Seventh Circuit (Nonprecedential) Reaffirms: No Prisoner Preliminary Injunction Without Concrete, Imminent Threat; No Interlocutory Appeal of Sanctions

Case: Sean Forester‑Hoare v. John Kind, et al. (No. 24‑2322)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Panel: Judges Easterbrook, Ripple, and Scudder

Date: March 31, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed denial of preliminary injunction; no appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory sanctions ruling

Note: Nonprecedential disposition; citable only under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Introduction

This nonprecedential order addresses two strands of appellate review arising from a pro se prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sean Forester‑Hoare, incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Institution and housed in the Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU), alleged Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference based on an asserted, persistent risk of harm from inmates and staff due to his pre‑incarceration affiliation with a law enforcement training program. He sought a preliminary injunction—specifically, a transfer to a different prison—and separately moved for sanctions against the prison’s security director, John Kind, whom he accused of filing a false affidavit.

The Eastern District of Wisconsin denied preliminary injunctive relief, finding that Forester‑Hoare failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and denied sanctions. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory sanctions ruling and affirmed the denial of injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), concluding that the record did not establish a concrete and imminent threat of physical injury or other irreparable harm absent court intervention.

Summary of the Opinion

Preliminary injunction: Affirmed. The court held that Forester‑Hoare did not show irreparable injury was likely without an injunction. His assertions of being “threatened literally everyday all day long” were too general and speculative, and the record—including multiple investigations—failed to corroborate physical assaults or a presently existing, specific threat within the RHU.
Sanctions: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Under the collateral order doctrine and Cunningham v. Hamilton County, interlocutory sanctions decisions are generally not appealable, and no certification under § 1292(b) was made.
Standards and deference: The panel reiterated the Winter irreparable-harm requirement, the Farmer standard for failure‑to‑protect injunctions (requiring an “objectively intolerable risk of harm”), the Seventh Circuit’s “presently existing actual threat” requirement, and the “wide‑ranging deference” due to prison administrators under Bell v. Wolfish.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008): The Supreme Court requires a clear showing that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. The Seventh Circuit applied this threshold requirement directly; because Forester‑Hoare failed to identify concrete, imminent harm, the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction could not issue.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994): Farmer governs Eighth Amendment failure‑to‑protect claims and speaks to injunctive relief standards, emphasizing that a plaintiff must show an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.” The panel relied on this formulation to underscore that non‑specific, generalized fear does not meet the standard required for preventive injunctions.
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011): The Seventh Circuit’s own articulation that “a presently existing actual threat must be shown,” and that more than a mere possibility of harm is required, dovetailed with Farmer and Winter to defeat the injunction. The opinion quotes this language to explain why generalized threats and uncorroborated past incidents did not suffice.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979): Bell instructs courts to give “wide‑ranging deference” to prison administration in matters of internal order and security. The panel invoked Bell to underscore judicial restraint, particularly salient where the requested relief—a transfer—would be a mandatory injunction intruding into prison placement decisions.
Proft v. Raoul, 944 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2019): Cited for the standard of review: legal rulings de novo, factual findings for clear error, and overall balancing for abuse of discretion. The court’s adherence to this framework shaped its limited review and ultimate affirmance.
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999): Cunningham holds that sanctions orders generally do not qualify for immediate review under the collateral order doctrine. The panel applied Cunningham to dismiss the appeal of the interlocutory sanctions ruling, noting also the absence of a § 1292(b) certification.
Statutes and Rules: 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (jurisdiction over orders denying injunctions); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (interlocutory appeal certification); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (screening prisoner complaints); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (pleading standard); Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (citation of nonprecedential opinions); Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C) (submission without oral argument).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds in two parts: jurisdiction and the merits of the preliminary injunction.

1) Appellate Jurisdiction

The panel first delineated its jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the court may review orders “denying injunctions,” which brought the district court’s PI denial within appellate reach. By contrast, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory sanctions ruling. Applying Cunningham, the panel held that sanctions orders generally do not fall within the collateral order doctrine because they are not sufficiently separate from the merits and can be reviewed after final judgment. No § 1292(b) certification existed, foreclosing an alternative route to interlocutory review.

2) Preliminary Injunction: Irreparable Harm and Deference

Turning to the injunction, the court applied Winter’s threshold requirement: irreparable harm must be likely without the injunction. It also integrated Farmer’s “objectively intolerable risk of harm” standard for Eighth Amendment preventative relief and the Seventh Circuit’s requirement of a “presently existing actual threat.”

The district court had invited both sides to present a focused, specific record regarding threats and the safety of Forester‑Hoare’s current placement. Instead, Forester‑Hoare asserted that it was impossible to specify threats because he is threatened “every day all day long” by both staff and inmates, and he submitted hundreds of pages of exhibits without explaining their significance. The defendants, by contrast, offered the sworn affidavit of Security Director Kind, which detailed 23 investigations into reported threats; only 2 investigations (related to a single episode) were partially substantiated, and neither involved a physical assault or corroborated threats of rape or death as alleged. The affidavit further explained the RHU’s security protocols—minimal, controlled inmate‑to‑inmate contact; no unsupervised interactions; and Forester‑Hoare’s cell location near the control room—reducing the likelihood of physical attack.

