Sixth Circuit Applies Muldrow to Title VII Religion Claims, Abrogates “Independent Harm” Rule, and Treats Coercive Sincerity Interviews as Potential Retaliation

Sixth Circuit Applies Muldrow to Title VII Religion Claims, Abrogates “Independent Harm” Rule, and Treats Coercive Sincerity Interviews as Potential Retaliation

Introduction

In Jeffrey Bilyeu v. UT-Battelle, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a significant, published decision at the intersection of Title VII religious discrimination, religious accommodation, and retaliation. The case arises from UT-Battelle’s 2021 COVID-19 vaccine mandate at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Jeffrey and Jessica Bilyeu, a married Christian couple opposed to vaccines developed or tested using fetal cell lines, sought religious accommodations. UT-Battelle’s process, according to the record, included a “sincerity” interview and a required “fact sheet” extolling vaccination and citing religious authorities who favored COVID vaccination. Religious objectors were made subject to a policy of unpaid leave; medical objectors were not.

The district court granted summary judgment to UT-Battelle on all claims except one of Mrs. Bilyeu’s retaliation claims (later settled). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit:

  • Affirmed dismissal of all of Jessica Bilyeu’s claims for lack of Article III standing;
  • Vacated and remanded Jeffrey Bilyeu’s disparate treatment and failure-to-accommodate claims in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024), which rejected the “materially adverse” gloss on Title VII discrimination claims; and
  • Reversed summary judgment on Jeffrey’s retaliation claim, holding that a jury could find UT-Battelle’s religious “sincerity” interview and mandatory “fact sheet” coercive enough to dissuade a reasonable employee from pursuing protected activity, even while clarifying that a mere denial of an accommodation request, standing alone, does not itself constitute retaliation.

The decision thus clarifies three important points of law in the Sixth Circuit: (1) Muldrow’s “some harm” standard governs Title VII status-discrimination claims, including religion; (2) the Circuit’s prior “independent harm” requirement for religious accommodation claims cannot survive Muldrow; and (3) while a bare accommodation denial is not retaliation, employer “sincerity” processes that shame, proselytize, or coerce may be actionable retaliatory adverse actions under Burlington Northern.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge John K. Bush, held:

  • Jessica Bilyeu lacks standing: Emotional distress from anticipatory fear of termination and self-imposed financial measures taken after she received a medical accommodation do not constitute Article III injury under Sixth Circuit precedent (Savel v. MetroHealth System) and Supreme Court doctrine (Clapper v. Amnesty International).
  • Disparate treatment (Jeffrey): The district court relied on the now-abrogated “materially adverse” standard to find no adverse employment action. After Muldrow, a Title VII plaintiff need only show “some harm” to a term or condition of employment. The court vacated and remanded for reconsideration under Muldrow’s standard.
  • Failure to accommodate (Jeffrey): The Sixth Circuit rejected its own prior requirement that a plaintiff show “independent harm” beyond the conflict between religious practice and the workplace rule (from cases like Reed v. UAW and Tepper v. Potter). Under Muldrow’s textual command, the inability to comply with both job requirements and religious belief is itself the cognizable harm. The court vacated and remanded for application of the correct standard.
  • Retaliation (Jeffrey): The court maintained Burlington Northern’s “materially adverse” standard for retaliation. It rejected the theory that denial of an accommodation ipso facto equals retaliation (which would render accommodation law superfluous and erase the employer’s undue-hardship defense). But it found triable issues that UT-Battelle’s interview and required reading—presenting religious authorities endorsing vaccines and shaming contrary beliefs—could dissuade a reasonable employee from seeking an accommodation. It reversed summary judgment and remanded for trial on retaliation.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024)

  • The Supreme Court held that Title VII’s phrase “discriminate against” means “to treat worse.” For status-based discrimination claims (race, sex, religion, etc.), a plaintiff need only show “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” No heightened “material,” “significant,” or “serious” threshold applies.
  • Muldrow abrogates lower courts’ “materially adverse” requirement for status discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit applies this to religious disparate treatment and, crucially, to its own accommodation framework.

Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023)

  • Reframed Title VII’s undue-hardship defense: an employer must show “substantial increased costs” in relation to its business to deny a religious accommodation.
  • Groff remains the governing standard on the employer’s defense. Bilyeu concerns the threshold harm standard and what constitutes actionable discrimination or failure to accommodate; Groff will govern the undue-hardship inquiry on remand.

EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015)

  • Explains that a failure-to-accommodate claim can arise from otherwise neutral policies that burden religious practice. The harm is the forced choice between faith and workplace rules.
  • Bilyeu aligns with Abercrombie by recognizing that the injury in accommodation claims is precisely this forced choice—without any extra “independent harm” overlay.

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)

  • Retaliation standard is distinct: a materially adverse action is one that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
  • Bilyeu reaffirms this standard and uses it to find a jury question on whether the employer’s interview and “fact sheet” would dissuade a reasonable worker from requesting an accommodation.

Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2007) and Reed v. UAW, 569 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2009)

  • Previously, Tepper and Reed required a “materially adverse” action for discrimination and an “independent harm” in accommodation claims (e.g., discipline or discharge).
  • Bilyeu holds these requirements cannot survive Muldrow. The court expressly doubts Tepper would tolerate involuntary, indefinite unpaid leave as categorically non-actionable and rejects Reed’s “independent harm” rule.

Savel v. MetroHealth System, 96 F.4th 932 (6th Cir. 2024)

  • Fear of termination and emotional distress from a vaccination policy, without more, is not a cognizable Article III injury.
  • Applied here to deny Jessica Bilyeu standing for injuries based on fear and self-imposed financial measures taken after she received a medical accommodation.

Standing and procedural standards

  • Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA: self-inflicted harms based on hypothetical future injury do not confer standing; relies on “certainly impending” standard.
  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby: summary judgment standard—whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.

Other authorities

  • Laster v. City of Kalamazoo: Sixth Circuit retaliation elements; incorporated in Bilyeu.
  • Corley v. United States: anti-superfluity canon used to reject a theory that would collapse accommodation claims into retaliation claims.
  • Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co. and Truskey v. Vilsack: employers may probe sincerity, but may not judge the “accuracy” of the religious belief or deny its religious nature because it diverges from official doctrine.
  • Kentucky v. Biden: underlying federal contractor mandate enjoined; contextualizes UT-Battelle’s decision to terminate unpaid leave and reinstate pay.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standing (Jessica Bilyeu)

The court reaffirmed its duty to ensure Article III jurisdiction. Jessica offered two injuries: (a) emotional distress from facing “effective termination for [her] beliefs,” and (b) financial decisions (401(k) loan, vehicle/boat sales) taken to prepare for unpaid leave. Under Savel, fear-based emotional harms arising from anticipated policy consequences are insufficient. And the financial measures were taken after she learned—at the preliminary injunction hearing—that she qualified for and promptly received a medical accommodation eliminating her risk of unpaid leave. Those self-imposed steps were therefore not traceable to an imminent injury. Without a cognizable injury-in-fact, her claims were properly dismissed.

2) Disparate Treatment (Jeffrey Bilyeu) under Title VII

The district court held Jeffrey failed to show a “materially adverse” action, relying on Tepper. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow, that standard is no longer valid for Title VII status-discrimination claims, including religion. The statutory text prohibits “discriminat[ion] against,” which Muldrow defines as “treat worse.” A plaintiff need only show “some harm” to a term or condition of employment; courts may not add a “significant” or “material” threshold. Because the district court employed the superseded standard, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration under Muldrow.

Practical implication: employer-imposed unpaid leave, loss of duties, altered schedules, or other non-pay changes can satisfy Title VII’s adverse-action element post-Muldrow if they produce “some harm” to a term or condition of employment. The panel’s footnote underscores skepticism that involuntary, indefinite unpaid leave could ever be categorically non-actionable.

3) Failure to Accommodate (Jeffrey Bilyeu) under Title VII

The Sixth Circuit’s pre-Muldrow framework required showing the employee was “discharged or disciplined” for noncompliance (Tepper/Smith) and, via Reed, an “independent harm” beyond the religious conflict itself. Bilyeu holds that this extra burden is incompatible with Muldrow’s text-only approach: in accommodation cases, the harm is the forced choice between religious practice and job rule—no additional “independent” harm is required. As the panel explains, requiring harm “independent” of the discrimination is just another way of imposing a heightened “materiality” threshold that Muldrow forbids.

The court therefore vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court must assess the accommodation claim without requiring discharge/discipline or independent harm. The employer still may assert Groff’s “undue hardship” defense, but the plaintiff need not meet a heightened injury threshold to get to that stage.

4) Retaliation (Jeffrey Bilyeu) under Title VII

For retaliation, Muldrow expressly left intact Burlington Northern’s “materially adverse” standard—actions that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker” from engaging in protected activity. The court assumed without deciding that requesting a religious accommodation is a protected activity (noting conflicting authorities and declining to resolve the issue because the parties did not brief it).

Importantly, the court rejected a categorical rule that denial of an accommodation equals retaliation for requesting the accommodation. That theory would:

  • Collapse accommodation claims into retaliation claims, violating the anti-superfluity canon and allowing plaintiffs to bypass the employer’s undue-hardship defense; and
  • Misalign with Burlington Northern’s rationale, because an employee’s risk-adjusted incentives to request an accommodation typically favor making the request even if it might be denied.

