Sham Declarations Cannot Manufacture Summary-Judgment Disputes; No Per Se Eighth Amendment Violation from a Cell Lacking an In-Cell Toilet/Sink When Reasonable Mitigation Exists

I. Introduction

In Jaryan Gills v. Robert Hamilton, et al. (7th Cir. Jan. 15, 2026), Illinois prisoner Jaryan Gills sued prison officials and the prison’s medical director, Dr. William Rankin, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations arising from (1) conditions of confinement in a medical segregation cell that lacked an in-cell sink or toilet and (2) allegedly delayed or substandard medical care after an assault left him with a broken arm requiring two surgeries. He also alleged a related conspiracy.

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, emphasizing two themes: (a) a plaintiff cannot use post-deposition declarations to “create” disputes of fact under the sham affidavit rule, and (b) Eighth Amendment liability requires proof that each defendant acted unreasonably given what they actually knew—especially on the subjective “deliberate indifference” element.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Evidentiary ruling affirmed: The court upheld the district court’s decision to disregard Gills’s declarations because they violated the sham affidavit rule by adding new, trial-critical details not given in his deposition.
Conditions-of-confinement claim rejected: A cell’s lack of an in-cell toilet/sink is not, by itself, unconstitutional; even assuming the objective prong could be met due to intermittent exposure to waste, the record did not support that officials acted with deliberate indifference where mitigation steps existed (portable urinal/waste bags; cleaning; access outside the cell).
Medical-care claims largely rejected/forfeited: Gills forfeited arguments against non-medical staff by failing to explain deliberate indifference and why they could not defer to medical staff. As to Dr. Rankin, the record showed reasonable responses and insufficient proof that Rankin caused or knowingly ignored harmful delays.
Conspiracy claim rejected: It failed both because there was no underlying constitutional violation and because there was no non-speculative evidence of an agreement to violate rights.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Summary judgment framework and appellate review

Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021): Provided the baseline instruction to view facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant at summary judgment.
Cent. States, Se. and Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Univar Sols. USA Inc., 148 F.4th 426 (7th Cir. 2025), and Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v. City of Waukegan, 128 F.4th 871 (7th Cir. 2025): Reinforced de novo review and the requirement to credit reasonable inferences for the nonmovant.
Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605 (7th Cir. 2022): Anchored the principle that failure to produce evidence on an essential element warrants summary judgment.
United States v. Trudeau, 812 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2016): Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings.

2. Rule 56 declarations and the sham affidavit doctrine

James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307 (7th Cir. 2020): Cautioned against using affidavits/declarations to “verify” complaint allegations as an end-run around discovery.
Clacks v. Kwik Trip, Inc., 108 F.4th 950 (7th Cir. 2024): Supplied the governing sham affidavit rule and, critically, the extension that exclusion can be proper not only for direct contradictions but also when new details “seek to undo” prior sworn testimony and “manufacture a dispute.” The court relied on this framing to uphold exclusion of Gills’s declarations.

The opinion’s evidentiary holding is practical and consequential: when a litigant’s deposition testimony omits the who/when/how of key events, later declarations that supply those missing specifics—especially where they change the apparent severity or duration—may be treated as an impermissible attempt to retrofit the record.

3. Conditions of confinement: objective severity and subjective deliberate indifference

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981): Reiterated that the Constitution requires humane prisons, not comfortable ones.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994): Supplied the two-part test (objective deprivation + subjective deliberate indifference) and the principle that reasonable abatement measures defeat liability.
Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716 (7th Cir. 2021): Helped frame how courts evaluate “necessities” (e.g., sanitation/hygiene) in light of mitigation (e.g., showers), supporting the conclusion that lack of certain amenities inside a cell is not automatically unconstitutional.
Jaros v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2012): Supported the proposition that more difficult access to toilets/showers (as opposed to outright deprivation) does not necessarily deny basic necessities.
Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019): Identified the baseline requirement of “reasonably adequate” sanitation and utilities, which the court read as not mandating in-cell fixtures in all circumstances.
Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020) (per curiam), and Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2007): Provided the counterpoint—egregiously unsanitary conditions (exposure to human waste) can satisfy the objective prong.
Williams v. Shah, 972 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2019): Foreclosed using § 1983 to enforce state regulations (here, an Illinois rule requiring sinks/toilets in segregation cells).

