Separate-Vote Rule Bars “Single-Target” Initiatives that Revoke and Regrant Broad Constitutional Powers

Introduction

In T.E.I. v. Knudsen (2026 MT 2), the Montana Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction, reviewed the Montana Attorney General’s legal-sufficiency determination rejecting a proposed constitutional initiative, Ballot Issue 4 (BI-4). Petitioner Transparent Election Initiative (TEI) sought a declaratory judgment requiring the Attorney General to approve (or prepare) ballot statements and to strike the Attorney General’s fiscal statement and statement of material harm.

The central issue was whether BI-4 violated the Montana Constitution’s separate-vote requirement (Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 11), which mandates that when more than one constitutional amendment is submitted at the same election, each must be prepared so it can be voted upon separately. BI-4 would add a new Article XIII, Section 8 defining the “powers of artificial person,” broadly revoking existing powers of corporations and other “artificial persons,” regranting only certain powers (excluding election and ballot-issue activity), and establishing enforcement and definitions.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the Attorney General’s rejection of BI-4 as legally insufficient because BI-4 violates the separate-vote requirement. The Court held that BI-4 effectuates at least two distinct constitutional changes: (1) limiting artificial persons’ powers and privileges to only those expressly provided by the Montana Constitution, and (2) revoking all existing powers and then regranting a narrowed set of powers through a revocation/restoration structure. Because that structure would force voters to accept broad, independent consequences beyond the asserted goal of preventing corporate political spending, the measure could be “split into separate votes.”

Having found the separate-vote violation dispositive, the Court did not reach TEI’s challenges to the fiscal statement timing or the accuracy of the statement of material harm.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Monforton v. Knudsen, 2023 MT 179
The Court relied on Monforton for two related propositions: (a) the Attorney General has authority to evaluate compliance with the separate-vote requirement in the legal-sufficiency review; and (b) a measure can have a single general purpose yet still violate the separate-vote rule if it presents multiple substantive decisions to voters. In Monforton, the initiative’s single purpose (“limiting property tax increases”) nevertheless contained two separable voter choices (a “valuation decision” and a “millage decision”), requiring separate votes. The Court used this framework to assess whether BI-4’s asserted aim (ending artificial-person election spending) masked multiple independently significant constitutional changes.
Mont. Ass'n of Counties v. State, 2017 MT 267 (“MACo”)
MACo supplies the controlling articulation of the separate-vote requirement’s objectives: preventing voter confusion/deceit and preventing “logrolling” (bundling distinct amendments to assemble a majority coalition). The Court also cited MACo for the point that adding “new matter” to the Constitution is itself a “change,” and for the Court’s obligation to enforce the separate-vote rule while not unduly burdening the people’s amendment power. In this case, MACo framed the inquiry as whether BI-4 compels voters to accept more than one amendment-like decision in a single up-or-down vote.
Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts v. Knudsen, 2025 MT 268 (“MNC”)
MNC reinforces that an “overarching goal” does not cure a separate-vote defect where voters are denied the ability to vote separately on substantive changes that are not closely related. There, maintaining nonpartisan judicial elections and prescribing election requirements for newly created courts were deemed separable issues. The Court analogized: just as a voter could support nonpartisan elections but oppose the new-court provision, a voter could support restricting artificial-person political spending but oppose BI-4’s broader revocation-and-regrant of all artificial-person powers.
Montanans for Election Reform Action Fund v. Knudsen, 2023 MT 226 (“MERAF”)
TEI invoked the principle that an initiative may affect multiple provisions if the components are integral to a single scheme. The Court distinguished MERAF: that measure created a top-four primary framework and necessarily specified the offices covered—scope-defining language integral to the framework. By contrast, BI-4 purportedly targets election spending but does so by revoking all powers of “artificial persons” and leaving regranted powers dependent on legislative action—an overbroad mechanism with effects far beyond the stated target.

