Sheriffs Need Not Accept Warrantless Municipal Arrestees Absent Statute or Agreement: Custody–Jurisdiction Line Clarified in City of Birmingham v. Pettway

Introduction

In City of Birmingham v. Pettway, the Supreme Court of Alabama confronted a recurring friction point between municipalities and counties: who is responsible for housing individuals arrested by city police officers for state-law offenses before a warrant issues? The City of Birmingham sought a declaratory judgment that Sheriff Mark Pettway, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson County, must accept into the Jefferson County Jail (1) persons arrested by Birmingham Police Department (BPD) officers for on-sight violations of state law (i.e., warrantless arrests) and (2) persons arrested by BPD for state-law misdemeanors, and that he must execute Alabama Law Enforcement Agency (ALEA) Form 072 to facilitate NCIC record-handling. The Jefferson County Commission (JCC) intervened given its fiscal exposure for jail operations.

After the trial court granted a judgment on the pleadings to Sheriff Pettway, dismissing the City’s complaint as nonjusticiable (moot and advisory), the Supreme Court affirmed—but for different reasons. The Court held the City’s case was justiciable and not moot, yet concluded on the merits that Alabama law does not require a county sheriff to accept municipal arrestees prior to issuance of a magistrate’s warrant. In doing so, the Court drew a bright line between court jurisdiction (where a case is prosecuted) and custodial responsibility (who must hold an arrestee), and declined to compel execution of ALEA Form 072 absent a legal duty or agreement.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court rejected the trial court’s justiciability rationale. The City’s complaint was not mooted by the expiration of a short-lived Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); nor did it seek an advisory opinion. Given the parties’ history and the Sheriff’s stated policies, litigation over the City’s asserted rights was “inevitable,” satisfying declaratory-judgment standards.
• On the merits, however, the Court affirmed judgment on the pleadings for Sheriff Pettway. No Alabama statute, rule, or binding authority obliges a sheriff to accept municipal arrestees without a magistrate’s warrant. Nor does the allocation of court jurisdiction over misdemeanors to district courts transfer pre-warrant custody to the county.
• The Birmingham Municipal Code designates the City Jail as the facility for persons arrested for violations of municipal ordinances and for violations of state law, authorizing the City to hold its arrestees until a warrant issues. The Sheriff conceded a duty to accept arrestees once a valid state-law warrant is issued; no controversy remained on that point.
• The Court declined to order the Sheriff to sign ALEA Form 072, finding no statutory duty to do so, and noting any such obligation during the MOU had become moot upon the MOU’s termination.
• Although the trial court erred in dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed with prejudice, that error was harmless because the Sheriff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Court relied on a mix of procedural precedent, statutory construction, and persuasive authorities to reach its result:

• Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings and standard of review: Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81 (Ala. 2000); B.K.W. Enters., Inc. v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603 So. 2d 989 (Ala. 1992); Deaton, Inc. v. Monroe, 762 So. 2d 840 (Ala. 2000); Harden v. Ritter, 710 So. 2d 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). These establish de novo review and acceptance of complaint facts as true.
• Justiciability in declaratory-judgment actions: Harper v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 873 So. 2d 220 (Ala. 2003) (declaratory relief appropriate where litigation is inevitable); Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Hous., L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285 (Ala. 2002); Town of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275 Ala. 113, 152 So. 2d 661 (1963); Baldwin Cnty. v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42 (Ala. 2003); and the Court distinguished Ex parte Marshall, 323 So. 3d 1188 (Ala. 2020), and Surles v. City of Ashville, 68 So. 3d 89 (Ala. 2011), where only anticipated controversies lacking factual context were presented.
• Affirmance on any valid ground: Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wright, 897 So. 2d 1059 (Ala. 2004) (appellate court may affirm on alternative grounds supported by the record).
• Sovereign immunity exception in declaratory actions: Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442 (Ala. 1987) (no immunity for statutory construction claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act against necessary state officials).
• Warrantless arrest timeline: State v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959 (Ala. 1994) (48-hour probable-cause requirement for warrantless arrests); Rule 3.1, Ala. R. Crim. P. (issuance of warrant upon probable cause); Rule 2.2, Ala. R. Crim. P. (allocation of trial forum for felonies, misdemeanors, and ordinance violations).
• Court-jurisdiction statutes: § 12-12-32, Ala. Code 1975 (district and municipal court jurisdiction for misdemeanors and ordinance violations); § 12-14-1 (municipal court jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction within police jurisdiction); § 12-11-30(b) (exclusive circuit-court jurisdiction over felonies). The City mistakenly cited § 12-11-3; the Court indicated § 12-11-30 was the likely intended reference.
• Custody and jail statutes: § 14-6-1 (sheriff as custodian of county jail and “all prisoners committed thereto”); § 14-6-5 (penalty for willful refusal to receive a person “lawfully committed”).
• Venue and general references: § 15-2-2 (venue) was cited by the City but not determinative of custody.
• Birmingham Municipal Code: § 11-1-1 (adopts state misdemeanor offenses as municipal ordinance violations); § 8-4-5(a) (arresting officers must take municipal offenders before municipal court or deliver to the city warden for detention); § 9-2-7 (designates Birmingham City Jail as the facility for persons arrested, detained, or sentenced for violations of city ordinances and/or state laws).
• Attorney General Opinions: 1988-348 (sheriff must receive persons “lawfully committed” to his charge; opinion addressed sick/injured arrestees, not municipal-to-county intake); 1998-78 (defines “municipal prisoner” as one charged with a municipal ordinance violation); 2002-248 (sheriff may deny use of county jail to municipal prisoners absent a legal obligation or agreement; any contract to house municipal prisoners should include both the sheriff and county commission). While not binding, these opinions were persuasive and consistent with the Court’s analysis.

Legal Reasoning

1) The case was justiciable, not moot and not advisory

The trial court viewed the City’s claim as tethered to a short-lived MOU that expired April 12, 2024. The Supreme Court disagreed. The City’s theory was statutory: it alleged Pettway was “required by state law” to accept on-sight state-law arrestees and state-law misdemeanants and to execute necessary forms (ALEA Form 072) to facilitate that intake. The MOU was context, not the cause of action.

Applying Harper, the Court found a live, bona fide controversy. The complaint recounted a pre-litigation arc: (a) Sheriff’s “standing policy” refusing warrantless arrestees and certain state-law misdemeanants; (b) a December 2023 MOU allowing short-term intake of on-sight arrests with a 48-hour paperwork window; (c) the Sheriff’s January 10, 2024 directive to stop accepting BPD arrestees owing to NCIC/ORI compliance issues; and (d) the Sheriff’s refusal to execute ALEA Form 072. Given this past conduct and the City’s ongoing need to transport arrestees, the Court deemed litigation “inevitable”—more than a speculative dispute.

2) On the merits, no duty exists to accept municipal arrestees without a warrant

The Court drew a careful distinction: Which court has jurisdiction to prosecute an offense is not the same question as who must physically house the arrestee before a warrant issues. The City primarily invoked § 12-12-32 and § 12-14-1 to argue that district court jurisdiction over state-law misdemeanors implied county jail custody. The Court rejected that inference:

• Rule 2.2(b) and § 12-12-32 allocate where misdemeanors and ordinance violations are prosecuted (district court or municipal court, depending on adoption as ordinances). They do not assign pre-warrant custody.
• Similarly, § 12-14-1(c) recognizes concurrent municipal/district jurisdiction for certain acts within a city’s police jurisdiction, but again says nothing about which sovereign must house arrestees before a magistrate’s warrant issues.
• By contrast, § 14-6-1 and § 14-6-5 focus on the sheriff’s control of the county jail and the duty to receive persons “lawfully committed” to the sheriff’s custody. That commitment trigger matters: a person is “lawfully committed” to the sheriff by legal authority (e.g., issuance of a warrant, court order, or other lawful commitment). The City did not establish that a BPD transport, standing alone, amounted to a legal “commitment” into the Sheriff’s custody.

