Sentencing-Date Version of Rule 29.15 Governs; Abandonment Doctrine Limited to Appointed Postconviction Counsel

1. Introduction

In Scott v. State (Supreme Court of Missouri, July 22, 2025), the Court addressed recurring procedural questions in Missouri postconviction practice under Rule 29.15: (i) which version of Rule 29.15 governs when the rule is amended after sentencing but before the amended postconviction motion is filed; and (ii) whether the “abandonment doctrine” can excuse the late filing of an amended motion when counsel entered an appearance without being formally appointed.

After Scott’s direct appeal was affirmed (State v. Scott, 636 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. App. 2021) (mem.)), the court of appeals issued its mandate on January 19, 2022. Scott filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion on April 11, 2022, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The motion court granted pauper status and directed notice to the Statewide Public Defender’s Office. A public defender entered an appearance on April 22, 2022, but did not seek an extension of time. An amended motion was filed August 4, 2022—well beyond the time limits if calculated under the version of Rule 29.15 applicable at sentencing. The motion court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. Scott appealed; the Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer.

Key issues

Which Rule 29.15 version applies? The version in effect at sentencing, or later amendments effective during the postconviction litigation?
Can abandonment excuse untimeliness? Specifically, does abandonment apply when counsel was not appointed by an order but instead entered an appearance?
What claims were properly before the motion court? If the amended motion is untimely and not excused, only the pro se claims remain.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, holding:

Mandatory time limits must be enforced in Rules 29.15 and 24.035, and the State cannot waive noncompliance, even by silence or concession.
The version of Rule 29.15 in effect on the sentencing date governs the entire postconviction proceeding because Rule 29.15(m) makes that temporal choice explicit.
The amended motion was untimely under Rule 29.15(g) as applicable to Scott, and no extension was sought.
The abandonment doctrine applies only to appointed counsel; because the public defender was not appointed by order (despite entering an appearance), abandonment could not excuse the untimely amended motion.
As a result, only Scott’s three pro se claims were properly before the motion court, and because Scott did not challenge the denial of those pro se claims on appeal, the judgment was affirmed.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Enforcing postconviction deadlines; non-waivability

Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. banc 2012): The centerpiece for the Court’s insistence that Rules 29.15 and 24.035 are mandatory; failure to comply results in a “complete waiver,” and courts must enforce the deadlines even if the State does not raise the issue. The Scott Court reiterates Dorris’s core point: the State cannot waive postconviction timeliness defects.
Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2014): Reinforces that Rule 29.15 is the “single, unified” postconviction procedure after trial and underscores the institutional importance of strict deadlines. Scott uses Price as part of the throughline that timeliness rules are structural features of Missouri postconviction practice, not forfeitable litigation positions.
Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. banc 2015) (Fischer, J., concurring): Quoted for the proposition that deadlines are so important the State cannot waive them; courts have an independent duty to enforce them.
Stanley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 532 (Mo. banc 2014): In the Rule 24.035 context, held time limits are mandatory and clarifies the respective responsibilities of movants and counsel. Scott uses Stanley to stress that postconviction timeliness duties fall on the litigants/counsel, not on discretionary judicial grace.
Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. banc 2002): Cited for the proposition that Rules 29.15 and 24.035 are interpreted in pari materia, allowing the Court to rely on shared structure and policy across both rules.

2) Determining which version of a rule applies

Wiseman v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 710 S.W.3d 29 (Mo. App. 2025): States the default procedural principle that new procedural rules generally apply to pending proceedings unless the rule provides otherwise. Scott uses Wiseman chiefly as a foil—because Rule 29.15(m) “states otherwise,” displacing the default presumption.
Treasurer of Mo. v. Penney, 710 S.W.3d 498 (Mo. banc 2025): Invoked for the anti-surplusage canon (every word should have effect). Scott relies on Penney to argue that reading Rule 29.15(m) as Scott proposed would render it a nullity.
Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. banc 2012): Also supports interpretive method—rules are interpreted like statutes; the Court uses “plain and ordinary meaning.”

3) Abandonment doctrine limits and appointment mechanics

Sanders v. State, 807 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. banc 1991) and Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. banc 1991): Identified as the origins of the abandonment doctrine, created to address inequity when appointed counsel’s failures jeopardize a prisoner’s postconviction rights.
Gittemeier v. State, 527 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. banc 2017): The controlling modern statement that abandonment applies only to situations involving appointed postconviction counsel. Scott treats Gittemeier as dispositive: without appointment, abandonment is unavailable.
Watson v. State, 536 S.W.3d 716 (Mo. banc 2018): Scott argued Watson extended abandonment to an unappointed public defender. The Court rejects that reading, emphasizing Watson did not cite Gittemeier or analyze the “appointed vs. unappointed” distinction, and therefore cannot be treated as silently overruling Gittemeier.
State v. Shegog, 633 S.W.3d 362 (Mo. banc 2021): Supplies the presumption against overruling precedent sub silentio. This is the doctrinal bridge that allows the Court to harmonize Watson with Gittemeier by treating Watson as not addressing (and therefore not changing) the rule.
Creighton v. State, 520 S.W.3d 416 (Mo. banc 2017) and Hopkins v. State, 519 S.W.3d 433 (Mo. banc 2017): Establish that notices/memoranda to the public defender—even if directing notification or transmitting filings—are not appointment orders. Scott applies these cases to hold that a docket entry granting pauper status and giving “notice” to the public defender’s office did not appoint counsel.

