Silencing Crime Victims by Nondisclosure Agreement as Professional Misconduct:
Commentary on Disciplinary Counsel v. Rossi, 2025-Ohio-5398

I. Introduction

In Disciplinary Counsel v. Rossi, 2025-Ohio-5398, the Supreme Court of Ohio imposed a six-month suspension on attorney Gregg August Rossi for ethical violations arising out of his representation of a criminal defendant accused of assaulting his romantic partner. The opinion is significant for two main reasons:

It squarely holds that an attorney-drafted nondisclosure agreement (NDA) designed to limit a crime victim’s communications about the underlying events with law enforcement and prosecutors is void as against public policy and that drafting such an agreement can constitute conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
It reinforces the primacy of the lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal over client-protective instincts, even where attorney-client privilege constrains disclosure, and clarifies that lawyers may not mislead a court to conceal a client’s violation of bond conditions.

The court also links this conduct to Ohio’s victims’ rights regime under Marsy’s Law and underscores that attempting to “contract around” a criminal prosecution—by silencing a victim through private agreement—implicates core public policy concerns.

This commentary analyzes the decision, its factual background, the rules and precedents applied, and the broader implications for criminal defense practice, victim-related agreements, and the use of NDAs in matters involving alleged criminal conduct.

II. Overview of the Case

A. Parties and Context

Relator: Disciplinary Counsel for the Supreme Court of Ohio (the entity responsible for investigating and prosecuting attorney misconduct).
Respondent: Gregg August Rossi, an Ohio lawyer admitted in 1990, long-time practitioner in Youngstown, with no prior discipline.
Underlying matter: Rossi represented Dr. John Yerkey, a chiropractor, on a misdemeanor assault charge. The alleged victim, “T.D.,” was Yerkey’s romantic partner and a pharmacist.

The assault case included a bond condition of no contact between Yerkey and T.D. Despite this, the two continued to communicate. In that context, Rossi drafted a “Mutual Release, Settlement Agreement, and Nondisclosure Agreement” (“NDA” or “agreement”) which:

Explicitly referenced the pending criminal case (Case No. 2021 CRB 00385 in Mahoning County Area Court No. 5);
Required T.D. to request dismissal of the criminal charges; and
Imposed a sweeping confidentiality obligation backed by a $1,000 penalty per disclosure, covering all communications between the parties during a timeframe that included the alleged assault.

B. Procedural History

March 2024: Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint alleging violations of:
- Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) – knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal; and
- Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) – conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
The parties entered into factual stipulations and exhibits; a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct held a hearing at which Rossi and others testified.
The Board found clear and convincing evidence of both charged violations and recommended:
- a six-month suspension, and
- as a condition of reinstatement, six hours of CLE in ethics, professionalism, and Marsy’s Law.
Rossi objected only to the sanction, arguing for a public reprimand or a fully stayed suspension.
The Supreme Court overruled his objections, adopted the Board’s findings and recommendations, and imposed an actual six-month suspension with the CLE condition.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Findings Underlying the Misconduct

The court’s key factual determinations include:

Attorney-client relationship and friendship: Rossi and Yerkey had a long-standing professional and social relationship. Rossi had even co-owned a residence with Yerkey and remained his landlord during 2021–2022.
No-contact order: After the assault charge in December 2021, the trial court ordered no contact between Yerkey and T.D. Nonetheless:
- T.D. contacted Yerkey on Christmas Eve 2021.
- They continued communicating about the case and bond conditions.
- Rossi reminded his client about the order but simultaneously suggested that being “on good terms” with T.D. “will help you in the long run,” and asked questions that presupposed ongoing contact.
The NDA:
- Drafted by Rossi at Yerkey’s request while the criminal case was pending.
- Covered May 1, 2021 to February 10, 2022 (encompassing the alleged assault and lead-up to a pretrial).
- Required T.D. to “request that the charges in Case No. 2021 CRB 00385 … be dismissed without prejudice.”
- Prohibited disclosure of “any personal information between the parties” (texts, emails, calls, pictures, etc.) during that period, with a $1,000 penalty per disclosure.
- Rossi never spoke to T.D. before she appeared at his office to sign; he did not advise her to seek independent counsel.
Effect on the criminal case:
- After signing, T.D. believed she could not continue cooperating with prosecutors without financial exposure.
- She informed the prosecutor’s office that she could no longer talk about the case, leading the office to believe it had lost a key witness.
- Assistant prosecutor Patrick Fening moved to compel production of the NDA; Rossi filed objections.
False statement to the court:
- In written objections, Rossi stated: “The terms and conditions of this Agreement were negotiated between [T.D.] and undersigned counsel…”
- This was false; Rossi had had no prior direct contact with T.D. before she came to his office simply to sign.
- The Board and court found this was not a mere “mistake” but a deliberate attempt to conceal ongoing violations of the no-contact order and to avoid bond revocation, and potentially Marsy’s Law issues.
Judicial response and eventual conviction:
- Judge Molly Johnson conducted an in camera review of the NDA, recused herself due to concerns arising from it, and referred Rossi to Disciplinary Counsel.
- A retired judge was appointed. With independent counsel, T.D. resumed cooperation. After a bench trial, Yerkey was convicted of assault and received the maximum 180-day sentence.

