Silent Record Bars Direct-Appeal McCoy Relief: Objection Must Appear in the Record; Otherwise the Concession-of-Guilt Claim Proceeds by Habeas

Case: People of Guam v. Brian Jason Martinez (aka Brenda Joyce Martinez; aka Joyce), Cite: 2025 Guam 17 (Supreme Court of Guam, Dec. 30, 2025)

I. Introduction

People of Guam v. Martinez arises from a high-speed police chase involving an allegedly stolen truck, a crash, and Martinez’s arrest the next day, during which police found a glass pipe and methamphetamine in her purse. Martinez faced multiple charges: theft of an automobile, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, eluding a police officer, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and reckless driving with property damage. The trial court granted acquittal on disorderly conduct. At trial, defense counsel adopted a stark strategy: concede Martinez was “dead to rights” on all remaining counts except auto theft, and focus the jury on acquittal of the theft felony. The jury acquitted on theft but convicted on the other offenses.

On appeal, Martinez raised only one claim: that counsel’s concessions violated the Sixth Amendment autonomy principle recognized in McCoy v. Louisiana, because the record did not show Martinez authorized the concessions and contained no colloquy or waiver. The Supreme Court of Guam confronted a procedural problem: the record was silent on whether Martinez objected, consented, or was even consulted. The court had previously denied a motion for limited remand and expressly directed that a McCoy claim could be raised on direct appeal only if the client’s objection appeared “somewhere in the record.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The opinion does not decide whether a McCoy violation occurred. Instead, it establishes and reinforces a preservation/record-adequacy rule for Guam: absent a record-based indication of the defendant’s objection (or otherwise sufficient record evidence of the defendant’s autonomy choice), the Supreme Court will not adjudicate a McCoy claim on direct appeal.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The autonomy right and structural error: McCoy v. Louisiana

The decision’s constitutional center of gravity is McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018). McCoy held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to insist that counsel not concede guilt to the charged crime over the defendant’s “intransigent objection” (¶ 19). The Guam court quotes McCoy’s key navigation metaphor: when the client makes “express statements of the client’s will to maintain innocence,” counsel may not “steer the ship the other way” (¶ 19). McCoy further characterizes such a violation as structural error—requiring a new trial without a prejudice showing (¶ 20).

Crucially, the Guam court uses McCoy to identify what is missing from the record: the defendant’s “intransigent and unambiguous objection” or equivalent record evidence that counsel overrode the defendant’s expressed objective (¶¶ 3, 19–21, 45–47). McCoy thus supplies both the substantive right and (indirectly) the evidentiary trigger: appellate courts need something concrete in the record demonstrating the defendant’s autonomy choice.

2. Ineffective assistance frameworks and the concession problem: United States v. Cronic, Florida v. Nixon, United States v. Swanson, and state “per se” approaches

The opinion carefully separates—but then reconnects—autonomy (McCoy) and competence (ineffective assistance) doctrines:

• United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), is cited for the proposition that certain attorney failures reflect an “actual breakdown of the adversarial process,” permitting presumed prejudice (¶ 22).
• Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004), is used to underscore that not every concession strategy automatically violates the Sixth Amendment when the defendant is nonresponsive; Nixon held no blanket rule requires explicit consent when counsel consults and the defendant “remains silent” (¶¶ 25–26).
• United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991), is invoked to show that conceding the core disputed issue can relieve the prosecution of its burden, supporting presumed prejudice under Cronic in appropriate circumstances (¶ 23).
• The opinion surveys state-law “per se” ineffective-assistance lines such as State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. 1985), and notes North Carolina’s “Harbison claim” practice (¶ 23), along with later elaborations including State v. Thompson, 604 S.E.2d 850 (N.C. 2004), and State v. Thomas, 397 S.E.2d 79 (N.C. 1990) (note 4). Florida’s state cases—Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000), and Nixon v. State, 857 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2003)—are presented as examples of state approaches later reversed or undermined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon (¶¶ 24–25).

