Seventh Circuit Mandates Review of “Changed Circumstances” in Successive Motions to Recruit Counsel
Commentary on Miguel Rico v. John Howe, 24-1175 (7th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

Miguel Rico, an Illinois state prisoner, brought a § 1983 action claiming that correctional officer John Howe displayed deliberate indifference to Rico’s suicidal behavior, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment. The district court twice denied Rico’s motions to recruit pro bono counsel and ultimately dismissed the action with prejudice as a discovery sanction after extensive non-compliance.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded—holding that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring Rico’s allegation of a “material change” (heavy medication) that impaired his ability to litigate when ruling on the second request for counsel. In doing so, the court clarified two intertwined principles:

1. When a pro se litigant files successive motions to recruit counsel, a district court must meaningfully evaluate new circumstances rather than reflexively rely on prior rulings; and
2. Competence must be measured with respect to the plaintiff’s own abilities, not those of any assisting jailhouse lawyer.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for the district court to reconsider Rico’s second motion to recruit counsel.
• Key finding: The district court’s text order denying counsel failed to address Rico’s intervening claim that medication substantially diminished his litigation capacity, constituting an abuse of discretion under Eagan v. Dempsey and related precedent.
• Because absence of counsel likely prejudiced Rico (non-compliance occurred while medicated), the error was not harmless.
• The appellate panel did not address the propriety of the dismissal sanction itself; that issue is left open on remand.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion weaves a tight web of Seventh Circuit authority on appointed counsel for indigent civil litigants:

• Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) – established the three-part framework for evaluating motions to recruit counsel: (1) reasonable efforts; (2) plaintiff’s competency vis-à-vis case difficulty; (3) whether counsel could change the outcome.
• Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2021) – held that ignoring changed circumstances is an abuse of discretion.
• Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2018) – required courts to examine a plaintiff’s own ability, not that of a jailhouse lawyer.
• Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2014) and McCaa v. Hamilton, 893 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2018) – similar emphasis on personal capacity and prejudice.
• Thomas v. Anderson, 912 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2018) – noted that repetitive motions without new grounds need not be revisited, highlighting the line Rico’s case crosses.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Step 1 – Reasonable Efforts. The district court had already found that Rico satisfied this threshold (numerous attempts to secure pro bono representation).
2. Step 2 – Competence Versus Difficulty.
   • At motion #1, the court reasonably concluded Rico could handle a fact-intensive excessive-risk claim.
   • At motion #2, new information—heavy medication causing cognitive impairment— altered Rico’s competence profile. Ignoring that factor violated Eagan and Walker.
3. Step 3 – Prejudice / Difference in Outcome. The appellate court linked dismissal directly to discovery failures that occurred while Rico was allegedly medicated. An attorney could have streamlined responses, sought protective orders, or requested extensions, likely averting dismissal. Hence prejudice was “reasonably likely.”

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Clarifies Obligation to Re-Evaluate Successive Requests. District judges in the Seventh Circuit must articulate why newly raised obstacles do—or do not—change the Pruitt calculus. Boiler-plate denials risk reversal.
• Re-affirms Non-reliance on Jailhouse Lawyers. Courts cannot bootstrap a lay helper’s skill into the plaintiff’s own competence; doing so masks true need for counsel.
• Discovery Sanctions & Access to Counsel. While not squarely resolved, the opinion intimates that harsh Rule 37 sanctions are disfavored when non-compliance plausibly stems from untreated mental or medical conditions.
• Practical Guidance for Practitioners. • Pro se litigants should document any evolving medical, language, or literacy barriers.
  • Defense counsel and courts must parse whether obstinacy or incapacity underlies discovery default.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 1983 Action

A federal civil lawsuit allowing individuals to sue state actors for constitutional violations.

Deliberate Indifference

Standard under the Eighth Amendment requiring proof that officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to inmate health or safety.

Pruitt Framework

The Seventh Circuit’s test to decide when a court should recruit counsel for an indigent civil litigant.

Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v) Dismissal

A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure permitting dismissal of an action when a party disobeys discovery orders.

Abuse of Discretion

A standard of appellate review that overturns a decision only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or based on an incorrect view of the law.

5. Conclusion

Miguel Rico v. John Howe reinforces that access to courts means more than allowing pro se filings—it requires attentive judicial assessment when a litigant’s capacity deteriorates. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion crystalizes two essential takeaways:

1. District courts must explicitly address new facts put forward in renewed motions to recruit counsel; rote denials invite reversal.
2. Evaluations of competence must pertain to the plaintiff personally, not to the often-invisible hand of a jailhouse lawyer.

Beyond prisoner litigation, the ruling will influence civil rights practice where indigent plaintiffs grapple with fluctuating mental or medical conditions. By tethering sanctions and competency analysis to the reality of a litigant’s state of mind, the court underscores fairness as a cornerstone of procedural justice.