Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980). The Supreme Court cautioned that “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” The Seventh Circuit uses Dennis to reject the notion that an adverse state-court ruling, by itself, plausibly alleges a judge’s participation in a conspiracy. Importantly, Dennis also recognizes that private actors who truly conspire with a judge act under color of law, but that principle does not help where the complaint lacks factual matter plausibly suggesting an actual conspiracy rather than mere judicial error or disagreement.

Milchtein v. Milwaukee County, 42 F.4th 814, 827 n.4 (7th Cir. 2022). Milchtein reinforces that § 1985(3) reaches “purely private” conspiracies only when the right at issue is enforceable against private conduct (e.g., Thirteenth Amendment). By contrast, Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal-protection rights require state action. The court applied this limitation to hold that Williams’s Fourteenth Amendment-based allegations against private parties fall outside § 1985(3)’s private-conspiracy exception.

Boucher v. Financial System of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018). Boucher articulates the “false, deceptive, or misleading” representation standard under § 1692e, evaluated from the perspective of the unsophisticated consumer. Here, because the property manager had contractual authority to enforce leases and terminate tenancies, counsel’s filing of an eviction on the manager’s behalf did not misrepresent anything material. Boucher supplies the interpretive framework for determining when litigation statements are actionable under the FDCPA.

Ash v. PSP Distribution, LLC, 226 N.E.3d 748, 753–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). Illinois fraud (common law) and statutory consumer fraud both require a deceptive act intended to induce reliance, actual reliance, and proximate causation. The Seventh Circuit relied on this predicate to find Williams’s allegations wanting: his decision to remove the grill stemmed from fear of eviction for a lease violation, not reliance on the truth of the cited ordinance. This broke the reliance/causation chain necessary for fraud.

Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999), and Bradley v. Sabree, 842 F.3d 1291, 1292 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016). Rowe is the controlling Seventh Circuit authority that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) authorizes screening “for all litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status.” Bradley notes a circuit split, but Rowe remains binding within the circuit. The court therefore rejected Williams’s contention (based on a nonprecedential order) that fee-paying litigants are exempt from § 1915 screening.

Legal Reasoning Issue-by-Issue

1) Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim involving a state eviction judge

The court’s analysis followed two steps. First, it assessed whether the complaint plausibly alleged a conspiracy involving Judge McCluskey. Citing Dennis, it held that the mere fact the judge ruled for the landlord does not raise a plausible inference of conspiratorial agreement. Without well-pleaded facts indicating an actual meeting of the minds—something beyond adverse judicial rulings—this theory fails under Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standards.

Second, the court addressed Williams’s alternative argument that § 1985(3) covers purely private conspiracies. The court agreed in principle that § 1985(3) can reach private conspiracies, but only when the right allegedly infringed is enforceable against private actors. Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are not—state action is a prerequisite. Thus, even apart from the failure to plausibly allege the judge’s involvement, Williams’s Fourteenth Amendment theory against the private landlord and its counsel falls outside § 1985(3)’s narrow private-conspiracy exception (Milchtein).

2) FDCPA claim against eviction counsel (15 U.S.C. § 1692e)

Williams alleged that the eviction complaint misrepresented who was entitled to possession by naming or proceeding on behalf of the property manager rather than the owner. The controlling question under § 1692e is whether the statement was false or misleading to the unsophisticated consumer and material to the debt or its collection. The court examined the parties’ management agreement (attached to the pleadings) and concluded that the property manager had explicit authority to enforce leases and terminate tenancies. Given that authority, the law firm’s filing on the manager’s behalf did not misstate a material fact about the right to pursue possession. No violation of § 1692e was plausibly alleged (Boucher).

3) Illinois common-law and statutory fraud claims

Two defects doomed these claims. First, Rule 9(b) particularity was lacking: the complaint did not sufficiently specify the “who, what, where, when, and how” of any fraudulent act. Second, and more fundamentally, the allegations failed to state fraud under Illinois law because the pleaded reliance was misdirected. Williams alleged he removed the grill out of fear of eviction, not because he accepted as true the referenced city ordinance. The lease itself prohibited grills, independent of any ordinance. Thus, the decision to comply was driven by lease enforcement, not reliance on a false ordinance representation—breaking the chain of causation required for fraud (Ash).

4) Section 1915(e)(2) screening of fee-paying litigants

Williams argued that because he paid the filing fee, the district court lacked authority to screen and dismiss his second amended complaint under § 1915(e)(2). The Seventh Circuit rejected that contention, reaffirming Rowe’s holding that § 1915(e)(2) applies to all litigants regardless of fee status. Although a later Seventh Circuit nonprecedential order had suggested otherwise in Williams’s separate litigation, that order does not override Rowe. The district court therefore acted within its statutory authority in screening and dismissing deficient claims.

Impact and Practical Implications

While nonprecedential, this order is a useful synthesis of settled principles in four recurring areas. Practitioners should expect district courts within the Seventh Circuit to continue applying these rules:

• § 1985(3) and private conspiracies: Plaintiffs must plead concrete facts showing an actual conspiratorial agreement; judicial rulings adverse to a party are not enough. And when the alleged right requires state action (e.g., Fourteenth Amendment due process), § 1985(3) does not provide a route against purely private actors.
• FDCPA in eviction litigation: Where a property manager has written authority to enforce leases and terminate tenancies, counsel’s decision to file an eviction in the manager’s name or on the manager’s behalf does not, without more, mislead the unsophisticated consumer. Plaintiffs should scrutinize management agreements before alleging § 1692e misrepresentation theories based on party capacity.
• Illinois fraud pleading: Reliance and causation must connect to the alleged misrepresentation itself. If a tenant acts to avoid eviction because a lease prohibits conduct (e.g., grills), the fact that a notice also references a possibly non-existent ordinance may not establish the required reliance. Complaints must also satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity standards.
• § 1915(e)(2) screening continues to apply to fee-paying litigants: District courts in the Seventh Circuit may screen and dismiss claims for failure to state a claim even when plaintiffs have paid the filing fee. Litigants should be prepared for early merits screening of amended complaints, not only for in forma pauperis cases.

For housing practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of lease language and management agreements in shaping both FDCPA exposure and fraud theories. For civil-rights litigators, it confirms the high bar for alleging conspiracies with judges and the doctrinal limits on § 1985(3) when the underlying right requires state action.