Sixth Circuit Clarifies Liberty-Deprivation for Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution: No Pretrial Restraints, No Seizure; Police Press Releases That Mirror Charging Documents Are Absolutely Privileged Under Kentucky Law

Introduction

In Reuben Jelani Adams v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025), a published opinion authored by Judge Julia Smith Gibbons and joined by Judges Batchelder and Bloomekatz, the court addresses a high-profile controversy involving five Black University of Kentucky football players who alleged racial harassment and violence at a fraternity party, followed by what they say were false criminal charges brought by a Lexington police detective.

After a grand jury returned a no true bill, the players sued city officials and the municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Kentucky state law. The district court dismissed the federal claims and most state claims, leaving only a state malicious-prosecution claim against the charging detective; it then declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the rest. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirms the dismissals, using the case to clarify two significant points:

What counts as a “deprivation of liberty” (i.e., a pretrial “seizure” of the person) for Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution and fabrication-of-evidence claims in the Sixth Circuit; and
How Kentucky’s absolute judicial-statement privilege applies to police press releases that merely repeat the content of charging documents.

The key issues were whether the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment liberty deprivation apart from the harms of being investigated and charged, and whether their state-law defamation and malicious-prosecution claims against a police sergeant and the police chief could proceed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirms dismissal of the federal § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence because the plaintiffs failed to plead a qualifying deprivation of liberty under the Fourth Amendment. The court holds that:

Mere initiation of criminal charges, the threat of imprisonment, being summoned for arraignment or to testify before a grand jury, temporary seizure of a phone for evidence, participation in university discipline proceedings, reputational or educational/athletic harms, and emotional distress do not collectively or individually constitute a Fourth Amendment “seizure” or deprivation of liberty.
Without such a deprivation, related § 1983 theories—supervisory liability, failure to intervene, and municipal (Monell) liability—necessarily fail for want of an underlying constitutional violation.

On the state claims, the court further holds:

Defamation claims fail because Kentucky’s absolute judicial-statements privilege covers a police press release that merely republishes allegations contained in charging documents.
Malicious prosecution under Kentucky law fails as to the sergeant and police chief because the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that either “initiated, continued, or procured” the criminal proceeding.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court builds on a line of Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court authorities that define the elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim and, critically, the type of liberty deprivation that can support it:

Sykes v. Anderson (6th Cir. 2010) and Wright v. City of Euclid (6th Cir. 2020): Establish the elements of a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim, including the requirement that the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty “as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Wright emphasizes that a summons to appear at court does not suffice.
Noonan v. County of Oakland (6th Cir. 2017) and Cummin v. North (6th Cir. 2018): Clarify that reputational harm, litigation expense, and property withholding do not amount to a liberty deprivation; merely being required to attend proceedings is insufficient.
Miller v. Maddox (6th Cir. 2017): Contrasts cases where plaintiffs did experience pretrial restraints—such as arrest, incarceration, pretrial program obligations, potential bond, required court appearances, and check-ins—showing what does qualify.
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati (6th Cir. 2002): Suggests that restrictions designed to compel court appearance (posting bond, court hearing obligations, pretrial services) are the kind of restraints that may count; mere curtailment of travel alone was not enough.
Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024): The Supreme Court characterized Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution as fundamentally about a seizure of the person, reinforcing that the claim is anchored to pretrial personal liberty restraints.
Albright v. Oliver (1994): The plurality rejected substantive due process as the basis for pretrial detention claims; Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence suggested a “continuing seizure” theory. The Sixth Circuit reiterates it has not adopted the concurrence to treat mere court attendance as a seizure (see Wright, Miller, Rapp).
Manuel v. City of Joliet (2017) and Baker v. McCollan (1979): Counsel that § 1983 claims must be grounded in a specific constitutional right and that mere wrongdoing without a constitutional deprivation is not cognizable.
McDonough v. Smith (2019) and Sixth Circuit applications (e.g., Tanner v. Walters, 2024; Friskey v. Bracke, 2020): Fabrication-of-evidence claims must tie the fabrication to a constitutionally cognizable harm; for Fourth Amendment claims, that is a pretrial deprivation of liberty.

On Kentucky defamation privilege, the court relies on:

Maggard v. Kinney (Ky. 2019) and Heavrin v. Nelson (6th Cir. 2004): Statements made in judicial proceedings that are material and pertinent are absolutely privileged even if false or malicious.
In re Lowenbraun (6th Cir. 2006) and Ohnemus v. Thompson (6th Cir. 2014): Extend judicial-statement privilege to republications that mirror the content of protected judicial filings.
O’Connell v. Thieneman (Ky. App. 2020) and Yanero v. Davis (Ky. 2001): Discuss qualified privilege and malice; relevant only if the absolute privilege does not apply.

