in sentencing appeals.
• Career-offender guideline (USSG § 4B1.1):
  • Increases offense level and criminal history category for defendants with certain prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses, often yielding very high ranges. Courts must start with this calculation but may vary when warranted.
• Departure vs. variance:
  • Departure: A sentence outside the guideline range based on a guideline policy statement (e.g., § 5H1.6). Requires specific showings tied to that policy.
  • Variance: A sentence outside the guideline range based on § 3553(a) factors and the court’s assessment of the case. No formal motion is required.
• USSG § 5H1.6 (Family ties and responsibilities):
  • States that family ties and responsibilities are “not ordinarily relevant” to departures, though extraordinary circumstances can justify consideration. Courts may still consider family responsibilities as part of the broader § 3553(a) variance analysis.
• Below-guidelines sentences on appeal:
  • Although only within-guidelines sentences receive a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness in the Sixth Circuit, defendants face a “heavy burden” to show that a below-guidelines sentence is still too long given the district court’s broad discretion and the deferential standard of review.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Duke reaffirms several entrenched sentencing principles: appellate courts will defer to a district court’s reasoned balancing of § 3553(a) factors; unpreserved factual challenges face the formidable plain-error standard; family caregiving, while relevant, usually merits limited weight given parity and deterrence concerns and the policy of § 5H1.6; and a sentencing judge may use the non–career-offender range as a practical yardstick when varying downward—so long as the career-offender range is calculated and respected as the starting point.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores the importance of preserving objections at sentencing, developing a robust and individualized record on rehabilitation and any claimed departures or variances (including formal motions where appropriate), and offering principled benchmarks for requested variances. For district courts, it confirms that careful, transparent reasoning tied to the record and § 3553(a) will be sustained—especially where the ultimate sentence falls below the advisory range. While not precedential, Duke provides a clear and practical blueprint for handling common issues in drug-sentencing cases involving the career-offender guideline and claimed mitigating factors such as caregiving obligations.