Introduction

In a published decision of first impression in the Sixth Circuit, the court held that time credits earned under the First Step Act (FSA) may be used to reduce a prisoner’s term of incarceration and to accelerate transfer into prerelease custody or the start of supervised release, but may not be used to reduce the length of the supervised-release term itself. Because petitioner Terrell Anthony Hargrove had already been released from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and was serving supervised release, the court dismissed his habeas appeal as moot, concluding that no “effectual relief” remained available.

The decision squarely addresses statutory language in 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) directing that earned “time credits … shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release.” The majority reads “toward” to mean movement “in the direction of” supervised release and harmonizes § 3632(d)(4)(C) with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g), which governs BOP transfers into prerelease custody or supervised release. The dissent would read “toward” as “against,” allowing credits to reduce time in prerelease custody or on supervised release, drawing support from the Supreme Court’s usage of “toward” in other sentence-credit statutes.

This commentary provides a detailed overview of the case, its statutory interpretation dispute, the court’s reasoning, the dissent’s critique, and the likely effects on FSA litigation and supervised-release practice within the Sixth Circuit.

Background and Procedural Posture

• Underlying convictions and sentences: Hargrove was sentenced in 2006 to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release for drug trafficking offenses. His supervised release was later revoked after a new drug offense. When this habeas case arose, he was serving 57 months for the revocation consecutively to a 46-month heroin-distribution sentence, followed by another five years of supervised release.
• Habeas petition: In 2023, while incarcerated, Hargrove filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition arguing that the BOP unlawfully refused to allow him to earn and apply FSA time credits. The Warden moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and because one of Hargrove’s convictions allegedly disqualified him from the FSA credit program.
• District court ruling: The district court dismissed, holding (i) Hargrove failed to exhaust and (ii) he was ineligible for credits due to an aggregate sentence that included a disqualifying offense.
• Intervening event: While the appeal was pending, Hargrove was released from BOP custody and began serving supervised release.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. It first rejected the Warden’s threshold “in custody” argument, confirming that a person on supervised release is “in custody” for habeas purposes. But it held as a matter of first impression that FSA time credits cannot reduce the term of supervised release. The court interpreted § 3632(d)(4)(C) and § 3624(g) to mean that credits apply to end incarceration sooner and to start supervised release earlier, not to shorten supervised release itself. Because Hargrove was already on supervised release, no court order applying credits could provide effectual relief; the case thus no longer presented a live controversy. The court did not reach the exhaustion ruling or Hargrove’s underlying eligibility for credits.

Analysis

A. Statutory Framework

• 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C): “Time credits … shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall transfer eligible prisoners, as determined under section 3624(g), into prerelease custody or supervised release.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g): Defines “eligible prisoner” and authorizes the BOP to transfer an inmate “to begin any such term of supervised release at an earlier date, not to exceed 12 months,” based on credits earned under § 3632.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): Provides that a prisoner whose sentence includes supervised release “shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation officer,” underscoring the transition from BOP custody to probation supervision.

B. Majority’s Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction and mootness posture.
   • “In custody” requirement: Individuals on supervised release satisfy habeas “in custody.” The court cited its own precedent to reject the Warden’s argument to the contrary.
   • Mootness turns on the scope of relief: If credits could reduce supervised release, the case would remain live; if not, then once on supervised release, no effectual relief remains and the case is moot.
2. Text and context of “toward” in § 3632(d)(4)(C).
   • Competing dictionary meanings: The panel acknowledged that “toward” can mean “in the direction of” or “in furtherance/partial fulfillment of.”
   • Contextual resolution: The court read the first sentence together with the second sentence of § 3632(d)(4)(C) and with § 3624(g). Because the Director of BOP “shall transfer eligible prisoners … into prerelease custody or supervised release,” and because eligibility under § 3624(g) is pegged to credits equaling the “remainder of the … term of imprisonment,” the statute contemplates applying credits to end incarceration and to start supervised release early—not to shorten supervised release itself.
3. Harmonizing with § 3624(g).
   • Eligible prisoners: A prisoner becomes “eligible” under § 3624(g) when he has earned sufficient credits to equal the remainder of his prison term.
   • Transfer authority and the 12‑month cap: The BOP may transfer a prisoner “to begin” supervised release up to 12 months early, confirming that credits accelerate the start of supervision but do not reduce its length.
4. Institutional roles and timing.
   • Once on supervised release, the Probation Office—not the BOP—supervises the defendant. The BOP’s transfer function is complete. Reading § 3632(d)(4)(C) to empower reduction of a term of supervised release after prison would mismap responsibilities and timing the statute presumes.
5. Caselaw support and rejection of contrary readings.
   • Aligned decisions: The panel cited the Eleventh Circuit’s Guerriero v. Miami RRM and numerous district court decisions concluding FSA credits reduce incarceration, not supervised release.
   • Contrary district court decisions: The court rejected readings that would limit credits to reducing prerelease or supervised-release time (e.g., Morgan, Smith, Roberts) or that bifurcate § 3632(d)(4)(C) into two different agency applications (e.g., Rivera‑Perez), explaining these approaches conflict with or render superfluous § 3624(g)’s detailed mechanism or the provision’s title and structure.
6. Johnson and the qualitative difference between incarceration and supervised release.
   • The majority invoked United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000), which refused to credit overserved prison time against supervised release because the two serve distinct purposes. That qualitative difference buttresses the conclusion that Congress did not authorize treating FSA prison credits as reducing supervised release.
7. Mootness disposition.
   • Because credits cannot reduce supervised release, no order could affect Hargrove’s current status; the appeal is dismissed as moot. The court therefore did not reach exhaustion or eligibility.

