Sixth Circuit Joins Sister Circuits in Rejecting the Exclusionary Rule for § 1983 Actions: Commentary on Karim Codrington v. Jay Dolak, 25a0178p.06 (6th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In Karim Codrington v. Jay Dolak, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit tackled a suite of constitutional and state-law claims stemming from a 2018 traffic stop in Louisville, Kentucky. The plaintiff, Karim Codrington—an African-American motorist—alleged that three Louisville Metro Police Department (“LMPD”) officers unlawfully stopped, searched, and arrested him, then fabricated drug evidence and stole thousands of dollars in cash. After the district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, Codrington appealed.

The Sixth Circuit’s published opinion is significant for two reasons: (1) it expressly adopts, for the first time in this circuit, the rule that the federal exclusionary doctrine and “fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree” principles do not apply in civil rights suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) it revives a Fourth Amendment fabrication-of-evidence claim, clarifying the level of circumstantial proof needed to survive summary judgment. The ruling simultaneously reinforces strict statute-of-limitations standards for other Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and remands derivative Monell allegations for further proceedings.

Summary of the Judgment

• Affirmed – dismissal of claims for unlawful search & seizure, selective enforcement, false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conversion.
• Reversed – dismissal of the § 1983 fabrication-of-evidence claim; the panel found a genuine dispute of material fact.
• Vacated & Remanded – municipal liability (Monell) claims, because their fate depends on the fabrication cause of action.
• New Precedent – The Sixth Circuit formally aligns with every other circuit to hold that the exclusionary rule and fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine are inapplicable in § 1983 civil litigation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) – Provided accrual rules for Fourth Amendment claims, anchoring the one-year Kentucky statute of limitations (§ 413.140(1)(a)).
• McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109 (2019) – Established that fabrication and malicious-prosecution claims accrue upon favorable termination, saving Codrington’s claims from time-bar arguments.
• Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999) and its progeny – Previously rejected the exclusionary rule in § 1983 suits; the Sixth Circuit now adopts the same logic.
• Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – Grounds municipal liability on a policy, custom, or failure-to-train. Remanded because the underlying fabrication claim was revived.
• Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010) – Provided the malicious-prosecution elements the Court applied to affirm dismissal.
• Various summary-judgment standards (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) guided the panel’s de novo review.

Legal Reasoning

Statute of Limitations. Relying on Wallace and Kentucky’s one-year personal-injury limitations period, the court held that Codrington’s unlawful-search, selective-enforcement, and false-arrest claims accrued no later than the date of formal charging (February 12 2019) and were therefore untimely when filed in November 2021. Arguments first raised on appeal were deemed forfeited.

Fabrication of Evidence. The court distinguished between (a) fabrication that induces prosecution (a Fourth Amendment wrong) and (b) fabrication that contributes to conviction (a Fourteenth Amendment due-process wrong). Because Codrington’s charges were dismissed pre-trial, the panel treated it as a Fourth Amendment claim. Circumstantial inconsistencies—missing body-cam footage, disputed photo evidence, and the implausible discovery of methamphetamine—created a jury question, rendering summary judgment improper.

Exclusionary Rule. On the malicious-prosecution claim the court concluded probable cause existed based on the undisputed marijuana/grinder evidence. It refused to suppress that evidence in the § 1983 analysis, adopting the reasoning of every sister circuit that the exclusionary rule is a judicial deterrent tailored to criminal trials and too costly to extend to civil rights damages actions.

Municipal Liability. Because a viable constitutional violation (fabrication) survives, Monell issues must be addressed anew by the district court, which had previously dismissed them solely for want of an underlying violation.

Conversion Claim. The court required specific, non-conclusory proof that $50,000 had been seized. Codrington’s failure to guide the court to admissible record evidence warranted affirmance of summary judgment for the officers.

Potential Impact of the Decision

• Exclusionary Rule Clarification. Civil-rights practitioners in the Sixth Circuit can no longer rely on suppression of illegally obtained evidence to prove absence of probable cause in § 1983 suits. Plaintiffs will need to attack the quality of the evidence itself or prove fabrication.
• Evidentiary Burdens in Fabrication Cases. The opinion underscores that direct video of planting is unnecessary at summary judgment; a web of circumstantial inconsistencies can suffice.
• Monell Litigation. By vacating the municipal dismissal, the court invites renewed scrutiny of LMPD’s alleged custom of pretextual, racially discriminatory traffic stops—potentially broadening municipal exposure.
• Litigation Strategy. Defense counsel should expect plaintiffs to plead fabrication more aggressively where probable cause exists for minor offenses. Conversely, plaintiffs must be meticulous in marshaling record evidence for state-law conversion or seizure claims.
• Statutory Accrual Rules. The panel re-emphasizes tight accrual standards for Fourth Amendment and equal-protection claims, reinforcing the need for quick filing or tolling strategies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983

A federal statute allowing individuals to sue state actors for violations of constitutional or federal rights. It provides a civil (money-damages) remedy, not criminal sanctions.

Exclusionary Rule / Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Judicial doctrines barring illegally obtained evidence (and its derivatives) from use in criminal trials to deter police misconduct. This case says they do not apply in civil § 1983 damages suits.

Fabrication of Evidence (Fourth-Amendment Variant)

When officers create or plant evidence and use it to obtain probable cause for arrest or prosecution, violating the right to be free from unreasonable seizures.

Monell Liability

Local governments are liable under § 1983 only when a policy or custom causes the constitutional injury or when they fail to train employees in a way that amounts to deliberate indifference.

Summary Judgment

A procedural device allowing courts to dispose of claims where no genuine dispute of material fact exists, saving juries for contested factual matters.

Probable Cause

Reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed a criminal offense—less demanding than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but more than a hunch.

Conclusion

Codrington v. Dolak is a milestone Sixth Circuit opinion for two reasons. First, it definitively eliminates the exclusionary rule as a litigation tool in § 1983 actions within the circuit, aligning Sixth Circuit precedent with all other regional courts of appeals. Second, by permitting a circumstantial fabrication-of-evidence claim to proceed, the court signals a willingness to let juries scrutinize contested police narratives even absent a “smoking-gun” video. Litigants should adjust strategies accordingly: municipalities must brace for revived Monell exposure, plaintiffs must file timely, and both sides must prepare for evidentiary battles unmitigated by suppression doctrines. The opinion thus recalibrates the balance between deterrence of police misconduct and finality in civil litigation, marking an important development in Fourth Amendment-related § 1983 jurisprudence.