Seventh Circuit Clarifies that Reassignment to Pre-Existing Job Duties Is Not a “Tangible Employment Action”:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Bankruptcy Estate of Santoasha Harris v. City of Milwaukee

Introduction

In Bankruptcy Estate of Santoasha Harris v. City of Milwaukee, No. 23-2932 (7th Cir. 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted a workplace-harassment saga stretching from 2012 to 2017. The plaintiff, Santoasha Harris—through her bankruptcy estate—sued the City of Milwaukee for Title VII violations (quid-pro-quo sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation) and for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Although the court’s ultimate holding is fact-specific, it announces an important doctrinal refinement: when an employer merely assigns an employee to tasks already encompassed by her written job description, that assignment—even if threatening, unpleasant, or motivated by hostility—does not qualify as a “tangible employment action” capable of defeating the employer’s Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense in quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment cases.

Summary of the Judgment

• The court held that the plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to prove (i) a tangible employment action stemming from her refusal to submit to sexual advances, (ii) employer negligence sufficient to impose liability for a hostile work environment, or (iii) any materially adverse action supporting a retaliation claim.
• It further held that the City satisfied both prongs of the Faragher-Ellerth defense: (1) reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassment, and (2) the employee’s unreasonable failure to utilize those preventive and corrective opportunities before 2017.
• The equal-protection claim under § 1983 collapsed because the record contained no evidence of intentional sex discrimination through municipal policy or practice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel relied heavily on a line of Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedents defining “tangible employment action,” employer liability, and the scope of adverse actions in retaliation cases.

• Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1996): Provided the five-part quid-pro-quo test applied by the court. The Harris panel embraced Bryson’s dual inquiry for the fourth element: What benefit was denied, and was the denial the result of resisting sexual advances?
• Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) & Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998): Furnished the two-prong affirmative defense (reasonable care + employee’s unreasonable failure) that the City successfully invoked.
• Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2000): Listed representative “tangible” actions (demotion, loss of supplies necessary for the job). By contrast, the Harris court found no comparable deprivation.
• Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013): Defined “supervisor” status, impacting liability standards; the panel avoided deciding whether the harasser was a supervisor because the claim failed either way.
• Trahanas v. Northwestern Univ., 64 F.4th 842 (7th Cir. 2023) & Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2012): Demonstrated what constitutes an effective anti-harassment policy in paper and practice.
• Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024): Reaffirmed that retaliation requires “significant” harm—material adversity beyond minor annoyances.
• Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986): Older § 1983 precedent distinguished because, unlike in Bohen, the City here possessed a policy and lacked knowledge of harassment until 2017.

Legal Reasoning

1. Quid-pro-quo claim
   – The City’s “threat” to assign Harris to outdoor trash duties could not be a tangible employment action because her official job description already allotted up to 70 % of her time to such duties.
   – No evidence showed any loss of pay, status, or responsibilities.
   – Having negated the fourth element, the court did not reach respondeat-superior issues.
   – Even assuming a supervisory harasser, the City won via Faragher-Ellerth: (a) comprehensive policy, (b) prompt one-month investigation, (c) separation and ultimate resignation of harasser, and (d) employee’s five-year delay in reporting.
2. Hostile-work-environment claim
   – Liability standard hinges on harasser’s status; but the claim fails under either (strict liability or negligence).
   – The same absence of a tangible employment action plus the Faragher-Ellerth defense disposed of the “supervisor” route; negligence was not shown because the policy worked when finally invoked and no earlier notice was proven.
3. Retaliation claim
   – Alleged actions (temporary schedule shift, trash duty, removal of makeshift desk, workplace camera, cold interactions) are at most “petty slights.”
   – None would dissuade a reasonable employee under Muldrow/White. Temporal proximity alone cannot prove causation.
4. Equal-protection claim
   – § 1983 requires intentional discrimination via municipal policy/custom (Monell).
   – City had policy and acted promptly; no deliberate indifference.
   – Thus, Bohen inapposite.

Impact of the Decision

The ruling carries several forward-looking effects:

• Refines “tangible employment action.” Threats or reassignments to tasks squarely within an employee’s existing job description are not “tangible” for quid-pro-quo purposes. Plaintiffs must demonstrate genuinely new detriments—pay cut, demotion, or materially diminished duties.
• Strengthens employers’ reliance on prompt action. A swift, month-long investigation and decisive discipline sufficed to establish reasonable care. Municipalities and private employers alike can look to this timeline as a benchmark.
• Emphasises the employee’s duty to report. Long delays may doom liability where reporting channels are clear and multiple.
• Raises the bar for retaliation claims post-Muldrow. Minor schedule tweaks and workspace inconveniences generally will not qualify as materially adverse.
• Limits § 1983 avenues. Plaintiffs cannot recast Title VII retaliation/harassment into constitutional claims absent proof of intentional municipal discrimination.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Tangible Employment Action: A concrete job action (e.g., hiring, firing, demotion, pay cut) that “significantly” alters employment. Mere shuffling of tasks you were already hired to perform isn’t enough.
• Faragher-Ellerth Defense: Employer’s shield against vicarious liability for supervisory harassment. Must prove (1) reasonable prevention/correction efforts, and (2) employee’s unreasonable failure to use them.
• Quid-Pro-Quo vs. Hostile Work Environment: Quid-pro-quo involves conditions/benefits tied to submission; hostile environment concerns pervasive or severe mistreatment regardless of tangible job impacts.
• Materially Adverse Action (Retaliation): An action likely to deter a reasonable worker from complaining—significant, not trivial.
• § 1983 & Equal Protection: Allows suits for constitutional violations by government actors, but demands proof that the government entity itself intentionally discriminated via policy/custom.

Conclusion

Bankruptcy Estate of Santoasha Harris v. City of Milwaukee underscores the nuanced boundaries of employer liability for workplace sexual harassment. The Seventh Circuit clarified that reassigning an employee to duties already contemplated by her job description—even when threatened as punishment—fails to constitute a “tangible employment action.” That clarification, coupled with the court’s vigorous application of the Faragher-Ellerth defense and the “material adversity” standard for retaliation, tightens plaintiffs’ evidentiary burdens while providing employers a clearer compliance roadmap. Going forward, litigants must focus on concrete, provable employment setbacks and timely invocation (or non-invocation) of robust reporting procedures. The decision thus fortifies existing doctrine and signals the court’s insistence on both prompt employer action and diligent employee reporting as twin pillars of workplace-harassment jurisprudence.