The Court further anchored its analysis in the Birmingham Municipal Code. Section 9-2-7 expressly designates the Birmingham City Jail as the facility for persons arrested for violations of city ordinances “and/or laws of the state.” Section 8-4-5(a) directs arresting officers to deliver municipal offenders to the city warden for detention pending court. Section 11-1-1 makes state misdemeanor offenses—when occurring within the city or its police jurisdiction—also municipal ordinance violations. Collectively, these provisions authorize (indeed, in the ordinary course expect) the City to hold arrestees whom its officers arrest for on-sight state-law violations while the City obtains the necessary warrant.

The Court also emphasized practical and statutory context: Alabama law contemplates at least three pathways for sheriffs to house municipal arrestees—by explicit agreement (e.g., an MOU or contract), during periods of municipal jail overcrowding, or when a municipal jail is closed. That these scenarios are specifically legislated reinforces that, absent such conditions, a sheriff is not ordinarily required to accept municipal arrestees pre-warrant. Here, the temporary December 2023 MOU filled that gap briefly; when it expired, so did any MOU-based intake duty. The City conceded an MOU is not required by law.

Finally, the Sheriff conceded, and the Court accepted, that he must accept arrestees once a valid state-law warrant has issued, regardless of misdemeanor or felony status. That concession removed any controversy about post-warrant intake. The remaining dispute—pre-warrant, on-sight arrestees—was resolved against the City.

3) The 48-hour rule narrows practical burdens on municipalities

The Court underscored that Alabama law permits warrantless arrests but requires prompt judicial oversight. Under State v. Blake and Rules 3.1 and 4.3 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, if a warrant is not obtained or a probable cause determination held within 48 hours, the arrestee must be released. Thus, even if municipalities must hold on-sight arrestees pending a warrant, that detention period is strictly time-limited.

4) No basis to compel the Sheriff to sign ALEA Form 072

The City asked for an order compelling the Sheriff to execute ALEA Form 072 (“NCIC Holder Of The Record Agreement”), which addresses NCIC/CJI record ownership and ORI usage. The Court declined. Absent a statutory duty or extant agreement requiring county intake of city arrestees pre-warrant, there is no legal basis to compel execution of agency paperwork meant to implement such intake. Any obligation to sign the form would have been an incident of the (now-terminated) MOU and is therefore moot. Moreover, the City did not allege it would suffer a sanction or legal injury if the Sheriff unlawfully accepted arrestees without proper NCIC/ORI arrangements; that further undermined the request for declaratory relief on the form.

5) Procedural refinements: Justiciability, immunity, and harmless error

• Justiciability: The Court corrected the trial court’s jurisdictional analysis—this controversy was not moot or advisory, given the Sheriff’s stated policies and the parties’ prior MOU practice. Declaratory judgments are designed to resolve such inevitable disputes before further harm ensues.
• Sovereign immunity: Citing Parker v. Amerson, the Court recognized that an official-capacity declaratory action seeking statutory construction falls within an exception to absolute immunity. Pettway preserved only a limited immunity objection to monetary relief, which was not at issue.
• Harmless error: Although a dismissal “with prejudice” is improper when based on subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the alternative merits ground under Unum, rendering the trial court’s with-prejudice language harmless.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) Clear rule: No pre-warrant intake obligation on sheriffs

The central precedential takeaway is straightforward: Alabama sheriffs have no general duty to accept municipal arrestees for state-law offenses before a magistrate issues a warrant. Municipalities remain responsible for their on-sight, warrantless arrestees during the short interval required to obtain a warrant or secure a probable cause determination. This decouples the forum of prosecution (district versus municipal court) from the immediate custodial obligation.