C. The Dissent’s Reasoning

Judge Moore viewed § 3632(d)(4)(C) as ambiguous and, guided by Congress’s consistent usage of “toward” in sentence-credit statutes, would interpret “toward” to mean “against,” thereby allowing credits to reduce time in prerelease custody or supervised release.

• Textual ambiguity: Dictionaries support both readings. The dissent emphasized that nothing intrinsic to § 3632(d)(4)(C) compels the majority’s choice.
• Consistent usage across related statutes:
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b): Credit “toward” a term of imprisonment has been read by the Supreme Court to operate as a reduction or credit “against” the sentence (Reno v. Koray), a reading also reflected in Sixth Circuit cases and Mont v. United States.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1): Good-time credits “toward” service of a sentence have been described by the Court as credit “against” prison time (Barber v. Thomas; Pepper v. United States).
• Structural reading of § 3632(d)(4)(C): The first sentence (passive voice) addresses applying credits to reduce time in prerelease or supervised release; the second sentence (active voice) separately empowers BOP to transfer eligible prisoners earlier, thereby avoiding superfluity and respecting the BOP/Probation division of labor after release.
• Policy and purpose: Allowing credits to reduce supervised release better aligns with the FSA’s recidivism-reduction goals by incentivizing sustained participation in programming and smoothing reentry. The dissent warned that the majority’s reading encourages doing the minimum necessary to trigger early release, contrary to Congress’s objectives.

D. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Article III and mootness:
  • Brown v. Yost, 122 F.4th 597 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (per curiam) (effectual relief requirement).
  • Church of Scientology v. United States, 509 U.S. 9 (1992) (effectual relief standard).
  • North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971) (per curiam) (mootness basics).
  • League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2008) (controversy must persist through litigation).
  • Sherrod v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 103 F.4th 410 (6th Cir. 2024) (jurisdiction first).
• Custody for habeas: In re Stansell, 828 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2016) (supervised release satisfies “in custody”).
• Statutory-interpretation tools:
  • United States v. Jones, 81 F.4th 591 (6th Cir. 2023) (start with text and structure).
  • Salazar v. Paramount Global, 133 F.4th 642 (6th Cir. 2025) (context controls meaning).
  • West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022) (words in statutory scheme context).
  • Scalia & Garner, Reading Law (2012) (context, harmonious reading).
  • Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (2018) (harmonious reading).
  • Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023) (headings as interpretive aid).
  • United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984) (avoid reading clauses in isolation).
• Supervised release vs. imprisonment: United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000) (time in prison not interchangeable with supervised release; distinct rehabilitative purpose).
• Other FSA time-credit cases:
  • Guerriero v. Miami RRM, No. 24-10337, 2024 WL 2017730 (11th Cir. May 7, 2024) (per curiam) (credits reduce incarceration, not supervised release).
  • District courts aligning with the majority: Singleton v. Neely, 2023 WL 9550049 (N.D. Ala. 2023), adopted 2024 WL 476949; Williams v. Fitch, 2024 WL 737803 (M.D. Ala. 2024), adopted 2024 WL 734477; Alexander v. Joseph, 2023 WL 6798866 (N.D. Fla. 2023), adopted 2023 WL 6794979; Harrison v. BOP, 2022 WL 17093441 (S.D. Fla. 2022); United States v. Calabrese, 2023 WL 1969753 (N.D. Ohio 2023).
  • Contrary district court readings: Dyer v. Fulgam, 2022 WL 1598249 (E.D. Tenn. 2022); United States v. Smith, 646 F. Supp. 3d 915 (E.D. Mich. 2022); United States v. Roberts, 2024 WL 4762680 (S.D. Ohio 2024); United States v. Morgan, 657 F. Supp. 3d 976 (E.D. Mich. 2023); Rivera‑Perez v. Stover, 757 F. Supp. 3d 204 (D. Conn. 2024).

