Introduction

In the case of Jeff Silvester, et al. v. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California (138 S. Ct. 945, 2018), plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of California's 10-day waiting period for the purchase of firearms. The plaintiffs, comprising lawful gun owners and non-profit organizations, argued that this waiting period infringed upon their Second Amendment rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The central issue revolves around whether California's waiting period constitutes an unconstitutional burden on the right to keep and bear arms, particularly concerning "subsequent purchasers" who already possess firearms.

Summary of the Judgment

The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, thereby upholding the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which favored California's waiting period. The Ninth Circuit had applied an intermediate scrutiny standard, aligning the waiting period with regulations concerning other constitutional rights. However, Justice Clarence Thomas, dissenting from the denial, criticized the lower court's application of intermediate scrutiny, asserting that it effectively amounted to a rational-basis review. He contended that the Second Amendment, being an enumerated right, should not be subjected to mere rational explanations and requires a higher level of judicial protection.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The dissent heavily references landmark cases such as McDonald v. Chicago and District of Columbia v. Heller, which establish and affirm the individual's right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. Justice Thomas underscores that these precedents mandate strict judicial scrutiny of laws infringing upon this right. Furthermore, he critiques the Ninth Circuit's reliance on intermediate scrutiny, a standard more lenient than necessary for constitutional rights of this magnitude.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Thomas argues that because the Second Amendment is explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, laws affecting it should not be evaluated under intermediate or rational-basis scrutiny, but rather under a strict scrutiny framework. He posits that the Ninth Circuit failed to adequately justify the waiting period with empirical evidence, instead relying on "common sense." Additionally, he points out procedural shortcomings, such as the lower court's failure to consider evidence related to "subsequent purchasers," and criticizes the appellate court for not deferring to factual findings made during the district court's trial.

Impact

This dissent highlights a significant tension in Second Amendment jurisprudence: the appropriate standard of review for laws regulating firearms. If Justice Thomas's perspective gains traction, it could lead to more stringent evaluations of firearm regulations, potentially striking down laws like California's waiting period. This would have wide-ranging implications for gun control measures nationwide, possibly limiting states' abilities to implement waiting periods or similar regulations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Standards of Scrutiny

Courts use different levels of scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of laws:

• Rational-Basis Review: The most lenient standard, requiring that a law be reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.
• Intermediate Scrutiny: A mid-level standard requiring that a law serve an important government interest and be substantially related to achieving that interest.
• Strict Scrutiny: The most stringent standard, requiring that a law serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

Justice Thomas argues that the Second Amendment merits strict scrutiny, not just intermediate or rational-basis review, due to its explicit constitutional protection.

Second Amendment Rights

The Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms. This right is considered fundamental, meaning that laws infringing upon it require the highest level of judicial scrutiny to ensure they are justified and not overly restrictive.