4. Medical care: deliberate indifference, deference, delay, and causation

Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948 (7th Cir. 2024): Stated the Eighth Amendment obligation to provide adequate medical care and the two-part deliberate indifference framework.
Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818 (7th Cir. 2021): Clarified the subjective knowledge component (awareness of facts + actual inference of substantial risk).
Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 1996): Used to support (without dispute) that a broken arm can be an objectively serious medical condition.
Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2019): Supported the ability of non-medical officials to defer to medical professionals, limiting liability for non-medical staff absent specific knowledge of mistreatment.
Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816 (7th Cir. 2022): Along with Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A), reinforced forfeiture principles for inadequately developed appellate arguments.
Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2018): Supplied the special requirement for delay-of-care claims involving painful but non-life-threatening conditions: the plaintiff must show the delay exacerbated injury or unnecessarily prolonged pain.
Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2017): Reaffirmed individualized § 1983 liability—each defendant must have personally caused a constitutional violation.
Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2019): Limited doctor liability for delays outside the doctor’s control, a key basis for rejecting claims tied to systemic or third-party delay (including pandemic-related disruption).

5. Civil conspiracy under § 1983

Archer v. Chrisholm, 870 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2017): Supported dismissal where there is no underlying constitutional violation.
Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2015): Required non-speculative evidence of an agreement; circumstantial evidence is allowed, but conjecture is not enough.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The evidentiary pivot: deposition testimony controls over later “improving” declarations

The court did not merely enforce a technicality; it treated the declarations as materially altering the case’s factual core (duration, frequency, identities, and severity). Under Clacks v. Kwik Trip, Inc., adding details can be as problematic as direct contradictions when it appears designed to “undo” deposition testimony and manufacture disputes. That framing allowed affirmance without resolving whether the declarations were also improper “complaint verification” under James v. Hale.

The opinion also treated the district court’s non-discussion of two other declarations (from Gills’s mother and a porter) as harmless because they did not materially change the evidentiary picture.

2. Conditions of confinement: no per se rule; the subjective prong does the work

The Seventh Circuit separated two ideas that are often conflated in prison-litigation narratives:

Structural deficiency is not automatically unconstitutional: The lack of an in-cell sink/toilet did not, standing alone, establish an objective deprivation of “life’s necessities,” especially given the availability of escorted access and stopgap measures. The court grounded this in Rhodes v. Chapman, Hardeman v. Curran, Thomas v. Blackard, and Jaros v. Ill. Dep't of Corr..
Exposure to human waste can be objectively serious: The court acknowledged (citing Taylor v. Riojas and Vinning-El v. Long) that forcing an inmate to live in egregiously unsanitary conditions can satisfy the objective prong, and it assumed arguendo that Gills might meet it based on intermittent episodes.

The decisive failure was subjective deliberate indifference under Farmer v. Brennan. Even crediting Gills’s admissible deposition testimony, the record indicated mitigation: portable urinal/waste bags, cleaning, and no denial longer than a single guard shift. That combination prevented a reasonable jury from finding officials knowingly disregarded an excessive risk.

Finally, the court shut the door on converting an Illinois administrative rule into a federal constitutional claim, relying on Williams v. Shah.