E. Practical Impact

1. Binding rule in the Sixth Circuit: FSA time credits cannot reduce the length of supervised release. Credits function to shorten incarceration and to begin supervised release up to 12 months earlier, per § 3624(g)(3). This aligns the Sixth Circuit with the Eleventh Circuit’s view and deepens the weight of authority against supervised-release reduction via FSA credits.
2. Mootness in pending and future cases: Once a petitioner is released from BOP custody to begin supervised release, a § 2241 challenge seeking application of FSA credits is generally moot within the Sixth Circuit because the court cannot grant effectual relief. Counsel should litigate these claims, if at all, while the client remains incarcerated.
3. Litigation strategy:
   • Timing: Seek expedited consideration where release is imminent; request preliminary relief if appropriate.
   • Relief framing: Craft remedies tied to earlier transfer or release dates during incarceration; once on supervised release, seek relief through other mechanisms rather than FSA credits.
   • Alternative supervised-release relief: The Sixth Circuit’s rule does not foreclose independent avenues for modifying or terminating supervised release (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) early termination after one year, or modification of conditions)—but those are distinct from FSA credit application.
4. BOP practice and policy: The decision reinforces BOP’s operational model: implementing credits to shorten prison time and to effect pre-release or early supervised-release start, subject to the 12‑month cap. It denies authority to treat credits as a “discount” against supervised-release length.
5. Unresolved questions left by the decision:
   • Exhaustion: The court did not decide whether § 2241 FSA claims require exhaustion or whether an exception applies.
   • Eligibility where aggregate sentence includes a disqualifying offense: The district court’s ground for dismissal (aggregate-sentence ineligibility) remains unreviewed in this appeal and thus unresolved at the circuit level.
   • Potential mootness exceptions: The panel did not address exceptions (e.g., “capable of repetition yet evading review”); their applicability to FSA credit disputes remains open.
6. Prospect of higher-court review or legislation: With multiple district courts having adopted the contrary reading and a reasoned dissent highlighting Supreme Court usage of “toward” in related statutes, this issue could attract further appellate attention or congressional clarification.

F. Complex Concepts Simplified

• First Step Act time credits: Earned by successful participation in evidence-based programs. Credits can reduce remaining prison time and trigger earlier transfer to prerelease custody or supervised release.
• “Toward” in sentence-credit statutes: Can mean either “in the direction of” (moving the start date earlier) or “in furtherance of/against” (reducing the length of the term). The majority adopts the former; the dissent the latter.
• Prerelease custody: Transitional placements like home confinement or residential reentry centers before release to supervision.
• Supervised release: A post-incarceration period under U.S. Probation supervision. It is not parole; it follows imprisonment and serves distinct rehabilitative and public safety goals.
• Mootness: A case becomes moot when courts can no longer grant effectual relief due to intervening events, such as a prisoner’s release to supervision when the only requested relief would have shortened incarceration.
• Exhaustion of administrative remedies: Often required for § 2241 petitions challenging BOP actions; unresolved here due to mootness.

G. Illustrative Examples

• Example 1 (within Sixth Circuit after Hargrove): An inmate earns 180 days of FSA credits. BOP may apply those credits to end prison 180 days early and may transfer the inmate to begin supervised release up to 12 months early. However, once supervised release begins, the length of that term remains the length imposed by the court; credits do not reduce it.
• Example 2 (mootness trigger): An inmate files a § 2241 petition seeking to apply FSA credits but is released to supervised release before adjudication. Under Hargrove, the petition becomes moot because the court cannot shorten supervised release with FSA credits.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s published decision in Hargrove establishes a clear and consequential rule: First Step Act time credits apply to reduce incarceration and to prompt earlier entry into prerelease custody or supervised release, but they do not reduce the length of supervised release itself. That rule controls mootness analysis for FSA habeas challenges in the circuit: once a petitioner is on supervised release, claims seeking application of credits are generally moot because no effectual relief remains.

The court’s reasoning turns on a contextual, harmonious reading of § 3632(d)(4)(C) with § 3624(g), and on the distinct purposes the law assigns to incarceration and supervised release. The dissent offers a robust contrary view grounded in consistent usage of “toward” across sentencing-credit statutes and the FSA’s rehabilitative aims. For now, practitioners in the Sixth Circuit must assume that FSA credits cannot shorten supervised release and should time litigation accordingly, while pursuing separate statutory avenues for modifying or terminating supervised release when appropriate. The decision brings the Sixth Circuit into alignment with the Eleventh Circuit and gives the BOP a reaffirmed blueprint for applying FSA credits, even as it leaves some collateral issues—exhaustion, eligibility in aggregate sentences—for another day.