Shaping Ohio Sentencing and Extraordinary Writ Practice: Commentary on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s December 24, 2025 Case Announcements (2025-Ohio-5682)

Supreme Court of Ohio – Case Announcements, December 24, 2025
Citation: 12/24/2025 Case Announcements, 2025-Ohio-5682

I. Introduction

The document designated as 2025-Ohio-5682 is not a single merits opinion, but a comprehensive set of case announcements by the Supreme Court of Ohio on December 24, 2025. It reports:

• Three merit decisions with opinions (including an important energy-siting case and a tax appeal).
• Multiple merit decisions without opinions—mostly original actions in mandamus, prohibition, and procedendo.
• A series of motions and procedural rulings, including grants of alternative writs and denials of stays and injunctions.
• Appeals accepted for review, including two certified conflicts raising significant sentencing questions.
• A grant of reconsideration in a complex trust case.

Although the announcements do not reproduce the full reasoning of any individual slip opinion, they contain several legally significant developments and signal where the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is heading, particularly in:

• Criminal sentencing and the division of authority between trial courts and the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC).
• The interpretation of Ohio’s Reagan Tokes Law in related mental health commitment statutes.
• The Court’s increasingly structured approach to extraordinary writs and potential vexatious litigators.
• Ongoing oversight of administrative agencies (e.g., the Power Siting Board) and the Board of Tax Appeals.

This commentary treats the December 24, 2025 Case Announcements as a unified “opinion” in the sense that they collectively shape procedure and signal substantive doctrines, even though the detailed reasoning of the referenced slip opinions is not reproduced in the text provided.

II. Summary of the Case Announcements

A. Merit Decisions with Opinions

1. In re Application of S. Branch Solar, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5679
   Power Siting Board, No. 21-669-EL-BGN – Order affirmed.
   The Supreme Court affirmed the Ohio Power Siting Board’s order concerning the South Branch Solar project. All justices concurred in the judgment; Chief Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion.
2. VVF Intervest, L.L.C. v. Harris, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5680
   Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2019-1233 – Decision reversed.
   The Court reversed the Board of Tax Appeals in a tax dispute. All justices joined the majority opinion; Chief Justice Kennedy dissented with a separate opinion.
3. State ex rel. Mack v. Robinson, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5681
   Richland App. No. 2025 CA 0021 – Judgment affirmed.
   The Court affirmed the appellate judgment in an original action; all justices joined the disposition.

The details of these three merits opinions are not set out in the announcements, but the outcomes—affirmance in an energy siting case, reversal in a tax appeal, and affirmance in a writ action—are procedurally clear.

B. Merit Decisions without Opinions

A substantial block of the document consists of summary dispositions in original actions:

• State ex rel. Whitney v. O'Brien – Mandamus and Prohibition: motions to dismiss granted; cause dismissed.
• State ex rel. Townsend v. Burnside – Procedendo: request for additional summons denied; motion to amend denied; cause dismissed under Rule 12.04. (Split on allowing amendment.)
• State ex rel. Callahan v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. – Mandamus: motions to dismiss granted; cause dismissed.
• State ex rel. Kennedy v. Harris – Mandamus: dismissed pursuant to Rule 12.04.
• State ex rel. Jones v. Eleventh Dist. Court of Appeals – Mandamus: emergency writ and docketing request denied; motion to dismiss granted; cause dismissed.
• State ex rel. Pottinger v. O'Malley – Mandamus and Prohibition: motions to dismiss granted; motion to amend opposition denied; cause dismissed.
• State ex rel. Hagens v. Warren Cty. Common Pleas Court – Mandamus: motion to dismiss granted; motion to amend denied; cause dismissed (with a dissent that would grant leave to amend).
• McBroom v. Ohio Aud. – Procedendo: motion to dismiss granted; motions for addendum and default judgment denied; cause dismissed.
• State ex rel. McCoy v. Wells – Mandamus: motion to dismiss granted; motion for sanctions denied, with three justices dissenting in part and favoring sanctions.

