Sixth Circuit Clarifies Racial Harassment: “Monkey” and “Monkey Ass” Are Race-Specific Slurs; Comparator Race May Be Proven by Perception; Workload Disparities May Support a Hostile Work Environment

Introduction

In Thomas Smith v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (per Judge Stranch, with Judge Cole concurring and Judge Readler concurring in part and in the judgment) reversed summary judgment for the employer on plaintiffs’ Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Tennessee Human Rights Act hostile work environment claims. The court held that supervisors’ use of the terms “monkey” and “monkey ass” toward African American drivers constitutes evidence of race-based harassment; that plaintiffs’ personal perception can establish the race of comparators at summary judgment; and that workload and assignment disparities—traditionally framed as “discrete” employment decisions—may be considered as part of the totality of circumstances supporting a hostile work environment.

The case arises from allegations by two African American truck drivers at P.A.M. Transport’s Whites Creek (Nashville) facility that their supervisors—driver manager Jermaine Davis (African American) and operations manager Jordan Claytor (white)—repeatedly used racially derogatory language (“monkey,” “monkey ass”), subjected them to demeaning and threatening treatment not imposed on white drivers, and assigned them longer routes, more loads, and damaged trucks without corresponding pay or time off. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, concluding that the record did not show race-based harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a triable claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed.

This published decision offers important doctrinal clarifications on: (1) the racial character of “monkey”-based epithets in the workplace; (2) evidentiary standards for proving comparator race through personal perception at summary judgment; (3) the inclusion of workload disparities in the hostile environment calculus; and (4) the contours of employer vicarious liability and the Faragher/Ellerth defense in supervisor-harassment cases.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that:

• Racial harassment can be shown by direct testimony that supervisors called African American employees “monkey” and “monkey ass.” Given the long-standing racist history of “monkey” when directed at African Americans, those terms permit a reasonable inference of race-based harassment and satisfy the second and third elements of a hostile environment claim at summary judgment. The addition of “ass” does not dilute the racial character of “monkey.”
• Same-race harassment is cognizable under Title VII and related statutes; the fact that one supervisor was African American does not neutralize the racist nature of the slurs.
• Plaintiffs’ personal perception is sufficient to identify comparator race at summary judgment under Federal Rule of Evidence 602; courts should not impose extra-statutory requirements such as self-identification or genetic evidence to prove comparator identity.
• Facially neutral, verbally abusive conduct (shouting, cursing, threats), when contextualized by explicit racial slurs, can be treated as racially motivated and counted toward the hostile environment.
• Employment-related burdens (longer routes, more loads, damaged trucks, lack of holiday/vacation differentials) may be considered as “ancillary impacts” contributing to a hostile environment when they add to the climate of hostility, consistent with McNeal v. City of Blue Ash.
• Considering the totality of circumstances—including repeated racial slurs by supervisors, hostile tone and threats, and comparative workloads—a reasonable jury could find the environment severe or pervasive.
• Because the alleged harassers were supervisors, P.A.M. Transport is vicariously liable unless it proves the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. On this record, P.A.M. Transport did not meet its burden at summary judgment: having a written policy alone is insufficient, and the employer offered no evidence of an effective prevention/correction program or prompt remedial action.

The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion weaves a robust tapestry of Supreme Court, Sixth Circuit, and sister-circuit authority:

• Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998): The court relies on Oncale’s core teaching that “sex-specific and derogatory terms” may create an inference of discrimination based on context, and rejects the district court’s misreading of Sixth Circuit language as imposing a “direct evidence” requirement. The Sixth Circuit extends Oncale’s logic to race: slurs need not be overtly racial in isolation if context and usage generate an inference of race-based harassment.
• Williams v. CSX Transportation Co., 643 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2011): The district court leaned on Williams, but the Sixth Circuit distinguishes it. In Williams, “monkey” comments were not directed at the plaintiff and occurred in a limited, isolated context. Here the slurs were directed repeatedly at the plaintiffs by their supervisors, a materially more severe setting.
• Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2006): Supports recognizing “monkey”-related labeling as racially harassing and confirms that facially neutral abuse can be evidence of discriminatory animus when coupled with overt slurs.
• Sister-circuit alignment on “monkey” as an odious racial epithet:
  • Banks v. General Motors, 81 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2023);
  • Kengerski v. Harper, 6 F.4th 531 (3d Cir. 2021);
  • Green v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 459 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006);
  • Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012).
  These cases underline the nationwide understanding that “monkey” and derivatives are racially charged when directed at African Americans.
• Severity/pervasiveness and single-incident cases:
  • Reed v. Procter & Gamble, 556 F. App’x 421 (6th Cir. 2014) (recognizing extraordinary single incidents can be severe);
  • Scaife v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 49 F.4th 1109 (7th Cir. 2022) (agreeing that one egregious slur can suffice in context);
  • Woods v. Cantrell, 29 F.4th 284 (5th Cir. 2022) (single use of an egregious slur by a supervisor sufficient to state a hostile environment claim).
• Comparator and evidentiary standards:
  • Logan v. Denny’s, 259 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2001): Plaintiff testimony comparing treatment to white coworkers can defeat summary judgment.
  • Fed. R. Evid. 602 and United States v. Hickey, 917 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1990): Low bar for personal-knowledge testimony; perception-based testimony is admissible.
  • Davis v. Gallagher, 951 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2020): Self-serving testimony may suffice absent demonstrable falsity or implausibility.
  • Wyatt v. Nissan North America, 999 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 2021): Anticipated admissibility at trial permits considering certain statements at summary judgment.
• Counting “discrete acts” toward hostile environment:
  • McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 117 F.4th 887 (6th Cir. 2024): Discrete employment decisions may contribute “ancillary impacts” to a hostile environment.
  • Schlosser v. VRHabilis, LLC, 113 F.4th 674 (6th Cir. 2024): Comparator evidence can reasonably tie facially neutral conduct to discriminatory animus.
• Employer liability and affirmative defense:
  • Barrett v. Whirlpool, 556 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2009): Vicarious liability for supervisors; Faragher/Ellerth defense elements.
  • Clark v. UPS, 400 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2005): A written policy alone is insufficient; policy must be reasonable and effective in practice with training and prompt corrective action.
• Intraclass (same-race) harassment:
  • EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, 266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001): Title VII can be violated by members of the same protected class as the victim.
  • Johnson v. Advocate Health, 892 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2018): Similar recognition and caution that members of a protected class may participate in discrimination.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied the standard five-part test for a racially hostile work environment under Title VII (and identically under § 1981 and THRA): membership in a protected class; unwelcome harassment; harassment based on race; harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive; and employer liability.