B. Rules Violated

Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) – Rossi knowingly made a false statement of fact to a tribunal by claiming he negotiated the NDA with T.D.
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) – Rossi engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by:
- implicitly encouraging his client to violate a no-contact bond condition,
- drafting a public-policy-void NDA that was designed in part to influence or thwart the prosecution of the criminal case,
- failing to explain the NDA to T.D. or suggest independent counsel though its terms directly affected the criminal prosecution and her rights, and
- delaying and complicating the criminal proceedings, necessitating the appointment of a new judge.

C. Sanction and Conditions

Aggravating factors (Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)):
- Dishonest or selfish motive;
- Multiple rule violations;
- Refusal to acknowledge the full wrongful nature of his misconduct.
Mitigating factors (Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)):
- No prior disciplinary record;
- Cooperative attitude in the disciplinary process;
- Extensive character evidence and reputation for good character and professional service.

Balancing these, the court imposed:

Six-month suspension from the practice of law;
Condition of reinstatement: proof of completing six hours of CLE specifically in ethics, professionalism, and Marsy’s Law, in addition to the standard CLE requirements.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Court’s Treatment of the NDA as Contrary to Public Policy

The central doctrinal contribution of Rossi is its clear statement that a contract provision which attempts to prevent a party from disclosing information about criminal activity to law enforcement or from cooperating in a criminal prosecution is unenforceable as a matter of public policy. The court situates this within a long-standing line of Ohio and national authority.

1. Foundational Ohio public policy contract cases

The court draws first on general contract principles:

Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132 (1823) – Early Ohio law recognizing that freedom of contract is valuable but not absolute; contracts “against the public law, general policy, or public justice” are invalid.
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64 (1916) – Reiterates that “liberty of contract is not an absolute and unlimited right,” but “subservient to the public welfare.”
Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 54 Ohio St.2d 45 (1978) – Adopts the test that a contract is void as against public policy if its purpose is “injurious to the public or contravenes some established interest of society.”

In Rossi, these principles are applied not to a typical commercial contract, but to a confidentiality agreement targeting a crime victim during a pending criminal case. The court emphasizes:

“We therefore conclude that Rossi’s drafting of the nondisclosure agreement to specifically identify the criminal case against Yerkey and prohibit T.D. from disclosing in any manner any communication that occurred between the parties during the period in which the alleged criminal offense occurred was unethical and prejudicial to the administration of justice to the extent that it purported to prevent T.D. from disclosing information about Yerkey’s alleged crimes to law-enforcement authorities.” (¶ 51, 16)

This is a strong reaffirmation that private agreements cannot be wielded to “buy” the suppression of criminal complaints or evidence, or to fence off a victim from the criminal justice system.

2. Older Ohio rule on releases tied to suppression of prosecution

The court then invokes a narrower but closely related line of Ohio cases:

Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hull, 51 Ohio St. 270 (1894) – Syllabus: a contract whose consideration, in whole or in part, is the suppression of a criminal prosecution is of no legal effect.
Brown v. Best Prods., Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 32 (1985) – Applies Springfield Fire to hold that a release whose consideration is suppression of a criminal prosecution is void for lack of consideration.

In those cases, the suppression was typically of threatened criminal charges used to cut off legitimate civil claims. Rossi extends the same public policy rationale to a setting where:

a real, pending criminal prosecution is ongoing, and
a victim is being induced to contractually “request dismissal” of that case while also being penalized for communicating about the underlying events.

