Sham Litigation and Reverse Payment Settlements in Pharmaceutical Antitrust: Insights from In Re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation

Sham Litigation and Reverse Payment Settlements in Pharmaceutical Antitrust: Insights from In Re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation

Introduction

The case of In Re: Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation (868 F.3d 132) adjudicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on August 9, 2017, stands as a pivotal decision intersecting intellectual property and antitrust law. This appeal involved plaintiffs representing both direct purchasers (entities like pharmacies) and indirect purchasers (consumers) of Wellbutrin XL, a drug used to treat depression.

The plaintiffs alleged that GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) engaged in anti-competitive practices, including sham litigation and reverse payment settlements, to delay the entry of generic versions of Wellbutrin XL into the market. These actions were purportedly in violation of Sections One and Two of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of GSK. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding GSK's alleged sham litigation and reverse payment settlements. Consequently, the plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing due to insufficient causation of their alleged injuries.

Key rulings included:

  • Affirmation of summary judgment granting to GSK on all antitrust claims.
  • Denial of plaintiffs' claims that GSK engaged in sham litigation or reverse payment settlements.
  • Rejection of class certification for indirect purchasers due to lack of ascertainability and standing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court extensively referenced established doctrines and precedents, including:

  • FTC v. Actavis, Inc. (133 S. Ct. 2223, 2013): Established that reverse payment settlements can violate antitrust laws and should be evaluated under the rule of reason.
  • Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: Protects entities from antitrust liability when petitioning the government, unless the actions are a sham to interfere with competition.
  • ILLINOIS BRICK CO. v. ILLINOIS (431 U.S. 720, 1977): Clarified antitrust standing, particularly for indirect purchasers under federal law.
  • King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. (791 F.3d 388, 3d Cir. 2015): Expanded the understanding of reverse payments beyond cash transactions.

Legal Reasoning

The court's decision hinged on two primary legal arguments presented by the plaintiffs:

  1. Sham Litigation: Plaintiffs claimed that GSK and Biovail filed baseless patent infringement lawsuits and a baseless FDA Citizen Petition to delay generic entry. The court applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, requiring plaintiffs to prove both objective baselessness and that the litigation caused an antitrust injury. The court found that the lawsuits were not objectively baseless as there was a legitimate basis for the patent claims.
  2. Reverse Payment Settlements: Plaintiffs alleged that GSK entered into agreements that effectively paid generics to delay market entry. Following Actavis, the court applied the rule of reason, assessing whether these settlements had anti-competitive effects. The court determined that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate antitrust standing, primarily because the delays were attributable to other factors, such as Andrx's blocking patent, not directly to GSK's actions.

The court emphasized that for antitrust claims to succeed, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants' actions directly caused the alleged injuries. In this case, the presence of Andrx's patent meant that even without GSK's settlements, generic entry would have been blocked, undermining the plaintiffs' causation claims.

Impact

This judgment underscores the stringent requirements plaintiffs must meet to succeed in antitrust litigation involving pharmaceutical companies. Key impacts include:

  • Strengthening of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: Reinforces that legitimate patent litigation actions are shielded from antitrust claims unless proven to be sham.
  • Application of Rule of Reason to Reverse Payments: Affirms that reverse payment settlements are not per se illegal but must be evaluated based on their competitive effects.
  • Antitrust Standing and Causation: Highlights the necessity for plaintiffs to establish a direct causal link between defendants' actions and their injuries, especially in the presence of other blocking factors like patents.
  • Challenges for Indirect Purchasers: Demonstrates the difficulties indirect purchasers face in asserting antitrust claims, especially under federal law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

This legal principle protects entities from antitrust liability when they petition the government for redress of grievances, including filing lawsuits. However, if the petition is a sham intended to harm competition rather than seek genuine legal relief, the protection does not apply.

Reverse Payment Settlements

In the pharmaceutical industry, these are agreements where brand-name drug manufacturers pay generic manufacturers to delay the introduction of generic versions. The Supreme Court ruling in FTC v. Actavis requires these agreements to be analyzed under the rule of reason to assess their impact on competition.

Rule of Reason

A legal standard used to determine if certain business practices violate antitrust laws. It involves a detailed analysis of the practice's pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects to assess its overall impact on competition.

Antitrust Standing

Legal standing to bring an antitrust lawsuit requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that they have suffered a direct injury caused by the defendant's anti-competitive conduct. This is distinct from general legal standing and involves specific antitrust-related criteria.