These dispositions show a strong pattern: most original actions are dismissed at the pleading stage, and the Court typically denies leave to amend or expand the pleadings, with limited and divided exceptions.

C. Motions and Procedural Rulings

Key procedural rulings include:

• State v. Lucius (2019-0543) – The Court denied a motion to seal or restrict public access to the case record.
• State ex rel. Bloodworth v. Toledo Corr. Inst. (2025-0775) – In mandamus, motions for relief from judgment and to amend that motion were denied.
• Multiple original actions where the Court sua sponte granted alternative writs and set Rule 12.05 briefing schedules:
  • State ex rel. Ames v. Andover Village Council (2025-1097).
  • State ex rel. Ames v. Stow-Munroe Falls City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. – three separate dockets (2025-1366, 2025-1424, 2025-1474), later consolidated.
  • State ex rel. Hall v. Moore (2025-1388).
  • State ex rel. Bailey v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (2025-1422).
  • State ex rel. Bristolville 25 Developer, L.L.C. v. Lordstown (2025-1497) – partial dismissal of one respondent and an order for the remaining respondents to answer.
• State v. Talbert (2025-1348 / 2025-1370) – The Court accepted a certified conflict on the authority of trial courts to disapprove participation in transitional control and consolidated related proceedings.
• State v. Wahl (2025-1439) – The Court accepted a certified conflict about how to interpret the “maximum prison term” in R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b) in light of the Reagan Tokes indefinite sentencing scheme.
• Timley v. Timley (2025-1527) – An emergency motion for injunction pending appeal was denied.
• In re A.M. (2025-1469) – A motion to stay was denied (with two justices dissenting).

In several of the Ames cases and related matters, the Court deferred ruling on “counterclaim/motion” filings seeking to label relators as vexatious litigators, holding those requests in abeyance while the merits proceed under an alternative writ.

D. Appeals Accepted for Review

• Gateway Royalty, L.L.C. v. EAP Ohio, L.L.C. (2025-1265) – The Court accepted the appeal on at least one proposition of law in an oil and gas / royalty dispute. There is a dissent from Justice Deters and a partial dissent from Justice Brunner (who would have accepted more propositions).
• State v. Talbert (2025-1370) – Consolidated with the conflict case (2025-1348), confirming the Court will directly address the certified sentencing question.

E. Reconsideration

• Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., N.A. (2025-0737 / 2025-0818) – The Court granted a motion for reconsideration, reinstating the appeal and setting an accelerated briefing schedule. Several justices dissented from granting reconsideration.

This reconsideration suggests that the Court views the underlying trust/fiduciary issues as sufficiently complex or important to warrant a second look, even after a prior decision reported at 2025-Ohio-5187.

III. Key Substantive Themes and Emerging Issues

A. Criminal Sentencing and Correctional Authority

1. Transitional Control and Judicial Power (State v. Talbert)

The Court certified a conflict in State v. Talbert on this question:

“Does a trial court possess the authority as a matter of law to disapprove or foreclose a defendant's participation in any Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's transitional control program at a sentencing hearing?”

The conflict cases identified are:

• State v. Toennisson, 2011-Ohio-5869 (12th Dist.).
• State v. Brown, 2016-Ohio-310 (1st Dist.).

The announcement does not detail these decisions’ reasoning, but the certified issue implies that:

• One district held—or strongly suggested—that a trial court may prohibit or disapprove participation in DRC’s transitional control program.
• Another district concluded—or strongly suggested—that such a prohibition exceeds the trial court’s authority, because transitional control is a function reserved to the DRC under statute.

Transitional control is typically governed by R.C. 2967.26 and related statutes. It allows the DRC to transfer eligible inmates to community-based transitional facilities (e.g., halfway houses) near the end of their prison terms to facilitate reentry. The core legal tensions include:

• Separation of powers: To what extent can a sentencing judge invade the executive branch’s discretion in administering sentences?
• Statutory interpretation: Does any sentencing provision or other statute explicitly authorize trial courts to declare a defendant ineligible for transitional control?
• Uniformity of sentencing: Allowing trial courts to veto transitional control could make eligibility highly judge-dependent rather than statute-dependent.