The court goes further and clarifies that even without coercion (though there was some here, given T.D.’s testimony about threats involving her employer), such provisions are void:

“[A] contractual provision that frustrates the prosecution of a criminal case is void against public policy even absent such coercion.” (¶ 48)

3. National authority and modern NDA context

The court anchors Ohio’s rule in broader national doctrine, citing:

Fomby-Denson v. Dept. of the Army, 247 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) – Holds that courts will not enforce contracts that bar a party from reporting alleged misconduct to law enforcement for investigation and possible prosecution. The Rossi court quotes the Federal Circuit’s statement that this is a “long-standing principle” of contract law. (¶ 49)
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) – Notes that agreements to conceal information relevant to the commission of a crime are contrary to public policy.
Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1972) – Recognizes broad public policy favoring disclosure of criminal activity.
Baker v. Citizens Bank of Guntersville, 282 Ala. 33 (1968); Groening v. Nowlen, 369 Mich. 28 (1963) – Both reflect the principle that contractual promises to conceal crimes or refrain from pressing charges are unenforceable.
Cosby v. American Media, Inc., 197 F.Supp.3d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2016) – Holds that to the extent a confidential settlement agreement purports to bar voluntary disclosure of information about crimes to law enforcement, it is unenforceable as against public policy.

By weaving these authorities together, the court moves beyond the older formulation of “suppression of prosecution” and articulates in modern NDA terms:

“[T]o the extent a [confidential settlement agreement] purports to prevent its signatories from voluntarily disclosing information about crimes to law enforcement authorities, it is unenforceable as against public policy.” (quoting Cosby, ¶ 50)

Rossi thus updates and harmonizes Ohio doctrine with contemporary concerns over NDAs used in contexts like domestic violence, sexual assault, and other criminal misconduct: lawyers may not draft or rely on confidentiality clauses whose effect is to obstruct or chill lawful cooperation with law enforcement.

B. Duty of Candor vs. Confidentiality: The False Statement to the Tribunal

1. The specific false statement

Rossi’s 3.3(a)(1) violation arose from a single but purposeful misrepresentation: he told the Mahoning County Area Court that the NDA “was negotiated between [T.D.] and undersigned counsel.” In reality:

Rossi never negotiated with T.D.;
All negotiations were between his client, in violation of the no-contact order, and T.D.;
Rossi only saw T.D. when she appeared to sign the pre-drafted NDA.

The Board rejected Rossi’s characterization of this as an inadvertent “mistake.” The Supreme Court agreed, finding that he lied to conceal violations of the no-contact order and to forestall bond-revocation proceedings or inquiry into possible Marsy’s Law issues (¶ 19–20).

2. The primacy of candor: Nienaber and Rule 3.3

Rossi argued that he was constrained by attorney-client privilege from revealing that Yerkey had violated the bond condition. But the court stressed that—even accepting privilege as a constraint—he could not affirmatively mislead the tribunal.

The court cites Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Nienaber, 80 Ohio St.3d 534 (1997), which in turn quotes the Nebraska Supreme Court:

“An attorney owes his first duty to the court. He assumed his obligations toward it before he ever had a client. His oath requires him to be absolutely honest even though his clients’ interests may seem to require a contrary course… The [lawyer] cannot serve two masters; and the one [he has] undertaken to serve primarily is the court.” (¶ 36)

Rule 3.3’s commentary (Comment 2) is also invoked:

“[T]he advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal … means the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.” (¶ 37)

Put simply: if privilege prevents disclosure, the lawyer’s lawful option is to remain silent or decline to answer—not to fabricate a false “safe” story to protect the client.

C. Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice (Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d))

The 8.4(d) analysis is the opinion’s other major doctrinal component. The court identifies three distinct aspects of prejudicial conduct.

1. Implicit encouragement of bond violation

Although Rossi sometimes reminded his client about the no-contact order, one text read:

“I cannot recommend you violate a court order. If you do[,] that is at your own risk. Obviously if you are on good terms that will help you in the long run but your call.” (¶ 11, 33–34)

Key points in the court’s reasoning:

The text simultaneously acknowledges the order and suggests that continued contact might benefit the client’s case.
By saying “your call,” Rossi effectively delegated compliance with the court order to the client’s discretion, rather than insisting on obedience.
He later requested updates T.D. could only provide by violating the no-contact order (“What’s up with [T.D.]?”), reinforcing his acquiescence in continued contact.

