Short Terms, Harsh Conditions: Seventh Circuit Holds That Three Months of Solitary in “Disgusting” Conditions Implicates a Liberty Interest, Yet Affirms on Qualified Immunity

Introduction

This comprehensive commentary examines the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Abre Jackson v. Marc T. Anastacio, No. 23-1703 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2025). The appeal presented a recurring and unsettled question in prison law: when does disciplinary segregation (solitary confinement) create a protected liberty interest that triggers Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process? The case arose after Jackson, an Illinois inmate, received a three-month term of disciplinary segregation following an altercation with correctional officers and a prison disciplinary hearing that did not allow him to call witnesses or review video evidence.

The district court granted summary judgment to the prison officials, holding that a three-month term did not implicate a protected liberty interest. The Seventh Circuit disagreed on that point, recognizing that even relatively short terms can implicate a liberty interest when coupled with “disgusting” conditions, but ultimately affirmed on qualified immunity grounds because the law in March 2020 was not clearly established.

Summary of the Judgment

• Liberty interest recognized (disputed fact): The court held that Jackson presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual dispute that his three months in segregation—combined with “disgusting” conditions (feces and urine on walls, pest infestation, contaminated water, constant noise, and feces/urine throwing)—amounted to an “atypical and significant hardship” under Sandin v. Conner. Thus, a jury could find his placement implicated a protected liberty interest.
• Qualified immunity controls outcome: Despite that recognition, the court affirmed summary judgment for the prison officials because, as of March 2020, it was not “clearly established” that three months of disciplinary segregation under conditions like those alleged by Jackson triggered due process protection. The officials were therefore entitled to qualified immunity from damages.
• Prospective clarification: The court announced that going forward in the Seventh Circuit, “such short terms of solitary confinement combined with comparable disgusting conditions will suffice to show a loss of protected liberty requiring procedural protections, as will longer terms of solitary confinement alone.”
• Process-due question reserved: The panel did not decide precisely what procedures were due to Jackson; it focused on the liberty-interest and qualified-immunity prongs.
• Separate writings:
  • Concurring opinion (Hamilton, J., joined by Rovner, J.): Urges development of clearer, duration-based rules (suggesting a presumptive threshold at one year and possibly moving toward 15 days in line with the Nelson Mandela Rules) and invites renewed Eighth Amendment scrutiny of prolonged solitary confinement.
  • Concurrence in the judgment only (Scudder, J.): Would have resolved the case on qualified immunity alone; warns that the majority’s approach risks conflating Eighth Amendment conditions analysis with due process and creating practical confusion for prison disciplinary hearings.