This body of law influences the Guam court’s key doctrinal clarification: McCoy is not the exclusive lens for concession cases; concession conduct may implicate McCoy autonomy, Cronic breakdown, Nixon consultation/silence principles, or more than one at once (¶¶ 22, 28, 37). That matters procedurally: if the record is silent, the proper vehicle may be collateral proceedings (habeas), where consultation, consent, and objection can be litigated as facts.

3. The record-adequacy/preservation line: Turner v. State, People v. Eddy, and federal reluctance to remand on direct appeal

• Turner v. State, 570 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), is cited for the proposition that a defendant cannot stay silent and raise McCoy only after trial, but the Guam court adopts Turner’s softer preservation standard: the defendant need not object “with the precision of an attorney,” and “express statements” of will to maintain innocence are what matter (¶ 30).
• People v. Eddy, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872 (Ct. App. 2019), is used to reject the notion that the defendant must interrupt proceedings in court; instead, the record must show (1) the defendant’s plain objective to maintain innocence and (2) counsel overriding that objective by conceding guilt (¶¶ 31–32, 44–45).
• United States v. Felicianosoto, 934 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2019), is cited as an example where an appellate court declined a request for remand to address McCoy on direct appeal (¶ 35).

These cases collectively support Guam’s insistence on a reviewable record. The court frames the issue as not whether the autonomy right exists (it does), but whether the appellate court can meaningfully adjudicate its violation without record support (¶ 35). The court emphasizes a basic appellate constraint: it will not “presume” a constitutional violation from silence (¶¶ 44–46).

4. Guam’s longstanding preference for collateral factual development

The decision is also grounded in Guam’s own appellate practice: when Sixth Amendment claims require facts beyond the trial record, the court has consistently directed defendants to collateral proceedings. The opinion lists numerous Guam cases reflecting that preference, including People v. Ueki, People v. Root, People v. Hall, People v. Aguirre, People v. Meseral, People v. Damian, People v. Guerrero, People v. Roberson, People v. Nathan, People v. Quintanilla, People v. Titus, People v. Reyes, People v. Taisacan, and People v. Narruhn (note 9).

Two additional Guam citations sharpen this procedural frame:

• People v. Mendiola, 2023 Guam 12 ¶ 17, provides the standard of review statement for preserved Sixth Amendment issues (¶ 16), highlighting that preservation matters.
• People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7 ¶ 14, is cited against the suggestion that Guam lacks any post-conviction avenue; the Superior Court’s general jurisdiction can entertain post-conviction motions absent an explicit statutory bar (¶ 35 n.7).

5. Remand authority and California analogues: People v. Wilson and People v. Braxton

The court acknowledges it has broad discretion to order a limited remand “as may be just under the circumstances” under 8 GCA § 130.60, and looks to California analogues because the provision is derived from California law (note 3). It cites People v. Wilson, 552 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2024), and People v. Braxton, 101 P.3d 994 (Cal. 2004), for the principle that limited remand may resolve factual issues affecting validity of judgment distinct from jury issues (note 3). Yet the court ultimately reaffirms remand is available but declines to use it here, preserving its institutional preference for habeas factual development absent a compelling justification (¶¶ 33, 36, 43).

6. Guidance on briefing and appellate obligations: Lamb v. Hoffman and Wilson v. Taylor

The court criticizes the appellant’s failure to support the request to revisit the prior order with adequate authority and analysis, invoking Lamb v. Hoffman, 2008 Guam 2 ¶ 35 (quoting Wilson v. Taylor, 577 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. 1998)), for the principle that a party may not simply “announce a position” and force the court to research and rationalize it (¶ 17). This is less about McCoy and more about appellate discipline: if a litigant seeks to upend settled procedural practice, the burden is on the litigant to engage the court’s precedent and contrary authorities.

7. Habeas appointment and prima facie screening: People v. Romero, May v. People, In re Clark, Martinez v. Ryan

On the habeas-counsel appointment, the court leans on California’s habeas screening structure:

• People v. Romero, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994), for the “prima facie case” threshold (¶ 48).
• May v. People, 2005 Guam 17 ¶ 9, for treating California habeas caselaw as persuasive when Guam’s habeas statutes derive from California (¶ 48).
• In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993), for the idea that counsel is typically appointed after prima facie showing (¶ 48) and due process concerns (¶ 48).
• Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), cited for the (suggested) importance of effective counsel in initial collateral proceedings when they are the first opportunity to raise certain ineffective-assistance claims (¶ 48).

