Simultaneous Miranda Warnings Are Valid If Reasonably Conveyed; Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Post‑Bruen Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c), and Tightens Recantation-Based New Trial Relief

Case: United States v. Billy J. Wilkins (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025) — Not Recommended for Publication
Panel: Gibbons, McKeague, and Ritz, JJ. (opinion by Judge Ritz)

Introduction

In this unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and 360-month sentence of Billy Wilkins for drug trafficking and firearms offenses arising from a warranted search of his Kentucky residence. The appeal presented three principal issues:

Whether Wilkins’s incriminating statements and derivative evidence should have been suppressed because officers read Miranda warnings simultaneously to Wilkins and his live-in girlfriend rather than “directly and independently” to him.
Whether Wilkins’s firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) and § 924(c)(1)(A) (possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking) are unconstitutional—facially or as applied—under the Second Amendment and void-for-vagueness doctrine.
Whether a new trial was warranted based on the girlfriend’s post-verdict jail-call “recantation” and whether the district court erred by deciding the motion without an evidentiary hearing.

The court held that: (1) Miranda warnings delivered simultaneously to multiple detainees may be valid when the rights are reasonably conveyed and understood; (2) the panel was bound by recent circuit precedent upholding the facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c) and rejecting Wilkins’s as-applied Second Amendment theories; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial or in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing where the purported recantation was unsworn, emotionally pressured, and inconsistent with trial testimony given under oath pursuant to an immunity agreement.

Summary of the Opinion

Suppression: No Miranda violation. Reading Miranda warnings simultaneously to Wilkins and his girlfriend did not render the advisement defective. The key question is whether the rights were reasonably conveyed and understood. Wilkins nodded and gave a verbal acknowledgment, then promptly made incriminating statements identifying firearms in the residence. Denial of suppression affirmed.
Second Amendment challenges:
- § 922(g)(1) facial challenge — foreclosed by United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024).
- § 924(c) facial challenge — foreclosed by United States v. Risner, 129 F.4th 361 (6th Cir. 2025).
- § 924(c) as-applied — fails because using/possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking is not a “lawful purpose” protected by the Second Amendment. See United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912 (6th Cir. 2025); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
- § 922(g)(1) as-applied — fails under the “dangerousness” framework reaffirmed in Williams; the panel is bound to follow it.
- Vagueness challenge to § 922(g)(1) — fails because Wilkins did not show vagueness as applied to his own conduct (as required outside the First Amendment context).
New trial and evidentiary hearing: Denial affirmed. Applying the Sixth Circuit’s Gordon test, the district court reasonably found it was not “reasonably well satisfied” that the girlfriend’s trial testimony was false. It permissibly credited sworn trial testimony over unsworn, emotionally fraught jail-call statements elicited after repeated pressure by Wilkins. The court also acted within its discretion to deny a hearing, especially given counsel’s concession that the witness would likely invoke the Fifth Amendment if called to testify.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Miranda and adequacy of warnings

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): Established the requirement that suspects be advised of their rights before custodial interrogation.
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989), and California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981): Warnings need not follow a “precise formulation”; the touchstone is whether they reasonably convey the rights.
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004): Emphasizes that courts look to whether officers “adequately and effectively” advise suspects; mere mechanical recitation is not always sufficient.
United States v. Clayton, 937 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 2019): The adequacy inquiry focuses on whether the warnings are reasonably likely to be understood (here, “not likely to confuse a reasonable listener”).
United States v. Ramamoorthy, 949 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2020): Evidence of understanding can include non-verbal acknowledgment (head nod) in combination with other circumstances (there, initialing a waiver form).
United States v. Crumpton, 824 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2016): Sets standards of review—factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo.

These authorities collectively allowed the court to reject a bright-line rule requiring individualized, one-by-one Miranda advisements. The Sixth Circuit anchored its reasoning in the “reasonable conveyance” standard and the particular facts—Wilkins’s nod and immediate, voluntary incriminating response—as evidence of understanding and waiver.

Second Amendment challenges to §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c)

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): Holds § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional and sets out a “dangerousness” framework for as-applied challenges post‑Bruen. Williams controlled the facial challenge and the procedural contours of the as-applied inquiry.
United States v. Greely, No. 23‑1978, 2025 WL 1797223 (6th Cir. June 30, 2025): Confirms no intervening developments justify departing from Williams; panels are bound absent Supreme Court or en banc reversal.
Salmi v. Sec’y of HHS, 774 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1985): Reinforces horizontal stare decisis within the circuit—panels cannot overrule prior published panel decisions.
United States v. Risner, 129 F.4th 361 (6th Cir. 2025): Upholds § 924(c) against facial Second Amendment attacks; applied here to dispose of Wilkins’s facial challenge.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Second Amendment protects keeping and bearing arms for lawful purposes. The court used Heller’s “lawful purpose” language to show that § 924(c) punishes conduct outside the Amendment’s core protection.
United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912 (6th Cir. 2025): Clarifies that using/possessing a gun “in furtherance of” drug trafficking is not a lawful purpose protected by the Second Amendment; supports rejecting Wilkins’s as-applied § 924(c) challenge.