On Kentucky malicious prosecution, the court applies:

Martin v. O’Daniel (Ky. 2016): Elements include that the defendant initiated, continued, or procured the proceeding.
Johnson v. St. Claire Medical Center (Ky. App. 2003): “Initiation” typically occurs with arrest, indictment, or issuance of warrant/summons.
Hyche v. Molett (Ky. App. 2018): Even interviewing witnesses, preparing reports, participating in arrest, and reporting the arrest may not amount to initiating, continuing, or procuring the prosecution.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three concentric steps.

1) No Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty

The plaintiffs alleged seven categories of harm: threat of imprisonment; being arraigned and compelled to testify before a grand jury; seizure of personal property and information (a phone); student disciplinary proceedings; loss of educational and athletic opportunities; reputational harm; and emotional distress.

The court holds none of these suffice to plead a “deprivation of liberty” under the Fourth Amendment as the Sixth Circuit understands it:

Charges and threat of imprisonment: The possibility of imprisonment if convicted does not itself create a pretrial seizure (Sykes; Wright).
Arraignment and grand jury testimony: Being summoned to court—even for an arraignment or to testify—does not rise to a constitutional deprivation without more (Wright; Noonan; Cummin).
Property seizure: Temporary seizure of a phone for evidence is not a liberty deprivation; the “liberty” inquiry focuses on restrictions on personal freedom of movement (Noonan).
University discipline: Participation in student misconduct proceedings is not a Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty (Wright).
Reputational and professional harm: These are not Fourth Amendment liberty deprivations. Reputation-based claims, if cognizable at all, arise under Fourteenth Amendment “stigma-plus” doctrine (Paul v. Davis), not under the Fourth (Noonan).
Emotional distress: Not a liberty deprivation under the Fourth Amendment.

By contrast, cases finding a deprivation involve pretrial restraints designed to ensure appearance, such as arrest or incarceration, bail/bond conditions, travel restrictions, mandatory check-ins, pretrial services obligations, or program requirements (Miller; Johnson). None of those were present here: the plaintiffs were not arrested, incarcerated, subject to bond or travel limits, or to pretrial supervision; they were not even indicted.

The plaintiffs urged the “continuing seizure” theory suggested by Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Albright v. Oliver, under which pretrial obligations to appear could be treated as a form of seizure. The Sixth Circuit reiterates that it has not adopted that theory in the absence of actual pretrial restraints, and out-of-circuit cases applying it have done so only where the plaintiff faced concrete conditions (e.g., bail, travel restrictions), not mere summonses (Schneyder; Murphy). The court therefore rejects reliance on Albright’s concurrence here.

2) Fabrication-of-evidence claim fails for the same reason

The court reiterates that “fabrication” is not a constitutional violation in itself; it must be tied to a deprivation of a specific right. For a Fourth Amendment theory, the fabrication must cause a pretrial deprivation of liberty. Without a qualifying seizure, the fabrication claim fails, regardless of the seriousness of the wrongdoing (Manuel; McDonough; Tanner; Friskey).

The plaintiffs cited Jackson v. City of Cleveland for a Fourteenth Amendment due process theory, but that addresses the knowing use of fabricated evidence likely to affect the jury’s decision—i.e., a trial-based fair-trial claim—not a Fourth Amendment pretrial seizure. Because the plaintiffs proceeded under the Fourth Amendment and alleged no qualifying seizure, the court affirms dismissal.

3) Derivative § 1983 theories necessarily fail

With no underlying constitutional violation, the supervisory-liability, failure-to-intervene, and Monell claims fail as a matter of law (McQueen; Bonner-Turner; Robertson).

4) State defamation barred by absolute privilege

Kentucky recognizes an absolute privilege for material, pertinent, and relevant statements made in judicial proceedings, even if false or malicious (Maggard; Heavrin). Under Sixth Circuit and Kentucky authority, that absolute privilege extends to a police press release that merely republishes the allegations in charging documents (In re Lowenbraun; Ohnemus).

Here, the complaint alleged the sergeant’s press release simply repeated the charges. Because those underlying allegations were themselves privileged in the charging documents, repeating them in a press release remains absolutely privileged. Had the press release gone beyond the charging documents, a qualified privilege (potentially overcome by malice) might apply—but the complaint did not identify any unprivileged statements beyond those already in the charging documents.

5) Kentucky malicious prosecution fails as to the sergeant and chief

Kentucky malicious prosecution requires that the defendant initiated, continued, or procured the proceeding (Martin). The plaintiffs attributed the charging decisions and presentations to the grand jury to Detective Vinlove; as to Sergeant Gordon and Chief Weathers, the allegations were either conclusory or complained of noncausal conduct (e.g., ignoring exculpatory evidence, issuing a press release).