Given this record, the court agreed with the district court that:

Forester‑Hoare’s statements were too general and speculative to establish a likely, imminent injury.
The record did not corroborate claims of past physical assaults or a present, concrete risk linked to his law‑enforcement coursework.
The current RHU placement is materially relevant to risk assessment; its structure and controls make a physical assault by other inmates “highly unlikely.”

The court also emphasized institutional deference under Bell v. Wolfish, noting that the requested relief—transfer to a different, preferably medium‑security prison—amounted to a mandatory injunction compelling prison administration to act. Such relief is “extraordinary” and especially disfavored absent strong evidence and a focused showing of irreparable harm. The combination of insufficiently specific evidence, conflicting or uncorroborated accounts, and the RHU’s protective features defeated the irreparable‑harm showing, making the denial of a preliminary injunction a proper exercise of discretion.

Impact and Implications

Although nonprecedential, this order offers several practical and doctrinal signals for prisoner litigation and preliminary‑injunction practice in the Seventh Circuit:

Specificity and corroboration are critical: Generalized assertions of ubiquitous threats—especially when unsupported by sworn testimony or tied to unsubstantiated or mischaracterized incidents—will not meet Winter’s “likely irreparable harm” threshold.
Current conditions matter: Courts will scrutinize the inmate’s present housing context. Confinement in RHU with limited, supervised movement and proximity to staff can undercut claims of imminent physical harm.
Mandatory relief faces a higher bar: Requests that intrude into prison management (e.g., requiring a transfer) will be treated as extraordinary. Absent detailed evidence of a specific, imminent risk that current protocols cannot mitigate, such relief is unlikely.
PREA complaints are not automatically dispositive: Partial substantiation of verbal harassment or general threats does not, without more, establish a present, intolerable risk of physical harm warranting injunctive relief.
Appellate jurisdiction is narrow for sanctions: Parties should expect to litigate sanctions issues to final judgment or seek (rare) § 1292(b) certification; the collateral order doctrine seldom enables immediate review.
Procedural discipline at the district court stage pays dividends: The district court’s early Rule 8 dismissal and directive for focused evidence presage the appellate outcome: voluminous but unfocused filings weaken, rather than strengthen, a PI request.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preliminary injunction: A temporary court order issued early in a case to prevent harm before the case is decided. To obtain it, a movant must show, among other things, that they are likely to suffer harm that cannot be remedied later (irreparable harm) without the injunction. It is an “extraordinary” remedy.
Irreparable harm: Injury that cannot be repaired by money damages or other remedies after the fact. Courts require a likelihood—not just a possibility—of such harm occurring absent the injunction.
Mandatory vs. prohibitory injunctions: A prohibitory injunction preserves the status quo by prohibiting conduct. A mandatory injunction compels affirmative action (e.g., transferring a prisoner). Courts are especially cautious with mandatory injunctions, particularly in prison administration.
Eighth Amendment failure‑to‑protect (Farmer v. Brennan): Prison officials must take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from known, substantial risks of serious harm. For injunctive relief, the risk must be “objectively intolerable,” not speculative or generalized.
Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU): A segregated housing setting where inmate movement and interactions are highly controlled and supervised. RHU can also house inmates for protective reasons, which may materially reduce risk of inmate‑on‑inmate assaults.
PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act): A federal statute promoting detection, prevention, and response to prison sexual abuse. A PREA investigation can substantiate verbal harassment without necessarily establishing a present risk of physical assault.
Interlocutory appeal and collateral order doctrine: Most appeals wait until the case ends. Limited exceptions exist. Orders denying injunctions are immediately appealable (§ 1292(a)(1)), but sanctions orders generally are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine and await final judgment unless certified under § 1292(b).
Nonprecedential disposition: An appellate decision designated as nonprecedential is not binding authority. It may be cited for persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, but it does not create new binding law.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in Forester‑Hoare v. Kind underscores familiar but exacting requirements for preliminary injunctive relief in the prison context. The court reaffirmed that a prisoner seeking preventive relief must present specific, corroborated facts showing a likely, imminent, irreparable injury—especially when requesting a mandatory injunction that would direct prison administrators to transfer an inmate. Generalized claims of constant threat, unaccompanied by concrete evidence and tempered by current housing conditions designed to reduce risk, will not suffice under Winter and Farmer. The court also clarified the limited scope of appellate jurisdiction over sanctions rulings at the interlocutory stage, applying Cunningham to foreclose immediate review.

Situated within a body of precedent that prizes both careful evidentiary showings and deference to institutional expertise, this decision provides practical guidance: focus on present, specific risks; substantiate allegations with sworn, targeted evidence; and tailor requested relief to demonstrated conditions. While nonprecedential, the order is a clear signal to litigants and courts alike that broad assertions of danger—without concrete, imminent threats—will not justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction in prisoner failure‑to‑protect cases.