Vagueness doctrine

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015): A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide fair notice or invites arbitrary enforcement.
United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975): Outside the First Amendment context, vagueness challenges must be assessed as applied to the defendant’s conduct—generalized vagueness arguments are insufficient.
United States v. Kettles, 970 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2020): Notes the strong presumption of validity afforded to Acts of Congress; few statutes meet the vagueness threshold.

New trial motions based on recantation

Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1949): Establishes the three-part test for new trials based on recanted testimony—(1) the court must be reasonably well satisfied the trial testimony was false; (2) without it, the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) the defendant was surprised and could not meet it at trial.
United States v. Willis, 257 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Lewis, 338 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1964): Recantations are viewed with extreme suspicion; sworn statements receive a presumption of truthfulness.
United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1991), superseded on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966 (6th Cir. 1997): The trial court is uniquely qualified to assess witness credibility; deference applies.
United States v. Betro, 115 F.4th 429 (6th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2014): Set the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing new trial denials.
United States v. Smith, 749 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2014), and United States v. O’Dell, 805 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1986): Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 33 motion lies within the district court’s discretion.
United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 1994): The defendant bears the burden on a new trial motion; such motions are disfavored and should be granted with caution.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Suppression (Miranda)

The core dispute was whether the Miranda advisement was invalid because it was read “en masse” to Wilkins and his girlfriend, with the officer making more eye contact with the girlfriend. The panel declined to adopt a bright-line rule that warnings must be delivered individually, one person at a time. Instead, drawing on Duckworth and Prysock, the court reiterated that warnings need not follow a “precise formulation”; what matters is whether the suspect was “adequately and effectively” advised such that a reasonable listener would not be confused (Seibert; Clayton).

On these facts, the officer read the standard warnings from a card; Wilkins nodded, gave a verbal acknowledgment, and immediately volunteered incriminating information about the location of firearms inside the house. The court treated the nod and verbal assent—paired with the spontaneous inculpatory statement—as sufficient evidence of understanding (see Ramamoorthy). Because Wilkins did not dispute that he actually understood his rights, his request for a suppression remedy failed.

B. Second Amendment: § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c)

The court rejected both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges. The facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) is foreclosed by Williams. The facial challenge to § 924(c) (using/carrying/possessing a firearm “during and in relation to” or “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime) is foreclosed by Risner. On the as-applied challenge to § 924(c), the court reasoned that the Second Amendment protects arms bearing for “lawful purposes” (Heller), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking is by definition not a lawful purpose (Underwood). Because Wilkins was convicted of the underlying drug trafficking crime and of possessing the firearms in furtherance of that crime, the Second Amendment provided no shelter.

On the as-applied § 922(g)(1) claim, Williams holds that the statute is constitutional as applied to “dangerous” individuals, and it sets the governing dangerousness framework post‑Bruen. Wilkins did not challenge the district court’s dangerousness finding; instead, he attacked Williams’s procedure. The panel reiterated that it is bound by Williams (Greely; Salmi), so the as-applied challenge failed.

C. Vagueness

Wilkins argued that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court applied the standard rule that, outside the First Amendment context, a vagueness challenge must be evaluated as applied to the defendant’s conduct (Krumrei; Powell). Because Wilkins offered only generalized vagueness arguments and did not demonstrate that § 922(g)(1) failed to give him fair notice or invited arbitrary enforcement in his particular circumstances—and because Acts of Congress are strongly presumed valid (Kettles)—the argument failed. The panel did not need to reach “overbreadth,” a doctrine typically reserved for First Amendment cases.

D. New Trial and Evidentiary Hearing

Applying Gordon, the district court denied a new trial on the first prong—lack of satisfaction that the trial testimony was false. The appellate panel found no abuse of discretion. DePew testified under oath at trial and had an immunity agreement conditioned on truthful testimony. The later jail-call “recantation” was unsworn, made under significant emotional pressure, and occurred in the context of Wilkins repeatedly urging her to retract. Given the Sixth Circuit’s longstanding skepticism toward recantations (Willis; Lewis), and the trial judge’s unique vantage to assess credibility (Chambers; Avery), it was permissible to credit the sworn testimony over the unsworn statements.

As to the request for an evidentiary hearing, the district court acted within its discretion (Smith; O’Dell). Defense counsel acknowledged that DePew would likely invoke the Fifth Amendment if called, undermining the utility of a hearing. The court had already observed DePew at trial and could resolve the motion on the paper record without an evidentiary proceeding.

