Silence Is Not Ambiguity: Wyoming High Court Holds Written Judgment Cannot Supply a Probation Length Omitted at Sentencing

Introduction

In James D. Van Winter v. State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 119 (Wyo. Nov. 4, 2025), the Wyoming Supreme Court resolved two distinct issues arising from a jury conviction for aggravated assault and battery and possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent. First, the Court affirmed the denial of a motion for a new trial under W.R.A.P. 21 premised on ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding there was no prejudice under Strickland. Second, the Court addressed a recurrent sentencing administration problem: a material variance between the court’s oral pronouncement and its written judgment. The Court held that where a district court’s oral sentence is silent as to the length of a discretionary probationary term, a written judgment cannot later “clarify” that silence by adding a probation length—doing so creates a material conflict that must be corrected on remand through a limited resentencing hearing.

The case arises from a domestic confrontation in Basin, Wyoming, during which multiple eyewitnesses testified that Mr. Van Winter threatened his brother‑in‑law with a pocketknife. At trial, defense counsel attempted to elicit fingerprint evidence through a police witness; the State’s hearsay objection was sustained, and counsel did not call a State Crime Lab witness. After conviction, the defense argued this omission deprived the jury of exculpatory fingerprint testimony and undermined a potential self‑defense theory. On sentencing, the district court orally imposed incarceration on Count I and a suspended two-to-four year term with probation on Count II but did not orally specify the length of probation; the written judgment set the Count II term at three-to-five years (suspended) and imposed three years of probation.

On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court (Fenn, J.) affirmed the denial of the ineffective assistance claim for lack of Strickland prejudice, vacated the written three-year probation term as conflicting with the oral pronouncement, and remanded to: (1) conform the written judgment on Count II to the oral sentence (two to four years, suspended), and (2) conduct a limited resentencing to determine the proper length of the probationary term in open court.

Summary of the Opinion

• Ineffective assistance (W.R.A.P. 21): Affirmed. The Court resolved the claim on the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington. Even assuming counsel should have presented fingerprint results, the evidence would not have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome because it was consistent with the State’s theory that multiple people handled the knife and did not meaningfully advance self-defense.
• Sentencing discrepancy: Reversed in part and remanded. The oral sentence controls. The written judgment’s three-to-five-year suspended term on Count II conflicted with the court’s oral two-to-four-year term and must be corrected. Further, because the district court did not orally pronounce the length of probation, the written judgment’s insertion of a three-year probation term created a material conflict (not an ambiguity) requiring vacatur of the probation length and a limited resentencing to set that term in open court.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Governs ineffective assistance; requires both deficient performance and prejudice. The Court disposed of the claim on prejudice alone.
• Galbreath v. State, 2015 WY 49, 346 P.3d 16: Clarifies that evidence consistent with the State’s case (e.g., lack of DNA on a surface) is not necessarily outcome-determinative; used to show no Strickland prejudice.
• Bindner v. State, 2024 WY 53, 548 P.3d 285: Failure to call a witness that would not negate guilt does not establish prejudice; applied similarly here.
• Bolen v. State, 2024 WY 48, 547 P.3d 961; Aisenbrey v. State, 2024 WY 131, 560 P.3d 283; Hill v. State, 2025 WY 86, 572 P.3d 505: Reinforce that courts may decide ineffective assistance claims solely on the prejudice prong.
• Wanberg v. State, 2020 WY 75, 466 P.3d 269: The oral sentence controls over the written judgment when they conflict; the remedy is remand to correct the written judgment.
• Christensen v. State, 854 P.2d 675 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting United States v. Earley, 816 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1987)): A written judgment may “clarify” an ambiguity in the oral pronouncement; sets up the ambiguity-versus-conflict framework.
• United States v. Geddes, 71 F.4th 1206 (10th Cir. 2023) (and United States v. Bruley, 15 F.4th 1279 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1987)): Persuasive federal authority holding that silence as to discretionary sentencing terms is a conflict, not an ambiguity; underscores the defendant’s right to be present for sentencing terms and the requirement that discretionary conditions be orally pronounced.
• Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, 151 P.3d 1136: Illustrates the standard remedy of remand to conform a written judgment to the oral sentence.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (W.R.A.P. 21)

The Court employed Strickland’s two-prong test but resolved the matter on prejudice. The defense asserted trial counsel was ineffective by failing to call a State Crime Lab witness to testify that the pocketknife contained another person’s fingerprint and not Mr. Van Winter’s. Trial counsel had tried to elicit this through an officer; after a hearsay objection was sustained, counsel did not offer a crime lab witness or make further admissibility arguments. Counsel testified she considered the fingerprint results exculpatory but not decisive and pursued a broader trial strategy focused on credibility, inconsistencies, and a theory of fabrication.

The Court emphasized two determinations:

• Consistency with the State’s case: Multiple witnesses testified the brother-in-law wrested the knife from Mr. Van Winter and handed it to the sister. The presence of another person’s fingerprint is consistent with that sequence and does not undercut the State’s theory of guilt. Citing Galbreath and Bindner, the Court noted that evidence which dovetails with the State’s narrative does not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
• Self-defense: The facts—following the sister’s car, refusing to leave, re-entering the home, and then holding a knife to the brother-in-law’s throat while threatening to kill—did not support a self-defense claim. The absence of Van Winter’s fingerprints did not make self-defense more plausible and, as the Court observed, could even undermine it. Thus, the omitted evidence would not likely have changed the verdict.