Yet the panel found a triable issue of retaliatory adverse action based on UT-Battelle’s interview and “fact sheet,” which, a reasonable jury could conclude, crossed the line from sincerity assessment into shaming or proselytizing designed to change the employee’s religious beliefs. The “fact sheet” touted religious leaders’ pro-vaccination views (including the Vatican and U.S. Bishops) and required a certification of having read it, while the interview probed why the employee’s beliefs diverged from religious leadership and suggested hypocrisy. A jury could find such a process would dissuade a reasonable worker from requesting an accommodation. The court therefore reversed and remanded for trial on retaliation.

Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

For the Sixth Circuit’s Title VII Jurisprudence

  • New adverse-action standard for discrimination: Muldrow’s “some harm” standard governs all Title VII status discrimination claims. The Circuit’s pre-existing “materially adverse” gloss (Tepper) is no longer viable for disparate treatment claims.
  • Accommodation claims reshaped: The Sixth Circuit’s “independent harm” requirement (Reed) is expressly incompatible with Muldrow and is no longer a barrier. Plaintiffs need not show discharge, discipline, or other extra harm beyond the forced choice between job rule and faith.
  • Retaliation remains distinct: Burlington Northern’s “materially adverse” standard endures for retaliation. Simply pairing “I asked for accommodation” with “it was denied” does not state a retaliation claim. But coercive or shaming “sincerity” processes may.

For Employers

  • Recalibrate adverse-action risk: Actions previously argued as “not material” (e.g., transfers, undesirable reassignments, forced unpaid leave, removal of privileges, altered shifts) now present greater litigation risk if they inflict “some harm.”
  • Rethink sincerity assessments: Employers may verify sincerity, but should avoid:
    • Proselytizing or attempting to correct employees’ religious doctrine;
    • Requiring employees to read or certify religious teachings or moral judgments;
    • Suggesting hypocrisy or religious inadequacy; or
    • Invoking religious authorities to shame or pressure the employee to change beliefs.
    Tailor questions to sincerity and job impact; do not debate theology.
  • Maintain medical/religious parity absent justification: Disparate consequences for religious vs. medical objectors (e.g., automatic unpaid leave for religious but not medical) will be scrutinized.
  • Document undue hardship under Groff: If denying an accommodation, build a record of “substantial increased costs” or comparable burdens tied to the employer’s business.

For Employees

  • Lower threshold to reach a jury on discrimination and accommodation: Showing “some harm” and a concrete conflict between religious practice and policy may suffice; no need to prove discharge or separate “independent harm.”
  • Retaliation remains viable when processes are coercive: Evidence that an employer’s response would dissuade a reasonable person from seeking accommodation (e.g., shaming interviews or compelled doctrinal readings) can support retaliation claims.
  • Standing matters: Emotional distress from anticipated harm and post-accommodation, self-imposed financial measures often won’t establish Article III injury.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Disparate Treatment vs. Failure to Accommodate vs. Retaliation:
    • Disparate treatment alleges the employer treated the employee worse because of religion.
    • Failure to accommodate alleges the employer refused a reasonable accommodation for religious practice absent undue hardship.
    • Retaliation alleges the employer punished the employee for engaging in protected activity (e.g., opposing discrimination, filing a charge, or, as assumed here, requesting accommodation).
  • Adverse Action Standards Differ:
    • For discrimination claims, after Muldrow: “some harm” to a term or condition of employment; no “material” threshold.
    • For retaliation claims, Burlington Northern still applies: action must be significant enough to dissuade a reasonable worker from protected activity.
  • “Independent Harm” (now abrogated): The old Sixth Circuit rule required harm beyond the religious-policy conflict in accommodation cases. Bilyeu rejects that rule—being forced to choose between faith and job rule is itself the harm.
  • Undue Hardship (Groff): An employer can deny an accommodation only by showing “substantial increased costs” or similar business burdens, a more demanding standard than the old “more than de minimis” test.
  • Sincerity Inquiry Boundaries: Employers may test sincerity (consistency, timing, etc.) but cannot judge the “truth” of beliefs or insist they match official church positions. Probing or shaming theology risks retaliation and discrimination liability.

Conclusion

Bilyeu marks an important recalibration of Title VII religion jurisprudence in the Sixth Circuit. By applying Muldrow’s textual “some harm” standard to status discrimination and repudiating the Circuit’s prior “independent harm” requirement for failure-to-accommodate claims, the court lowers the threshold for employees to advance religious discrimination and accommodation claims to trial. At the same time, the court preserves the distinct Burlington Northern retaliation standard and draws a principled line: the mere denial of an accommodation is not retaliation, but coercive “sincerity” procedures that shame or proselytize can be materially adverse retaliatory actions for a jury to evaluate.

For employers, the opinion underscores the need to revisit policies and training, particularly around religious accommodation processes during public health or safety mandates. For employees, it clarifies the evidentiary showings required to reach a jury on disparate treatment, accommodation, and retaliation—and the limits of Article III standing. In sum, the decision establishes binding, published precedent that will influence how district courts in the Sixth Circuit analyze religious discrimination and accommodation disputes—and how employers design and administer accommodation procedures—in the wake of Muldrow and Groff.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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