Sixth Circuit Clarifies: Ohio Aggravated Robbery Is “Generic Extortion” Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)

Introduction

United States v. Sha-Kim Mandela, No. 24-3718 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) (unpublished), addresses whether an Ohio aggravated-robbery conviction under Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.01(A)(1) qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career-offender enhancement in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.1.

The defendant, Sha-Kim Mandela, received a 120-month sentence for bank robbery. He challenged the district court’s decision to classify him as a career offender, arguing that his 2010 Ohio aggravated-robbery conviction did not fit within the Guidelines’ “enumerated-offenses clause.” The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that § 2911.01(A)(1)—when predicated on a theft under §§ 2913.01/2913.02—is a categorical match to “generic extortion” as defined in § 4B1.2(e)(2). This decision reinforces a growing body of Sixth Circuit law construing violent-felony definitions and provides prosecutors, defense counsel, and district courts with clearer guidance on Ohio robbery-related predicates.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Siler, Kethledge, Bush, JJ.) affirmed Mandela’s sentence.
Key holding: Ohio aggravated robbery, § 2911.01(A)(1), with a deadly-weapon element and a theft predicate defined in § 2913.02, is categorically equivalent to “extortion” in § 4B1.2(a)(2).
Because Mandela also had a prior Ohio assault conviction, the aggravated-robbery predicate gave him the two requisite “crimes of violence,” justifying career-offender status.
The court sidestepped the alternative “elements clause” theory and rested exclusively on the enumerated-offenses clause.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) – Provides the modern “categorical approach” framework: compare statutory elements to “generic” offense elements; broader statutes do not qualify.
Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) – Explains divisibility and the modified categorical approach; permits courts to consult “Shepard documents.”
Cervenak, 135 F.4th 311 (6th Cir. 2025) (en banc) – Re-states de novo review and clarifies Shepard-document usage in Guidelines cases.
United States v. Ivy, 93 F.4th 937 (6th Cir. 2024) – Analyzed a different portion of Ohio’s aggravated-robbery statute but laid groundwork on divisibility and theft predicates.
United States v. Butts, 40 F.4th 766 (6th Cir. 2022) – Reiterates categorical-approach fundamentals.
United States v. Wilson, 978 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 2020) – Discusses the breadth of Ohio’s 31-subsection theft definition and implications for categorical matching.
Ohio Supreme Court precedents: State v. Evans, 911 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 2009); State v. Harris, 911 N.E.2d 882 (Ohio 2009) – Recognize that displaying a weapon during a theft inherently involves threats of physical harm.
United States v. Rice, 2024 WL 3898564 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2024) – Earlier unpublished decision reaching the same conclusion; Mandela deepens that reasoning.

Legal Reasoning

Framework Selection: Because the government relied on the enumerated-offenses clause, the panel confined its analysis to whether Ohio aggravated robbery lined up with “extortion.”
Divisibility & Modified Categorical Approach:
- § 2911.01(A) is divisible both by the “aggravators” [(A)(1)–(3)] and by the 31 possible predicate “theft offenses.”
- Shepard documents (indictment & plea) showed Mandela violated (A)(1) with a § 2913.02 theft predicate, allowing the court to examine that specific variant.
Element-by-Element Comparison (Guidelines extortion requires (1) obtaining value; (2) by wrongful force, fear, or threat):
- Ohio theft (§ 2913.02) satisfies element 1 because every subsection involves “obtaining or exerting control” over another’s property or services.
- § 2911.01(A)(1) satisfies element 2 because displaying/brandishing a deadly weapon during the theft necessarily uses or threatens force, instilling fear of injury.
No Overbreadth: The statute does not criminalize any conduct less violent than generic extortion; thus it is equal or narrower.
Career-Offender Threshold Met: Combined with Mandela’s prior assault, the aggravated-robbery conviction met the two-predicate requirement of § 4B1.1(a)(3).

Impact of the Decision

Clarifies Ohio Law’s Federal Consequences: District courts within the Sixth Circuit now have explicit guidance that § 2911.01(A)(1) + § 2913.02 qualifies under the enumerated-offenses clause—reducing litigation on identical objections.
Influence on Plea Bargaining: Defense attorneys must advise Ohio defendants that an aggravated-robbery plea may later trigger federal career-offender status.
Broader Sentencing Consistency: By reaffirming the use of Shepard documents and a precise modified approach, Mandela promotes uniformity across circuits analyzing similarly structured state statutes.
Potential Ripple Effects:
- Other states with “weapon-display” robbery statutes may now be analogized to extortion.
- The opinion may inform Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and § 924(c) litigation, where the enumerated-offenses methodology is similar.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical Approach: Courts ignore the actual facts of a prior crime and instead compare the legal elements on paper to a generic federal definition.
Divisible Statute: A law that lists multiple, alternative elements (like different weapons or predicate crimes). Courts may look at limited records to identify which alternative formed the basis of the conviction.
Shepard Documents: Official records (indictment, plea transcript, jury instructions) the Supreme Court allows courts to consult when using the modified categorical approach.
Enumerated-Offenses Clause: Part of § 4B1.2 that automatically treats certain listed crimes (e.g., burglary, arson, extortion) as crimes of violence without needing to show “use of force.”
Generic Offense: A “common-denominator” definition distilled from state laws and the Model Penal Code, used to standardize comparisons.
Career-Offender Enhancement: A Guidelines provision that markedly increases sentencing ranges for defendants 18+ with two prior qualifying violent or drug felonies.

Conclusion

United States v. Mandela cements the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation that Ohio aggravated robbery under § 2911.01(A)(1)—when the underlying theft is § 2913.02—fits squarely within the Guidelines’ definition of “extortion.” The decision underscores the judiciary’s commitment to a rigorous, element-focused methodology while offering concrete instruction for future sentencing proceedings. Practitioners should note the precedent’s immediate effect on Ohio defendants and its persuasive logic for analogous statutes nationwide.