Kentucky courts set a high bar for “initiate, continue, or procure.” Even interviewing witnesses, preparing a report, participating in an arrest, and reporting the arrest to an employer do not suffice (Hyche). “Procurement” means being the proximate and efficient cause of setting the law in motion. The plaintiffs alleged neither direction nor encouragement of the detective, nor provision of false information. Accordingly, the state malicious-prosecution claim was properly dismissed as to Gordon and Weathers.

Impact

This opinion has several practical and doctrinal consequences in the Sixth Circuit:

Sharper line on Fourth Amendment “seizure” in malicious prosecution: Plaintiffs must plead concrete, pretrial restraints on liberty—arrest, incarceration, bail/bond conditions, travel limits, pretrial check-ins, or similar—to state a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim. Summonses, arraignment attendance, and grand-jury testimony alone do not suffice.
Fabrication-of-evidence claims under the Fourth rise or fall with the same seizure requirement: Mere fabrication, without a resulting qualifying restraint on liberty, does not state a Fourth Amendment claim.
Police communications risk management in Kentucky: Agencies that limit press releases to the content of filed charging documents enjoy absolute privilege against defamation. Expanding beyond the four corners of charging papers risks losing the absolute shield and moving into qualified-privilege territory where malice can be litigated.
Pleading strategy in mixed federal–state cases: Where there is no arrest or pretrial conditions, federal malicious-prosecution and Fourth-based fabrication claims will likely fail; plaintiffs may consider (as appropriate) state torts like malicious prosecution against the actual charging officer, or—if the case proceeds to trial—the potential for Fourteenth Amendment fair-trial claims. Absent a trial, Jackson-type due process claims generally do not fit.
Supervisory and Monell claims require an underlying constitutional violation: Without a viable Fourth (or other constitutional) claim, derivative theories cannot proceed. Plaintiffs should also avoid group pleading and must allege concrete, causal actions by each defendant under Kentucky’s “initiate/continue/procure” standard.
University disciplinary consequences are not Fourth Amendment “seizures”: This opinion specifically clarifies that campus misconduct proceedings and resulting reputational/educational harms do not constitute a Fourth Amendment liberty deprivation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment: A federal claim that law enforcement caused you to be prosecuted without probable cause, and as a result you were subject to pretrial restraints on your liberty (a seizure, beyond any initial arrest), with the case ending in your favor.
Deprivation of liberty / seizure of the person: Pretrial constraints on your freedom of movement imposed by the criminal process—arrest, jail, bail/bond conditions, travel restrictions, required check-ins. Mere court attendance or a summons is not enough in the Sixth Circuit.
Continuing seizure doctrine: A theory (discussed by Justice Ginsburg in Albright) that a person remains “seized” while subject to legal process. The Sixth Circuit has not adopted this theory absent actual restraints designed to secure court appearance.
No true bill: A grand jury’s decision not to indict; in effect, the charges are dismissed at the grand-jury stage.
Fabrication-of-evidence claim: A constitutional claim that officials created false evidence. Under the Fourth Amendment, it must cause a seizure (pretrial deprivation of liberty). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is typically a fair-trial claim where false evidence affected the jury.
Monell liability: Municipal liability under § 1983 for constitutional violations caused by a policy, custom, or failure to train/supervise, but there must first be an underlying constitutional violation.
Absolute judicial-statements privilege (Kentucky): Statements made in judicial proceedings (material, pertinent, relevant) are absolutely protected from defamation liability, even if false or malicious. Republishing the exact content of charging documents in a press release remains absolutely privileged.
Kentucky malicious prosecution—initiate, continue, procure: To be liable, a defendant must be the proximate and efficient cause of commencing or continuing proceedings—not merely tangentially involved or publicly commenting.

Conclusion

Adams v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t cements, in a published Sixth Circuit opinion, a stringent understanding of “deprivation of liberty” for Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution and fabrication-of-evidence claims: without pretrial restraints on a person’s freedom of movement—such as arrest, bond conditions, travel limits, or required supervision—there is no Fourth Amendment seizure, even where the initiation of charges and attendant publicity cause serious reputational, educational, or emotional harms. The court expressly declines to expand “continuing seizure” to encompass mere summonses, arraignments, or compelled grand-jury testimony.

The opinion also gives clear guidance on Kentucky defamation law: police press releases that simply recite what the charging documents allege are absolutely privileged as judicial statements. And under Kentucky malicious-prosecution doctrine, supervisory officials who neither direct nor cause charges to be filed are not proper targets absent specific, causal actions amounting to initiation, continuation, or procurement of the prosecution.

The case underscores a recurring theme in constitutional tort litigation: egregious alleged misconduct does not always map onto a federal constitutional remedy. When there is no pretrial seizure, federal Fourth Amendment theories will falter; litigants must carefully select and plead the appropriate constitutional or state-law pathways, and defendants—especially municipalities and police agencies—should be mindful that tight adherence to the content of judicial filings in public communications preserves absolute privilege under Kentucky law.