Case Background

After a “chuckhole” incident at Stateville Correctional Center involving the use of chemical spray and alleged rough handling, Jackson was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center. At a March 2020 adjustment hearing conducted by two officers, Jackson could offer his account and ask questions, but he could not call witnesses or view video. The committee recommended multiple sanctions, including three months in disciplinary segregation. The warden approved the recommendation. Jackson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a due process violation in the imposition of segregation. The district court held three months was too short to create a liberty interest and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Jackson appealed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974): Recognizes that inmates are entitled to limited procedural protections before being deprived of good-time credits, and, in a key footnote, links those protections to disciplinary solitary confinement as a “major change in the conditions of confinement.” Wolff sets the due process baseline for certain prison discipline, though later cases refine when those protections attach.
• Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995): Shifts the liberty-interest inquiry away from the wording of regulations to whether the discipline imposes an “atypical and significant hardship” relative to ordinary prison life. Thirty days in segregation did not cross the threshold in Sandin.
• Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005): Holds that transfer to a “supermax” with extreme isolation and indefinite duration implicates a liberty interest. Critically, Wilkinson examines both duration and conditions, and accepts modest, nonadversarial procedures for system-wide placements.
• Marion v. Columbia Correctional Institution, 559 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009): Clarifies that the liberty-interest analysis requires looking at the “combined import” of duration and conditions; periods approaching or exceeding one year may implicate a liberty interest even without unusually harsh conditions.
• Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2015): Emphasizes the severity-duration interplay; short terms can still implicate a liberty interest where conditions are “disgusting.”
• Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019): Four months of segregation with vague complaints about cell conditions were insufficient; specificity and severity matter.
• Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958 (7th Cir. 2024): Assumed—without deciding—that five months in unsanitary conditions implicated a liberty interest but found the process sufficient. The Jackson panel relies on Ealy’s posture to move from assumption to explicit recognition for short terms with severe conditions.
• Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2013): Acknowledges the doctrinal ambiguity in the “atypical and significant hardship” standard and applies qualified immunity where the law is unclear.
• Out-of-circuit duration markers:
  • Second Circuit: Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227 (2000) (305+ days suffices; 101–305 days require record development); later decisions refine a burden-shifting approach.
  • First Circuit (en banc): Perry v. Spencer, 94 F.4th 136 (2024) (15 months of administrative segregation sufficed absent contrary showing).
  • Ninth Circuit: Brown v. Oregon DOC, 751 F.3d 983 (2014) (27 months sufficed).
  • Tenth Circuit: Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210 (2006) (750 days warranted review).
• Qualified immunity anchors: Harlow v. Fitzgerald, Anderson v. Creighton, Pearson v. Callahan, and Camreta v. Greene guide the two-prong analysis and permit courts to decide the merits first to clarify the law.
• Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020): Eighth Amendment summary reversal denying qualified immunity where confinement conditions were “deplorably unsanitary.” While not a due process case, it underscores that officials cannot subject prisoners to horrific conditions—supporting the characterization of Jackson’s segregation as “disgusting.”
• Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012) and Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880 (7th Cir. 2024): Endorse “informal, nonadversarial” procedures for certain segregation placements. The Scudder concurrence relies on these to argue the panel should have resolved the case on qualified immunity, avoiding broader liberty-interest pronouncements.

Legal Reasoning

1) Framework: Deciding Merits First to Clarify the Law

Exercising discretion under Camreta, the panel addressed the first qualified-immunity prong (constitutional violation) to clarify when short-term segregation implicates a liberty interest. The court observed that lower courts need guidance: bright-line rules are elusive, and qualified immunity often forecloses damages even where rights are infringed.

2) Liberty Interest: Duration + Conditions

The court applied the settled Seventh Circuit approach from Marion: consider both the duration and the conditions. Although three months standing alone typically does not trigger due process (Lekas), the “combined import” in Jackson’s case—three months plus exceptionally unsanitary and dangerous conditions—could amount to an “atypical and significant hardship” under Sandin.

The panel expressly labeled the conditions “disgusting,” citing sworn descriptions of human waste on walls, vermin, contaminated water (Legionella), constant banging/noise, and feces/urine throwing—markedly worse than the vague conditions in Lisle and comparable to the filth recognized in Ealy (assumed liberty interest) and the extremity condemned in Taylor (Eighth Amendment).

3) The Value of a Duration-Based Rule (but not adopted as a rigid line)

The court surveyed the “outer limits”: other circuits assume or recognize that terms approaching or exceeding a year presumptively trigger a liberty interest without needing atypical conditions. Seventh Circuit precedent does not yet adopt a minimum duration that automatically suffices, but decisions like Bryan and Wagner suggest that a year is near the boundary under current law. The opinion signals that longer terms alone can suffice; shorter terms require a close look at conditions.

4) Qualified Immunity: Not Clearly Established in March 2020

Turning to prong two, the court held the right was not clearly established at the time. Jackson could not identify a controlling Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit case holding that three months in segregation, even with comparable conditions, implicated a liberty interest. Nonprecedential decisions and district court rulings could not fill the gap. Given the acknowledged doctrinal ambiguity—especially for terms in the “months” range—qualified immunity barred damages.

5) What Process Is Due? Reserved

The panel did not decide whether the hearing procedures Jackson received were constitutionally sufficient. This is noteworthy given the tension:

• Wolff and its footnote envision minimum protections when solitary is imposed as discipline.
• Wilkinson and Westefer accept “informal, nonadversarial” process for certain placement decisions (especially system-wide or administrative assignments).
• Adams v. Reagle extended that informal model to individual disciplinary segregation in a way the Hamilton concurrence criticizes.