4) Appellate review posture

Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413 (Mo. banc 2024): Cited for the “clearly erroneous” standard and the presumption that motion-court findings are correct.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Court’s first principle: postconviction time limits are mandatory and non-waivable

The Court begins by reaffirming the strict enforcement regime for postconviction deadlines. Relying primarily on Dorris v. State and Price v. State, the Court emphasizes that the rules’ “shall” language creates mandatory, jurisdictionally significant timing requirements: failure to comply results in “complete waiver,” and courts must enforce the deadlines even when the State does not press the point. Scott extends this principle rhetorically and categorically: the State cannot waive noncompliance “period,” regardless of the procedural posture or concessions.

2) Choosing the governing rule version: Rule 29.15(m) controls

The central interpretive move is the Court’s reading of Rule 29.15(m) (as it existed at Scott’s sentencing), which provided: “This Rule 29.15 shall apply to all proceedings wherein sentence is pronounced on or after January 1, 2018.” Scott was sentenced in November 2020, so the “sentencing-date” version governs his entire postconviction proceeding, even if amendments took effect before his amended motion was filed.

The Court acknowledges the general default rule described in Wiseman v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. that procedural changes usually apply to pending proceedings. But Rule 29.15(m) “states otherwise,” displacing that presumption. Invoking Treasurer of Mo. v. Penney, the Court underscores that Scott’s interpretation would make Rule 29.15(m) meaningless.

The Court also notes (in a consistency argument) that the current rule text, since July 1, 2023, explicitly states the same sentencing-date principle—confirming the Court’s reading of the earlier version rather than suggesting a change in approach.

3) Applying the governing rule: Scott’s amended motion was late under Rule 29.15(g)

Under the applicable version of Rule 29.15(g) (for appealed cases), the amended motion was due within 60 days of the earlier of: (1) issuance of the appellate mandate, and (2) appointment of counsel or entry of appearance by non-appointed counsel. The mandate issued January 19, 2022, and counsel entered an appearance April 22, 2022. The amended motion was filed August 4, 2022—outside the allowable period. No extension was requested or granted.

4) No abandonment inquiry because counsel was not appointed

Scott sought to salvage the late filing through abandonment. The Court rejects this for two related reasons:

Doctrinal limitation: Under Gittemeier v. State, abandonment applies only to appointed postconviction counsel; the Court declines to extend it to unappointed counsel.
No appointment order in fact: Applying Creighton v. State and Hopkins v. State, the docket entry granting pauper status and giving notice to the public defender’s office was not an appointment order. Counsel’s voluntary entry of appearance did not retroactively create “appointed counsel” status for abandonment purposes.

The Court addresses Watson v. State directly and treats it as non-controlling on the appointment question because it offered no analysis and did not cite Gittemeier. Using State v. Shegog, the Court declines to read Watson as silently altering the appointment limitation.

5) Procedural consequence: only pro se claims were properly before the motion court

Because the amended motion was untimely and not excused, only the pro se motion’s claims were properly before the motion court. The Court affirms because Scott did not assert error on appeal as to the denial of those pro se claims. The Court further notes the motion court should not have reached the merits of the untimely-added amended claims (citing Watson v. State for the general proposition that untimely postconviction motions should not be adjudicated on the merits).

C. Impact

Sentencing-date “lock-in” for Rule 29.15 timing provisions: Scott cements that Rule 29.15(m) functions as a choice-of-law clause for postconviction procedure—future litigants cannot rely on midstream amendments to extend deadlines when the sentencing-date version governs.
Sharper line between appointed and unappointed counsel: The decision emphasizes that abandonment is a narrow, status-based doctrine. Public defenders (or other counsel) entering appearances without appointment orders may expose clients to unexcused default if deadlines are missed.
Administrative practice in motion courts: The case incentivizes clearer docketing. “Notice to the public defender” is not appointment. If courts intend to appoint counsel, an express appointment order matters, but Scott also makes clear that counsel’s appearance can “obviate” appointment—while still leaving abandonment unavailable absent an order.
Appellate enforcement even without State objection: Scott reiterates that timeliness is policed by courts sua sponte, increasing predictability but reducing flexibility where parties proceed as if the case were timely.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 29.15 / Rule 24.035: Missouri’s primary postconviction relief procedures. Rule 29.15 generally follows trials; Rule 24.035 generally follows guilty pleas. They are interpreted together (in pari materia) because they share structure and purpose.
Mandatory time limits / “complete waiver”: If the rules require filing by a certain deadline, missing it generally ends the case (waiving postconviction review), regardless of whether the State objects.
Mandate: The appellate court’s official notice returning jurisdiction to the lower court and finalizing the appellate disposition.
In forma pauperis: Permission to proceed without paying costs due to indigency.
Abandonment doctrine: A judicially created exception allowing a late amended postconviction motion to be considered when the lateness results from failures of appointed postconviction counsel (not merely any lawyer who appears).
Appointment order vs. entry of appearance: An “appointment order” is a court order formally appointing counsel. An “entry of appearance” is a lawyer’s filing stating they represent the party. Scott holds that mere notice to a public defender is not an appointment order, and that abandonment hinges on appointment status.
Clearly erroneous: The deferential appellate standard for reviewing motion-court findings; reversal occurs only when the record leaves the appellate court with a firm impression a mistake was made.

5. Conclusion

Scott v. State reinforces Missouri’s strict postconviction procedural regime in three concrete ways: (1) courts must enforce Rule 29.15/24.035 deadlines and the State cannot waive noncompliance; (2) Rule 29.15(m) fixes the governing rule version as the one in effect at sentencing, insulating cases from later amendments; and (3) the abandonment doctrine remains confined to failures by appointed postconviction counsel, not counsel who merely enters an appearance. The decision’s practical message is exacting: timeliness must be calculated under the correct rule version, extensions must be requested within the rule, and appointment status can determine whether any equitable “abandonment” safety valve exists.