Sixth Circuit Confirms District Courts May Deny Amendment 821 Reductions and Maintain Above-Amended-Guidelines Sentences with an Adequate § 3553(a) Explanation

Introduction

United States v. Luster is a nonprecedential decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirming a district court’s denial of a sentence-reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) following the Sentencing Commission’s 2023 criminal-history amendment (Amendment 821, Part A). After pleading guilty to a string of violent robberies—bank robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and related conspiracies—Dennis J. Luster received a total sentence of 125 months in 2022. When Amendment 821 retroactively reduced “status points” and lowered his criminal history category from V to IV (and thus his advisory Guidelines range from 100–125 months to 84–105 months), Luster sought a reduction to 105 months—the top of the amended range.

The district court found him eligible for a reduction, but declined to grant one after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing Luster’s long and violent record and the gravity of the offense conduct. On appeal, Luster argued that the court failed to adequately justify what, in light of the amended range, became an above-Guidelines sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court’s explanation was adequate and within its discretion.

Summary of the Opinion

Eligibility: Both parties agreed—and the district court found—that Amendment 821, Part A, retroactively lowered Luster’s criminal history category, making him eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2).
Discretionary Denial: Despite eligibility, the district court declined to reduce the sentence after reconsidering the § 3553(a) factors, citing the seriousness of the offenses, the harm to victims, the need for deterrence, and Luster’s extensive violent criminal history.
Above-Amended-Guidelines Sentence: Because the amended advisory range was 84–105 months, the unchanged 125-month sentence became an above-Guidelines sentence in the post-amendment posture. The Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the district court provided a sufficiently compelling explanation for that variance.
Affirmance: Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the Sixth Circuit held the explanation was adequate and affirmed the denial of the reduction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Hanson, 124 F.4th 1013 (6th Cir. 2025), and United States v. Flowers, 963 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2020) — These cases confirm the standard of review for § 3582(c)(2) denials is abuse of discretion. This frames the appellate inquiry: Did the district court apply the correct legal standards and provide a reasoned explanation based on accurate facts?
United States v. Moore, 582 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 405 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2005)) — Reinforces what constitutes an abuse of discretion: applying the wrong legal standard, misapplying the right standard, or relying on clearly erroneous facts. The panel measured the district court’s explanation against this baseline.
United States v. DeJournett, 817 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2016) — Describes the pre-2023 criminal history “status points” regime (two points for committing an offense while under a criminal justice sentence), setting up the significance of Amendment 821, Part A’s reduction to one point and its retroactive effect.
United States v. Johnson, 26 F.4th 726 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748 (6th Cir. 2020)) — Articulates the requirement that an above-Guidelines sentence must be supported by a justification sufficiently compelling to match the degree of variance and must explain how the case differs from the “mine-run” or “heartland” cases contemplated by the Guidelines. The panel used this framework to assess the district court’s explanation for maintaining 125 months when the amended range topped out at 105.
United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Smith, 474 F.3d 888 (6th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) — These decisions recognize that a defendant’s extensive or egregious criminal history can justify an upward departure or variance. The panel invoked this principle to validate the district court’s reliance on Luster’s twenty-one adult convictions and violent record.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in three key steps.

Eligibility Under Amendment 821, Part A: The district court correctly determined that the one-point status adjustment retroactively lowered Luster’s criminal history category from V to IV and his advisory range to 84–105 months. This satisfied the threshold requirement for § 3582(c)(2) consideration.
§ 3553(a) Reassessment and the Effective Upward Variance: Although eligible, Luster was not automatically entitled to a reduction. The court revisited the § 3553(a) factors—including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the need to reflect seriousness, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public—and concluded that the original 125-month term remained “sufficient but not greater than necessary.” Because the amended top-of-range is 105 months, maintaining 125 months amounts to an above-Guidelines sentence in the post-amendment framework.
Adequacy of the Explanation for the Variance: Applying Johnson and Perez-Rodriguez, the panel asked whether the district court’s justification matched the degree of variance and distinguished Luster’s case from the mine-run. The record showed:
- The robberies caused “extraordinary harm” and terrorized victims.
- Luster had twenty-one adult convictions, including violent conduct, and prior sanctions failed to deter him.
- In the court’s judgment, the criminal history score still underrepresented the risk and seriousness in this case.
Those points, tied expressly to § 3553(a)(2)’s deterrence, respect for the law, and public-protection aims, provided a sufficiently compelling rationale for staying at 125 months notwithstanding the lower advisory range.