Future cases in the Seventh Circuit will need to reconcile these lines once a liberty interest is found.

Impact

Immediate Effects

• Liberty-interest threshold clarified: In the Seventh Circuit, placement in disciplinary segregation for “short terms” (like three months) who endure “comparable disgusting conditions” now triggers a protected liberty interest. Prison officials must anticipate that minimal due process will be required in such cases.
• Longer terms, even with tolerable conditions: The court signals that longer terms alone can suffice to create a liberty interest, moving Seventh Circuit law closer to the First and Second Circuits’ duration markers.
• Damages vs. injunctive relief: Qualified immunity will continue to block damages for pre-Jackson conduct in many cases involving months-long segregation. But for conduct after this decision, officials are on notice; injunctive and declaratory relief also remain available.

Procedural Posture Going Forward

• Record-building on conditions: Prisoners should document specific, severe condition details (sanitation, pest infestation, water quality, exposure to human waste, environmental hazards, constant noise). Vague descriptions are often insufficient.
• Knowledge and notice: Although the majority did not condition liberty-interest findings on what the hearing officers knew, the Scudder concurrence flags a practical challenge: if officials do not know the actual segregation conditions, how can they calibrate process? Expect future litigation over whether knowledge (actual or constructive) should be part of the analysis or a separate element of personal liability.
• What process is due remains open: Adams suggests informal procedures suffice prior to disciplinary segregation; Wolff suggests more. This tension will invite further appellate clarification, especially now that more cases will cross the liberty-interest threshold.

Substantive Law on Solitary Confinement

• Momentum toward bright lines: Judge Hamilton’s concurrence urges a presumptive duration rule (one year, perhaps moving toward 15 days) to prevent “repetitive cycles” of qualified immunity and provide clear guidance to prison officials.
• Eighth Amendment reconsideration: The concurrence urges serious re-examination of prolonged solitary under the Eighth Amendment, noting evolving standards of decency, the Nelson Mandela Rules, and a growing scientific consensus regarding harms of isolation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Liberty interest: Under the Fourteenth Amendment, certain changes in a prisoner’s conditions of confinement are so serious that they trigger due process protections before they can be imposed. Whether disciplinary segregation qualifies depends on both how long it lasts and how harsh it is compared to ordinary prison life.
• “Atypical and significant hardship” (Sandin): A benchmark asking whether the punishment goes beyond what prisoners ordinarily face. Short terms alone often do not qualify, but short terms with extreme conditions—and longer terms even with tolerable conditions—can.
• Qualified immunity: Government officials are shielded from damages unless the violated right was “clearly established” at the time. Even if the court recognizes a right today, officials may not be liable for past conduct if the law was uncertain when they acted.
• Administrative vs. disciplinary segregation: Administrative segregation is typically for management/safety (not necessarily punitive); disciplinary segregation is punishment for misconduct. Both can become prolonged; the Eighth Amendment can be implicated by either, but due process triggers differ.
• Wolff vs. Wilkinson/Westefer tension: Wolff suggests minimum due process (like the ability to present evidence) when imposing solitary as discipline. Wilkinson and Westefer accept less formal processes for certain placement decisions. How those lines apply to disciplinary segregation in individual cases is unresolved in the Seventh Circuit.
• Eighth vs. Fourteenth Amendment: The Eighth focuses on whether conditions are cruel and unusual, looking to evolving standards of decency; the Fourteenth focuses on process—whether a liberty interest exists and what procedures are required before imposing harsh conditions. The majority here used conditions to identify a liberty interest but did not decide if the conditions themselves violated the Eighth Amendment.