2) Municipal–county arrangements remain paramount

The opinion strongly incentivizes formal intergovernmental agreements. If a city wants county intake for pre-warrant arrestees, it must negotiate and maintain a written agreement that includes:

• Clear intake criteria and time limits consistent with 48-hour rules;
• Compliance mechanisms for NCIC/CJI record ownership and ORI usage (e.g., ALEA Form 072) and who is the holder of record;
• Financial terms and operational responsibilities; and
• Execution by both the sheriff and the county commission (as AG Op. 2002-248 counsels).

3) Charging decisions and cost allocation

The JCC accused the City of charging state-law misdemeanors instead of identical municipal offenses to shift jail costs to the county. While the trial court dismissed the JCC’s counterclaim and the JCC did not appeal, the Supreme Court’s custody–jurisdiction analysis blunts such cost-shifting: charging a misdemeanor under state law does not, standing alone, transfer pre-warrant custody to the sheriff.

4) Operational adjustments for law enforcement

• Municipalities should ensure around-the-clock access to magistrates or streamlined warrant procedures to meet the 48-hour requirement.
• City jail capacity and classification procedures must account for short-term detention of state-law arrestees pending warrants.
• Agencies should audit NCIC/ORI practices and, where agreements exist or are contemplated, complete ALEA Form 072 and related compliance steps.

5) Legislative and policy horizons

If policymakers favor uniform county intake of pre-warrant state-law arrestees, legislation would be required to impose that duty, define funding, and standardize record-ownership responsibilities. Until then, the default remains local autonomy linked to local responsibility, tempered by short constitutional timelines for probable cause determinations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• On-sight (warrantless) arrest: An arrest made by an officer who personally observes the offense or otherwise has statutory authority to arrest without a warrant. Such arrests require prompt judicial review; under Alabama law, a warrant or probable cause determination generally must occur within 48 hours.
• “Lawfully committed” to the sheriff: The sheriff’s statutory duty to accept a prisoner into the county jail attaches when legal authority commits the person to the sheriff’s custody—typically via a magistrate’s issued warrant or court order. A municipal transport alone, without a warrant, does not equal “lawful commitment.”
• Concurrent jurisdiction: Both municipal and district courts may prosecute certain lower-level offenses (e.g., where a city adopts state misdemeanors as municipal ordinances). However, which court may try the case does not decide which governmental entity must physically hold the arrestee pre-warrant.
• ORI/NCIC/CJI and ALEA Form 072: ORI is a unique identifier assigned to an agency for accessing the NCIC/CJI systems. The “Holder of the Record Agreement” (ALEA Form 072) designates which agency owns and maintains specific entries. It is a compliance instrument; it does not itself create a duty for sheriffs to accept arrestees.
• Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 12(c)): A procedural device allowing a court to decide a case based solely on the pleadings when no material fact dispute exists, applying the law to the admitted facts as alleged in the complaint.
• Mootness and advisory opinions: Courts decide actual controversies with concrete facts, not hypothetical questions. A declaratory judgment is proper when a real dispute exists and litigation is likely or inevitable—even if damages have not yet occurred.

Conclusion

City of Birmingham v. Pettway clarifies a key structural principle of Alabama criminal administration: the place of prosecution and the place of pre-warrant custody are distinct questions. Absent statute or an operative agreement, a sheriff has no duty to accept municipal arrestees for on-sight state-law violations before a magistrate issues a warrant. Municipalities may, and often must, hold such arrestees in their own facilities, consistent with local ordinances and the 48-hour constitutional and rules-based requirements for probable cause and warrant issuance.

Procedurally, the Court reaffirmed the proper use of declaratory judgments to resolve inevitable public-law disputes while also illustrating that appellate courts may affirm on alternative legal grounds even when trial courts err on justiciability. Substantively, the decision encourages formal, comprehensive city–county agreements for short-term housing of municipal arrestees and cautions that compliance with ALEA/NCIC record protocols is an implementation task, not an independent intake obligation.

The opinion’s durable message is pragmatic federalism at the local level: cooperation by contract where statute is silent, clear lines of default responsibility in the absence of agreement, and strict time limits to protect arrestees’ rights—all now explicitly harmonized by the Alabama Supreme Court.