Introduction

In Shelton v. City of Locust Grove, Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of civil-rights and state-law claims stemming from the shooting of two dogs by municipal police officers. The case presents a stark factual backdrop—officers obtained an on-the-spot “abandonment” of the dogs, the mayor directed euthanasia, and officers later admitted they shot and disposed of the animals. One dog, Sancho, returned injured nine days later. Despite the troubling facts, the court resolved the appeal on legal grounds concerning Article III standing, the merits-based nature of “Fourth Amendment standing,” the doctrine of abandonment, and the role of police reports on a motion to dismiss.

The core holdings are twofold: (1) Article III standing and “Fourth Amendment standing” are distinct; whether a plaintiff has a cognizable possessory or privacy interest is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one; and (2) an owner’s objectively manifested abandonment of property—here, dogs—defeats a Fourth Amendment seizure claim even if the owner subjectively hoped to reclaim the property later. The court also held that the officers had probable cause to issue a “dogs at large” citation and that a threat to issue a lawful citation does not render abandonment involuntary.

The plaintiffs were Deanna Shelton and Chloe Jennings; the defendants were the City of Locust Grove, its mayor Jason Williams, and officers Clay Hall and Brett Russell. Plaintiffs asserted a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state tort claims (intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence/conversion), and sought injunctive relief restricting future dog seizures and killings. The district court dismissed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

• Article III vs Fourth Amendment “standing”: The court reiterates that Article III standing (injury, causation, redressability) is jurisdictional, but so-called “Fourth Amendment standing” (whether a plaintiff’s own rights were violated) goes to the merits and should not be “jurisdictionalized.”
• Jennings’s Article III standing: Jennings lacked Article III standing because the complaint itself alleged Shelton was the sole owner of the dogs “at all relevant times,” thus Jennings suffered no injury-in-fact.
• Shelton’s Article III standing: Shelton, as alleged owner, had Article III standing. Whether she retained a Fourth Amendment interest turned on abandonment, a merits question.
• Abandonment: The court applied an objective test. Shelton’s words and conduct—agreeing to “abandon” the dogs as strays to avoid tickets—objectively relinquished her possessory interest, defeating her Fourth Amendment claim notwithstanding her subjective expectation to retrieve the dogs later.
• Voluntariness and probable cause: A threat to issue a citation does not itself make abandonment involuntary, and here officers had probable cause to issue “dogs at large” citations based on the dogs’ presence outside containment (including in a neighbor’s yard), defeating any coercion theory.
• Incorporation by reference: The district court permissibly considered the officers’ police report, which plaintiffs quoted and relied on and whose authenticity was undisputed, to find probable cause and to contextualize abandonment.
• State and other constitutional claims: Oklahoma “dangerous dog” seizure provisions were inapplicable, and noncompliance with state/local post-seizure rules does not itself render a seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. New Fourteenth Amendment due-process theories raised for the first time on appeal were not considered.
• Disposition: Affirmed in full.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395 (2018) and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978): These decisions anchor the distinction between Article III standing and the merits inquiry into whether the plaintiff’s own Fourth Amendment rights were infringed. The Tenth Circuit leans on Byrd to caution against conflating merits with jurisdiction.
• Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023) and Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006): Reaffirm that courts should treat rules as jurisdictional only when Congress clearly says so. The court uses this to emphasize that “abandonment” is not jurisdictional.
• United States v. Ross, 963 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc): The Tenth Circuit approvingly cites Ross’s reasoning that abandonment is a merits question bearing on whether the Fourth Amendment right is implicated, not on Article III standing.
• Mayfield v. Bethards, 826 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2016): Confirms that killing a dog is a Fourth Amendment “seizure.” The court reiterates that such killings presumptively interfere with possessory interests absent a warrant or exception—unless, as here, the owner has abandoned the interest.
• Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003) and Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep’t, 844 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2014): These cases support the proposition that privately owned dogs are “effects” protected by the Fourth Amendment and that owners have a right against unreasonable dog seizures.
• United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Porter, 66 F.4th 1223 (10th Cir. 2023); United States v. Juszczyk, 844 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Easley, 911 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Denny, 441 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2006): These Tenth Circuit decisions frame abandonment as an objective inquiry considering words, acts, and other facts. They recognize both subjective intent and objective reasonableness, but objective manifestations can defeat claims even if the owner subjectively intended to retain an interest.
• United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561 (10th Cir. 1991) and Easley: Establish that police pressure or investigation does not per se render abandonment involuntary; voluntariness is judged by totality of objective circumstances.
• Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008): The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard does not fluctuate with state or local law procedures. This undercuts arguments that noncompliance with state/local euthanasia or impoundment rules automatically converts a seizure into a Fourth Amendment violation.
• Prager v. LaFaver, 180 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1999); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010); Cuervo v. Sorenson, 112 F.4th 1307 (10th Cir. 2024); Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2017); Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2018): These authorities support the district court’s ability to consider documents incorporated by reference on a motion to dismiss when the complaint quotes, relies on, and does not dispute the authenticity of such documents. The opinion applies an abuse-of-discretion standard to this procedural decision.
• Atlas Biologicals, Inc. v. Kutrubes, 50 F.4th 1307 (10th Cir. 2022) and pleading standards cases (Twombly; Iqbal): Reinforce Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement and Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility principles guiding dismissal.

