Sixth Circuit Clarifies: Complete Denial of Union Intervention Is Immediately Appealable; Police Union May Intervene as of Right at the Liability Stage When Monell Claims Target CBA-Rooted Policies

Introduction

In Estate of Donovan L. Lewis v. City of Columbus, Ohio, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed whether a police union—the Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge #9 (FOP)—may intervene as of right in a federal civil-rights action alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Estate alleges that the Columbus Division of Police (CPD) maintains a policy or custom of racially discriminatory policing and excessive force that culminated in the fatal shooting of Donovan Lewis and seeks damages and structural injunctive relief. Central to the Estate’s theory are CPD policies and practices that the City collectively bargained with the FOP and embedded in the labor contract (the CBA).

The district court denied FOP’s motion to intervene—both as of right and permissively—concluding the union had at most a limited interest in any remedial phase, not in the liability phase. It invited FOP to refile if the case reached injunctive relief or settlement talks. FOP appealed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the denial was immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine and that FOP met all four elements for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2).

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine, emphasizing that a complete denial of intervention—even “without prejudice” and paired with an invitation to refile later—is immediately appealable when it effectively excludes the movant from the case and is otherwise conclusive, separate from the merits, and unreviewable later. On the merits, the court held that:

• Substantial legal interest: FOP has a direct, substantial, and protectable interest in the liability phase because the Estate’s Monell theory challenges policies rooted in and shaped by the CBA that FOP negotiated and must defend as the exclusive representative of approximately 1,800 CPD officers.
• Impairment absent intervention: Excluding FOP from the liability phase would practically disadvantage the union by foreclosing its ability to shape the factual record and legal findings that will frame any equitable relief and affect CBA terms.
• Inadequacy of representation: Although the City and FOP share a general objective of defeating liability, FOP showed the City may not adequately represent the union’s interests—particularly where the City has historically opposed, and publicly criticized, key CBA provisions the Estate targets.

Construing Rule 24 broadly, the Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of intervention as of right and did not reach permissive intervention.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court’s jurisdictional and merits rulings rest on a well-developed line of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit authority, complemented by persuasive sister-circuit decisions in police union contexts.

• Finality and the collateral-order doctrine:
  • Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59 (2018) and In re Fifth Third Early Access Cash Advance Litigation, 925 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2019): Reaffirm the “final decision” standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
  • Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) and Fox v. Saginaw County, 35 F.4th 1042 (6th Cir. 2022): Set the three-prong collateral-order test (conclusiveness, separateness, and effective unreviewability).
  • Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987): Recognizes immediate review of orders that bar a movant from becoming a party “in any respect,” but denies review when permissive intervention has already been granted.
  • Purnell v. Akron, 925 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1991) and Sales v. Marshall, 873 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1989): Sixth Circuit exercises collateral-order jurisdiction to review complete denials of intervention.
  • Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Huebsch, 969 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2020): Persuasively explains that an invitation to refile “if circumstances change” does not defeat immediate appealability; the denial still “freezes” the proposed intervenor out of the case.
• Rule 24(a)(2) intervention of right:
  • Purnell and Grainger v. Ottawa County, 90 F.4th 507 (6th Cir. 2024): In the Sixth Circuit, courts construe the intervention right “broadly” in favor of would-be intervenors; if the four elements are met, intervention is mandatory.
  • Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1989) and Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2007): Define the need for a “direct and substantial” interest, while emphasizing the Sixth Circuit’s expansive approach.
  • Chapman v. Tristar Products, Inc., 940 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2019): The Rule 24(a)(2) “interest” threshold is lower than Article III standing’s injury-in-fact requirement.
  • Providence Baptist Church v. Hillandale Committee, Ltd., 425 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2005) and Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971): A “real party in interest” with a “significantly protectable interest” may intervene, particularly when interests cannot be vindicated elsewhere in due course.
  • Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir. 1997): An organization that was a “vital participant” in producing the challenged legal framework, and whose members are directly regulated by it, has a substantial interest and may overcome adequacy by showing the existing party may not make all of its arguments.
  • Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass’n v. Township of Peninsula, 41 F.4th 767 (6th Cir. 2022): Confirms that an association’s concrete member impacts (not merely ideological interests) satisfy both the substantial-interest and impairment prongs; explains the minimal showing required to demonstrate possible inadequacy of representation.
• Police-union intervention in Monell-style suits (persuasive authority):
  • Payne v. City of New York, 27 F.4th 792 (2d Cir. 2022): A police union’s interests may be impaired at the merits stage where a court could require changes to department policies.
  • United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002): Police union had a protectable interest at the merits stage because the complaint sought injunctive relief against member officers and alleged unconstitutional officer conduct.
• Local district court practice (persuasive in context):
  • Alsaada v. City of Columbus, 2021 WL 1720999 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2021); Shreve v. Franklin County, 2011 WL 250407 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 25, 2011); United States v. City of Columbus, No. 2:99-cv-1097 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2000): District courts in the Southern District of Ohio have repeatedly allowed FOP intervention where litigation implicated CBA terms and union members’ rights.
  • United States v. City of Detroit, 712 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2013): Recognizes that district courts may tailor limited intervention to future remedial proceedings—useful as a contrast to the complete denial here.

