Sixth Amendment Trial Errors Are Nonjurisdictional; Mandamus Will Not Lie to Vacate Convictions: Commentary on State ex rel. Johnson v. McNamara, 2025-Ohio-2891

Introduction

In State ex rel. Johnson v. McNamara, 2025-Ohio-2891, the Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously affirmed the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ sua sponte dismissal of an inmate’s mandamus action seeking to vacate his criminal sentence. The relator, Alfred A. Johnson Sr., argued chiefly that he was denied his constitutional right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and that this purported violation stripped the trial court of both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, rendering his conviction void. He further asserted a juror knew the presiding judge and that the indictment’s mens rea allegations were deficient, each allegedly depriving the court of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected these jurisdictional characterizations. Reiterating, and consolidating, recent doctrine, the Court held that alleged Sixth Amendment errors (including Faretta/self-representation issues and ineffective assistance claims), juror-related irregularities, and claimed defects in an indictment are nonjurisdictional trial errors. They do not divest a court of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction and thus cannot be used to transform an otherwise ordinary appellate claim into a successful mandamus petition. Because Johnson’s claims were cognizable by direct appeal—which he had already pursued—mandamus did not lie.

This decision continues the Court’s post-Harper/Henderson jurisprudence distinguishing true jurisdictional defects (which yield void judgments) from nonjurisdictional trial errors (which are voidable and must be pursued through the ordinary appellate process).

Summary of the Opinion

The Court confined its review to the certified record and the issues raised and decided below, refusing to consider a full trial transcript appended for the first time in the Supreme Court and new arguments not presented to the Sixth District (¶¶ 8–9; citing State ex rel. Harris v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-2901; Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-1056; Kalish v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 73 (1977)).
The standard for sua sponte dismissal without notice is whether the complaint is frivolous or obviously meritless; the Court applied that standard in reviewing the appellate court’s dismissal (¶¶ 10–11; citing State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex, 2020-Ohio-411; State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, 2023-Ohio-3832; State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 2006-Ohio-6573; State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 2020-Ohio-4777).
On the merits, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas had subject-matter jurisdiction over Johnson’s felony case (robbery under R.C. 2911.02(A)(2)), and personal jurisdiction was unaffected by the asserted trial errors (¶¶ 12–17; citing R.C. 2931.03; State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784; State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913; State ex rel. Thompson v. Gonzalez, 2024-Ohio-897).
Alleged violations of the right to counsel/self-representation, juror-irregularity claims, and purported indictment defects are nonjurisdictional; even if error occurred, those issues do not void the judgment and must be pursued by appeal, not mandamus (¶¶ 15–17; citing State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2023-Ohio-3534; Pope v. Bracy, 2022-Ohio-3190; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275; DeVore v. Black, 2021-Ohio-3153; Jury v. Miller, 2016-Ohio-3044; Orr v. Mack, 1998-Ohio-32).
Because Johnson had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law—direct appeal—for his Sixth Amendment and related claims, mandamus relief was unavailable (¶ 18; citing State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 1997-Ohio-72).

Background and Procedural History

Johnson, an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution, filed a mandamus action in the Sixth District Court of Appeals asking the court to order Judge Joseph McNamara to “fix the record” and vacate his sentence in Lucas C.P. No. CR0202101960. He alleged that the trial court denied his right to proceed pro se in violation of Faretta and identified additional claimed errors: a juror who knew the judge and an indictment that, he contended, misstated or omitted the correct mens rea.