A noteworthy footnote acknowledges the district court’s apparent miscalculation at the original sentencing: offense level 25, CHC V properly yields a 100–125 month range (not 120–125). Neither party objected at the time, and the panel does not rely on that error to disturb the outcome. In the § 3582(c)(2) posture, the salient point is that the amended range is 84–105 months, and the district court supplied adequate reasons for remaining above it.

Impact

Even though this opinion is “not recommended for publication,” it offers clear guidance for future § 3582(c)(2) motions premised on Amendment 821 and beyond:

Eligibility does not guarantee relief. District courts retain broad discretion to deny reductions after revisiting § 3553(a), even when a defendant’s advisory range decreases.
Maintaining the original sentence may become an above-amended-range variance. When the amended range drops below the existing sentence, the court’s explanation must satisfy variance standards—i.e., it must be proportionately compelling and explain why the case is outside the mine-run.
Criminal history and offense conduct remain potent justifications. Where the court reasonably finds that a defendant’s history or the offense’s harm is underrepresented by the amended calculations, an above-amended-range sentence can be affirmed.
Defense strategy implications. Defendants should be prepared to rebut the original sentencing rationale with concrete, up-to-date mitigation—e.g., rehabilitation, programming, disciplinary record, reentry planning—and to argue why the Commission’s policy choice embedded in the amendment should carry persuasive weight in the § 3553(a) analysis.
Harmlessness of past guideline arithmetic missteps. Absent timely objection or demonstrated prejudice, historical miscalculations that do not drive the § 3582(c)(2) decision may not warrant relief on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2): A statute allowing courts to reduce a previously imposed term of imprisonment when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the applicable Guidelines range, subject to the Commission’s policy statements and the § 3553(a) factors.
Amendment 821, Part A: A 2023 change to the Guidelines’ criminal history rules that reduced the “status points” added for committing an offense while under a criminal justice sentence from two points to one, and made that change retroactive. Here, it lowered Luster’s criminal history category, reducing his advisory range from 100–125 months to 84–105 months.
Advisory Guidelines Range: A sentencing range suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines based on offense severity and criminal history. Courts must consider it but may vary based on statutory factors.
Variance vs. Departure: A “departure” applies specific Guidelines provisions authorizing movement off the range. A “variance” relies on § 3553(a) to impose a sentence outside the advisory range based on case-specific factors. In this case, keeping 125 months after the amended range dropped to 84–105 months functioned as an upward variance.
“Mine-run” or “heartland” cases: The typical cases the Guidelines are designed to cover. When a court varies, it should explain what makes the case atypical or more serious than the norm.
Abuse of discretion: Appellate standard under which a district court’s decision will be reversed only if it applied the wrong legal rule, misapplied the correct rule, or relied on clearly erroneous facts.
§ 3553(a) factors: Statutory sentencing factors, including the nature of the offense, defendant’s history and characteristics, deterrence, protection of the public, respect for law, and the need for just punishment and rehabilitation.

Conclusion

United States v. Luster reinforces a practical but significant principle in the wake of Amendment 821’s retroactivity: a reduced Guidelines range opens the door to reconsideration under § 3582(c)(2), but it does not compel a reduced sentence. When a district court explains, with reference to § 3553(a), why the case remains outside the mine-run—here, because of extraordinary victim harm, an extensive violent record, and the need for deterrence and public protection—maintaining the original sentence above the amended advisory range is within the court’s discretion and will be affirmed on appeal.

For litigants, the opinion underscores the need to do more than point to a lower range. Defendants should marshal concrete, current mitigation and squarely address the district court’s prior rationale. For courts, Luster offers a roadmap for drafting denials: acknowledge eligibility, articulate how the § 3553(a) factors outweigh the new range, and make clear why the case is non-typical in a way that justifies the degree of variance. Although unpublished, the decision is a clear signal within the Sixth Circuit that Amendment 821 relief may be withheld where the original sentencing rationale remains compelling.