By accepting the conflict, the Supreme Court signaled that it will provide a statewide rule on whether trial judges can, in the sentencing entry, effectively override DRC’s transitional-control discretion.

2. Indefinite Sentencing and Mental Health Commitments (State v. Wahl)

In State v. Wahl (6th Dist.), the Court certified—and the Supreme Court accepted—a conflict on this question:

“Does the ‘maximum prison term or term of imprisonment that the defendant or person could have received’ as used in R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b) for determining the final termination of commitment include the maximum prison term imposed under the indefinite sentencing scheme required by the Reagan Tokes Law?”

The conflict case is:

• State v. Young, 2021-Ohio-215 (8th Dist.).

R.C. 2945.401 concerns continued commitment of individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) or otherwise under forensic mental health supervision. Subsection (J)(1)(b) links the ultimate duration of commitment to the maximum prison term the person could have received if convicted of the underlying offense.

Ohio’s Reagan Tokes Law created an indefinite sentencing scheme for many felonies, with a structure such as “minimum 10 years, maximum 15 years.” The question in Wahl is whether “maximum prison term” in a mental-health-commitment statute should:

• Be read to include the indefinite maximum (the upper tail of the sentence); or
• Be limited to some other measure (e.g., the minimum term or the “stated” term without the indefinite extension).

The 6th and 8th Districts have taken divergent views—hence the certified conflict. The Supreme Court will now clarify how the new indefinite sentencing regime interacts with existing civil-commitment frameworks, with direct consequences for:

• The maximum duration of mental health commitments aligned with criminal exposure.
• Consistency between criminal sentencing policy and civil confinement for forensic patients.
• Due process and proportionality considerations for individuals under long-term psychiatric supervision tied to criminal charges.

B. Extraordinary Writ Practice and Docket Management

A striking theme in the announcements is the Court’s tight control over extraordinary writ practice:

• Many petitions in mandamus, prohibition, and procedendo were dismissed at an early stage, often on motions to dismiss or under Rule 12.04.
• Requests for leave to amend complaints were frequently denied, with occasional dissents favoring greater flexibility (e.g., in Townsend v. Burnside and Hagens v. Warren Cty. C.P. Court).
• In a smaller set of cases, the Court issued a sua sponte alternative writ, which is a preliminary order requiring further briefing and evidence before deciding whether a full writ is warranted.

The Court also addresses the recurring problem of litigants (often frequent pro se relators) who file repetitive or abusive writ actions:

• In multiple Ames cases (2025-1097, 2025-1366, 2025-1424, 2025-1474), respondents’ “counterclaim/motion” filings—seeking to declare the relator a vexatious litigator and to obtain sanctions—are held in abeyance.
• In State ex rel. McCoy v. Wells, the Court denies sanctions against the relator, while three justices would have granted sanctions.

This pattern suggests a two-track approach:

1. The Court maintains a high bar for granting extraordinary relief and often dismisses unmeritorious or procedurally defective petitions.
2. At the same time, it exercises measured restraint in immediately imposing sanctions or vexatious-ligator designations, preferring to resolve the merits (or at least the preliminary merits) before addressing such collateral consequences.

The repeated narrow splits (e.g., some justices favoring sua sponte dismissal or sanctions, others insisting on a fuller process) reveal an internal debate about how aggressively to police the Court’s original jurisdiction docket.

C. Administrative and Regulatory Law

1. Energy Siting – In re Application of S. Branch Solar

In In re Application of S. Branch Solar, Slip Opinion 2025-Ohio-5679, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ohio Power Siting Board’s order. While the opinion’s reasoning is not in the announcement, several implications can be drawn:

• The Court continues a pattern of deference to specialized administrative agencies in complex, technical matters like energy infrastructure siting, absent clear legal error.
• Energy and environmental disputes—particularly around solar—often involve competing statutory and policy interests (renewable energy development, agricultural preservation, local land use concerns). An affirmance provides regulatory certainty for both developers and communities relying on Board decisions.
• Chief Justice Kennedy’s separate concurrence indicates that at least one member of the Court had additional observations or doctrinal refinements, though she agreed with the result.