For the court, this crossed the line from passive failure to stop misconduct into active, if indirect, encouragement, particularly given the attorney’s role as officer of the court and the predictable consequence that such contact would impact the prosecution and bond conditions.

2. The false pleading and concealment of no-contact violations

The false statement about negotiating the NDA affected more than abstract “truth-telling”: it obscured concrete procedural ramifications:

The assistant prosecutor testified that, had he known about the ongoing contact, he would have brought a bond-revocation issue to the court and perhaps moved to revoke bond.
Judge Johnson testified that her practice is to hold a bond-revocation hearing when a no-contact order is violated and that she would have “absolutely” considered such a hearing here (¶ 20).

Thus, Rossi’s misrepresentation directly interfered with the court’s ability to enforce its own orders and regulate liberty pending trial—core elements of the “administration of justice.”

3. Drafting an NDA intended to thwart prosecution

The court closely reads the NDA:

It specifically names the pending criminal case and requires T.D. to request dismissal.
It imposes a sweeping confidentiality obligation covering virtually all communications between the parties during the period that includes the alleged assault.
It sets a $1,000 penalty per disclosure—substantial enough to create a chilling effect on cooperation with prosecutors.
Crucially, while one paragraph allows disclosure of the terms or negotiations of the agreement “to the extent required by law,” there is no counterpart exception allowing T.D. to disclose the substance of the communications underlying the alleged crime to police or prosecutors (¶ 45).

The court concludes that:

The NDA was intended, in part, to silence T.D. and derail the prosecution.
To that extent, the NDA is void and drafting it was “unethical and prejudicial to the administration of justice” (¶ 51).

This is a direct ethical condemnation of using private civil-style agreements to contract around a criminal case, especially where the “other party” is an unrepresented victim.

D. Sanction Analysis and Distinguishing Prior Discipline Cases

1. The Fowerbaugh rule and its tempering

The court applies the principle from Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187 (1995):

“When an attorney engages in a course of conduct that violates [the ethical rule prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation], the attorney will be actually suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.” (¶ 57)

It notes that this presumption of actual suspension has sometimes been tempered:

For an isolated incident of dishonesty; or
Where there is an “abundance of mitigating evidence” (Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489 (2003), cited at ¶ 57).

But here, even if the false statement were “singular,” it was part of a broader pattern of prejudicial conduct:

Implicitly condoning bond violations;
Drafting a public-policy-void NDA targeting a victim’s ability to cooperate with prosecution;
Failing to recognize the gravity of that conduct and persisting in the view that the NDA was “legal, valid, and enforceable” (¶ 30–31).

2. Why false-notarization cases do not control

Rossi cited a series of “false notary” cases in which lawyers who improperly notarized documents and filed them with courts received public reprimands (e.g., Moore 2017, Wilson 2014, Mezacapa 2004, Thomas 2001, Bush 2023, Bryant 2021, Craig 2012, Billingsley 2024, Melnick 2005, Simon 1994) (¶ 53–55).

The Supreme Court emphasizes that Rossi’s behavior was:

Different in kind and degree: He did not merely cut a corner on notarization; he lied to hide bond violations and facilitated a contract attempting to obstruct a criminal prosecution.
Embedded in a live criminal proceeding with a vulnerable victim, implicating constitutional victims’ rights and bond enforcement.

Accordingly, false-notarization precedents do not justify a mere public reprimand.

3. Why a fully stayed suspension was rejected

Rossi also amassed a set of cases where significant misconduct led to conditionally stayed suspensions, e.g.:

Disciplinary Counsel v. Harmon, 157 Ohio St.3d 151 (2019) – Two-year suspension fully stayed, despite serious misconduct in representing a dementia-diagnosed friend, because of unique emotional involvement and context (¶ 60).
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Ryan, 2024-Ohio-5570 – One-year suspension fully stayed; lawyer lied and tried to manipulate a client into withdrawing a grievance, but there were further unique mitigating factors (COVID-19 delays, attempts at restitution, and confusion over privilege in a disciplinary context) (¶ 61–62).
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Villarreal, 2024-Ohio-5165 – 18-month suspension fully stayed; lawyer submitted an affidavit she knew contained falsehoods, but took full responsibility, showed remorse, and paid substantial sanctions (¶ 63–64).