3. Medical care: individualized liability, knowledge, and control over delays

The opinion applied a disciplined, defendant-by-defendant approach:

Non-medical defendants: Gills did not develop an argument that they were deliberately indifferent or that they could not defer to medical staff; under Giles v. Godinez and appellate forfeiture principles (Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Mwangangi v. Nielsen), those claims fell away.
Dr. Rankin: The court treated most allegations as delay-of-care theories and required proof under Mitchell v. Kallas (harm from delay) plus proof that Rankin actually caused the delay under Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara and Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.. On the record as construed at summary judgment, Rankin ordered physical therapy and requested sling padding; the delays were not attributable to him (and, for therapy, the court referenced disruption “by a pandemic”). The court also found no evidentiary basis that Rankin knew the specialist’s ice instruction or knew Gills was unable to access hygiene facilities in a way that created a substantial infection risk.

The through-line is epistemic and causal: Eighth Amendment medical liability turns on what the defendant knew and did (or failed to do) within their sphere of control, not on the patient’s dissatisfaction or on system delays that the defendant did not create.

4. Conspiracy: no underlying violation and no evidence of agreement

Under Archer v. Chrisholm, a conspiracy claim cannot survive without an underlying constitutional violation. And even if it could, Beaman v. Freesmeyer required more than speculation. The alleged indicia—knowledge of cell conditions, investigation flaws, visitation limits, and shower policy changes—did not amount to evidence of an agreement to violate rights.

C. Impact

Sharper enforcement of the sham affidavit rule in prisoner cases: The opinion signals that plaintiffs who provide sparse deposition accounts on pivotal details (duration, frequency, named actors) risk losing the ability to “fill gaps” later with declarations. This affects how prisoner-plaintiffs and counsel must approach depositions: the deposition becomes the primary factual narrative for summary judgment.
No per se constitutional rule tied to in-cell plumbing: The court reaffirmed that constitutional sanitation is context-dependent. Litigants must focus on actual deprivation (e.g., prolonged exposure to waste, inability to clean, repeated denials) and—critically—proof of officials’ subjective awareness and failure to take reasonable measures.
Medical-care claims must tie harm and delay to a specific actor’s knowledge/control: The reliance on Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. underscores that systemic problems (staffing, logistics, pandemic disruptions) are not automatically chargeable to an individual doctor absent evidence of control or culpable inaction.
Appellate briefing discipline matters: By invoking forfeiture (Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Mwangangi v. Nielsen), the opinion reminds litigants that undeveloped arguments—especially as to certain defendants—may be treated as abandoned.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A pretrial decision where the court rules for one side because the admissible evidence shows no real dispute of important facts requiring a trial.
Sham affidavit (or sham declaration) rule: A rule preventing a party from defeating summary judgment by submitting a later sworn statement that contradicts—or strategically adds critical new details to—earlier sworn testimony (usually a deposition), in order to create a fake factual dispute.
Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference”: A two-part test: (1) the condition must be objectively serious (a real deprivation or serious medical need), and (2) the defendant must subjectively know of and disregard a substantial risk—more than negligence, closer to reckless disregard.
§ 1983 vs. state-law/regulatory violations: Section 1983 is a vehicle to remedy violations of the federal Constitution and federal law. Violating a state regulation (like an administrative code requirement) does not automatically equal a federal constitutional violation.
Forfeiture on appeal: If an appellant does not meaningfully develop an argument (with reasons and record support), the appellate court may treat it as abandoned.
§ 1983 conspiracy: A claim that defendants agreed to violate constitutional rights and acted on that agreement. It requires evidence of an agreement (direct or solid circumstantial), not speculation.

V. Conclusion

Gills affirms summary judgment across conditions-of-confinement, medical-care, and conspiracy theories by insisting on evidentiary rigor and defendant-specific proof. The decision’s most operational lessons are that (1) post-deposition declarations cannot be used to retrofit missing facts under the sham affidavit rule, (2) lack of an in-cell sink/toilet is not itself an Eighth Amendment violation when reasonable access and mitigation exist, and (3) medical deliberate-indifference claims require proof that the particular defendant knowingly disregarded a substantial risk and actually caused harmful delay or denial of treatment. In the broader Eighth Amendment landscape, the opinion reinforces that liability turns less on institutional imperfection and more on demonstrable, culpable disregard of known risks.