Seventh Circuit Reaffirms High Bar for Reversal Based on Closing-Argument Misconduct and Clarifies Evidentiary Predicate for “Future Emotional Distress” Instructions under Illinois Law

Introduction

In David W. Magnuson v. Trulite Glass & Aluminum Solutions, LLC, No. 24-1660 (7th Cir. Sept. 5, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a post-trial judgment and the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial after a jury awarded $122,500 in damages stemming from a 2017 rear-end collision. Although the defendant admitted negligence, the parties disputed the extent and causation of the plaintiff’s claimed injuries, including a spinal cord condition (myelomalacia) and shoulder damage, as well as emotional distress. The plaintiff, who sought between $14.3 million and $20.4 million, argued on appeal that he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s closing-argument remarks and by the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on “future emotional distress” as a separate damages element under Illinois law. He also challenged several evidentiary rulings.

The Seventh Circuit rejected those arguments and affirmed across the board. This nonprecedential disposition (citable only as allowed by Fed. R. App. P. 32.1) is nevertheless a useful and concrete application of settled law: (1) improper closing remarks rarely justify a new trial absent “substantial prejudice,” especially where curative instructions are given; and (2) in diversity cases applying Illinois law, a plaintiff must present some evidence specifically supporting future emotional distress—beyond evidence of current distress and the permanence of physical injury—to warrant the corresponding jury instruction and a separate line item on the verdict form.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial and the jury’s damages verdict:

Closing-argument misconduct. Even assuming defense counsel’s remarks (questioning why the plaintiff did not sue a treating physician and briefly referencing a prior, unrelated lawsuit) were improper, they did not result in substantial prejudice. The court emphasized the mitigating effect of standard jury instructions that arguments are not evidence and noted the jury still awarded a six-figure sum, exceeding the defense’s request.
Future emotional distress instruction. The district court properly declined to give Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) 30.05.01 on future emotional distress (and to include a separate future-distress line on the verdict form). The plaintiff’s witnesses described current and past mental suffering and the permanence of physical injury, but there was no evidence specifically supporting future or permanent emotional harm.
Other evidentiary complaints. Challenges to cross-examination about vacation photographs, evidence of a 1997 accident, defense causation arguments, argument that plaintiff failed to prove a traumatic brain injury, and the scope of a defense expert’s opinions all failed under abuse-of-discretion review.

Outcome: Affirmed.

Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Applied

Rule 59(a) standard—Abuse of discretion: The panel reviewed the denial of a new trial for abuse of discretion (Ewing v. 1645 W. Farragut LLC, 90 F.4th 876, 886 (7th Cir. 2024); Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2004)). The court reiterated that a jury verdict stands if a reasonable basis exists in the record when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, with weight and credibility committed to the jury (Kapelanski).
Closing-argument misconduct—Prejudice requirement: A party seeking a new trial over counsel’s remarks must show both improper comments and prejudice (Viramontes v. City of Chicago, 840 F.3d 423, 431 (7th Cir. 2016); Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 2012)). Improper closing remarks “rarely” warrant reversal (Christmas). Reversal is appropriate only if the remarks influenced the jury, causing substantial prejudice (Mayall v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 1993); Arcor, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 960 F.2d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 1992)). Curative instructions mitigate any harm (Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 745 (7th Cir. 2008)). Jurors are presumed to follow instructions (United States v. Garcia, 81 F.4th 691, 698 (7th Cir. 2023)).
Jury instructions—State substantive law, federal procedural law: In diversity cases, state law governs the substance of instructions, federal law governs formulation and delivery (Karahodzic v. JBS Carriers, Inc., 881 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2018)). Denials of requested instructions are reviewed for abuse of discretion (Downing v. Abbott Laboratories, 48 F.4th 793, 810 (7th Cir. 2022); E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d 916, 921–22 (7th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2016)), with de novo review reserved for pure legal questions (Downing; Kuberski v. Rev Recreation Grp., Inc., 5 F.4th 775, 779 (7th Cir. 2021)). Reversal is warranted only when the instructions, taken as a whole, so misled the jury that they caused prejudice (Farnik v. City of Chicago, 1 F.4th 535, 544 (7th Cir. 2021)).
Illinois law on giving instructions—“Some evidence” standard: Illinois law requires some evidence in the record to justify the theory of a proposed instruction (LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 406 (1998)). The court specifically addressed Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction Civil No. 30.05.01 concerning emotional distress “experienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future,” whose Notes on Use require evidence that justifies inclusion (IPI Civil 30.05.01, Section 30, p. 14 (Rev. 2021)).
Evidentiary rulings—Abuse of discretion: The court reviewed evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion and found none (Karahodzic, 881 F.3d at 1015 n.2; Reed v. Freedom Mortgage Corp., 869 F.3d 543, 548 (7th Cir. 2017)).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Closing-Argument Remarks: No Substantial Prejudice and Curative Instruction

