Seventh Circuit Clarifies the Post-Shinn Landscape: No Rhines Stay, No § 3599 Funding, and Limited Competency Stays When State Procedures Foreclose Relief

1. Introduction

Jeffrey Alan Weisheit, convicted in Indiana of murdering two young children and sentenced to death, sought federal habeas corpus relief after extensive state litigation failed. His federal petition raised more than 30 grounds, a host of procedural motions (Rhines stay, competency-based stay, and a request for investigative funding under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f)), and highlighted the interplay among Martinez, Trevino, and the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Shinn v. Ramirez. The Southern District of Indiana denied all relief. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit (Judges Easterbrook, St. Eve, and Pryor; opinion by Judge St. Eve) affirmed, issuing a tightly reasoned opinion that crystallises several post-Shinn rules at the intersection of federal habeas practice and state post-conviction procedure.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Procedural Default: Most of Weisheit’s claims were procedurally defaulted; the remainder failed on the merits.
Rhines Stay Denied: A stay is available only for truly unexhausted claims. Because Indiana’s successive-petition rules rendered further state review unavailable, Weisheit in fact had no unexhausted claims.
Competency-Based Stay Denied: Where claims are defaulted or purely legal, the petitioner’s present competence cannot affect the outcome, so a stay is unwarranted.
§ 3599(f) Funding & Transport Denied: Investigative services are not “reasonably necessary” when any evidence produced would be inadmissible under § 2254(e)(2) or under state rules.
Merits Review: Applying AEDPA deference, the court upheld the Indiana Supreme Court’s adjudication of juror-bias, voluntariness, evidentiary, and multiple Strickland claims.
Result: District court judgment affirmed in full.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel canvassed an impressive array of Supreme Court and circuit authority. Key precedents and their roles include:

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) – sets the criteria for stay-and-abeyance. The Seventh Circuit emphasised that Rhines applies only where state remedies are still “available.” Because Indiana precludes successive petitions lacking a “reasonable possibility” of success (Ind. P-C R 1(12)), Weisheit’s claims were deemed defaulted rather than unexhausted.
Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022) – forecloses factual development in federal court unless § 2254(e)(2) is satisfied. This drove two outcomes: (i) Weisheit abandoned reliance on Martinez/Trevino in federal court; (ii) any new brain-scan evidence would be useless, defeating § 3599 funding.
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) & Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) – provide “cause” to excuse defaults of ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IATC) claims due to post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness. The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana’s own post-conviction standards (Graves/Baum) and recent case Isom v. State, 235 N.E.3d 150 (Ind. 2024), foreclose state-court revival, distinguishing federal “cause” from state “successive-petition” standards.
Ayestas v. Davis, 584 U.S. 28 (2018) – articulates when services are “reasonably necessary” under § 3599(f). Applied to deny funding because no court could lawfully consider the sought evidence.
Ryan v. Gonzales, 568 U.S. 57 (2013) – limits competency-based stays; adopted to deny Weisheit’s request.
Voluminous Strickland lineage (Wiggins, Rompilla, Belmontes, etc.) – the panel reiterated “double deference” on federal habeas review of IATC claims.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Unexhausted vs. Defaulted Claims
The opinion’s central move is definitional: if state law provides no procedural vehicle to hear a claim, the claim is defaulted, not unexhausted. Hence, the first Rhines prerequisite (“some claims unexhausted but potentially reviewable in state court”) collapsed.
Section 3599(f) Funding Standard
Applying Ayestas and Shoop v. Twyford, the panel assessed (a) potential merit, (b) likelihood of generating admissible evidence, and (c) procedural viability. Because § 2254(e)(2) barred new evidence and Indiana would not reopen the case, funding was “not reasonably necessary.” The court tacitly links “necessity” to “admissibility,” an analytic step now explicit in Seventh Circuit precedent.
Competency Stay
Echoing Gonzales, the court held that when (i) all claims are either defaulted or purely legal, or (ii) AEDPA forbids new facts, petitioner’s competence offers no “substantial benefit,” so a stay is an abuse of discretion.
AEDPA Merits Review
For each preserved claim, the court asked only whether the Indiana Supreme Court’s result was objectively unreasonable. The detailed discussion of juror misconduct, voluntariness, Strickland prejudice, and exclusion of non-scientific future-danger evidence underscores the Seventh Circuit’s adherence to the “fair-minded jurist” test of Harrington v. Richter.

3.3 Likely Impact

Clarifies Post-Shinn Strategy: Petitioners cannot use Rhines to manufacture unexhausted claims when state rules foreclose successive relief. Defense teams must now assess state “successive-petition” gatekeeping before filing blended (mixed) federal petitions.
Guidance on § 3599(f): Funding inquiries will begin with “Could any court later admit what you seek to develop?” – a threshold that will sink many requests for neuro-imaging or new experts.
Competency-Based Stays Narrowed: The court’s reiteration of Gonzales supplies district judges a blueprint for denying stays where record expansion is impossible.
State-Federal Comity Strengthened: By deferring to Indiana’s interpretation of its own post-conviction rules, the opinion solidifies principles of federalism under AEDPA.
Practical Effect on Capital Litigation: Capital habeas counsel must marshal all facts in state proceedings; the window to augment the record in federal court has virtually closed in the Seventh Circuit.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural Default vs. Exhaustion: • Exhaustion – You have not yet asked the state courts, but you still can. • Procedural Default – It is now too late; state rules bar you.
Rhines Stay: A pause in the federal case allowing a petitioner to finish state review. It is available only if state courts remain open to the claim.
§ 2254(e)(2): The federal rule that normally forbids new evidence in habeas unless (i) a new constitutional rule applies or (ii) the new facts could not have been discovered earlier and clearly prove innocence.
§ 3599(f): A federal funding statute for death-row inmates. Money is allowed only when the service (investigator, expert, brain scan) is “reasonably necessary,” meaning the results could make a legal difference.
“Double Deference” in Strickland Claims: A federal habeas court looks through two lenses: (1) Was counsel’s performance deficient/prejudicial? (2) Was the state court unreasonable in saying it was not?

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Weisheit v. Neal is less about the lurid facts of a double child-murder than about the procedural architecture governing capital habeas litigation after Shinn. It cements three propositions: (1) A Rhines stay disappears once state law forecloses successive review; (2) investigative funding is unavailable when § 2254(e)(2) blocks the door to new evidence; and (3) competency-based stays are disfavoured when the petition raises only record-based or defaulted claims. Coupled with an exacting application of AEDPA deference on the merits, the opinion signals that in the Seventh Circuit, federal habeas will increasingly turn on state-court diligence and record completeness. Future petitioners must adapt by front-loading all potential claims and evidentiary development in state court or risk the courthouse door being irrevocably shut.