Legal Reasoning

1) Article III standing vs. “Fourth Amendment standing”

The court carefully separates jurisdiction from merits. Jennings lacked Article III standing because the complaint unequivocally alleged Shelton as the sole owner “at all relevant times,” eliminating any injury-in-fact to Jennings. By contrast, Shelton had Article III standing because she alleged injury to her own possessory interest. Whether Shelton retained a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest after “abandonment” is a merits inquiry, consistent with Byrd and the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Ross cautioning against “jurisdictionalizing” merits questions.

2) Abandonment defeats a Fourth Amendment seizure claim

The abandonment analysis is objective and turns on words and conduct. The officers offered Shelton a choice: be cited for dogs at large or declare the dogs strays and relinquish them. Shelton chose the latter. Even though she subjectively hoped the dogs would be temporarily held at the Pryor pound, the complaint did not allege she communicated a limited, conditional relinquishment to the officers or that there was an agreement to that effect. On those pleadings, her express “abandonment” and denial of ownership objectively extinguished her possessory interest. Under Tenth Circuit law, a subjective desire to retrieve property later does not preserve a reasonable, objective expectation of continued possessory rights when words and acts manifest abandonment.

The court’s reasoning aligns with Garzon, Porter, Juszczyk, and Easley: abandonment can be established by objective facts even if subjective intent is mixed or contrary, and relinquishment of an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy or possession defeats the claim. Thus, while killing a pet ordinarily constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure (Mayfield), there can be no violation of the plaintiff’s own rights if, before the shooting, the plaintiff had already abandoned the property interest.

3) Voluntariness and the role of probable cause

Shelton argued the abandonment was coerced by the threat of citation. The court held that the mere existence of police pressure or investigation does not render abandonment involuntary, citing Morgan and Easley. Even assuming a threat to issue an unlawful citation could vitiate voluntariness, the officers had probable cause to issue a “dogs at large” citation on two independent bases:

• The dogs were present outside containment on Shelton’s property (front yard) when officers were there; and
• Before Shelton arrived, an at-large complaint reported the dogs in a neighbor’s yard, which the police confirmed.

Because probable cause existed, the threat of citation did not constitute improper coercion. That conclusion fortifies the voluntariness of Shelton’s abandonment.

4) Use of the police report at the pleading stage

Plaintiffs quoted the report in their complaint and did not dispute its authenticity. The district court therefore had discretion to consider the report’s other portions under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The appellate court reviewed that procedural decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed. This allowed the court to rely on the report’s narrative that officers responded to an at-large complaint and found the dogs in the neighbor’s yard, a fact supporting probable cause and the abandonment analysis.

Notably, the court also observed that where incorporated documents conflict with complaint allegations, the document controls—a familiar rule in the Tenth Circuit (Brokers’ Choice).