Because there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome even if the fingerprint evidence had been introduced, the prejudice prong was not met; the Court therefore did not need to decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient.

2) Oral Pronouncement vs. Written Judgment: Probation Length

The court reaffirmed the familiar rule that the oral sentence controls and a written judgment must conform to it (Wanberg). On Count II, the oral sentence imposed a two-to-four year term, suspended to probation, consecutive to Count I; the written judgment, however, reflected a three-to-five year suspended term—plainly a conflict, requiring correction.

The more significant issue was the length of probation: the district court was silent at the hearing, but the written judgment later set the probationary term at three years. Under Christensen, a written judgment can clarify an “ambiguity” in the oral pronouncement. The key question, then, was whether silence on a discretionary sentencing component (probation length) is an “ambiguity” that can be clarified or a “conflict” that must be corrected.

Looking to persuasive authority from the Tenth Circuit (Geddes, Bruley, Villano), the Court held that a district court’s silence about a discretionary sentencing provision is not an ambiguity—it creates a material conflict if the written judgment later supplies a term the judge did not pronounce in open court. The rationale is twofold:

• Right to be present: A defendant has the right to be present for sentencing (W.R.Cr.P. 43(a)), which includes hearing the discretionary terms of the sentence. If the court is silent, the defendant leaves the courtroom without knowing a core component of the sentence.
• Discretionary terms must be pronounced: While Wyoming did not need to decide the full breadth of Geddes (requiring oral pronouncement of all discretionary conditions), it embraced Geddes’s reasoning to hold that the length of probation—a discretionary term per Wyo. Stat. § 7‑13‑302—must be set in open court and cannot be later supplied in writing.

Applying that rule, the Court vacated the three-year probation term because it conflicted with the oral pronouncement (which was silent) and remanded for a limited resentencing so the district court could set the probation length on the record. The court also directed that the written judgment be conformed to the oral two-to-four year suspended term on Count II.

Practical Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Sentencing practice in Wyoming courts:
  • Judges should orally pronounce the entire sentence, including the length of probation and any discretionary conditions they intend to impose. Silence invites remand.
  • Clerks and probation offices should avoid “filling in” omitted terms when drafting judgments; the written order must reflect exactly what was pronounced.
• Defense and prosecution:
  • Defense counsel should object at sentencing if any discretionary component (e.g., probation length) is not pronounced or is unclear.
  • Prosecutors should ensure the sentencing record is complete by prompting the court to state the length of probation and any discretionary conditions.
• Appellate litigation:
  • Expect more targeted remands where written judgments add discretionary terms not announced at sentencing. This case supplies a clear remedy: vacate the added term and conduct a limited resentencing.
  • The decision places Wyoming in line with federal circuit authority emphasizing defendants’ presence and clarity at sentencing.
• Ineffective assistance claims:
  • Reaffirms a high bar for Strickland prejudice: Evidence that is merely “exculpatory” in a narrow sense but consistent with the State’s overall narrative will rarely suffice to undermine confidence in the verdict.
  • Trial strategy choices, especially about calling or not calling experts/analysts, will not warrant relief absent a substantial likelihood of a different outcome.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Strickland prejudice: To win an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different. “Reasonable probability” means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome—not just a conceivable effect.
• W.R.A.P. 21 and a “Calene” hearing: Wyoming allows defendants to seek a new trial based on ineffective assistance while an appeal is pending. A “Calene hearing” is the evidentiary proceeding used to develop a record on the claim.
• Oral vs. written sentence: The sentence announced from the bench controls. The written judgment is a record of that sentence and cannot contradict it.
• Ambiguity vs. conflict:
  • Ambiguity: When the oral pronouncement is unclear, the written judgment may clarify it.
  • Conflict: When the oral pronouncement is clear—or silent on a discretionary term—the written judgment cannot add to or contradict it.
• Suspended sentence and probation: A court may impose a prison term but suspend its execution and place the defendant on probation. Under Wyo. Stat. § 7‑13‑302, the length of probation is discretionary and must be set by the judge.
• Possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent: A separate offense from aggravated assault; here, the same episode supported both counts (brandishing a pocketknife with threats).

Conclusion

James D. Van Winter v. State of Wyoming clarifies two important points in Wyoming criminal procedure. On ineffective assistance, the Court reiterates that purportedly exculpatory forensic omissions do not establish Strickland prejudice when they align with the State’s narrative and do not materially bolster a viable defense, such as self‑defense. On sentencing, the Court establishes a consequential rule for oral-versus-written discrepancies: silence in the oral pronouncement regarding the length of a discretionary probation term cannot be “clarified” later in the written judgment. That omission creates a material conflict requiring vacatur of the added term and a limited resentencing to set the probation length on the record.

The decision protects the defendant’s right to be present for all discretionary elements of the sentence and promotes transparency and accuracy in sentencing records. Going forward, Wyoming trial courts, counsel, and clerks should treat the oral pronouncement as the operative sentence and ensure that all discretionary elements—especially the length of probation—are expressly articulated in open court and mirrored verbatim in the written judgment.