Seventh Circuit Clarifies Plain-Error Review of Impermissible § 3553(a) Factors in Supervised-Release Revocations

Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Ronald Haddad, Jr., Nos. 24-2855 et al. (7th Cir. June 27 2025)

Introduction

United States v. Haddad is a consolidated appeal from four pro se notices filed by Ronald Haddad challenging (i) the revocation of his supervised release, (ii) the six-month re-imprisonment term, and (iii) the new 30-month term of supervised release imposed by the district court (Chief Judge Virginia M. Kendall, N.D. Ill.). Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief asserting that the appeal was frivolous; Haddad submitted Rule 51(b) responses. Applying its usual Anders protocol to revocation matters, the Seventh Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal in a non-precedential order.

Although non-precedential, the decision articulates and synthesises several important rules, chief among them the court’s clarification that a district judge’s passing reference to impermissible § 3553(a) factors during a revocation sentencing does not constitute reversible plain error when the record shows heavy reliance on permissible factors and the sentence lies within the Chapter 7 policy-statement range. In doing so, the court further tightened the plain-error framework announced in United States v. Durham, 967 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2020) and later applied by the Supreme Court in Esteras v. United States, 599 U.S. ––– (2025).

Summary of the Judgment

• The court reviewed only the issues flagged in counsel’s Anders brief and Haddad’s Rule 51(b) filings.
• It affirmed the revocation decision, finding that a 2024 Illinois conviction for trespass and an arrest supported by probable cause for aggravated battery on a peace officer satisfied the preponderance standard.
• It held that any evidentiary objection to the police report was forfeited, and even if the Grade B battery violation failed, the Grade C trespass violation independently justified revocation.
• It found the six-month custodial term lawful (below the two-year statutory maximum) and presumptively reasonable because it sat near the low end of the 4–10-month Chapter 7 range.
• Although the district judge briefly noted the seriousness of the offense and the need to promote respect for law—both not enumerated in § 3583(e)—the panel ruled that this did not amount to reversible plain error.
• The new 30-month supervised-release term and its conditions were upheld; Haddad had expressly waived objections.
• Three additional pro se appeals were dismissed—one as untimely, the others as procedurally improper supplements.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The order is dense with citations. The most influential authorities are grouped below:

1. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) – governing counsel’s withdrawal when an appeal is wholly frivolous; extended here to revocation matters consistent with United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2016).
2. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) – confirming that the right to counsel in revocation proceedings is not absolute, yet the Seventh Circuit continues to apply Anders safeguards as a best practice.
3. Evidentiary/Confrontation Cases
   
   • United States v. Fleming, 9 F.3d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Jett, 982 F.3d 1072 (7th Cir. 2020) – a conviction, even on appeal, satisfies the preponderance standard for revocation.
   • United States v. Lopez-Hernandez, 687 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2012) – district courts may rely on police reports at sentencing.
   • Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) – minimal due process for revocations, including a right to confront adverse witnesses.
4. Plain-Error & Reasonableness Framework
   
   • United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) – four-prong plain-error test.
   • United States v. Durham, 967 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2020) – “reasonable probability” standard for the third Olano prong in sentencing contexts.
   • Esteras v. United States, No. 23-7483, 2025 WL 1716137 (U.S. 2025) – forbids reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) & (a)(2)(B) in revocation sentences.
5. Conditions of Supervised Release
   
   • United States v. Patlan, 31 F.4th 552 (7th Cir. 2022) – failure to object after a direct invite equals waiver.
   • United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015) – certain standard conditions are overbroad; omission of them benefits the defendant.

Legal Reasoning

1. Validity of the Violations
   The panel accepted the state-court conviction for trespass as conclusive evidence of a Grade C violation and treated the police report, coupled with Haddad’s admissions, as adequate evidence of a Grade B violation. Any confrontation-clause challenge was forfeited, triggering plain-error review that Haddad could not satisfy.
2. Guideline Calculations & Statutory Caps
   A Grade B violation with CHC I yields a 4–10-month range (U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4). The six-month sentence and two-year statutory maximum (§ 3583(e)(3)) dovetailed without error.
3. Plain-Error Analysis of Impermissible Factors
   Importantly, the court crystallised a two-step mitigator for references to forbidden factors post-Esteras:
   1. Where the reference is brief or “passing,” and
   2. Where the record otherwise reflects heavy reliance on permissible factors,
      the defendant cannot meet the third Olano prong (effect on substantial rights).
   This approach harmonises circuit precedent with the Supreme Court’s recent articulation in Esteras.
4. Presumption of Reasonableness
   Sentences within the Chapter 7 range remain “presumptively reasonable” (Yankey, 56 F.4th 554 (7th Cir. 2023)). Haddad offered nothing to rebut the presumption.
5. Waiver of Conditions Challenge
   The judge read the conditions aloud. Haddad, through counsel, stated “no objections,” effectuating a true waiver rather than mere forfeiture—foreclosing appellate review (Patlan).

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Sentencing Practice – District judges in revocation hearings now have clearer guidance: a fleeting reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, without more, will seldom upset a within-range sentence on plain-error review.
• Defense Strategy – Defense counsel must object contemporaneously to (i) reliance on police reports where witness confrontation is desired and (ii) any mention of impermissible sentencing factors; failure to do so almost guarantees affirmance.
• Anders Briefs in Revocations – The order re-endorses the Seventh Circuit’s long-standing extension of Anders to revocation appeals, cementing procedural expectations for appointed counsel.
• Administrative Clarity – The court signalled that minor mismatches between oral pronouncements and written judgments will not precipitate resentencing unless they materially alter legal obligations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release

A period of community supervision that follows imprisonment, analogous to parole but governed by federal statute.

Revocation Hearing

A court proceeding to determine whether the defendant violated release conditions and, if so, what sanction to impose.

Grade A/B/C Violation

Classification of violations in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Grade B is more serious than Grade C, affecting the recommended imprisonment range.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The civil-standard burden of proof: more likely than not (>50%). Far lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Plain Error

An error that is (1) clear or obvious and (2) affects substantial rights; an appellate court may remedy it (3) if it seriously affects the fairness or reputation of judicial proceedings.

Anders Brief

A filing in which counsel states that, after diligent review, the appeal presents no non-frivolous issues, and seeks to withdraw.

§ 3553(a) Factors vs. § 3583(e) Factors

At initial sentencing, judges must consider all § 3553(a) factors. At revocation sentencing (§ 3583(e)), they may consider only a subset—not seriousness of the offense or respect for law (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)).

Conclusion

United States v. Haddad reinforces existing doctrine while adding an important gloss: mere mention of impermissible § 3553(a) factors, without demonstrable influence on the sentence, does not satisfy the demanding plain-error standard on appeal. For practitioners, the decision underscores the imperative to lodge timely objections to (i) evidentiary shortcuts and (ii) sentencing commentary in revocation proceedings. For courts, it confirms that adherence to Chapter 7 ranges and a concise explanation focusing on permissible considerations will withstand appellate scrutiny. Ultimately, Haddad contributes to the evolving jurisprudence on supervised-release revocations, harmonising Seventh Circuit practice with recent Supreme Court guidance and solidifying the contours of plain-error review in this specialised arena.