Legal Reasoning

1) Jurisdiction: Why this denial was immediately appealable

The court rejected jurisdiction under § 1291’s “final decision” rule but accepted jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. The district court’s order conclusively denied intervention “in all respects” and addressed issues separate from the merits (who can participate). It would be effectively unreviewable later because the court’s invitation to refile at the remedial phase did not guarantee future participation. The mere “without prejudice” label and an open-ended offer to entertain another motion do not forestall immediate appellate review. This aligns with Stringfellow (no appeal when permissive intervention has already been granted), Purnell and Sales (immediate appeals of complete denials), and the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Driftless Area.

2) Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2)

Applying de novo review (timeliness uncontested), the Sixth Circuit found FOP met all four elements.

• Substantial legal interest:
  • The Estate’s Monell claim challenges CPD policies and customs that are intertwined with the CBA provisions FOP negotiated and must defend under Ohio’s collective-bargaining regime (ORC §§ 4117.04, 4117.05, 4117.08).
  • The complaint specifically targets or implicates the investigative time limit (90 days), just-cause discipline and terminations, indemnification, officer safety measures, pension and retirement protections, and “past practices” clauses—bedrock CBA terms that affect members’ rights, wages, and working conditions.
  • Exhibit A’s proposed reforms (e.g., a points-based discipline system, internal whistleblower hotline, pension forfeiture upon retiring in bad standing, early hospital visitation for families) may conflict with or require renegotiation of the CBA framework.
  • Like the organizations in Miller and Wineries, and the police unions in Payne and City of Los Angeles, FOP is a “vital participant” in the policy framework at issue and its members are directly regulated by both existing policies and any court-ordered changes.
  • The court emphasized that the “substantial legal interest” threshold is lower than Article III standing and is construed broadly in this circuit.
• Impairment if intervention is denied:
  • The burden is “minimal.” Excluding FOP from the merits phase would place it at a practical disadvantage: it could not develop the factual record, offer experts, or make legal arguments necessary to defend CBA-rooted policies before the court reaches findings that will guide any injunction.
  • Because more than half of the proposed reforms address mandatory bargaining topics, a merits judgment could directly weaken or disrupt negotiated terms without FOP’s input.
• Inadequacy of representation by existing parties:
  • Although the City and FOP share the general objective of defeating Monell liability, FOP carried its “minimal” burden to show the City “may” not adequately represent FOP’s distinct interests.
  • The City has historically sought to remove or dilute CBA provisions central to the union’s position (e.g., the 90-day investigative limit; the just-cause termination standard). Public statements by City officials and correspondence to the DOJ, as alleged, reflect tension with CPD leadership (comprised of FOP members) and criticism of certain CBA terms.
  • The City may also pursue settlement options that trade away union-favored provisions. The City did not even respond to the intervention motion. As in Miller, a different litigation strategy pathway suffices to show possible inadequacy.

Impact and Significance

This decision is likely to shape § 1983 municipal liability litigation—and public-sector reform litigation more broadly—across the Sixth Circuit.

