Seventh Circuit Reinforces Waiver and Presumed Reasonableness in Anders Sentencing Appeals After Defendant Accepts the Guidelines Range

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Anthony M. Taylor’s guilty pleas to (1) possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and (2) unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The investigation included two controlled purchases of cocaine by a confidential source and the execution of a search warrant at Taylor’s residence, where officers found 46.5 grams of cocaine and three firearms, including one reported stolen.

The district court ultimately imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment (concurrent on both counts), followed by supervised release. On appeal, appointed counsel moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, asserting that any appellate issues would be frivolous. Taylor did not respond.

The key appellate issues were therefore not the underlying merits of guilt, but whether any nonfrivolous challenges existed to: (i) the guilty plea, (ii) the procedural reasonableness of the sentence (including Guidelines calculations), or (iii) the substantive reasonableness of the within-Guidelines term.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal. Applying Anders procedures, the court limited its review to the issues counsel discussed because counsel’s submission was thorough and Taylor did not file a response. The panel concluded that:

• Any challenge to Taylor’s guilty plea was properly omitted because Taylor did not wish to withdraw his plea.
• Any procedural challenge to the sentence would be frivolous because the district court adopted Taylor’s objections to the PSR and Taylor affirmatively agreed the revised Guidelines calculation was accurate—waiving further Guidelines challenges.
• Any substantive-reasonableness challenge would be frivolous because the sentence was within the advisory range and the district court explained the sentence using multiple 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Anders establishes the framework allowing appointed appellate counsel to withdraw when counsel concludes an appeal is frivolous, while requiring a sufficient submission to enable the court to independently evaluate whether any nonfrivolous issues exist. Here, the panel treated counsel’s brief as “thorough,” triggering the standard Anders path: a limited, issue-focused review and dismissal once no nonfrivolous grounds were identified.

2) United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Bey supplies the Seventh Circuit’s practice point invoked here: when counsel’s Anders brief is adequate and the defendant does not respond, the court “limit[s] our review to the subjects that counsel discusses.” The Taylor order applies that limitation explicitly, narrowing the court’s independent review to the topics counsel addressed.

3) United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024).
Larry is cited for a procedural norm in Anders guilty-plea appeals: if counsel consulted the defendant and the defendant does not wish to withdraw the plea, counsel may omit extensive plea-validity analysis. In Taylor, counsel advised Taylor about risks and benefits, confirmed Taylor did not want to withdraw the plea, and the panel deemed omission appropriate under Larry.

4) United States v. Fuentes, 858 F.3d 1119, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 2017).
Fuentes supports the waiver holding: when a defendant affirmatively accepts the Guidelines calculation in the district court, the defendant waives (not merely forfeits) appellate challenges to that calculation. Taylor is a clean illustration: after the district court adopted Taylor’s objections and recalculated a lower range, Taylor “affirmed that the guidelines calculation was accurate.” The panel treated that as waiver, making a later procedural Guidelines attack frivolous.

5) Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 53 (2007).
Gall is cited for the sentencing court’s obligation to consider mitigation arguments and adequately explain the sentence in light of § 3553(a). The panel relied on the district court’s engagement with Taylor’s mitigation points (age, remoteness of convictions, reduced risk of violence at release) to confirm procedural soundness.

6) United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384 (7th Cir. 2022).
Major provides the appellate presumption that a within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. Taylor’s 87-month sentence fell within the 70–87 month range, so the presumption applied; the panel found nothing in the record to rebut it given the district court’s articulated reliance on § 3553(a) factors (seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, respect for law).

7) United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 860 (2022).
This Supreme Court decision is invoked in the district-court proceedings to frame the “crime of violence” inquiry—specifically the requirement that a predicate offense include the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.” While the Seventh Circuit’s order does not resolve the substantive classification question (because the district court sustained Taylor’s objections and lowered the range), the citation shows how modern “force clause” doctrine informs Guidelines disputes about prior convictions.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps that, together, explain why dismissal was appropriate under Anders:

1. Scope control in an unopposed, adequate Anders submission. Under United States v. Bey and Circuit Rule 51(b), Taylor’s failure to respond—combined with a thorough Anders brief—meant the court confined its independent review to the issues counsel identified as typical and potentially appealable.
2. Procedural sentencing issues were extinguished by waiver. The district court accepted Taylor’s PSR objections, rejected the career-offender designation, recalculated a lower range (70–87 months), and Taylor explicitly agreed the revised calculation was correct. Under United States v. Fuentes, that affirmative acceptance constitutes waiver, making further Guidelines-calculation challenges frivolous on appeal.
3. Substantive reasonableness was insulated by a within-range sentence and an adequate explanation. Because the sentence was within the advisory range, United States v. Major supplies a presumption of reasonableness. The sentencing transcript, as described, reflects engagement with mitigation and an explanation anchored in § 3553(a) (seriousness of firearm possession—including a stolen firearm—specific deterrence in light of recidivism after a 2012 federal conviction, protection of the public, and respect for law). Under Gall v. United States, this level of explanation defeats a plausible claim of unreasoned sentencing.

C. Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order underscores several practical, repeat-player lessons for federal sentencing appeals in the Seventh Circuit:

• Waiver risk at sentencing is decisive on appeal. When a defendant affirmatively agrees with the district court’s Guidelines calculation (especially after receiving favorable rulings), Fuentes-style waiver can make later appellate challenges categorically frivolous—an especially important dynamic in Anders cases.
• Within-Guidelines sentences remain difficult to overturn. The Major presumption, combined with a sentencing record that touches multiple § 3553(a) factors, sharply limits the plausibility of substantive-reasonableness arguments.
• Adequate Anders briefing narrows the court’s review. By invoking Bey, the court signaled that thorough issue-spotting by counsel can effectively define the contours of appellate review when the defendant files no response.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anders brief: A filing by appointed counsel stating the appeal has no nonfrivolous issues, paired with enough analysis for the appellate court to verify that conclusion. If the court agrees, it permits counsel to withdraw and typically dismisses the appeal.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: “Procedural” concerns whether the court used the right process (correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of arguments, adequate explanation). “Substantive” concerns whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of § 3553(a), even if the process was correct.
• Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known argument (often by affirmatively agreeing in court); it usually ends the issue on appeal. Forfeiture is a failure to timely raise an argument; it may still be reviewed under stricter standards. The court treated Taylor’s confirmation of the Guidelines range as waiver.
• Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A Guidelines designation that can substantially increase the offense level and criminal history category if the defendant has qualifying prior convictions for “crimes of violence” and/or “controlled substance offenses.” Here, the district court rejected the designation (including due to remoteness/age and insufficient proof of a qualifying “crime of violence”).
• “Crime of violence” and the force requirement: Many federal sentencing rules ask whether a prior offense has, as an element, the use/attempted use/threatened use of violent force. The defense invoked United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 860 (2022) to argue a prior escape-related conviction did not meet that standard; the district court agreed the government had not shown it qualified.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s order in Taylor shows a common endpoint for Anders sentencing appeals: when the defendant does not seek plea withdrawal, affirmatively accepts a corrected (and often reduced) Guidelines calculation, and receives a within-range sentence supported by a § 3553(a) explanation, there is typically no nonfrivolous appellate path. The decision highlights the combined force of (i) limited Anders review under United States v. Bey, (ii) waiver doctrine under United States v. Fuentes, and (iii) the within-Guidelines presumption of reasonableness under United States v. Major, with procedural sufficiency assessed through Gall v. United States.