For practitioners, the practical takeaway is that challenges to Power Siting Board decisions face a significant evidentiary and legal hurdle. Absent evidence of misapplication of law or arbitrary decision-making, the Court is reluctant to disturb Board orders.

D. Tax and Commercial Litigation

1. VVF Intervest, L.L.C. v. Harris – Oversight of the Board of Tax Appeals

In VVF Intervest, L.L.C. v. Harris, Slip Opinion 2025-Ohio-5680, the Court reversed a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). We are not given the detailed holding, but several structural points are apparent:

• The reversal demonstrates that, notwithstanding the BTA’s expertise, the Supreme Court exercises active oversight over statewide tax adjudication.
• The BTA often hears disputes involving property tax valuation, classification, and procedural issues. A high-court reversal typically signals that the BTA misapplied a statute, misinterpreted precedent, or failed to follow evidentiary rules.
• Chief Justice Kennedy’s dissent underscores that the case likely involved a close question of statutory interpretation or tax policy, with differing views on how strictly to review the BTA.

2. Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co. – Reconsideration in Complex Trust Litigation

In Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., the Court grants a motion for reconsideration, reinstating an appeal in a complex trust/fiduciary matter. This is noteworthy because:

• Reconsideration at the Supreme Court level is relatively rare and typically reserved for cases where the Court perceives a material misunderstanding of law or fact or broader systemic ramifications.
• The fact that reconsideration is granted over dissent signals internal disagreement about whether the prior disposition was correct, or about the institutional significance of the case.
• The accelerated briefing schedule—aligning with a related case—suggests that the Court is seeking to resolve intertwined fiduciary or estate-planning issues in a coherent, consolidated fashion.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Context

The announcements explicitly reference several prior cases and statutory regimes, primarily in connection with the certified conflicts.

A. State v. Toennisson and State v. Brown – Transitional Control

Although the text does not provide the holdings of Toennisson and Brown, we know:

• Both deal with the intersection of sentencing authority and the DRC’s transitional control program.
• They reached inconsistent conclusions on whether trial courts may, at sentencing, foreclose future placement in transitional control.

The statutory background likely involves:

• R.C. 2967.26 – authorizing the DRC to transfer inmates to transitional control near the end of their sentence.
• Sentencing statutes (in the R.C. 2929.11–2929.19 range) – specifying the terms of imprisonment and various forms of post-release supervision.

The conflict raises a classic separation-of-powers question: does a sentencing judge’s authority end with the imposition of a lawful sentence, leaving its administration to the executive (DRC), or can the judge carve out exceptions and restrictions that limit DRC’s discretion?

B. State v. Young – “Maximum Prison Term” under R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b)

State v. Young (2021-Ohio-215, 8th Dist.) interpreted the phrase:

“the maximum prison term or term of imprisonment that the defendant or person could have received”

in the context of R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b). That subsection ties the outer limit of a forensic mental health commitment to the maximum term of imprisonment that could have been imposed for the underlying offense.

With the advent of the Reagan Tokes Law, many felonies now carry indefinite sentences. The conflict in Wahl suggests that:

• One line of cases treats the indefinite maximum as the relevant “maximum prison term.”
• Another line may read “maximum” more narrowly, possibly limited to the minimum or a determinate baseline.

The Supreme Court’s resolution will determine how the indefinite sentencing framework is imported into civil-commitment calculations.

C. The Reagan Tokes Law – General Background

The Reagan Tokes Law (R.C. 2967.271 and related provisions) instituted indefinite sentencing for certain first- and second-degree felonies:

• The sentencing court imposes a minimum term within a statutory range.
• The statute sets a higher maximum term (often expressed as minimum + a fixed number of years).
• DRC and the parole board determine, based on inmate conduct and institutional criteria, whether the person is released at the minimum or held up to the maximum.

