Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Establishes the two-pronged IAC test—deficient performance and prejudice. The Wyoming Supreme Court disposed of the IAC claim on prejudice alone, consistent with Strickland’s framework and Wyoming practice.
• Hill v. State, 2025 WY 86, ¶ 12, 572 P.3d 505 (Wyo. 2025); Aisenbrey v. State, 2024 WY 131, 560 P.3d 283; Bolen v. State, 2024 WY 48, 547 P.3d 961; Bindner v. State, 2024 WY 53, 548 P.3d 285; Jendresen v. State, 2021 WY 82, 491 P.3d 273: Wyoming authorities reiterating that IAC claims frequently turn on the prejudice prong and are reviewed as mixed questions; appellate courts may resolve on prejudice without reaching deficiency.
• Galbreath v. State, 2015 WY 49, 346 P.3d 16; Bloomer v. State, 2010 WY 88, 233 P.3d 971; Bindner, 2024 WY 53: Cases holding that purportedly exculpatory evidence that is nonetheless consistent with the State’s theory does not establish Strickland prejudice. This line of cases was central to rejecting the fingerprint-based IAC claim here.
• Wanberg v. State, 2020 WY 75, 466 P.3d 269; Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, 151 P.3d 1136; Christensen v. State, 854 P.2d 675 (Wyo. 1993): Wyoming cases establishing that oral pronouncement controls over a conflicting written judgment, and that written orders may clarify ambiguities but may not contradict the oral sentence.
• United States v. Geddes, 71 F.4th 1206 (10th Cir. 2023); United States v. Bruley, 15 F.4th 1279 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Earley, 816 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1987): Persuasive federal authorities emphasizing the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing and holding that discretionary conditions must be orally pronounced; silence on discretionary aspects is a conflict, not an ambiguity, when later supplied in writing. The Wyoming Supreme Court expressly relied on this reasoning to treat silence on probation length as a material conflict requiring resentencing.
• W.R.Cr.P. 43(a): Requires defendant’s presence at imposition of sentence, supporting the Court’s insistence that core discretionary sentencing components be pronounced in open court.
• Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 (2025): Vests district courts with discretion over probation length, reinforcing that the length is a discretionary term that must be imposed with the defendant present.

Legal Reasoning

1) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel under W.R.A.P. 21

The Court applied Strickland’s prejudice prong. The defense argued trial counsel should have introduced Crime Lab fingerprint evidence showing someone else’s fingerprint on the knife and the absence of the defendant’s prints. Counsel testified she considered the evidence exculpatory but strategically focused on witness inconsistencies, timing (20-minute delay before the 911 call), and a theory of fabrication; she did not press hearsay admissibility arguments or call a lab analyst.

The Supreme Court held there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome had the fingerprint evidence been admitted. Critically, the State’s witnesses consistently testified that the brother-in-law wrested the knife away and then handed it to the sister—facts that would readily explain the presence of someone else’s fingerprint and the absence of the defendant’s prints. As in Galbreath and Bindner, when proposed defense evidence is entirely consistent with the prosecution’s case, it does not create the kind of “reasonable probability” required by Strickland’s prejudice prong.

The Court further observed that the fingerprint results did not bolster self-defense; indeed, the trial record reflected that the defendant followed his sister home, refused to leave, reengaged after release, and threatened to kill his brother-in-law while holding a pocketknife to his throat. The absence of defendant’s fingerprints offers no affirmative support for a self-defense narrative in that evidentiary context. Accordingly, even assuming deficient performance, prejudice was not shown, and the IAC claim failed.

2) Oral Pronouncement vs. Written Judgment; Probation Length Must Be Pronounced in Open Court

Wyoming law has long held that when an oral sentence conflicts with a written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls, and the appropriate remedy is remand to correct the written judgment (Wanberg; Frederick). The Court reaffirmed that principle by ordering the written judgment in this case be conformed from a suspended 3–5 year term to the orally pronounced suspended 2–4 year term on Count II.

The novel question was whether the trial court’s silence at oral sentencing regarding the length of probation could be treated as an “ambiguity” (permitting written clarification under Christensen) or whether a written insertion of a three-year probation term conflicts with the oral sentence. Turning to persuasive Tenth Circuit authority (Geddes; Bruley; Villano), the Court held that a court’s silence on a discretionary sentencing component—here, the length of probation—creates a conflict, not an ambiguity, when the written judgment later supplies the missing term. Because the defendant has a right to be present at sentencing (W.R.Cr.P. 43(a)), and probation length is a discretionary sentencing decision (Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302), the term must be pronounced in open court.

The Court therefore vacated the written three-year probation term and remanded for a limited resentencing hearing to determine the appropriate probationary period with the defendant present. This holding ensures that defendants leave the courtroom knowing the full scope of their sentences and prevents after-the-fact augmentation through written judgments.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Sentencing Practice in Wyoming

• New Clarification: For the first time, Wyoming has squarely addressed whether a district court’s silence at oral sentencing on the length of probation can be “clarified” by a written judgment. The Court held it cannot; silence is a conflict, not an ambiguity, when the missing term is discretionary. Trial courts must orally pronounce the length of probation.
• Right to Be Present Reinforced: The decision strengthens the defendant’s right to be present at the imposition of sentence for all material, discretionary sentencing choices, not merely incarceration terms.
• Appellate and Post-Judgment Corrections: Expect increased attention to oral-sentencing transcripts when reviewing written judgments. Parties should promptly move to correct written judgments that supply discretionary terms omitted at oral sentencing. Limited resentencing hearings will be the proper mechanism to set omitted discretionary terms.
• Bench Protocols: Sentencing judges should adopt checklists to ensure oral pronouncements include: (i) incarceration term(s), (ii) concurrency/consecutivity, (iii) suspension, (iv) probation grant, (v) probation length, and (vi) any discretionary conditions. Doing so avoids remands and preserves finality.

B. Defense Strategy and Ineffective Assistance Claims

• Evidentiary Consistency Matters: The Court’s reliance on Galbreath and Bindner underscores a recurring theme: evidence that is “exculpatory” only in isolation may not establish prejudice if it coheres with the State’s narrative. Defense counsel should evaluate whether proposed forensic results truly undercut the State’s theory, or whether they can be reconciled with the State’s proof.
• Self-Defense Proof: Where the trial record strongly suggests the defendant was the aggressor, tangential forensic evidence (e.g., absence of fingerprints) is unlikely to rescue a self-defense theory on prejudice review. Practitioners should focus on evidence showing reasonable perception of imminent harm and proportionality, rather than forensic gaps that are explainable by other handling.
• W.R.A.P. 21 (Calene Hearing) Use: The decision illustrates the utility and limits of developing IAC claims through a Calene hearing. Even where counsel acknowledges a tactical misstep or unrealized plan (e.g., not calling a lab analyst), the prejudice hurdle remains high absent a demonstrable likelihood of a different verdict.