The court distinguishes these cases on two key grounds:

Comparative mitigation: Those respondents often accepted full responsibility, showed genuine remorse, or faced additional sanctions (e.g., restitution or monetary sanctions) that mitigated the need for an active suspension.
Nature of misconduct: While serious, their misconduct did not involve intentionally structuring a contract to suppress a victim’s cooperation in a pending criminal case and did not as directly implicate bond enforcement and victims’ rights.

4. Cases supporting a six-month actual suspension

The court finds the closest analogs in:

Disciplinary Counsel v. Spinazze, 2020-Ohio-957 – Part-time city prosecutor lied to the court about his reasons for offering an OVI plea and falsely claimed officers consented; later misled his supervisor in an attempt to conceal the misconduct. Violations included Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). He received a six-month suspension (¶ 28, 68–70).
Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 122 Ohio St.3d 65 (2009) – Attorney violated a juvenile court’s gag order by leaking filings to the media, then lied to the court and to the unemployment bureau about the leak. Violations included 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). He also received a six-month suspension (¶ 28, 71–72).

In both cases, as in Rossi, the lawyer:

Interfered directly with a pending judicial proceeding,
Engaged in deliberate dishonesty about events critical to that proceeding, and
Triggered significant concerns about the integrity of the adjudicatory process.

Although Spinazze and Rohrer involved more rule violations, both also had additional mitigating factors (e.g., loss of employment). By contrast, Rossi:

Persisted in defending the legality and enforceability of the NDA;
Did not acknowledge that drafting an agreement aimed at suppressing a victim’s cooperation is inherently prejudicial to justice.

Accordingly, a six-month actual suspension is presented as proportional and necessary “to protect the public and to impart on Rossi the full extent of the wrongfulness of his misconduct” (¶ 75).

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice” (Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d))

Rule 8.4(d) is intentionally broad. In practical terms, conduct is “prejudicial to the administration of justice” if it:

Interferes with the fair or orderly resolution of a case;
Undermines the court’s ability to enforce its orders (e.g., bond or protective orders);
Obstructs the fact-finding process (e.g., manipulating evidence, witnesses, or proceedings);
Attacks the integrity of the justice system (e.g., deliberate misrepresentations, manipulation of victims or witnesses).

In Rossi, the court found prejudice where:

the lawyer facilitated violation of a no-contact order;
attempted to shield those violations from the court via a false pleading; and
drafted an agreement whose point was to choke off a key witness’s cooperation with prosecution.

B. Marsy’s Law in the Background

Ohio’s Marsy’s Law (Ohio Const. art. I, § 10a) grants crime victims specific rights, including:

the right to be informed about and be present at criminal proceedings;
the right to be heard at critical stages (e.g., plea, sentencing, parole);
the right to reasonable protection from the accused; and
the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect.

While Rossi does not analyze Marsy’s Law at length, the opinion:

Notes that Rossi’s misrepresentation helped conceal possible Marsy’s Law violations from the court (¶ 19);
Conditions reinstatement on CLE that includes the “application of Marsy’s Law” (¶ 4, 75).

This signals that Ohio lawyers must consider victims’ constitutional rights when structuring agreements or communications around criminal cases. Using an NDA to silence a victim about the underlying criminal conduct is difficult to reconcile with those rights.

C. Public Policy and Void Contracts

When courts say a contract or clause is “void as against public policy,” they mean:

Even if the parties voluntarily agreed, the law will not enforce that promise;
Enforcement would harm the public interest (for example, by concealing crimes, obstructing justice, or encouraging illegal behavior);
Such contracts can neither be used as a claim nor as a defense in litigation regarding their terms.

In Rossi, the NDA’s confidentiality clause is void to the extent it purports to:

bar T.D. from speaking with law enforcement or prosecutors about the alleged assault, or
impose financial penalties for cooperating with the prosecution.

D. Attorney-Client Privilege vs. Duty of Candor

Two duties are in tension here:

Attorney-client privilege / confidentiality (Prof.Cond.R. 1.6): Lawyers must not reveal information relating to the representation without the client’s informed consent, absent an exception.
Duty of candor to the tribunal (Prof.Cond.R. 3.3): Lawyers must not make false statements to a court or fail to correct prior false statements.