This cluster supports the court’s discretionary, facilitative stance: even though the direct appeal is affirmed, the court attempts to ensure the autonomy/concession issue is litigated in a meaningful forum with counsel.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s operative distinction: substantive right vs. appellate reviewability

A central analytic move is the court’s insistence that recognizing a Sixth Amendment autonomy right does not answer whether an appellate court can adjudicate its violation on a silent record (¶ 35). The court treats record adequacy as a prerequisite to merits review, not as an element that defines whether the right exists. This reframing responds to the appellant’s argument that requiring a record objection “turns McCoy on its head” (¶ 30) by clarifying that the issue is preservation and proof, not the right’s existence.

2. Harmonizing McCoy and Nixon to define the fact questions that must be answered

The opinion’s doctrinal synthesis is practical: concession cases turn on consultation and the defendant’s expressed objective. The court adopts the formulation attributed to federal interpretation: counsel must consult; and if the client “engages” and insists on innocence, counsel cannot override (¶ 20; see also ¶ 45 referencing United States v. Hashimi). The problem on direct appeal is that consultation/consent/objection are typically off-record attorney-client communications. Without record evidence, an appellate court cannot determine whether the case is:

• a McCoy autonomy override (express insistence on innocence ignored),
• a Nixon-type situation (consultation occurred; defendant did not approve or protest),
• an ineffective-assistance breakdown under Cronic/Swanson, or
• some combination.

Because those categories require factual findings, the court concludes collateral proceedings are the proper mechanism absent record evidence (¶¶ 46–47).

3. Why limited remand was rejected (in this case)

The court acknowledges it has power to order limited remand (note 3; ¶ 36), and it concedes there are non-frivolous policy arguments for remand (¶ 36; note 8). But it rejects remand here for reasons that are as much institutional as doctrinal:

• Noncompliance with a prior appellate directive: the court had instructed not to raise McCoy on a silent record; appellant did so anyway, without persuasive justification (¶¶ 4, 33).
• Inapposite authority: appellant’s reliance on United States v. Hashimi was misplaced because it arose in a post-conviction posture, not direct appeal (¶ 34). Other cited cases likewise involved post-conviction evidentiary development (¶ 34).
• Failure to engage Guam precedent: appellant did not confront the court’s long line of cases preferring habeas for extra-record Sixth Amendment development (¶ 36; note 9).
• Judicial economy not established here: while remand may sometimes be efficient, it is not categorically so; the court offers considerations (e.g., existence of other appellate issues, affidavits, judicial economy analysis) but finds remand unjustified on these facts and briefing (¶¶ 41–43).

4. The court’s “procedural safety valve”: affirmance without prejudice plus appointment of habeas counsel

The remedy structure reflects a balance between procedural regularity (no merits adjudication on silence) and constitutional sensitivity (autonomy rights and structural error concerns). By affirming without prejudice and appointing habeas counsel (¶¶ 47–51), the court signals that:

• the claim is not forfeited forever merely because it cannot be adjudicated on direct appeal, and
• the system should provide a realistic path to litigate consultation/consent facts.

The opinion also cautions that habeas practice typically expects consolidation of claims in the first petition (note 13, citing In re Friend, 489 P.3d 309 (Cal. 2021)), encouraging comprehensive post-conviction litigation rather than piecemeal filings.

C. Impact

1. A concrete Guam procedural rule for McCoy on direct appeal

The opinion establishes an explicit rule of appellate reviewability in Guam: a McCoy claim is reachable on direct appeal only if the client’s objection appears “somewhere in the record” (¶ 50). In practice, this is likely to:

• shift many concession-of-guilt disputes to habeas proceedings, where attorney-client communications can be proven via testimony, affidavits, and credibility findings;
• reduce the Supreme Court’s willingness to entertain direct-appeal McCoy claims premised solely on the absence of an on-record waiver/colloquy; and
• increase the importance of developing a record at trial (or at least creating record indicia of the defendant’s position), without necessarily requiring disruptive in-court objections.

