Sixth Circuit Adopts Sentencing‑Package Doctrine for First Step Act §404: Non‑Covered Counts May Be Reduced When Interdependent with Covered Offenses

Sixth Circuit Adopts Sentencing‑Package Doctrine for First Step Act §404: Non‑Covered Counts May Be Reduced When Interdependent with Covered Offenses

Introduction

In United States v. Edward Dale, a consolidated appeal involving members of Detroit’s “Best Friends” gang, the Sixth Circuit addressed the scope of resentencing authority under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The defendants—Edward Dale, Gene Polk, John Gordon, and Gregory Brown—were convicted in the mid‑1990s of a far‑reaching drug conspiracy involving both powder and crack cocaine, multiple intentional killings in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise (21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)), and § 924(c) firearms offenses. Each received concurrent life sentences on the conspiracy and homicide counts and mandatory consecutive terms on the § 924(c) counts, consistent with the then‑mandatory Sentencing Guidelines.

After Congress enacted the First Step Act to retroactively implement the Fair Sentencing Act’s crack‑cocaine reforms, each defendant sought a reduction. The district court reduced not only the sentences on the covered crack‑conspiracy counts but also the non‑covered homicide sentences, concluding it had authority to “correct [the] entire sentence” based on a “sentencing package” theory. The government appealed, arguing (1) the court lacked authority to reduce any non‑covered homicide sentences; (2) even if Section 404 allows some relief on non‑covered counts, these murders were not part of a “sentencing package”; (3) in Gordon’s case, the earlier limited remand foreclosed relief; and (4) the reduced sentences were substantively unreasonable.

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion (Judge White, joined by Judge Stranch; Judge Murphy dissenting) resolves key threshold questions and clarifies the extent of a district court’s resentencing power under § 404. Most importantly, the court squarely adopts the “sentencing‑package doctrine” for First Step Act cases in this circuit, while vacating and remanding because the record did not establish whether the defendants’ homicide sentences were, in fact, interdependent with the covered drug‑conspiracy sentences.

Summary of the Opinion

  • No waiver or forfeiture: The government did not waive or forfeit its challenge to the district court’s authority to reduce the non‑covered homicide sentences. Although the government raised some arguments late, the district court had addressed the core issue and the matter was fully briefed on appeal.
  • Mandate rule: The prior remand in Gordon’s case was a general remand. It did not bar the district court from considering eligibility to reduce non‑covered counts on alternative grounds (like the sentencing‑package doctrine), even though the panel had held a § 848(e)(1)(A) homicide is not a “covered offense.”
  • Core holding on § 404 authority: The First Step Act authorizes reductions on non‑covered offenses only when those sentences were part of an interdependent “sentencing package” with a covered offense. The court rejects an unlimited view that would allow reduction of any non‑covered count merely because a covered count is being resentenced.
  • Application and remand: The district court did not explain how the homicide sentences were interdependent with the covered drug‑conspiracy sentences. The Sixth Circuit vacated the resentencings and remanded for the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether a sentencing package existed for each defendant and, if so, whether to exercise its discretion to reduce any non‑covered counts as part of that package.
  • Substantive reasonableness: The panel did not reach the government’s substantive‑reasonableness challenge, given its remand for further proceedings on authority/eligibility.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

  • Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022): Emphasizes broad district court discretion at the resentencing stage under § 404, subject only to § 404(c)’s two express limits. The Sixth Circuit uses Concepcion to reinforce that once eligibility is established, district courts possess wide latitude; but eligibility is still a legal question bounded by statutory text.
  • United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2021): Eligibility determinations under § 404 are reviewed de novo; the discretionary resentencing choice comes later.
  • Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62 (2017): Sentencing courts may consider mandatory consecutive terms (e.g., § 924(c)) when fashioning sentences on other counts, showing how sentences can be interdependent—grounding for the sentencing‑package doctrine.
  • Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997): In the § 2255 context, when one part of a “sentencing package” is vacated, courts may revisit the entire package to ensure the aggregate sentence fits the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth Circuit draws an analogy to § 404, finding the same structural interdependence can exist.
  • Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008): Recognizes appellate authority to vacate the entire sentence to allow district courts to reconfigure an interdependent sentencing plan—another building block for the package concept.
  • United States v. Curtis, 66 F.4th 690 (7th Cir. 2023); United States v. Hudson, 967 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Richardson, 96 F.4th 659 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Spencer, 998 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2021): Sister circuits embracing, to varying degrees, § 404 authority to reach non‑covered counts in a sentencing package. The Sixth Circuit aligns with this side of the split.
  • United States v. Young, 998 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Gladney, 44 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2022); United States v. Baptiste, 834 F. App’x 547 (11th Cir. 2020): Sister circuits rejecting any application of the sentencing‑package doctrine under § 404. The Sixth Circuit respectfully disagrees, finding their formalism about count‑specific sentences inconsistent with real‑world sentencing interdependence.
  • Mandate and remand framework: United States v. Campbell, 168 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. O’Dell, 320 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Purdy, 870 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2017). These cases guide the limited vs. general remand analysis. The panel deems the earlier order in Gordon a general remand, leaving room to consider sentencing‑package arguments on return to the district court.
  • Waiver/forfeiture: United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Clariot, 655 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2011); Blanchet v. Charter Communications, 27 F.4th 1221 (6th Cir. 2022). These authorities explain the prudential nature of forfeiture and why, given the district court’s discussion and full briefing, appellate review was appropriate.
  • Guidelines grouping: U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. D (2023) introductory commentary, recognizing that some counts are “closely intertwined” and grouped; where grouped counts are revisited, the interdependent structure matters for resentencing.