1) Unwelcome Harassment And Race-Based Connection

The plaintiffs’ testimony that supervisors called them “monkey” and “monkey ass,” combined with evidence that non-African American drivers were not treated comparably, was sufficient to create a triable question on whether harassment occurred and was based on race. Importantly, the court clarified:

• “Monkey” has a longstanding racist valence when directed at African Americans; courts across circuits have treated it as an odious epithet. The racial inference is obvious in context.
• Adding “ass” does not sanitize the slur. “Monkey” and derivative terms, including “monkey ass,” are functionally equivalent for this purpose.
• Same-race harassment is actionable; a harasser’s membership in the same protected class does not negate the racial character of the slur or the claim.
• The district court erred in demanding “direct evidence” that is racism-proof on its face; Oncale permits reliance on contextual inferences drawn from usage and surrounding facts.
• Comparator race can be established through plaintiffs’ personal perception under Rule 602; the court rejected extra-legal demands for self-identification or genetic evidence. The district court’s “African American vs. Black vs. white” taxonomy was legally unsupported and improperly heightened plaintiffs’ burden.

2) Severe or Pervasive—Totality of the Circumstances

Evaluating the environment “as a whole,” the court considered:

• Repeated, direct use of racially degrading slurs (“monkey,” “monkey ass”) by supervisors. Even a single, egregious slur may be enough in some contexts; here, the testimony supported multiple uses over time, including threats (“get your monkey ass out there and do the job or I’m going to write you up”).
• Facially neutral but hostile verbal treatment (screaming, cursing, threats), which a jury could find racially motivated when viewed alongside explicit slurs.
• Comparative workload and assignment burdens (longer hours, lengthier routes, damaged trucks) that contributed to an ongoing climate of anxiety, fatigue, and demoralization. Under McNeal, such discrete decisions can count as ancillary impacts in hostile environment analysis.

From this totality, a reasonable jury could find conduct that was humiliating, threatening, and interfering with work, satisfying the “severe or pervasive” requirement.

3) Employer Liability and the Faragher/Ellerth Defense

Because the alleged harassers were supervisors, P.A.M. Transport is vicariously liable unless it establishes the two-part affirmative defense: reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassment, and unreasonable failure by the employee to use preventive/corrective opportunities. The court found:

• P.A.M. Transport did not meet its burden on the first element at summary judgment. A written policy alone does not suffice; the employer offered no evidence of training, supervisory requirements, or effective practice.
• There was no evidence of prompt corrective action, despite plaintiffs’ reports to driver liaisons and managers.
• Although plaintiffs referenced constructive discharge and termination, the court did not rule out the defense categorically on that basis due to abandonment of other claims; the defense fails here because the employer did not prove “reasonable care” on this record.

Impact

1) Substantive Clarification on Racial Epithets

The Sixth Circuit now squarely aligns with other circuits in recognizing that “monkey” and derivative terms, including “monkey ass,” are racially derogatory when directed at African Americans. This reduces room for summary judgment arguments that such terms are ambiguous or non-racial in workplace contexts.

2) Comparator Proof at Summary Judgment

The court rejects heightened, extra-statutory demands for proving comparator race. Plaintiffs may rely on personal perception and experience under Rule 602. This lodestar will likely make summary judgment less attainable for defendants where plaintiffs’ perception-based testimony is plausible and unrefuted by clear contrary evidence.

3) Totality Approach Embraces Workload/Assignment Disparities

Building on McNeal, courts in the Sixth Circuit may consider “discrete” workload and assignment disparities as part of the hostile environment’s “ancillary impacts,” expanding the evidentiary landscape beyond words alone and strengthening plaintiffs’ ability to show pervasive, dignity-harming conditions.