The key takeaway from Rossi is:

Privilege may bar you from disclosing certain facts;
It never authorizes you to fabricate false facts or mislead the court;
If the only way to respond fully would be to violate privilege, the ethical choice is to decline to answer or to state that you cannot respond because of privilege—not to provide a false “cover story.”

E. Nondisclosure Agreements in Criminal-Related Contexts

NDAs are common in civil disputes (employment, business, settlements). However, when alleged criminal conduct is involved:

NDAs may not lawfully bar parties from:
- reporting crimes to police or regulators;
- cooperating with prosecutors;
- responding truthfully to subpoenas or court orders.
Attempts to do so are void and may:
- expose the drafting attorney to ethics charges (as in Rossi);
- in extreme cases, raise concerns about obstruction or witness tampering (though the opinion does not suggest Rossi was criminally charged).

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Constraints on Defense Counsel in Victim-Focused Negotiations

Rossi places clear guardrails around defense-side attempts to “resolve” domestic violence or similar cases through private agreements:

While civil releases or mutual no-contact agreements can have legitimate purposes, lawyers may not:
- condition those agreements on a victim’s silence about the underlying crime;
- attach financial penalties to cooperation with law enforcement; or
- treat a victim as if they were a represented party when they are not, especially where criminal rights and constitutional protections are at stake.
Defense counsel must be careful not to:
- facilitate violations of protective or bond orders;
- allow private agreements to intrude on the prosecution’s charging authority or the court’s role.

B. Drafting NDAs Post-Rossi

Ohio lawyers drafting NDAs in contexts that touch alleged criminal conduct now have a clearer compliance roadmap:

Any NDA must:
- explicitly preserve the right (and duty) to cooperate with law enforcement, prosecutors, courts, and regulatory bodies; and
- avoid terms that penalize or chill truthful testimony or reporting of suspected crime.
Clauses that say or effectively mean “you may not talk to the police or prosecutor about X, or you’ll pay money” are unenforceable and ethically dangerous.
Where a victim or witness is unrepresented, the lawyer must exercise heightened care:
- not to give legal advice adverse to that unrepresented person’s interests; and
- to suggest they seek independent counsel before signing any agreement affecting their rights in a criminal matter.

C. Reinforcing Victims’ Rights and Institutional Integrity

The opinion bolsters several institutional values:

Victims’ participation: Marsy’s Law is implicitly reinforced by condemning efforts to sideline a victim’s voice via private agreements.
Judicial control over bonds: Courts must be able to rely on motion practice and representations of counsel to police compliance with bond conditions; misrepresentations that conceal violations strike at that authority.
Prosecutorial discretion: By invalidating contracts that attempt to predetermine dismissal of charges, the decision protects prosecutorial independence from private bargains between defendant and victim.

D. Disciplinary Significance: Dishonesty Will Usually Mean Actual Suspension

Rossi reaffirms that where dishonesty is used to manipulate or insulate pending proceedings:

An actual suspension is the expected outcome absent highly unusual mitigating circumstances;
Even a single false statement, when carefully crafted to protect a client by deceiving a court, will likely trigger suspension, not just a reprimand;
Character letters and prior good record, while important, may not suffice where the lawyer does not recognize the full scope of wrongdoing.

VII. Conclusion

Disciplinary Counsel v. Rossi is a significant disciplinary and doctrinal decision. It:

Clarifies that NDAs and similar agreements that seek to silence crime victims or impede cooperation with law enforcement are void as against public policy and that drafting such agreements can violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d);
Reasserts the lawyer’s first duty to the court, holding that attorney-client privilege does not license a lawyer to mislead the tribunal, especially regarding compliance with bond orders;
Demonstrates that implicitly encouraging a client to violate a court’s no-contact order, and then papering over that violation with a misleading narrative and a problematic NDA, amounts to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice;
Confirms that in Ohio, dishonesty connected to pending criminal proceedings—especially where it impacts victims and judicial control over the case—will typically result in an actual suspension, not merely a reprimand or fully stayed sanction.

For practitioners, the case is a clear warning: civil-style tools like releases and nondisclosure agreements cannot be repurposed to reshape or obstruct criminal prosecutions, particularly at the expense of unrepresented victims. The public nature of criminal justice, the court’s control over its processes, and the constitutional rights of victims cannot be contracted away.

Silencing Crime Victims by Nondisclosure Agreement as Professional Misconduct: Commentary on Disciplinary Counsel v. Rossi, 2025-Ohio-5398