Seventh Circuit: § 1981 Complaints Must Plead Non-Speculative Race Causation; Weak Comparator Allegations Cannot Supply Plausibility

Case: Yubo Miao v. United Airlines, Inc. (No. 25-1649)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date: January 13, 2026

I. Introduction

Yubo Miao, an American citizen of Chinese descent, alleged that United Airlines personnel singled him out for harsh treatment after he boarded a Chicago-to-San Diego flight, culminating in his removal from the aircraft. He sued United asserting race discrimination under Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, and Miao appealed only the § 1981 claim.

The central issue on appeal was pleading sufficiency: whether Miao’s factual allegations plausibly supported an inference that United impaired his contractual right to air transportation “but for” his race, as required for a § 1981 claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege race discrimination. The majority reasoned that the alleged conduct—staring, forceful instruction, a disputed accusation of physical contact, removal from the plane, and later scrutiny—did not, without more, support a reasonable inference that race caused the adverse treatment.

The court emphasized that the only allegation potentially suggesting racial motivation was a purported comparator: a white passenger with similar luggage who was not confronted or removed. The majority held the comparison failed because Miao allegedly “repeatedly disobey[ed]” crew instructions, unlike the proposed comparator.

On jurisdiction, the court held it could hear the appeal despite the district court’s “without prejudice” dismissal, because the order terminated the action and Miao conceded nothing remained to be done below.

Finally, the panel directed that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), the district court amend the judgment to reflect that dismissal was with prejudice.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Pleading standard and the plausibility requirement

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): The backbone of the court’s Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. The majority invoked Iqbal for the requirement that a complaint “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and that speculative allegations are insufficient. The opinion uses Iqbal to justify demanding factual content that supports a discrimination inference rather than a narrative that merely permits suspicion.
Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg, 930 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2019): Cited for the standard of review on a motion to dismiss—accepting well-pleaded facts as true and drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. The dissent later relies on the same principle to argue the majority drew inferences against Miao.
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008): Used by the majority to disregard a conclusory allegation (“did not ignore or defy instructions”) that conflicted with more detailed factual allegations. The dissent, however, cites Tamayo to caution that “pleading oneself out of court” should be assessed skeptically and that the alleged “inconsistency” was not truly incompatible.

2. § 1981 elements and causation

Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006): Cited for the proposition that § 1981 protects the equal right “to make and enforce contracts without respect to race.” The case anchors the contractual-right framing (here, the right to contract for air carriage and to enforce that contract).
Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327 (2020): Central to the holding. The court applies Comcast’s “but for” causation requirement at the pleading stage, concluding the complaint did not plausibly support an inference that race was the determinative cause of any contractual impairment.

3. Discrimination framework and the role of comparators

Smith v. Chi. Transit Auth., 806 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2015): Cited for the proposition that the “legal analysis for discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981 is identical,” supporting the majority’s use of Title VII pleading logic in the § 1981 context.
Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774 (7th Cir. 2022): The majority uses Kaminski to reinforce that allegations must support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff was singled out because of a protected characteristic, not merely treated badly. The dissent argues the majority imported an evidentiary “scrutiny” more appropriate for summary judgment.
Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2014): The court acknowledges that a plaintiff need not identify “similarly situated comparators at the pleading stage,” but then distinguishes this case because the comparator allegation was essentially the only asserted bridge from mistreatment to race discrimination.
Katti v. Arden, 161 F.4th 217 (4th Cir. 2025) and Joyner v. Morrison & Foerster LLP, 140 F.4th 523 (D.C. Cir. 2025): Out-of-circuit persuasive authority supporting the majority’s view that comparator allegations must provide a meaningful benchmark; general or weak comparator pleading cannot carry a claim when other allegations are speculative as to racial motivation.
Tamayo v. Blagojevich (again): The majority’s “cf.” reference highlights that a comparator can help plausibility when the complaint plausibly alleges similarity; here, the majority found obvious distinctions that defeated the comparator’s probative value.

4. Appellate jurisdiction and finality

Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2016): Recognizes that dismissals “without prejudice” are generally not final for § 1291 purposes—setting up the court’s need to explain why this case is appealable.
Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405 (2015): Supplies the “practical rather than technical” approach to finality; if the order terminates the action, it can be treated as final.
Doermer v. Oxford Fin. Grp., 884 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2018): Supports relying on the appellant’s concession that nothing remains to be done in the district court, reinforcing practical finality.

5. Authorities emphasized in the dissent (procedural discipline and discrimination proof)

Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335 (7th Cir. 2024): The dissent’s organizing precedent—warning against collapsing the pleading stage into summary-judgment evaluation. The dissent quotes it for the proposition that the “time to demand evidence” is summary judgment, not Rule 12.
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010): Cited by the dissent to stress that plausibility is about whether the story “could have happened,” not whether it is more likely than not.
Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Used in the dissent to emphasize that plausibility is not a probability requirement.
Donaldson v. Taylor Prods. Div. of Tecumseh Prods. Co., 620 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1980) and Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intern. Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974): Cited in the dissent’s footnote to underscore that § 1981 has no administrative exhaustion requirement (relevant to Miao’s DOT complaint but not dispositive to pleading sufficiency).
Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group, Inc., 83 F.4th 1006 (5th Cir. 2023): Discussed in the dissent regarding airline discretion under 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b), suggesting that even broad airline authority does not immunize racially motivated removals where race is the but-for cause.

B. Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in three key steps:

Identify the governing § 1981 standard: Under Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald and Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, Miao had to plead that United impaired a contractual right (air carriage) and that race was the “but for” cause of that impairment.
Evaluate whether alleged facts support a race-based inference: The court treats the alleged staring, yelling, false accusation, and later scrutiny as race-neutral on their face because there were no race-referential statements and no contextual facts tying the conduct to race. In the majority’s view, the allegations show mistreatment but not discriminatory mistreatment.
Test the comparator allegation because it is the only race-linking fact: The opinion effectively holds that when comparator pleading is the sole factual basis for inferring discrimination, the comparator must be plausibly similar in the respects that prompted the adverse action. The court concluded obvious distinctions existed—most importantly, “repeatedly disobeying flight crew instructions”—and therefore the comparator did not make racial motivation plausible.

A notable procedural coda is the Rule 60(a) directive: although the district court dismissed “without prejudice,” the panel orders the judgment corrected to “with prejudice.” This signals the majority’s view that amendment would be futile given its assessment that the allegations, as pleaded, cannot plausibly support race causation rather than merely failing to include more detail.

Point of fracture with the dissent: The dissent does not dispute Iqbal/Twombly plausibility or Comcast but-for causation. It disputes the majority’s application—arguing the majority (i) resolved competing inferences against the plaintiff, (ii) treated ambiguous facts as settled “rule violations,” and (iii) effectively evaluated whether the claim would survive summary judgment rather than whether it was plausibly alleged.

C. Impact

The opinion’s practical impact is likely to be felt in § 1981 (and parallel Title VII) pleading in the Seventh Circuit in three ways:

Comparator-only pleading is risky: The court does not impose a categorical comparator requirement (it reiterates Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc.), but it signals that where comparator allegations are the only concrete bridge to racial motivation, courts will examine similarity closely even at the pleading stage, and will reject comparisons with “obvious distinctions.”
“Mistreatment” is not “discrimination” absent race-anchoring facts: Allegations of hostility, disrespect, or even dishonesty by employees may be treated as insufficient without factual context that makes race causation plausible (e.g., racially coded statements, pattern allegations, differential enforcement of the same rule under similar circumstances, or other circumstantial indicia).
Finality and “with prejudice” corrections: The decision reinforces that “case terminated” language can create appellate finality despite “without prejudice” labeling, and it also demonstrates appellate willingness to require correction of the judgment to “with prejudice” under Rule 60(a), which can materially affect plaintiffs’ ability to refile or amend.

The dissent, by contrast, frames the case as a warning: courts should not convert plausible narratives of discrimination into non-starters by weighing alternative explanations or selecting adverse inferences before discovery.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss: A request to throw out a complaint because, even assuming the alleged facts are true, the law does not provide a remedy (or the allegations do not plausibly show entitlement to relief).
“Plausibility” (Iqbal/Twombly): The complaint must include enough factual detail to make the claim reasonably inferable, not merely possible or speculative.
§ 1981 “make and enforce contracts”: Protects against race discrimination that interferes with contracting (here, the contract of carriage for air travel and related enforcement/benefits).
“But-for” causation (Comcast): The plaintiff must plausibly allege that the adverse action would not have happened if the plaintiff were a different race—race must be determinative, not merely one factor among others.
Comparator evidence: Allegations that similarly situated people of another race were treated better. At pleading, it can support an inference of discrimination, but (as this opinion illustrates) the comparison may fail if material differences explain the treatment.
Dismissal “with prejudice” vs. “without prejudice”: With prejudice generally ends the claim permanently in that court (cannot be refiled); without prejudice ordinarily allows refiling or amendment.
Appellate “final decision” (28 U.S.C. § 1291): Appeals typically require a final, case-ending decision. Even a “without prejudice” dismissal can be treated as final if, practically speaking, the case is over (as when the court terminates the action and the parties agree nothing remains below).

V. Conclusion

Yubo Miao v. United Airlines, Inc. strengthens a pleading-side message in Seventh Circuit § 1981 litigation: a detailed account of unfair treatment is not enough unless the alleged facts plausibly connect the mistreatment to race under Comcast’s but-for standard. When a plaintiff relies primarily on comparator allegations to supply that connection, the comparator must be plausibly similar in the respects that matter to the adverse decision.

The dissent underscores a competing institutional concern—preserving the boundary between plausibility pleading and summary-judgment proof—suggesting the majority’s approach risks premature merits adjudication. The majority, however, treats the absence of race-anchoring facts (and the weakness of the only comparator) as leaving only speculation, warranting dismissal and even correction of the judgment to a dismissal with prejudice.