2. Practical incentives for defense counsel and trial courts (without mandating a colloquy)

The court expressly notes that federal law does not require a colloquy before concession strategies, citing United States v. Hashimi’s observation that counsel “might be well advised” to put consultations on the record, especially outside capital contexts where concessions are rare (¶ 27). While Guam does not mandate a colloquy, this decision will predictably create incentives:

• For counsel: document consultation and client objectives in a way that can be made record-accessible if needed (e.g., sealed statements, in-court confirmations where appropriate, or other ethically permissible methods).
• For trial judges: consider whether, in high-risk concession situations, a brief inquiry would protect the record and reduce later post-conviction litigation—recognizing the court did not impose such a requirement here.

3. Expanded attention to limited remand practice—but no doctrinal shift yet

Although the court declines remand, it offers a roadmap for future litigants seeking limited remand under 8 GCA § 130.60: address judicial economy, identify whether other trial errors exist, and support motions with affidavits under Guam R. App. P. 6 (¶ 42). This is an invitation to better-developed remand requests in future cases, even as the court reaffirms its general preference for habeas factual development (¶ 46).

4. A notable use of appointment power in aid of meaningful collateral review

By appointing habeas counsel sua sponte (¶¶ 48–49), the court pragmatically acknowledges that the direct appeal posture may be structurally ill-suited to prove autonomy override, and that meaningful litigation requires counsel. This may influence future cases where the Supreme Court perceives a potentially meritorious Sixth Amendment claim that is unreviewable on the trial record alone.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “McCoy claim”: A Sixth Amendment argument that counsel violated the defendant’s personal right to choose the objective of the defense—specifically, the right to insist on maintaining innocence—by conceding guilt over the defendant’s expressed objection.
• “Autonomy” vs. “effective assistance”: Autonomy is about who decides certain fundamental objectives (e.g., maintain innocence). Effective assistance is about whether counsel’s performance was competent. This opinion stresses they can overlap when counsel concedes guilt (¶¶ 22, 28, 37).
• “Structural error”: A constitutional error so fundamental that courts presume harm; the defendant need not prove the outcome would have been different. McCoy characterizes autonomy violations as structural (¶ 20).
• Nixon consultation-and-silence scenario: If counsel consults and the defendant does not approve or protest, explicit consent is not always constitutionally required before implementing a concession strategy (¶ 26).
• “Silent record”: The trial transcript and filings contain no information proving whether the defendant objected, consented, or was consulted. An appellate court generally cannot decide fact-bound constitutional claims on such a record (¶¶ 35, 44–47).
• “Direct appeal” vs. “habeas corpus”: Direct appeal reviews the trial record for legal error. Habeas is a collateral proceeding that can develop new evidence (testimony/affidavits) to resolve claims dependent on facts outside the trial record—like private attorney-client consultations.
• “Limited remand”: A temporary return of the case to the trial court during the appeal so the trial court can make factual findings or exercise discretion on a specific issue. Guam has authority to do this, but the court prefers habeas for most extra-record Sixth Amendment claims unless compelling reasons are shown (note 3; ¶¶ 36, 43, 46).

V. Conclusion

People of Guam v. Martinez is chiefly a procedural precedent with constitutional stakes. The Supreme Court of Guam held that a McCoy autonomy claim is reviewable on direct appeal only when the defendant’s objection to counsel’s concession appears somewhere in the trial record; appellate courts will not presume a Sixth Amendment violation from silence (¶ 50). Where consultation, consent, and objection are off-record, the proper route is a collateral habeas proceeding capable of factual development (¶¶ 5, 47, 51).

The decision also clarifies the doctrinal landscape: concession-of-guilt disputes may implicate McCoy autonomy, Cronic breakdown principles, and Nixon consultation rules, sometimes simultaneously (¶¶ 22, 28). Finally, the court’s affirmance “without prejudice,” coupled with appointing habeas counsel, reflects an effort to preserve meaningful adjudication of a potentially structural constitutional claim while maintaining the institutional boundary that appellate review requires an adequate record.