Hatch-Waxman Act

A federal law that facilitates the approval of generic drugs while protecting the patent rights of original drug manufacturers. It balances competition from generics with incentives for innovation by extending patent terms under certain conditions.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit's affirmation in the In Re: Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation case reinforces the robust protections afforded to legitimate patent enforcement actions under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. It also emphasizes the rigorous standards plaintiffs must meet to claim antitrust violations, especially concerning reverse payment settlements.

For pharmaceutical companies, the decision underscores the importance of ensuring that their legal strategies to protect patents are rooted in genuine legal claims rather than anti-competitive motives. For plaintiffs, particularly indirect purchasers, the case highlights the challenges in establishing antitrust standing and causation in a landscape dominated by complex patent protections and regulatory frameworks.

Overall, the decision serves as a critical reference point for future cases at the intersection of intellectual property and antitrust law, shaping the contours of competitive behavior in the pharmaceutical industry.

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Case Details

Year: 2017
Court: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Judge(s)

Kent A. Jordan

Attorney(S)

Kenneth A. Wexler Justin N. Boley Wexler Wallace LLP 55 W. Monroe St. - Ste. 3300 Chicago, IL 60603 Peter D. St. Phillip, Jr. [ARGUED] Richard W. Cohen Gerald Lawrence, Jr. Uriel Rabinovitz Melissa Cabrera Lowey Dannenberg Cohen & Hart, P.C. One North Broadway - Ste. 509 White Plains, NY 10601 Karen Iannance Kissel Hirsch & Wilmer 370 Lexington Avenue - Ste. 1200 New York, NY 10017 James G. Stranch, III Joe P. Leniski Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC 227 Second Ave. North - 4th Fl. Nashville, TN 37201 Counsel for Appellant Indirect Purchaser Class/ End-Payor Class David F. Sorensen [ARGUED] Andrew C. Curley Caitlin G. Coslett Nicholas Urban Berger & Montague, P.C. 1622 Locust Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 Thomas M. Sobol [ARGUED] Gregory T. Arnold David S. Nalven Kristen A. Johnson Kristie A. LaSalle Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP 55 Cambridge Parkway - Ste. 3-1 Cambridge, MA 021142 John W. Barrett Barrett Law Group 400 Court Square North P.O. Box 927 Lexington, MS 39095 Peter Kohn Faruqi & Faruqi 101 Greenwood Avenue - #600 Jenkintown, PA 19046 Dianne M. Nast NastLaw 1101 Market Street - #2801 Philadelphia, PA 19107 Counsel for Appellant Direct Purchaser Class Leslie E. John [ARGUED] Edward D. Rogers Stephen J. Kastenberg [ARGUED] Jason A. Leckerman Jessica M. Anthony Marcel S. Pratt Ballard Spahr 1735 Market Street - 51st Fl. Philadelphia, PA 19103 Taimarie N. Adams 640 N. Broad Street - #529 Philadelphia, PA 19130 Daniel J. Boland 217 Ryers Avenue Philadelphia, PA 19102 Timothy K. Gilman Kirkland & Ellis 601 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10022 Emily P. Hughes Jason R. Parish Kirkland & Ellis 655 15th Street, NW - Ste. 1200 Washington, DC 20005 Simeon G. Papacostas Kirkland & Ellis 300 N. LaSalle Street - #2400 Chicago, IL 65054 Susanna R. Greenberg University of Pennsylvania School of Law 3400 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104 Chong S. Park Ropes & Gray 2009 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20006 Counsel for Appellee SmithKline Beecham Corp, dba GlaxoSmithKline; GlaxoSmithKline PLC Linda E. Kelly Quentin Riegel Leland P. Frost Manufacturers' Center for Legal Action 733 10th Street, NW - Ste. 700 Washington, DC 20001 Brian H. Pandya Wiley Rein 1776 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 Counsel for Amicus, National Association of Manufacturers Deborah L. Feinstein Markus H. Meier Bradley S. Alberg Daniel W. Butrymowicz Elizabeth R. Hilder Jamis R. Towey David C. Shonka Joel Marcus Mark S. Hegedus Federal Trade Commission MS-582 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20580 Counsel for Non Party Amicus, Federal Trade Commission Barbara W. Mather Robin P. Sumner Lindsay D. Breedlove Pepper Hamilton 3000 Two Logan Square Eighteenth & Arch Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Amicus, Antitrust Economists Sarah K. Frederick Goodwin Procter LLP Exchange Place 53 State Street Boston, MA 02109 Counsel for Amicus, Generic Pharmaceutical Association David W. Ogden Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20006 Mark A. Ford Peter A. Spaeth Daniel C. Wewers Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 Counsel for Amicus, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Daniel G. Brown Latham & Watkins 885 Third Avenue - Ste. 1000 New York, NY 10022 Counsel for Par Pharmaceutical Inc., and its predecessor in interest Anchen Pharmaceuticals

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