5) State-law compliance and Fourteenth Amendment theories

The court rejected the idea that noncompliance with state or local post-seizure procedures transforms a seizure into a Fourth Amendment violation, invoking Virginia v. Moore to disentangle federal reasonableness from state-law mechanisms. Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due-process theories were not considered because they were raised for the first time on appeal and insufficiently developed. The Oklahoma “dangerous dog” statutes were inapposite because the seizure was not premised on dangerousness.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Clarified doctrinal boundary: The opinion, though an unpublished order and judgment, crisply instructs Tenth Circuit district courts and litigants to keep jurisdictional standing (Article III) distinct from the merits of Fourth Amendment claims. Abandonment pertains to the latter.
• Objective abandonment governs pet-seizure cases: Plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional dog shootings must plead facts showing they retained an objective possessory interest at the time of the seizure. Expressly “abandoning” animals as strays—even under financial pressure—can defeat the claim, unless facts plausibly show any relinquishment was limited, conditional, and communicated to officers (e.g., a clear, contemporaneous agreement about temporary impoundment and a right of return).
• Probable cause and voluntariness: Threats to issue lawful citations will not ordinarily invalidate the voluntariness of relinquishment. Plaintiffs seeking to argue coercion must plausibly allege (and later prove) absence of probable cause or other coercive conduct rendering any relinquishment involuntary under the totality of circumstances.
• Pleading with precision matters: The complaint’s allegation that Shelton alone owned the dogs foreclosed Jennings’s injury-in-fact and contributed to dismissal. In multi-plaintiff property cases, counsel must align party status with the property interests actually alleged.
• Incorporation-by-reference risks: Quoting and relying on a police report in a complaint can open the door to judicial consideration of the entire document on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Plaintiffs should anticipate that unhelpful portions will be considered; defendants should preserve authenticity and centrality arguments to enable incorporation.
• Alternative constitutional routes: Where Fourth Amendment claims are weakened by abandonment, plaintiffs should consider timely pleading Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process (e.g., deprivation of property without adequate process) or substantive due process theories if supported by law and facts. Waiting until appeal risks waiver.
• Municipal liability (Monell) and injunctive relief: Although not separately analyzed, the demise of the underlying constitutional claim effectively ended municipal-liability and injunctive claims. For forward-looking relief, plaintiffs would need to plausibly allege a real and immediate threat of repeated injury and a policy or custom causing the harm.
• Policy and training implications for municipalities: Even though the court “in no way endorses or condones what happened,” municipal actors should implement clear, lawful impoundment and euthanasia policies, officer training on conditional relinquishments, and documentation protocols to reduce litigation risk under other theories (e.g., due process, state law torts).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article III standing vs. Fourth Amendment “standing”: Article III standing asks whether you are in the right courthouse at all (injury, causation, redressability). “Fourth Amendment standing,” a misnomer, asks whether your own Fourth Amendment rights were infringed—this is a merits question (did you have a protected privacy/possessory interest?).
• Abandonment (Fourth Amendment context): If you give up your property (by words or actions), you may lose any Fourth Amendment protection for it. Courts look at what you objectively said and did, not just what you secretly intended. If your words and acts reasonably convey you relinquished ownership or possessory control, your Fourth Amendment claim to that property typically fails.
• Voluntariness under pressure: Police presence or investigation creates pressure, but that does not automatically make your actions involuntary. A threat to issue a lawful citation (supported by probable cause) normally does not invalidate your choice to relinquish property.
• Incorporation by reference at Rule 12(b)(6): If a complaint quotes and relies on a document and there’s no dispute about its authenticity, a court can treat the document as part of the complaint without converting the motion to summary judgment. Plaintiffs should be cautious about selectively quoting such documents.
• State-law compliance vs. Fourth Amendment reasonableness: Violating a state rule (like a euthanasia procedure) does not automatically make a seizure unreasonable under the federal Constitution. State-law remedies may exist, but the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard is independent of local procedures.
• Dog shootings as “seizures”: The Constitution treats privately owned dogs as property or “effects.” Killing a dog is a seizure because it permanently interferes with the owner’s possessory interest. The question becomes whether that seizure was reasonable and whether the plaintiff had a protected interest at the time.

Conclusion

Shelton underscores two pivotal doctrinal points in Fourth Amendment litigation. First, courts must not conflate Article III standing with the merits: whether a plaintiff had a personal, protectable Fourth Amendment interest (here, a possessory interest in dogs) is a merits question, not a jurisdictional bar. Second, objective abandonment—manifested by words and actions—defeats a Fourth Amendment claim even when a plaintiff subjectively hoped to reclaim property later.

The opinion also provides practical guidance on coercion and probable cause: threats to issue lawful citations do not vitiate voluntariness. It confirms that courts may consider the full contents of incorporated documents at the pleading stage. And it signals that while noncompliance with state or local procedures may be concerning, it does not independently convert a seizure into a Fourth Amendment violation.

Though nonprecedential, the decision is a persuasive and clear articulation of the separation between jurisdiction and merits in Fourth Amendment cases, and a concrete application of the objective abandonment doctrine in the emotionally charged context of pet seizures. For future litigants, the case highlights the imperative to plead conditional or limited relinquishment in express terms, to develop probable-cause challenges with specificity, and to preserve any complementary due-process or state-law theories from the outset.