Legal Reasoning

The statutory text of § 404(b) authorizes a court that “imposed a sentence for a covered offense” to “impose a reduced sentence as if” the Fair Sentencing Act’s sections 2 and 3 had been in effect when the “covered offense” was committed. The majority rejects the defense view that this confers a roving commission to reduce any sentence for any unrelated offense simply because a covered offense is present. Reading the provision as a whole, the court reasons the resentencing must be tethered to the covered offense and the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes.

At the same time, the court recognizes the practical reality that sentencing often proceeds as an integrated enterprise. District courts frequently craft a global sentence—especially where mandatory consecutive terms or grouped counts are involved—and the court’s choice on one count may be calibrated to the punishment imposed on another. The majority identifies three textual and contextual anchors for incorporating that interdependence into § 404:

  • Ordinary meaning of “sentence” and context: A “sentence” is the punishment imposed, which can comprise an aggregate of count‑by‑count terms conceived as a whole. Section 404 does not include an express restriction barring courts from modifying interdependent non‑covered counts when the covered count’s punishment is being re‑set “as if” the Fair Sentencing Act applied.
  • Concepcion’s backdrop of discretion: Congress imposed only two explicit limits in § 404(c), and did not otherwise constrain the traditional discretion district courts wield in sentencing and resentencing. Recognizing sentencing packages is consistent with that tradition.
  • Analogy to Pasquarille and § 2255 resentencing: While § 404 is not § 2255, both provisions are silent on the precise scope of relief when one part of an interdependent sentencing plan changes; Pasquarille teaches that, absent an express limitation, courts may recalibrate the whole package to ensure the aggregate sentence satisfies § 3553(a).

The court thus adopts a middle path: § 404 does not enable plenary resentencing or carte blanche reductions on non‑covered counts, but it does permit reductions on non‑covered counts that are “interdependent” with a covered count—i.e., part of a sentencing package. The “operative question,” borrowing from the Seventh Circuit, is whether the record gives reason to think the sentences were interdependent “at the time of sentencing.” Indicators may include grouping under the Guidelines, contemporaneous statements about a single “global” punishment, and calibration of one term in light of another (such as adjusting a non‑mandatory term to account for a mandatory consecutive term elsewhere).

Application, Remand, and Ancillary Issues

  • Interdependence not established: Although the district court asserted authority to reduce the homicide sentences under a “sentencing package,” it did not explain how, for any defendant, the homicide sentences were actually interdependent with the covered drug‑conspiracy sentence. Because the government raised the package issue (albeit late) and the district court offered little analysis, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for a fresh, defendant‑specific interdependence determination.
  • Mandate rule (Gordon): The prior remand was general, not limited; it vacated the earlier denial “as to Count 1” but did not confine the remand to that count. The district court remained free to consider non‑covered counts on a valid alternative theory (sentencing package), provided it did not contradict the prior holding that § 848(e)(1)(A) itself is not a “covered offense.”
  • Waiver/forfeiture: Despite the government’s failure to brief eligibility sooner, forfeiture is prudential. The district court had addressed the merits, the issue was fully briefed on appeal, and appellate review served both accuracy and fairness. No waiver or forfeiture barred consideration of the statutory authority question.
  • Concurrent‑sentence doctrine: The district court had rejected the government’s early reliance on this prudential doctrine. The Sixth Circuit did not ground its holding in the concurrent‑sentence doctrine; rather, it resolved the scope of § 404 authority and remanded on the sentencing‑package analysis.
  • Substantive reasonableness: Because the court vacated and remanded on authority/eligibility grounds, it did not adjudicate the government’s substantive‑reasonableness challenge to the reduced terms.