4) Vicarious Liability and Policy Effectiveness

Employers cannot rely solely on having a written EEO/harassment policy. They should be prepared to prove that the policy is reasonable and effective in practice, with supervisor training, complaint channels, and documented prompt corrective action. Failure to do so will undercut the Faragher/Ellerth defense at summary judgment.

5) Intraclass Harassment

The opinion reinforces that same-race harassment is fully cognizable. Employers should train across all levels that harassment based on protected traits is prohibited regardless of the harasser’s identity, and investigators should not discount complaints because the harasser shares the complainant’s race.

6) Judicial Use of Non-legal Sources

The majority’s footnote criticizing reliance on ChatGPT and user-edited dictionaries underscores a cautionary principle: courts should ground analysis in legal authorities and reliable evidence, not crowd-sourced or AI-generated definitions, particularly for racially charged language.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Race-specific and derogatory terms: A term need not explicitly reference race to be racially derogatory; context matters. “Monkey,” when directed at an African American, carries a well-documented racist history. Derivatives like “monkey ass” inherit that character.
• Direct versus circumstantial evidence: There is no rigid “direct evidence” requirement in hostile environment claims. Words and context that reasonably support an inference of racial motive suffice at summary judgment.
• Severe or pervasive: The test asks whether the environment, assessed as a whole, would be objectively hostile or abusive to a reasonable person and was subjectively perceived as such. Courts consider frequency, severity, whether conduct is humiliating or threatening, and whether it interferes with work.
• Totality of circumstances: Courts look across all conduct—slurs, tone, threats, scheduling, assignments—rather than isolating incidents. Facially neutral abuse can be deemed discriminatory when contextualized by explicit slurs.
• Comparator evidence: At summary judgment, a plaintiff’s perception-based testimony about coworkers’ race and treatment is generally admissible and may suffice to show disparate treatment unless clearly refuted.
• Vicarious liability for supervisors: Employers are strictly liable for supervisor harassment unless they prove they exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment and the employee unreasonably failed to use corrective opportunities. A paper policy is not enough; training, enforcement, and prompt action matter.
• Intraclass harassment: Title VII prohibits harassment even when the harasser and victim share the same protected characteristic (e.g., both are African American).
• Ancillary impacts of discrete acts: Workload, route assignments, and similar decisions can contribute to the “climate of hostility,” even if those acts might also be actionable as discrete discrimination claims.

The Concurrence

Judge Readler agreed that the “monkey” epithet, coupled with a hostile, threatening tone, sufficed to defeat summary judgment on the hostile environment claim. He would not have reached the comparator-based theory and expressed skepticism that the comparator evidence met the “significantly probative” threshold. The concurrence’s discussion highlighted the sensitivity of assessing intent and context, including in intraclass (same-race) harassment, and raised questions about whether “monkey ass” always carries a racial connotation. The majority, in footnotes, rejected reliance on AI-generated or crowd-sourced definitions and reiterated that black-letter law and EEOC guidance control the intraclass harassment analysis.

Practical Takeaways

• Words matter: “Monkey” and derivative terms directed at African Americans are presumptively racial in context and will almost always defeat defense claims of ambiguity at summary judgment.
• Train supervisors: Because supervisor usage magnifies severity and triggers vicarious liability, targeted training, monitoring, and swift correction are essential.
• Policies must work in practice: Maintain robust anti-harassment policies, conduct regular training, require and document supervisor compliance, and ensure prompt, well-documented responses to complaints.
• Document assignments and rationale: If workloads and routes are allocated based on neutral criteria, keep contemporaneous records; otherwise, such disparities can support a hostile environment claim.
• Do not discount same-race allegations: Investigate intraclass harassment with the same rigor as any other complaint.
• Summary judgment posture: Plaintiffs’ perception-based testimony can carry the day; defendants should be prepared with concrete, admissible records that clearly rebut plaintiffs’ accounts. Disputes about tone, words, and assignment patterns are often for the jury.

Conclusion

Smith v. P.A.M. Transport is a significant Sixth Circuit decision clarifying several recurring issues in hostile work environment litigation. First, the court cements the proposition that “monkey” and derivative epithets like “monkey ass,” when directed at African Americans, are race-specific slurs that readily support an inference of discriminatory harassment. Second, it restores a sensible evidentiary approach to comparator identity by recognizing the sufficiency of perception-based testimony at summary judgment. Third, it confirms that workload and assignment disparities may contribute to the hostile environment calculus under a totality-of-circumstances analysis. Finally, it reemphasizes the rigor of the employer’s burden to prove an effective anti-harassment program when invoking the Faragher/Ellerth defense in supervisor-harassment cases.

Collectively, these holdings reduce the likelihood of premature dismissal of harassment claims hinging on racially loaded language and contextual disparate treatment. They also signal to employers the need for meaningful, enforced policies, supervisor training, and prompt corrective action. As a published decision, Smith will shape litigation and compliance practices across the Sixth Circuit and contribute to the continued national consensus on how courts evaluate racially charged workplace speech and hostile environment claims.