Singh v. Bondi: Self-Inflicted Incapacity, Presumption of Competence, and “Good-Cause” Continuances in Immigration Court

Introduction

In Singh v. Bondi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit confronted two recurring procedural questions in immigration litigation:

• When must an Immigration Judge (IJ) pause proceedings to investigate a respondent’s mental competency?
• Under what circumstances is an IJ required to grant a continuance when the respondent claims to be medically or mentally unable to proceed?

Jasvir Singh, an Indian national who entered the United States without authorization, engaged in a 74-day hunger strike while in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. At his asylum merits hearing, he sought a continuance, alleging lingering physical and cognitive impairment. The IJ denied the request, found Singh competent, deemed his unsigned asylum application abandoned, and ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Singh petitioned for review.

The Tenth Circuit’s published opinion, authored by Judge Eid, clarifies that:

1. Self-inflicted incapacity (e.g., a voluntary hunger strike) does not, without competent evidence linking it to cognitive dysfunction, rebut the regulatory presumption that non-citizens are competent to participate in removal proceedings.
2. A continuance is not “good cause” where the claimed inability to proceed is self-created or unsupported by concrete, probative medical evidence.

Summary of the Judgment

Applying substantial-evidence review to the competency determination and abuse-of-discretion review to the continuance denial, the court:

• Affirmed that the IJ and BIA correctly presumed competence and found no “indicia of incompetence” under Matter of M-A-M-, because Singh was responsive, oriented, and able to confer with counsel.
• Held that doctor letters predicting “possible” cognitive issues did not compel a contrary finding; they lacked specific linkage to Singh’s actual mental functioning during the hearing.
• Upheld the denial of a continuance, emphasizing Singh’s multiple prior continuances, five-month preparation window, representation by counsel, and failure to identify non-cumulative evidence he would offer if the hearing were postponed.

Consequently, the petition for review was denied and the order of removal left intact.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I.&N. Dec. 474 (BIA 2011) – establishes the presumption of competence and the “indicia” trigger for a formal competency inquiry. Singh relied on it; the court applied it strictly, requiring objective signals of incompetence.
• Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020) – supplies the modern articulation of substantial-evidence review (“any reasonable adjudicator”). Cited for the deferential factual standard.
• Takwi v. Garland, 22 F.4th 1180 (10th Cir. 2022) & Barrera v. Barr, 798 F. App’x 312 (10th Cir. 2020) – prior Circuit decisions finding competence despite PTSD and depression diagnoses. Used to show the court’s consistent demand for a nexus between diagnosis and functional impairment.
• Jimenez-Guzman v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2011) & Reyes-Garcia v. Lynch, 617 F. App’x 884 (10th Cir. 2015) – define abuse-of-discretion review for continuances and approve denials after multiple extensions.
• Matter of Sibrun, 18 I.&N. Dec. 354 (BIA 1983) – sets out factors for continuances when additional evidence is sought. The court explained why those factors were inapposite to Singh’s medically-based request.
• INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) – classic citation for the “compel” threshold in substantial-evidence review.

Legal Reasoning

1. Competency Determination
   • Under M-A-M-, competency is presumed. The IJ must conduct a deeper inquiry only if “indicia of incompetence” appear.
   • The court catalogued the IJ’s on-the-record observations: coherent answers, physical mobility, ability to recall dates, and explicit statement that he understood questions.
   • Medical letters did not override these observations: they were predictive, generalized, and silent on real-time cognition.
   • Because reasonable adjudicators could accept the IJ’s findings, substantial-evidence review foreclosed reversal.
2. Continuance Analysis
   • Good cause under 8 C.F.R. §1003.29 is discretionary. Key factors: prior continuances, preparation time, prejudice, and case-management efficiency.
   • Singh’s incapacity was self-induced; allowing a continuance would create perverse incentives for strategic self-harm.
   • He received multiple prior extensions and nearly five months to prepare; no new evidence was identified.
   • Hence, the IJ’s denial was rational, consistent with policy, and not grounded on impermissible considerations.

Impact of the Decision

• Circuit Guidance – Provides the Tenth Circuit’s clearest statement that voluntary self-harm (hunger strikes) does not automatically undermine competence nor furnish “good cause” for delay.
• Agency Practice – Encourages IJs to place weight on contemporaneous courtroom observations over speculative medical opinions, unless such opinions concretely link symptoms to functional impairment.
• Litigant Strategy – Signals to defense counsel that competency challenges must be evidence-rich, tying medical findings to in-court abilities; broad medical prognoses will not suffice.
• Detention-Based Protests – May reduce strategic effectiveness of hunger strikes aimed at delaying proceedings, potentially influencing detainee protest tactics and ICE medical protocols.
• Continuance Doctrine – Reinforces that multiple prior extensions narrow the scope for further delays absent extraordinary, well-documented circumstances.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Presumption of Competence – In immigration court, every respondent is assumed mentally fit to proceed unless there are warning signs (e.g., confusion, inability to answer questions).
• Indicia of Incompetence – Observable clues suggesting mental incapacity: incoherent speech, disorientation, medical diagnoses showing cognitive deficit, etc.
• Continuance for “Good Cause” – A pause in the hearing granted only when the requesting party shows a valid reason (illness, new evidence, counsel unavailability) and diligence.
• Substantial-Evidence Review – A deferential appellate standard: the court asks whether the agency’s fact-finding is reasonable, not whether it is the only plausible view.
• Abuse-of-Discretion Review – The appellate court upholds an IJ’s discretionary decision unless it lacks reasoning, contradicts policy, or relies on impermissible factors.

Conclusion

Singh v. Bondi cements two pragmatic rules for immigration adjudication in the Tenth Circuit:

1. The presumption of competency stands firm unless concrete, case-specific evidence connects a respondent’s condition to an inability to understand or participate.
2. Self-imposed or speculative incapacity does not by itself justify continuances; applicants must show diligent preparation and identify specific, probative evidence that additional time would produce.

By harmonizing precedent and articulating these principles in a published opinion, the court offers clear guidance to IJs, litigants, and detention officials, curbing dilatory tactics while safeguarding genuine due-process concerns. Future competency and continuance disputes within the Tenth Circuit—and likely beyond—will look to Singh v. Bondi as a touchstone for balancing administrative efficiency with the fair-hearing rights of non-citizens.