By 2024, the Ohio Supreme Court had already upheld key features of this scheme against constitutional challenges (e.g., separation of powers, jury trial, and due process concerns), but numerous implementation questions remain. The Wahl conflict illustrates how downstream statutes—especially those tying civil consequences to a “maximum prison term”—must now be reconciled with the indefinite-sentencing model.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Extraordinary Writs: Mandamus, Prohibition, and Procedendo

• Mandamus – An order compelling a public official or court to perform a clear legal duty where:
  • The relator has a clear legal right to the act requested.
  • The respondent has a clear legal duty to perform it.
  • No adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists.
• Prohibition – An order preventing a court or tribunal from exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction.
• Procedendo – An order directing a lower court to proceed to judgment or otherwise move a case forward when it has improperly refused or failed to act.

These writs are extraordinary remedies; they are not substitutes for ordinary appeals. The high dismissal rate in the announcements reflects the Court’s insistence that relators satisfy stringent criteria before invoking its original jurisdiction.

B. Alternative Writ

An alternative writ (Rule 12.05) is a preliminary order issued when the Court finds that a writ petition is not clearly meritless:

• It does not grant the ultimate relief sought.
• Instead, it directs the respondent to file an answer and orders the parties to submit evidence and briefs on a defined schedule.

In the December 24 announcements, several relators (e.g., Ames, Hall, Bailey, Bristolville 25 Developer) obtained alternative writs, signaling that the Court found their claims potentially meritorious and worthy of fuller examination.

C. Rule 12.04 Dismissal

Under Supreme Court Practice Rule 12.04, the Court may dismiss an original action where:

• The complaint fails to state a claim for which an extraordinary writ can issue; or
• The allegations, even if true, show no entitlement to the writ due to the availability of an adequate legal remedy (e.g., appeal, motion in the trial court).

References in the announcements to dismissals “pursuant to Rule 12.04” indicate that the Court found the complaints facially deficient or procedurally improper.

D. Vexatious Litigator and Sanctions

• A vexatious litigator is someone who habitually abuses the court system through repetitive, frivolous, or harassing filings. Once designated, that person may be barred from filing new actions without prior leave courts.
• Sanctions can include monetary penalties, costs, or other consequences for frivolous litigation.

The announcements show courts and respondents increasingly seeking such designations (particularly in the Ames cases), but the Supreme Court defers decision on those requests, treating them as “counterclaim/motion” issues to be addressed later, if at all.

E. Certified Conflict

When Ohio appellate districts issue decisions that are in conflict on a question of law, a district court may certify the conflict to the Supreme Court under App.R. 25. If the Supreme Court determines that:

• (1) there is an actual conflict, and
• (2) the question is of public or great general interest,

it may accept the case. The Supreme Court then:

• Identifies the specific question of law to be addressed (as it did in Talbert and Wahl), and
• Issues a binding decision that resolves the conflict and guides all lower courts statewide.

F. Transitional Control

Transitional control is a pre-release program administered by the DRC for certain inmates near the end of their prison terms. It commonly involves:

• Transfer to a community residential facility, halfway house, or similar setting.
• Enhanced supervision and reentry-focused services.
• Continuation of the sentence under less restrictive conditions to ease reintegration.

The key debate in Talbert is whether the sentencing judge may preemptively bar an inmate from participating in this program.

G. “Maximum Prison Term” Under R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b)

Under R.C. 2945.401, individuals in forensic mental health custody (e.g., NGRI acquittees) can be held in a hospital or similar facility. Subsection (J)(1)(b) caps the total duration of commitment at the “maximum prison term” that could have been imposed had the person been convicted.

The conflict in Wahl is whether, when the underlying offense now carries an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law, the cap for civil commitment includes the statutory indefinite maximum or some lesser figure. That choice has concrete consequences for how long a person may be lawfully confined in a mental-health facility.