The Sixth District sua sponte dismissed the complaint, concluding that none of the asserted errors deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and that Johnson had an adequate remedy by direct appeal—a remedy he had already pursued unsuccessfully as to his Faretta claim. Johnson appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, attaching a full trial transcript not considered below.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State ex rel. Harris v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-2901, ¶ 16: A reviewing court cannot augment the record with new materials and decide an appeal on that basis. The Court relied on Harris to exclude the full trial transcript Johnson appended for the first time on appeal (¶ 8).
Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-1056, ¶ 21; Kalish v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 73, 79 (1977): Appellate courts ordinarily decline to consider questions not presented to, considered by, and decided by the lower court. These authorities cabined the Supreme Court’s review to issues raised in the mandamus complaint in the Sixth District (¶ 9).
State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex, 2020-Ohio-411, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 2006-Ohio-6573, ¶ 14; State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, 2023-Ohio-3832, ¶ 9: A court of appeals may dismiss a complaint sua sponte if it is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail; the Supreme Court’s review asks whether the claims are frivolous or obviously meritless. These set the procedural framework for affirming the Sixth District’s dismissal (¶¶ 10–11).
State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 2020-Ohio-4777, ¶ 8: Mandamus requires the relator to prove a clear legal right to relief, a clear legal duty in the respondent, and the absence of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This baseline made Johnson’s adequate-remedy-by-appeal decisive (¶ 11).
State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 1997-Ohio-72, ¶ 9: Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court with general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction; jurisdictional challenges have an adequate remedy by appeal. This principle undercuts attempts to repackage nonjurisdictional trial error into a mandamus claim (¶ 11; reiterated at ¶ 18).
State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 36: Personal jurisdiction in criminal cases is obtained through lawful process, arrest, arraignment, and plea. The Court used Henderson to reject Johnson’s theory that trial-management errors affect personal jurisdiction (¶ 13).
R.C. 2931.03; State ex rel. Thompson v. Gonzalez, 2024-Ohio-897, ¶ 13: Common pleas courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases. Given that Johnson was indicted for second-degree felony robbery under R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and (B), subject-matter jurisdiction was secure (¶ 14).
State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2023-Ohio-3534, ¶ 21: A violation of the right to counsel does not deprive a sentencing court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ogle squarely answers Johnson’s Faretta-based jurisdictional argument (¶ 15).
State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 19: Subject-matter jurisdiction addresses a court’s power to adjudicate a class of cases and is determined without regard to the particular parties’ rights; the forum’s competence to hear the controversy is the focus. This reinforced that juror-related and Sixth Amendment claims are not jurisdictional (¶ 16).
Pope v. Bracy, 2022-Ohio-3190, ¶¶ 11–12: Alleged defects in a jury verdict do not render a judgment void for lack of jurisdiction. The Court analogized this to the juror-knowing-the-judge claim (¶ 16).
DeVore v. Black, 2021-Ohio-3153, ¶ 9; Jury v. Miller, 2016-Ohio-3044, ¶ 4; Orr v. Mack, 1998-Ohio-32, ¶ 4: Claims that the defendant was convicted of an uncharged offense or that an indictment was defective are procedural, not jurisdictional; after conviction, the judgment binds the defendant to the offense of conviction. These authorities dispose of the indictment-based jurisdictional challenge (¶ 17).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s logic unfolded in a sequence that both honored procedural norms and clarified substantive jurisdictional doctrine.

Scope of review and record integrity. The Court first refused to consider materials (a full trial transcript) and issues presented for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court. This ensured fidelity to the certified record and preserved the hierarchical structure of appellate review (¶¶ 8–9).
Sua sponte dismissal standard. The Court reiterated that courts of appeals may dismiss a complaint sua sponte if it is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail. Its own task on review was to determine whether the claims were frivolous or obviously meritless (¶¶ 10–11).
Mandamus prerequisites and adequate appellate remedies. The Court emphasized that mandamus requires the absence of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Because Johnson’s claims—Faretta/self-representation, juror familiarity, indictment defects, and ineffective assistance—are ordinary trial or appellate issues, they fall squarely within the scope of direct appeal. Johnson had, in fact, raised the self-representation issue on direct appeal and lost, underscoring the availability (and use) of an adequate remedy (¶ 18).
Jurisdiction confirmed; errors, if any, are nonjurisdictional. On the merits, the Court distinguished jurisdiction from error:
- Subject-matter jurisdiction existed because Johnson was indicted for a felony over which the common pleas court has jurisdiction (R.C. 2931.03; ¶ 14).
- Personal jurisdiction was unaffected by trial-management issues; it is acquired through lawful process, arrest, arraignment, and plea (Henderson; ¶ 13).
- Alleged Faretta-related errors, even if assumed, do not strip a court of subject-matter jurisdiction (Ogle; ¶ 15). Likewise, assertions that a juror knew the presiding judge or that the indictment’s mens rea phrasing was flawed are not jurisdictional. They are trial or procedural issues that, at most, render a judgment voidable on timely appeal (¶¶ 16–17).
Conclusion and disposition. Given the presence of jurisdiction and the availability of direct appeal, Johnson could not establish either a clear legal right to mandamus relief or the necessary lack of an adequate remedy. The Sixth District’s sua sponte dismissal was therefore affirmed (¶ 19).

3) The Decision’s Place in Ohio’s Evolving “Void vs. Voidable” Jurisprudence

This opinion coheres with the Supreme Court of Ohio’s recent recalibration of void/voidable doctrine in criminal cases. Beginning with State v. Harper (2020), and continuing through State v. Henderson (2020), the Court has emphasized that most sentencing and trial errors render judgments voidable rather than void. Only true jurisdictional defects—lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, in rare instances, patent and unambiguous absence of authority—produce void judgments subject to collateral attack at any time.