3) Impact and Practical Implications

Miranda practice: No per se rule against simultaneous advisements

Law enforcement in the Sixth Circuit can read Miranda to more than one suspect at once, provided the warnings are clearly and effectively conveyed and each suspect manifests understanding. The safest practice remains to confirm understanding individually and, where feasible, obtain an explicit, individualized acknowledgment or written waiver.
Courts will look at the totality of circumstances, including non-verbal cues (e.g., nods), verbal acknowledgments, and the immediacy and voluntariness of subsequent statements.

Second Amendment litigation: Limited pathways post‑Williams, Risner, and Underwood

§ 922(g)(1) remains facially valid in the Sixth Circuit; as-applied challenges must grapple with the circuit’s “dangerousness” framework. Absent Supreme Court intervention or en banc reconsideration, panels will adhere to Williams.
§ 924(c) now sits on solid constitutional footing in the Sixth Circuit both facially (Risner) and as applied to drug-trafficking contexts (Underwood). Arguments that seek to recast in‑furtherance possession as protected “self-defense” in the home are unlikely to succeed when coupled with drug trafficking convictions.
Defense counsel should anticipate that generalized post‑Bruen arguments will be rejected unless tightly anchored to the circuit’s historical-tradition analysis and the specific as-applied dangerousness framework.

Vagueness challenges: Must be as-applied (outside First Amendment)

General vagueness attacks on § 922(g)(1) will fail. Defendants must show that the statutory terms are unclear in the context of their actual conduct and prosecution.

New trial motions based on recantation: Heavy skepticism endures

Unsworn, post-trial “recantations” obtained in emotionally charged, recorded jail calls—particularly when a defendant is urging the witness to change their story—will rarely satisfy the first Gordon prong.
Trial judges retain broad discretion to deny evidentiary hearings when they can adjudicate credibility on the record and where further proceedings would be unproductive (e.g., anticipated invocation of the Fifth Amendment).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Miranda warnings: Before custodial interrogation, police must advise a suspect of the right to remain silent, that statements may be used against them, the right to an attorney, and the right to appointed counsel if indigent. The warnings need not be read verbatim from any script; the question is whether a reasonable person would understand their rights in context.
Implied understanding and waiver: A suspect’s nods, “uh-huh/yes,” and immediate voluntary statements following an advisement can demonstrate understanding of rights and an implied decision to speak.
Facial vs. as‑applied constitutional challenges: A facial challenge claims a law is unconstitutional in all its applications; an as-applied challenge argues the law is unconstitutional as applied to the particular defendant’s circumstances.
Void-for-vagueness: A criminal law is impermissibly vague if it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of what conduct is prohibited or invites arbitrary enforcement. Outside the First Amendment, a defendant must show vagueness as applied to their own case.
“Dangerousness” in § 922(g)(1): Under Sixth Circuit precedent (Williams), the historical tradition supports disarming dangerous persons. Thus, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to individuals deemed dangerous under that framework.
§ 924(c) “in furtherance of”: Requires a nexus between the firearm and the drug trafficking offense, such as possession of the firearm to protect drugs, proceeds, or the trafficking operation. Such use is not a lawful purpose under the Second Amendment.
Standards of review:
- Suppression rulings: factual findings—clear error; legal conclusions—de novo.
- New trial motions: abuse of discretion (a deferential standard).
Recantation and the Gordon test: To obtain a new trial based on recanted testimony, the court must be convinced the trial testimony was false, that the verdict might have been different without it, and that the defendant was surprised and unable to challenge it at trial. Courts view recantations with “extreme suspicion,” especially when unsworn or influenced by emotional or relational pressures.

Conclusion

United States v. Wilkins provides three salient clarifications for practitioners in the Sixth Circuit:

There is no per se invalidity when officers deliver Miranda warnings simultaneously to more than one person. The touchstone remains whether the warnings were reasonably conveyed and understood—something that can be shown through a combination of acknowledgments and the suspect’s subsequent voluntary statements.
In the wake of Williams, Risner, and Underwood, Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c) face steep headwinds in the Sixth Circuit. § 922(g)(1) remains facially valid, and as-applied challenges turn on a dangerousness inquiry; § 924(c) punishes conduct not protected by the Amendment because it involves unlawful purposes tied to drug trafficking.
Recantation-based new trial motions remain disfavored. District courts may rely on the presumption of truthfulness of sworn trial testimony, assess credibility based on their firsthand observations, and decline hearings where they are unlikely to aid resolution.

Although not precedential, Wilkins is a detailed, up-to-date application of the Sixth Circuit’s Miranda jurisprudence, its post‑Bruen Second Amendment framework, and its disciplined approach to recantation-driven Rule 33 motions. It will be persuasive authority for district courts and litigants confronting similar suppression, constitutional, and new-trial issues.