Seventh Circuit Signals Recognition of ADEA Hostile Work Environment Claims, but Affirms for Lack of Age-Based Evidence

Introduction

In Tanya Blumenshine v. Bloomington School District No. 87, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed a recurring but unsettled question in its jurisprudence: whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) recognizes hostile work environment (HWE) claims. While the panel once again stopped short of definitively holding that an ADEA hostile environment claim exists, it strongly signaled agreement with the majority view that such claims are cognizable. Ultimately, the court affirmed summary judgment for the school district because the plaintiff, a veteran special education kindergarten teacher, failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any alleged harassment was “because of” her age.

The case arises from an involuntary transfer of a 52-year-old teacher from one elementary school to another, followed by disputes over student assignments, classroom support (including crisis-intervention staffing), performance feedback, and a single confrontational incident with an administrator-in-training. The key legal issue on appeal was not whether these events were stressful or even objectionable, but whether they were sufficiently linked to age-based animus to sustain an ADEA hostile environment claim at the summary judgment stage.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Bloomington School District No. 87. Reviewing the record de novo and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the panel held that there was no genuine dispute of material fact on a core element of an ADEA hostile work environment claim: that the challenged conduct occurred because of the plaintiff’s age.

The court:

Reiterated that it has often assumed the ADEA permits hostile environment claims and, by close textual analogy to Title VII and the ADA, strongly suggested that assumption is correct.
Applied the familiar hostile environment elements to the ADEA context, emphasizing the need for evidence that the harassment was based on age.
Concluded that the plaintiff’s subjective belief and speculation did not create a triable issue, especially in the absence of age-related remarks, comparative evidence, or other indicia of age animus.
Held that disputes about a recorded meeting and administrative disagreements over student support and behavior management were not materially probative of age discrimination.

Case Background

Plaintiff-appellant Tanya Blumenshine, born in 1967, had worked for the District since 1989 and had an exemplary record as a kindergarten teacher. In May 2019, at age 52, she was involuntarily transferred from Stevenson Elementary (which houses the District’s most severe and profound special education programs) to Sheridan Elementary. The transfer decision involved Superintendent Dr. Barry Reilly, Principal Katy Killian (Stevenson), Assistant Superintendent for HR Herschel Hannah, and Principal Jennifer McGowan (Sheridan). The District explained that it reassigned her to support Sheridan by replacing a struggling, less experienced teacher, leveraging her proven skill set.

Following the transfer, Ms. Blumenshine alleged a hostile work environment based on four categories of conduct:

She was assigned a disproportionately challenging kindergarten class (academically and behaviorally).
She received allegedly unfair criticism and performance feedback from Sheridan’s principal.
The school denied her request for a full-time Crisis Prevention and Intervention (CPI) aide, hindering her ability to safely manage students with IEPs (individualized education plans) related to physical aggression.
She experienced an intimidating encounter with a “principal intern,” who entered her classroom after hours, stood between her and the door, and questioned her struggles.