Johnson extends this framework to the specific context of Faretta/self-representation claims and related Sixth Amendment issues, making explicit that even the mismanagement or erroneous denial of a defendant’s self-representation request does not affect a court’s jurisdiction. This ensures such claims remain in the mainstream appellate channel rather than becoming vehicles for extraordinary relief via mandamus.

Impact and Practical Implications

For litigants (defendants and inmates)

Faretta/self-representation claims must be preserved at trial and pursued on direct appeal. They cannot be recharacterized as jurisdictional defects to support mandamus or other extraordinary writs.
Alleged juror irregularities (including claims that a juror knows the judge) and attacks on indictment sufficiency or mens rea phrasing are nonjurisdictional. These issues must be timely raised and appealed; they are not grounds to void a judgment by mandamus.
Attempts to expand the record on appeal by attaching new materials will be rejected. Parties must ensure the necessary transcripts and exhibits are part of the certified record below.

For trial courts

While Johnson confirms that Faretta errors are nonjurisdictional, it remains essential to conduct a thorough, on-the-record inquiry when a defendant seeks to proceed pro se. Doing so protects the record for appeal and reduces postconviction litigation risk.
If a juror is known to the court or counsel, consider making a supplemental inquiry on the record to forestall appellate claims—even though a failure to do so is not jurisdictional.

For appellate courts

The decision endorses judicious use of sua sponte dismissal for facially meritless extraordinary-writ complaints, while restating the Supreme Court’s review standard for such dismissals (frivolous or obviously meritless).
It reinforces restraint in reviewing only the issues presented and the record certified by the lower court.

For the law of extraordinary writs

Johnson tightens the boundary between jurisdictional defects (properly addressable via extraordinary writs) and nonjurisdictional trial errors (addressable on appeal). It will likely reduce writ filings that attempt to circumvent direct appeal by recasting ordinary trial errors as jurisdictional flaws.
The opinion underscores the “patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction” threshold for deploying extraordinary writs against courts of general jurisdiction (Dannaher, ¶ 9).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Subject-matter jurisdiction vs. personal jurisdiction

Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s power, conferred by the constitution or statute, to hear a class of cases—for example, felony criminal cases in the court of common pleas (R.C. 2931.03). If subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment is void.
Personal jurisdiction is the court’s authority over a particular defendant, typically obtained through lawful process, arrest, arraignment, and plea. Trial-management errors do not negate personal jurisdiction (Henderson).

Void vs. voidable

Void judgments arise from a true lack of jurisdiction and can be attacked at any time.
Voidable judgments arise from errors committed by a court with jurisdiction—such as evidentiary rulings, jury selection issues, indictment sufficiency disputes, or Faretta/self-representation errors. Such errors must be addressed by timely appeal.

Mandamus

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy requiring (1) a clear legal right to relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent, and (3) no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. If a direct appeal is available, mandamus ordinarily will not lie (Martre; Dannaher).
A mandamus complaint must be precise. Johnson’s vague request to “fix the record” (without specifying what to fix) illustrates how ambiguity can undercut the “clear legal right/duty” elements, although the Court resolved the case on jurisdiction and adequate-remedy grounds (¶ 4).

Faretta/self-representation rights

A defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself if he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives counsel (Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 835). Trial courts typically conduct an on-the-record inquiry to ensure any waiver is valid.
Trial courts can deny self-representation when the defendant is not competent to waive counsel or engages in disruptive behavior. Even if a court errs in handling a Faretta request, the error is nonjurisdictional and must be reviewed on appeal—not through mandamus (¶ 2; ¶ 15).

Conclusion

State ex rel. Johnson v. McNamara delivers a clear, unified message: alleged Sixth Amendment violations—including Faretta/self-representation claims—juror irregularities, and indictment defects are nonjurisdictional trial errors. They do not deprive a common pleas court of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction, and they do not render a conviction void. The proper vehicle for such claims is the ordinary appellate process, not an extraordinary writ of mandamus.

By adhering to the certified record and issues preserved below, reaffirming the standard for sua sponte dismissals of plainly meritless writ complaints, and anchoring subject-matter jurisdiction in R.C. 2931.03, the Supreme Court of Ohio reinforces its post-Harper/Henderson jurisprudence: voidness is reserved for true jurisdictional defects; everything else is voidable and must be addressed by timely appeal. The Court’s unanimous, per curiam disposition offers practical guidance to litigants, trial judges, and appellate courts alike—promoting procedural regularity, finality of judgments, and the proper channeling of constitutional claims through the appellate process.