Legal Reasoning

Jurisdiction and standard of review
The Court confirmed the Attorney General’s role in determining legal sufficiency, including separate-vote compliance, and exercised original jurisdiction to review that determination under § 3-2-202(3)(a), MCA.
Separate-vote test: separability, not slogans
The Court reiterated that a measure’s “singular goal” is insufficient if the proposal can be split into distinct voter choices. The operative question is whether the initiative forces voters to accept multiple substantive constitutional changes in a single vote—thereby defeating Article XIV, Section 11’s guarantee of separate expression on separate amendments.
BI-4 contains multiple substantive constitutional decisions
The Court identified, “at a minimum,” two changes:
- Change 1: A new constitutional rule that artificial persons may have no powers or privileges except those “this constitution expressly provides.”
- Change 2: A sweeping revocation of all powers “previously granted … under Montana law” and a regrant of only limited “necessary or convenient” powers (excluding election/ballot activity), to be further shaped “as the legislature may provide.”
This structure, the Court reasoned, expands the measure’s consequences beyond restricting election spending: it potentially strips broad categories of entities (including nonprofits, unincorporated associations, and cooperatives) of existing legal powers unless and until the Legislature reauthorizes them within BI-4’s narrow definition.
Voter choice and anti-logrolling concerns
Even absent classic coalition-building logrolling, the Court held BI-4 still offends Article XIV, Section 11 because it forces a voter who favors limiting artificial-person political spending to also accept a much broader restructuring of artificial-person powers and privileges, including unknown downstream effects on non-election activities. The Court emphasized that the Constitution requires the ability to express separate opinions on separate amendments.

Impact

Drafting constraint for constitutional initiatives
Measures aimed at a specific policy outcome (e.g., corporate election spending) must avoid accomplishing that aim through additional, independently consequential constitutional restructuring (e.g., wholesale revocation of all artificial-person powers). The more an initiative uses a broad “reset” mechanism, the greater the risk it will be deemed to present multiple separable votes.
Limits on “overinclusive” implementation mechanisms
The decision signals heightened scrutiny when an initiative’s mechanism reaches well beyond its stated target, especially where it creates interim legal uncertainty (here, by revoking powers and making future powers depend on subsequent legislative action).
Election-law and corporate-rights litigation posture
Although the case is framed as ballot-measure procedure, its practical effect is substantial: initiatives seeking to regulate political spending by entities may need to be narrowly tailored into a single, closely related constitutional change—or split into multiple measures—rather than bundled with broader redefinitions of legal personhood and powers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Separate-vote requirement (Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 11): If a proposal effectively asks voters to approve more than one constitutional change, voters must be allowed to vote on each change separately. It prevents bundling (“logrolling”) and reduces confusion.
Legal sufficiency determination: A statutory, pre-election screening by the Attorney General assessing whether a proposed measure satisfies legal requirements (including here, compliance with the separate-vote rule), subject to Supreme Court review in original jurisdiction.
“New matter”: New constitutional text added by amendment. Adding new matter is itself a constitutional change, but the separate-vote issue arises when the added matter embodies multiple separable decisions.
“Ultra vires”: An action taken beyond an entity’s lawful authority. BI-4 used the concept to declare non-political-committee election and ballot-issue activity by artificial persons unauthorized and void.
“Revocation and regrant” structure: A mechanism that first strips all existing powers and then restores only a subset. The Court treated this as a distinct substantive change, not merely an implementation detail, because it can alter many non-election-related legal capacities.

Conclusion

T.E.I. v. Knudsen reinforces and extends Montana’s separate-vote jurisprudence: a constitutional initiative does not satisfy Article XIV, Section 11 merely because it pursues a single stated policy goal. If the measure’s text accomplishes that goal by packaging additional, independently significant constitutional changes—here, a broad limitation of artificial-person powers plus a wholesale revocation-and-regrant framework—then it presents multiple voter decisions and must be rejected as legally insufficient. The decision will likely push future initiative proponents to draft narrower amendments or to separate broader structural reforms into multiple ballot measures so voters may decide each change on its own merits.