Notably, Ms. Blumenshine conceded that no one ever made age-related comments to or about her. She nevertheless attributed the overall treatment to her age, stating that she could not “get into” administrators’ heads but believed age explained why she was targeted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986): Established that Title VII’s reference to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” encompasses hostile work environment claims. The panel uses Meritor as a textual anchor: the ADEA uses materially identical language, supporting the inference that Congress intended the same scope.
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005): The Supreme Court recognized parallelism between Title VII and the ADEA, importing Title VII constructions to the ADEA where statutory language and purposes align. This doctrinal bridge supports recognizing hostile environment claims under the ADEA.
Ford v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office, 942 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2019): The Seventh Circuit recognized hostile environment claims under the ADA, which shares Title VII’s “terms, conditions, or privileges” clause. The panel’s citation and comment that “extended hypothetical analysis should end” underscores that the same logic likely applies to the ADEA.
Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2020) and Racicot v. Wal-Mart, 414 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2005): Prior Seventh Circuit decisions that assumed, without deciding, that the ADEA allows hostile environment claims. The present opinion maintains the assumption but strengthens the textual foundation and cites broad circuit consensus.
Multi-circuit consensus: Rivera-Rivera (1st Cir.), Brennan (2d Cir.), Dediol (5th Cir.), Crawford (6th Cir.), Moses (8th Cir.), Sischo-Nownejad (9th Cir.), Steele (D.C. Cir.)—all recognizing ADEA hostile environment claims. The Seventh Circuit aligns itself with this trend, signaling that formal recognition is likely imminent.
Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016): Instructs courts to evaluate discrimination evidence holistically rather than pigeonholing as “direct” or “indirect.” The panel applies Ortiz, asking whether the full evidentiary record can support a verdict of intentional age discrimination—not whether individual pieces fit category labels.
David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508, 846 F.3d 216 (7th Cir. 2017): Reinforces the Ortiz holistic approach and the ultimate inquiry: can a reasonable jury find intentional discrimination?
Halloway v. Milwaukee County, 180 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 1999); Widmar v. Sun Chemical, 772 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 2014); Amadio v. Ford, 238 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2001): These cases caution that speculation and subjective belief cannot create a triable issue of discriminatory motive. The panel relies on this line to reject the plaintiff’s conclusory age-based inference.
Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545 (7th Cir. 2022): Clarifies “materiality”: disputed facts that do not affect the outcome under the governing law do not preclude summary judgment. The alleged dispute over whether a meeting was recorded is not material to age discrimination.
Wrolstad v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Society, 911 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2018): Restates the ADEA’s protective scope (workers 40 and older) while emphasizing age-based discrimination. The panel cites Wrolstad to underscore that the statute’s focus is age-based conduct, not workplace disputes untethered to age.
Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2005): Illustrates that conduct equally explainable without reference to the protected trait does not raise an inference of discriminatory motive. Applied here, pedagogical disagreements and resource allocations do not support an age inference absent age-linked evidence.
Runyon v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, 619 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2010) and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009): Emphasize the plaintiff’s burden to prove age motivated the adverse conduct under the ADEA (but-for causation in disparate treatment). The panel invokes this burden framing: it is not the employer’s burden to disprove age discrimination.
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2014) and Bunn v. Khoury Enterprises, 753 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014): Standard of review and summary judgment principles (de novo review; genuine dispute of material fact required).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps.

Threshold (claim availability): Drawing on the statutory text (“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”) and parallelism with Title VII and the ADA, the panel explains why hostile environment claims fit comfortably within the ADEA’s framework. Citing wide circuit consensus, it strongly suggests that formal recognition is the logical end point. Yet, in prudential fashion, the panel does not resolve the question because the claim fails on independent grounds.
Merits (age-based nexus): Applying the familiar hostile environment elements, the court focuses on the “because of age” requirement. It examines the four categories of alleged mistreatment and finds no evidence—direct or circumstantial—that connects them to age:
- Disproportionate student assignment: While the plaintiff’s class was challenging, there was no evidence that age motivated the distribution. The principal maintained she did not make the assignments and that the students’ needs were not fully known before school began.
- Performance critiques and meetings: These arose from a specific parent complaint and reflected a pedagogical disagreement (de-escalation techniques versus physical restraint with CPI). No age-based remarks or indicators were present.
- Denial of a full-time CPI aide: This administrative decision was grounded in an instructional philosophy (proactive de-escalation) and disputes over IEP implementation. Again, no age nexus was shown. The plaintiff’s suggestion of a different motive (IEP advocacy) actually undermined the claim that age was the reason.
- Confrontation with the principal intern: Although the encounter was unsettling, the record did not tie the intern’s conduct to age-based animus.
The court reiterates that a plaintiff’s subjective belief—without more—cannot carry the burden at summary judgment. Under Ortiz, the holistic evidentiary record must permit a reasonable jury to find intentional age discrimination; here it did not.

Impact

This decision has several important implications:

Doctrinal trajectory: The Seventh Circuit continues to edge toward formally recognizing ADEA hostile environment claims, aligning with the majority of circuits. Litigants should expect the court to adopt that position in a suitable case; this opinion lays the textual and precedential groundwork.
Evidence demands: The opinion reinforces a stringent requirement for an age-based nexus. Absent age-related remarks, comparative evidence, patterns showing older workers are singled out, or other circumstantial markers of age animus, plaintiffs will struggle to reach a jury on ADEA hostile environment claims.
Ordinary management disputes: Pedagogical disagreements, workload assignments, and resource-allocation decisions—even if debatable or frustrating—are not inherently age-based. Plaintiffs must bridge the gap from “unfair” to “age-motivated.”
Materiality at summary judgment: Disputes that do not speak to age-based motivation (for example, whether a meeting was recorded) are not material under Rule 56 and will not forestall judgment.
Practical guidance for plaintiffs: Build the age nexus with specifics—comparators (treatment of similarly situated younger colleagues), age-focused comments or stereotypes, statistical patterns (older teachers consistently receiving the most challenging classrooms), abrupt policy shifts correlated with age, or decision-maker admissions. Mere conjecture is insufficient.
Practical guidance for employers (including school districts): Document legitimate, non-age reasons for transfers, class assignments, and staffing decisions; train administrators to avoid comments that could be construed as age-based; address complaints promptly; and maintain clear rationales for resource allocations. These practices both reduce legal risk and create a defensible record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hostile work environment (HWE): A form of discrimination where the workplace is permeated with severe or pervasive harassment that alters the conditions of employment. To be actionable, the hostility must be “because of” a protected characteristic (here, age 40+).
ADEA: The Age Discrimination in Employment Act protects workers aged 40 and older from discrimination “because of” age. Courts often look to Title VII cases for guidance when statutory language and purposes parallel.
Severe or pervasive: The harassment must be serious or frequent enough to change the work environment’s conditions, not just occasional slights. In this case, the court did not need to decide this element because the age nexus was missing.
“Because of” age and but-for causation: Under the ADEA, the plaintiff bears the burden to show the challenged conduct occurred because of age (the Supreme Court requires but-for causation for disparate treatment). The Seventh Circuit’s citation to Gross underscores that the plaintiff—not the employer—must prove discriminatory motivation.
Summary judgment and material fact: Summary judgment is appropriate when, even viewing the evidence in the non-movant’s favor, there is no genuine dispute over facts that would affect the outcome. Disputes that do not bear on age-based motive are immaterial.
Ortiz holistic approach: Courts should consider all evidence together to determine whether a reasonable jury could find intentional discrimination, rather than sorting evidence into rigid categories.
IEP and CPI aides (school context): IEPs are individualized education plans required by law for students with disabilities; CPI certification involves training in crisis prevention and safe physical restraints. Disagreements over these supports, without more, are educational policy disputes—not proof of age bias.

Application to the Facts

The court methodically applied the legal standards to the record:

Transfer decision: Supported by non-age reasons (placing a successful, experienced teacher into a challenging assignment). No evidence tied the decision-makers’ motives to age. A dispute over whether a meeting was recorded is immaterial to age discrimination.
Challenging class composition: The record, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, showed a demanding class but no age-related allocation criteria, and the principal denied personal involvement in the assignments. The timing and scoring of students did not establish a discriminatory motive.
Performance feedback and meetings: Triggered by a specific parent complaint and grounded in classroom management philosophy. No age-based remarks were made; the meetings contained suggested interventions rather than age-targeted criticism.
CPI aide denial and IEP disputes: Reflect a difference in approach (de-escalation versus restraint) and contested views about IEP implementation. The plaintiff’s claim that administrators were reacting to her IEP advocacy suggests a non-age motive, which undermines (rather than supports) an inference of age-based harassment.
Principal intern encounter: Unprofessional or intimidating conduct, without evidence of age animus, does not create an ADEA HWE claim. The intern’s comments referenced the teacher’s prior school environment, not her age; no age-based remarks were made.

What the Decision Does—and Does Not—Decide

Does: Affirms that a plaintiff must present evidence that alleged harassment was because of age; reaffirms that speculation and subjective belief cannot defeat summary judgment; and endorses a holistic review of the record under Ortiz.
Signals: By textual analysis and citation to consensus across circuits, the Seventh Circuit strongly signals that ADEA hostile work environment claims are cognizable—though it does not formally hold so here.
Does not: Resolve whether the conduct alleged was “severe or pervasive” or define the precise causation standard for ADEA HWE beyond emphasizing the plaintiff’s burden to show age-motivated conduct. Those issues remain for another day.

Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Tanya Blumenshine v. Bloomington School District No. 87 is best understood as a clarifying opinion with two principal messages. First, the Seventh Circuit continues its steady march toward formal recognition of ADEA hostile work environment claims, aligning with the broad national consensus rooted in the shared statutory language of the civil rights laws. Second, and dispositively here, the court underscores that such claims rise or fall on evidence tying the alleged hostility to age. Without age-related remarks, comparative proof, pattern evidence, or other circumstantial indicators, a plaintiff’s sincere belief is not enough to create a triable issue.

For practitioners, the opinion is both a roadmap and a guardrail: it maps the likely doctrinal endpoint on ADEA HWE and it marks the evidentiary boundaries that will control at summary judgment. For employers, particularly in education settings, it underscores the value of transparent, documented pedagogical and staffing rationales and the risk-reduction benefits of training administrators to avoid language or conduct that could be construed as age-related. For plaintiffs, it is a reminder that the “why” is decisive: show that the conduct occurred because of age, not merely that it occurred.