VI. Likely Impact and Future Directions

A. Sentencing and Correctional Administration

The Supreme Court’s eventual decisions in the Talbert and Wahl conflicts will have significant ramifications:

• For trial judges:
  • If the Court holds that judges may not bar transitional control, sentencing entries will have to avoid language that invades DRC’s statutory domain.
  • If judges can bar transitional control, they will possess a new, potent sentencing tool with major reentry and correctional-policy impacts.
  • On the Reagan Tokes issue, judges will need clear guidance on how to communicate the “maximum prison term” when that figure has both criminal and civil-commitment consequences.
• For DRC and forensic facilities:
  • A ruling limiting judicial authority over transitional control would confirm executive-branch discretion in managing late-term placement decisions.
  • Forensic hospitals will gain clarity on the timeline for discharge consideration for NGRI or similarly situated patients whose underlying offenses carry indefinite sentences.
• For defendants and forensic patients:
  • Outcomes in these cases will directly influence how long they may be confined, and under what conditions, beyond the traditional minimum-maximum framework.
  • There may also be constitutional litigation (due process, proportionality, equal protection) depending on how broadly “maximum prison term” is interpreted in the commitment context.

B. Extraordinary Writ Practice and Access to the Supreme Court

The December 24 announcements reinforce several signals for future litigants:

• The Court is skeptical of expansive writ practice; many claims that could be raised by appeal, motion, or in the normal trial-court process will not qualify for extraordinary relief.
• Relators must draft factually specific, legally precise complaints; the Court often denies leave to amend and dismisses under Rule 12.04 when the original pleading is insufficient.
• Nevertheless, where a petition presents a colorable claim of governmental overreach or legal error without an adequate remedy, the Court is willing to issue an alternative writ, set structured briefing, and (at least temporarily) hold off on sanctions or vexatious-litigator findings.

In short, the Court is seeking to preserve the integrity of its docket without entirely foreclosing access to extraordinary relief for genuinely aggrieved relators.

C. Administrative and Tax Law Stability

The affirmance in S. Branch Solar and the reversal in VVF Intervest collectively indicate:

• A continued inclination to uphold specialized administrative judgments (Power Siting Board) unless they conflict with law.
• A readiness to correct the BTA where its interpretations deviate from statutory text or established precedent.

This balance helps maintain predictability in Ohio’s regulatory and tax environment while keeping agencies within legal bounds.

D. Reconsideration as a Safety Valve in Complex Civil Cases

Granting reconsideration in Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co. shows the Court’s willingness to:

• Use reconsideration as a safety valve in sophisticated civil matters (trusts, estates, fiduciary duties) where the implications may not have been fully appreciated initially.
• Coordinate related appeals (via synchronized briefing) to reach coherent and comprehensive rulings on intertwined legal issues.

VII. Conclusion

The December 24, 2025 Case Announcements, though procedurally oriented and largely devoid of full opinion text, are doctrinally important. They:

• Set the stage for major rulings on:
  • The scope of trial court authority over transitional control programs (Talbert), and
  • The interaction between Reagan Tokes indefinite sentencing and the “maximum prison term” used in forensic mental health commitments (Wahl).
• Demonstrate a strong but nuanced effort to manage the Court’s original-jurisdiction docket in extraordinary writs, balancing dismissal of meritless petitions with a disciplined, staged approach to sanctions and vexatious-ligator designations.
• Reaffirm the Court’s role as a supervisory tribunal over administrative agencies and the BTA, willing to affirm or reverse as statutory fidelity requires.
• Highlight the use of reconsideration in complex civil litigation to ensure that precedent is well-anchored and internally consistent.

For practitioners, policymakers, and scholars, 2025-Ohio-5682 is a roadmap of the issues that will likely dominate Ohio’s appellate landscape in the near term: the evolving contours of sentencing power, the administration of indefinite sentences, the interplay between criminal justice and mental health law, and the ongoing calibration of access to extraordinary judicial remedies.