The Dissent

Judge Murphy would hold that § 404 never permits reductions to sentences imposed for non‑covered offenses, rejecting any incorporation of the sentencing‑package doctrine into the First Step Act. He emphasizes the text’s repeated focus on “the covered offense,” the post‑Guidelines baseline that each count receives its own sentence, and the general rule in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) that courts “may not modify” imprisonment terms absent express statutory authorization, which he finds lacking for non‑covered counts under § 404(b). He aligns with the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.

Even if the doctrine applied, the dissent finds no interdependence here. Because § 2A1.1 set a mandatory Guidelines life sentence for the homicides at the time and the Guidelines were mandatory pre‑Booker, the drug‑conspiracy sentences could not have influenced the homicide terms. On that basis, the dissent would reverse outright rather than remand.

Impact

  • Binding Sixth Circuit precedent: District courts in the Sixth Circuit now have clear authority to reduce non‑covered sentences under § 404 only when those sentences are part of an interdependent “sentencing package” with a covered offense. This formal adoption resolves earlier unpublished assumptions and aligns the circuit with the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.
  • Case‑specific factfinding required: On remand—and in future § 404 proceedings—district courts must make a record‑based determination whether the sentences were interdependent. Relevant indicators include:
    • Contemporaneous statements about a unified or “global” sentence;
    • Whether counts were grouped under the Guidelines and how that grouping affected the combined offense level;
    • Whether one term was set in light of a mandatory consecutive term (e.g., § 924(c));
    • Whether a concurrent life term on Count B simply mirrored the life term on Count A, suggesting integration, or independently reflected a mandatory or independently justified life term.
  • Practical consequences for violent non‑covered counts: Where non‑covered counts (such as § 848(e)(1)(A) murders) carried mandatory Guidelines life sentences at the original (pre‑Booker) sentencing, defendants may struggle to show interdependence. Conversely, where the original judge explicitly calibrated a non‑covered term to other counts, reductions may be available.
  • Ongoing circuit split: The Sixth Circuit’s decision deepens a mature split. The issue is well‑positioned for potential Supreme Court review, particularly given Concepcion’s emphasis on resentencing discretion and the interplay with § 3582(c)’s “express authorization” requirement.
  • Mandate discipline and preservation: The opinion clarifies the scope of general vs. limited remands and underscores that prudential forfeiture will not foreclose review of purely legal eligibility questions where the district court addressed the merits and the issue is fully briefed on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • First Step Act § 404 and “covered offense”: Section 404 allows reduced sentences for offenses whose statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act (principally crack quantities). A “covered offense” is one directly affected by those changes. Homicide offenses like § 848(e)(1)(A) are not covered.
  • Sentencing‑package doctrine: When a court fashions a single, integrated punishment across multiple counts, the individual sentences are interdependent. If one part is later altered by statute or appeal, the court may revisit the others to maintain a coherent aggregate sentence. Under this opinion, that doctrine applies in § 404 proceedings, but only for interdependent counts.
  • Grouping under the Guidelines: Some counts are “grouped” because they reflect closely related harm. Grouping affects offense levels and can tie sentences together. Murder is generally excluded from grouping, which can cut against interdependence unless other indicators show a global sentencing plan.
  • Mandate rule: On remand, a district court must follow the appellate court’s directions. A “limited remand” tightly cabins what can be done; a “general remand” leaves broader room—so long as the court does not contradict issues already decided.
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and precludes review. Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right; courts may still review forfeited issues in suitable circumstances, especially where the district court addressed the merits and the issue is fully briefed.
  • Concurrent‑sentence doctrine: A prudential doctrine allowing courts to decline to resolve challenges to a count when the sentence runs concurrently with an equal or longer sentence on another count and resolution would not affect custody. It does not define the scope of § 404 authority.

Conclusion

United States v. Edward Dale establishes a significant rule for § 404 resentencings in the Sixth Circuit: district courts may reduce non‑covered counts only when those counts formed part of a “sentencing package” interdependent with a covered offense. The court rejects both extremes—neither an unbounded power to alter any non‑covered sentence nor a categorical ban on reaching them. Instead, the court requires a fact‑sensitive inquiry into interdependence grounded in the original record and sentencing architecture.

On remand, the district court must determine whether, at the original sentencings, the homicide sentences were truly tied to the covered crack‑conspiracy sentences or instead stood independently (for example, because mandatory Guidelines required life on the homicides regardless of the drug count). Only if interdependence is shown does § 404 permit consideration of reductions on those non‑covered counts—and even then, relief remains discretionary under § 3553(a).

By aligning with the Fourth and Seventh Circuits and diverging from the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh, the Sixth Circuit has taken a clear position in an entrenched split. The decision provides concrete guidance to district courts and litigants while setting the stage for possible Supreme Court review on the reach of § 404 and the role of the sentencing‑package doctrine in retroactive crack resentencings.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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