• Immediate appealability clarified: District courts’ “without prejudice” denials that wholly exclude a movant from the case are immediately appealable collateral orders. Courts cannot insulate such denials from review merely by inviting a later motion.
• Union participation at the liability stage: When plaintiffs’ Monell theories challenge policies rooted in collective-bargaining agreements, public-sector unions will often be able to show a substantial legal interest at the merits stage—not just in the remedy phase. This aligns the Sixth Circuit with the Second and Ninth Circuits in police-union contexts.
• Discovery and record effects: Unions will have standing to take discovery, present evidence, and make arguments that directly shape the liability findings and thus the scope of any injunctive relief. Expect more complex, multi-party proceedings in high-profile civil-rights cases.
• Collective bargaining implications: Judicial scrutiny of municipal policies will proceed with the union at the table, protecting labor interests related to discipline, investigations, assignments, and benefits. This should promote more durable remedies by integrating CBA realities into any structural relief.
• Settlement dynamics: With unions as parties, settlement negotiations will need to account for CBA constraints and union priorities, potentially yielding more comprehensive, implementable reforms—or highlighting irreconcilable policy-labor tensions earlier.
• Beyond policing: The Rule 24 framework here logically extends to other public-sector unions (e.g., corrections, fire, education) whenever plaintiffs’ claims or proposed injunctions materially affect CBA-governed terms and conditions of employment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Collateral-order doctrine: A narrow exception to the usual rule that only final judgments are appealable. It allows immediate appeals of orders that conclusively resolve an important question separate from the merits and would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment. A complete denial of intervention fits this when nothing assures future participation.
• Intervention as of right (Rule 24(a)(2)): A nonparty must be allowed to join a case if it moves timely and shows four things:
  • A substantial legal interest in the case’s subject.
  • That interest may be impaired if intervention is denied.
  • Existing parties may not adequately represent that interest.
  • (Timeliness, which was not at issue here.)
  In the Sixth Circuit, these elements are construed broadly in favor of intervention.
• Monell liability: Municipalities can be liable under § 1983 when an official policy, widespread custom, or failure to train/discipline causes a constitutional violation. Plaintiffs often seek structural reforms to prevent recurrence.
• Collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) and “exclusive representative” status: Under Ohio law, the union exclusively represents the bargaining unit in mandatory subjects like discipline, investigations, assignments, promotions, and benefits. Court-ordered reforms affecting these areas can implicate or conflict with the CBA.
• Adequacy of representation: If a party and the would-be intervenor share a general objective, courts presume adequate representation—but that presumption is easily overcome by showing the party may not make all the intervenor’s arguments, has divergent interests, or might settle away key protections.

Practical Guidance

• For plaintiffs: When crafting Monell complaints and proposed injunctions, anticipate union intervention where CBAs are implicated. Consider early engagement with unions to avoid later conflicts and to shape implementable reforms.
• For municipalities: If you historically opposed certain CBA provisions, recognize that those positions can evidence inadequate representation under Rule 24. Plan for unions as active litigants at the merits stage.
• For unions: Document the nexus between challenged policies and specific CBA provisions; identify concrete member impacts (discipline, safety, benefits); and highlight past bargaining history to establish substantial interest and inadequacy.
• For district courts: Where relief realistically affects CBA-governed terms, expect that denying intervention entirely is disfavored. Courts retain case-management authority and may tailor intervention scope and participation, but categorical exclusion is vulnerable to reversal.

What the Decision Does Not Do

• It does not decide the Estate’s underlying § 1983 claims or any Monell liability.
• It does not address permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), because intervention as of right sufficed.
• It does not resolve timeliness (not contested).
• It does not specify participation limits; standard case-management tools remain available to the district court.

Conclusion

Estate of Donovan L. Lewis v. City of Columbus, Ohio establishes two important principles in the Sixth Circuit. First, a district court’s complete denial of intervention is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, even when the court labels the denial “without prejudice” and invites a later motion. Second, public-sector unions—here, a police union—have a substantive right to intervene at the liability stage of Monell litigation when the claims and proposed remedies materially target policies rooted in or shaped by a collective bargaining agreement.

The ruling harmonizes Sixth Circuit doctrine with persuasive authority from the Second and Ninth Circuits and reinforces this circuit’s broad construction of Rule 24. Going forward, where constitutional litigation implicates CBA-governed policies, unions will likely be indispensable participants from the outset—shaping discovery, liability findings, and any structural reforms. The decision promises more comprehensive adjudication of civil-rights disputes that intersect with labor rights, while acknowledging the practical necessity of including the exclusive bargaining representative when court-ordered relief may reconfigure the workplace architecture its members rely upon.