Sheppheard v. Morrisey: Fourth Circuit Narrows Article III Standing—
“General Supervisory Authority” Alone Cannot Support Suit Against State Executives over Prison Conditions

1. Introduction

In Thomas Sheppheard v. Patrick Morrisey, No. 24-6691 (4th Cir. 2025), a putative class of West Virginia prisoners, jail detainees and juvenile offenders sued the state’s Governor and the Acting Cabinet Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, alleging that overcrowding, understaffing, and dilapidated facilities violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought sweeping declaratory and injunctive relief—including a court order compelling officials to spend hundreds of millions from the State’s budget surplus.

The District Court dismissed the action for lack of standing, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Sitting by designation, Judge Jasmine Yoon authored a published opinion joined by Judges Wilkinson and Rushing. The decision crystallises a critical rule: a state officer’s general supervisory or budget-proposal powers, without statutorily grounded authority to control the challenged conduct, are insufficient to satisfy the “traceability” and “redressability” prongs of Article III standing.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Traceability: Plaintiffs failed to show that their injuries flowed from conduct of Governor Morrisey (substituted for former Governor Justice) or Secretary Cunningham. Day-to-day control over prisons is vested in the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (WVDCR), not in the named defendants.
• Redressability: The court could not likely redress plaintiffs’ harms through an injunction against the Governor or the Secretary:
  • The Governor’s pardon power is discretionary and outside judicial control.
  • Budgetary decisions require legislative approval; courts cannot compel the Governor to appropriate or re-allocate funds.
  • The Secretary can propose budgets and enter contracts only with legislative approval; he cannot unilaterally fix staffing levels or maintenance.
• Result: Because both the causation and redressability elements were missing, Article III standing was absent. The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed dismissal without reaching sovereign-immunity, political-question, exhaustion or other issues.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) — Established the “irreducible minimum” of standing (injury, traceability, redressability). The panel repeatedly invoked Lujan’s framework and plaintiffs’ burden to plead facts supporting each element.
2. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) — Cited for the modern articulation of standing requirements, especially redressability.
3. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) — Supplies the “determinative or coercive effect” test: where multiple actors intervene, a defendant’s conduct must have coercive influence on third parties. Plaintiffs here could not show the Governor or Secretary had such power over the Commissioner or Legislature.
4. Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001) — Holds that a state official’s “general authority to enforce the laws” does not create a special relationship under Ex parte Young. The panel leaned on this doctrine to reject plaintiffs’ reliance on the Governor’s broad executive powers.
5. South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Limehouse, 549 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 2008) — Plaintiffs argued Limehouse supported standing because the Fourth Circuit allowed injunctive relief against a transportation director. The panel distinguished Limehouse: that official actually signed permits and managed the challenged dredging project, unlike the Governor’s attenuated role here.
6. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) — Although Young creates a path around sovereign immunity for prospective injunctive relief, it still requires an official with actual enforcement duty. The court emphasized that Young does not dispense with Article III’s causation and redressability.
7. State ex rel. Dodrill v. Scott, 352 S.E.2d 741 (W. Va. 1986) — Plaintiffs cited this state case to argue the Governor could use clemency to solve overcrowding. The panel found Dodrill irrelevant to federal standing: it recognised only a “permissible” gubernatorial option, not a judicially enforceable duty.
8. Additional federal cases—TransUnion v. Ramirez, Sierra Club v. DOI, Shipman, Buscemi v. Bell, Horne v. Flores, NFIB v. Sebelius—were employed to highlight separation-of-powers limits and the remedial power of courts.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Causation (Traceability)

• The injuries—unsafe conditions, inadequate staffing, dilapidated infrastructure— stem from budgetary allocations and operational decisions made by the Legislature and the WVDCR Commissioner, not by the named defendants.
• The Governor’s role is chiefly to propose a consolidated budget; he does not individually approve expenditures for door locks or hire officers.
• The Secretary’s statutory duties are similarly high-level: formulating budgets for the Governor and providing “support, oversight and guidance.” Plaintiffs offered no factual details showing that this advisory role caused the constitutional violations.

B. Redressability

• Appropriations: Neither defendant possesses unilateral authority to appropriate funds; without the Legislature, a judicial order would be ineffectual.
• Pardon Power: Even if mass clemency could relieve overcrowding, that power is discretionary. Federal courts may not command its exercise.
• Contracting/Personnel: The Secretary may enter contracts only after legislative approval; thus an injunction cannot assure remedial action.

C. Separation of Powers

“Policy disagreements should be addressed to elected policymakers at the ballot box, not to unelected judges in the courthouse.” — Slip op. at 23-24

The opinion underscores the constitutional boundary separating judicial review from policymaking and budgeting. Mandating specific staffing levels or capital expenditures would immerse federal courts in executive and legislative prerogatives.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

1. Pleading Strategy: Civil-rights litigants in the Fourth Circuit must now carefully align each requested remedy with a defendant who wields statutory authority to grant it. Naming the “top of the chain”—a Governor or cabinet secretary—will no longer suffice unless a concrete enforcement nexus exists.
2. Prison-Conditions Litigation: Future plaintiffs will likely sue the WVDCR Commissioner or wardens, and may add legislative officials if direct appropriations are essential. The decision may spur state-court filings, where standing doctrine sometimes differs.
3. Clarification of Ex parte Young in the Fourth Circuit: Sheppheard builds on Waste Management and narrows Limehouse, signalling that Young suits must still satisfy Article III and cannot rely on “general supervisory” language.
4. Budgetary Injunctions Disfavoured: The opinion cautions district courts against ordering a state to allocate surplus funds, reaffirming federalism and separation-of-powers restraints.
5. Potential Legislative Action: By highlighting the Legislature’s central role, the decision may increase political pressure in West Virginia for statutory reform or appropriations to improve correctional facilities.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article III Standing: The constitutional rule that you cannot sue in federal court unless
    1) you are injured;
    2) the defendant likely caused that injury (traceability); and
    3) a court order would likely fix it (redressability).
• Traceability vs. Redressability: Traceability asks “Who hurt you?” Redressability asks “If the judge rules for you, will it heal the hurt?”
• Ex parte Young Doctrine: Normally a state cannot be sued in federal court (Eleventh Amendment), but a plaintiff may sue a state officer personally for prospective relief to stop an ongoing violation of federal law—if that officer actually enforces the law at issue. Sheppheard clarifies that Young does not bypass standing requirements.
• Discretionary Power: A power an official may but is not required to use (e.g., gubernatorial pardons). Courts cannot force an official to exercise a truly discretionary power.
• Appropriation Authority: In most states, only the legislature can decide how public money is spent. Executives can propose budgets or request transfers but cannot write the checks themselves.

5. Conclusion

Sheppheard v. Morrisey is now the Fourth Circuit’s leading case on standing in institutional-reform litigation. It draws a bright line: plaintiffs must anchor causation and redressability in defendants with concrete, statutory control over the allegedly unlawful conditions. General oversight, public statements, or budget suggestions will not do. By reaffirming separation-of-powers principles, the court constrains the federal judiciary’s role in managing state correctional systems while implicitly directing reform advocates toward officials—and political processes—better positioned to enact change.