Two remarks were challenged: (i) defense counsel’s suggestion that if a nine-month delay in diagnosing myelomalacia worsened the plaintiff’s condition, he could have sued his doctor; and (ii) the reference to the plaintiff’s earlier, unrelated unemployment lawsuit to argue he is not averse to litigation. The Seventh Circuit emphasized the contextual review of closing arguments and concluded:

Contextual fit: The comments were tied to the plaintiff’s own theory and evidence. The “why no malpractice suit?” remark was framed as a challenge to the plaintiff’s causation narrative, not as evidence. The reference to prior litigation was styled as rebuttal to any suggestion that plaintiff avoided litigation (and the record reflected the plaintiff himself had discussed being off work during that period).
No substantial prejudice: The court held that even if the remarks were improper, they did not substantially prejudice the plaintiff. The jury still returned a six-figure award—well above the defense’s requested number—suggesting the comments did not unduly suppress damages.
Curative instructions: The district court instructed the jury that counsel’s statements are not evidence. Appellate courts presume jurors follow such instructions absent overwhelming contrary indications. No such indication existed.

Against this legal backdrop, and under abuse-of-discretion review, the panel found no basis to disturb the verdict or grant a new trial on damages.

2) Future Emotional Distress Instruction: Insufficient Record Foundation

Under Illinois law, the jury may be instructed on future emotional distress when there is some evidence that the plaintiff will reasonably experience such distress in the future. The plaintiff cited testimony from six witnesses—family members, treating physicians, a neuropsychologist, and himself—as proof of ongoing mental suffering and permanent physical injury. The district court, and the Seventh Circuit, found that proof wanting for this specific instruction:

Evidence must point to future mental harm: While testimony established present and past distress and the permanence of certain physical conditions (e.g., cervical radiculopathy, myelomalacia, imbalance), it did not speak to a permanent or future mental-health prognosis. That evidentiary gap is critical under IPI 30.05.01.
Discretion under Illinois law: Illinois courts vest trial judges with discretion to determine what issues have been raised by the evidence (LaFever). Applying that standard, the Seventh Circuit agreed it was proper to omit the future-distress instruction and corresponding verdict line item.

3) Other Evidentiary and Argument Issues: No Abuse of Discretion

The plaintiff also challenged:

Cross-examination about vacation photographs and references to them in closing;
Admission of evidence concerning a 1997 car accident;
Defense arguments about alternative causes of injury;
Defense argument that the plaintiff failed to prove a traumatic brain injury; and
A defense expert’s testimony allegedly offering previously withdrawn opinions.

The Seventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion in any of those rulings. In short, the court detected no reversible error and concluded the verdict had an adequate evidentiary basis.

C. Impact and Practical Significance

Although nonprecedential, the decision sends several clear signals to trial practitioners in the Seventh Circuit, especially in diversity tort cases governed by Illinois damages law:

Closing-argument claims are uphill on appeal. Even pointed or arguably improper rhetoric is unlikely to trigger a new trial absent a persuasive showing of “substantial prejudice” that infected the verdict. Standard instructions that arguments are not evidence will strongly mitigate any perceived harm.
“Future emotional distress” requires specific proof. Plaintiffs seeking a separate line item for future mental suffering should present explicit testimony—preferably from a qualified expert, though lay testimony may suffice in some cases—speaking to the reasonable certainty of future emotional distress. Evidence limited to current distress and permanent physical impairment is not enough.
Causation themes can survive even where negligence is admitted. The defense’s “why not sue the doctor?” line—controversial in tone—was treated as a causation-and-damages argument in context. Admitting negligence does not waive a defendant’s right to argue alternative causal pathways for particular injuries or their extent.
Everyday-life evidence remains potent. Vacation photographs and similar materials often find their way into damages trials. Plaintiffs should expect courts to permit some use of such evidence to test credibility, capacity, or the impact of alleged injuries, subject to relevance and unfair-prejudice limits.
Verdict sustainability. Where the jury awards a meaningful sum to the plaintiff—and particularly when that sum exceeds the defense’s position—appellate courts are less likely to see prejudice flowing from contested arguments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 59(a) new trial: After a jury verdict, a party can ask the trial judge to order a new trial if significant errors occurred (e.g., improper argument, evidence, or instructions) that likely affected the outcome. Appellate courts defer to the trial judge’s discretion.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential standard. The appellate court asks whether the trial judge’s decisions fall within a broad range of permissible choices. If reasonable judges could disagree, the decision typically stands.
Substantial prejudice (closing arguments): Not every misstep in argument warrants a new trial. The remarks must have influenced the jury to the point of causing meaningful, outcome-affecting harm.
Curative instruction: A direction from the judge telling jurors to disregard argument or evidence or clarifying that lawyer statements are not evidence. Courts presume jurors follow these instructions.
Diversity jurisdiction and Erie: In federal court hearing state-law claims because of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy, state law supplies the substantive rules (e.g., what damages are available), while federal law controls procedure (e.g., how instructions are given, standards of review).
Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 30.05.01: Allows jurors to consider emotional distress “experienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future.” The instruction may be given only if there is evidence supporting future emotional harm—not just present suffering or permanent physical injury.
Myelomalacia: Softening or damage to the spinal cord tissue, often associated with chronic compression or injury.
Osteophytes: Bone spurs, often arising from degenerative changes, that can narrow spaces around nerves or the spinal canal.
Cervical radiculopathy: Nerve irritation or compression in the neck region that can cause pain, weakness, or numbness radiating into the shoulders, arms, or hands.
Nonprecedential disposition: An appellate decision designated as not binding in future cases, though it may be cited as permitted under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 for persuasive value.

Strategic Takeaways for Practitioners

For plaintiffs:
- To secure a future emotional distress instruction, build a record that expressly addresses future mental-health impacts (e.g., expert testimony on the likelihood of ongoing depression, anxiety, or PTSD).
- Object promptly to closing-argument overreach and, where necessary, request specific curative instructions. Preserve all claimed errors clearly in the record.
- Anticipate collateral evidence (e.g., travel photos, prior accidents) and prepare contextual explanations and targeted in limine requests.
For defendants:
- Position closing remarks within the evidentiary record and the plaintiff’s theory to avoid claims of unfair prejudice.
- Use causation themes (alternative causes, prior conditions) carefully, especially where liability is admitted, to contest the extent of injury and damages.
- Leverage the presumption that jurors follow instructions by ensuring standard limiting instructions are requested and delivered.
For trial judges:
- Maintain standard instructions emphasizing that arguments are not evidence and give tailored curative instructions when needed.
- Require a specifically future-focused evidentiary predicate before giving IPI 30.05.01’s future-emotional-distress component or a separate damages line.

Conclusion

Magnuson v. Trulite Glass & Aluminum Solutions, LLC underscores two enduring principles in Seventh Circuit practice. First, claims of closing-argument misconduct rarely carry the day on appeal; absent a showing of substantial prejudice, especially where the jury is properly instructed, verdicts will stand. Second, in Illinois personal-injury cases tried in federal court, a plaintiff must supply record evidence specifically pointing to future emotional harm to justify a future emotional distress instruction and a discrete damages line. The decision reflects deference to juries and trial judges under abuse-of-discretion review, and it offers practical guidance to litigants about building (or challenging) the foundation for damages instructions and managing the risks of robust closing arguments. While nonprecedential, the ruling is a clear and instructive application of settled standards that will inform trial strategy in personal injury and other damages-focused litigation.