Precedents Cited: How They Mapped the Court’s Path

• Sandin and Wilkinson: Defined the modern two-variable (duration + conditions) test; Wilkinson confirms that very harsh, indefinite isolation implicates a liberty interest.
• Marion: Cemented in the Seventh Circuit that courts must consider both duration and conditions; recognized that terms approaching a year may suffice alone.
• Kervin and Lisle: Clarified the importance of specificity and severity—“disgusting” conditions matter, and vague complaints will not suffice.
• Ealy: A stepping stone—assumed a liberty interest for five months in unsanitary conditions; Jackson turns that assumption into a clarified rule for shorter periods with extreme conditions.
• Hardaway, Anderson, Harlow, Pearson, Camreta: Set the qualified immunity backdrop and allowed the court to decide the merits to clarify future conduct while still affirming for lack of clearly established law.
• Taylor v. Riojas: Not a due process case, but it underlines the legal system’s intolerance for “deplorably unsanitary” conditions, bolstering the conclusion that Jackson’s conditions were “disgusting.”

Practical Guidance

For Correctional Administrators and Hearing Officers

• Assume that short disciplinary segregation terms combined with severe, unsanitary conditions will trigger a liberty interest requiring procedural protections.
• Anticipate that longer terms can trigger due process even without extreme conditions.
• Audit segregation units for sanitation, pest control, water quality, and environmental hazards; document remedial actions. Actual conditions may govern whether hearings must include due process (and will govern Eighth Amendment exposure).
• Review hearing procedures. Even if Adams suggests informal processes can suffice, expect litigation over whether Wolff requires more where a liberty interest is triggered.
• Preserve and disclose relevant video or documentary evidence and consider allowing witness statements when feasible and safe—especially where conditions are known to be harsh.

For Prisoners and Advocates

• Build a record with detailed, contemporaneous evidence of conditions (photos if allowed, medical records, maintenance logs, water tests, pest reports, affidavits).
• Where possible, seek injunctive or declaratory relief to avoid qualified immunity obstacles to damages.
• Tie conditions to duration: short terms plus extreme conditions, or longer terms alone, are the strongest liberty-interest showings under Jackson.
• In Eighth Amendment challenges, develop evidence of psychological and physical harms from isolation; the concurrences signal a judicial willingness to re-examine prolonged solitary under evolving standards of decency.

Open Questions After Jackson

• What process is due once a liberty interest is triggered? The panel did not decide, leaving unresolved the tension between Wolff’s minimum protections and the informal procedures endorsed by Wilkinson/Westefer/Adams.
• Must hearing officers know the actual conditions? The majority’s liberty-interest analysis does not hinge on knowledge, but the Scudder concurrence spotlights this as a practical and doctrinal concern—especially for personal-capacity damages.
• Will the court adopt a bright-line duration rule? The Hamilton concurrence urges presumptions (one year, perhaps shorter), signaling that a clearer boundary may be forthcoming in an en banc or future panel decision.
• How will Eighth Amendment doctrine evolve? The concurrence invites renewed scrutiny of prolonged solitary as potentially cruel and unusual, especially in light of international norms (Mandela Rules) and modern science.

Conclusion

Jackson v. Anastacio marks a meaningful doctrinal development in the Seventh Circuit: the court expressly recognizes that short terms of disciplinary segregation, when combined with “disgusting” conditions, can implicate a protected liberty interest, and that longer terms may suffice even without unusually harsh conditions. The court nonetheless affirms on qualified immunity because, in March 2020, the law was not clearly established for three months under such conditions.

Two concurring opinions frame the path forward. Judge Hamilton (joined by Judge Rovner) urges clearer duration-based rules and renewed Eighth Amendment scrutiny of prolonged solitary. Judge Scudder cautions against conflating due process with conditions analysis and would have resolved the case narrowly on qualified immunity. Together, these opinions highlight both the legal uncertainty and the policy urgency surrounding solitary confinement.

The key takeaways are practical and immediate: officials must treat short-term segregation in severe, unsanitary conditions as liberty-implicating and afford due process; advocates should document conditions with precision; and courts in the Seventh Circuit now have a clarified standard for when disciplinary segregation crosses the “atypical and significant hardship” line. At the same time, what procedures are due once that line is crossed—and whether prolonged solitary confinement is substantively permissible under the Eighth Amendment—remain live and consequential questions awaiting further judicial development.