Sentence-Reduction Denials Under § 3582(c)(2) Are Not “Upward Variances”
A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Julio Suarez, 69 F.4th ___ (3d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Julio Suarez, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted an increasingly common post-sentencing scenario: a prisoner seeks a “retroactive” reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) after the Sentencing Commission lowers the applicable range. Julio Polanco Suarez—convicted for a multi-year tax-refund scheme and aggravated identity theft—invoked the 2023 “Zero-Point Offender” amendment (U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1) to request a 16-month lowering of his 70-month sentence. The district court acknowledged eligibility but exercised its discretion to deny any reduction. Suarez appealed, arguing chiefly that (1) the court undervalued his post-sentence rehabilitation and the new empirical findings on recidivism, and (2) by leaving the original sentence intact the court necessarily created an “upward variance” from the amended range and therefore had to justify that variance separately. The Third Circuit, in a precedential opinion by Judge Chung, rejected these arguments and affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit held:

• Suarez was eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) and § 1B1.10, but eligibility does not guarantee relief.
• The district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Its written opinion showed holistic consideration of the nature of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public, and Suarez’s rehabilitative efforts.
• A refusal to lower a sentence in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not an “upward variance” from the amended Guidelines range and therefore does not trigger the heightened explanation requirement that accompanies true variances at original sentencings.

Accordingly, the panel affirmed the denial of Suarez’s motion for a sentence reduction.

3. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010)
  Provided the “two-step” framework for § 3582(c)(2) motions: (1) determine eligibility; (2) decide, in discretion, whether a reduction is warranted. The Suarez panel leaned heavily on Dillon’s statement that § 3582(c)(2) does not create a “full resentencing” and cited it to reject the “variance” theory.
• Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109 (2018)
  Addressed how much explanation is required when a court grants only a partial reduction. Suarez invoked Chavez-Meza; the Third Circuit cited the same case to show that a succinct explanation may suffice when the judge presided over the original sentencing and the record is clear.
• United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2009) & United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2009)
  Clarified the abuse-of-discretion standard in § 3582(c)(2) appeals. The panel relied on these decisions to underscore appellate deference to district courts’ weighing of § 3553(a) factors.
• United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2007) & United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2010)
  Stand for the proposition that true variances (sentences outside the range) demand a reasoned explanation. Suarez argued these cases were triggered; the panel explained why they were inapplicable.
• United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2012)
  Held that a court need not make explicit findings on every § 3553(a) factor if the record shows consideration. This principle insulated the district court’s concise opinion.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Eligibility Conceded; Discretion Central. Both parties agreed Suarez’s range dropped to 54–61 months. Step 1 of Dillon was therefore uncontested; the case turned entirely on Step 2 discretion.

2. Holistic § 3553(a) Review. The panel recited the district court’s key findings: seven-year fraud, $1.5 million loss, deliberate dishonesty, and deterrence needs. The court also explicitly credited Suarez’s programming and misconduct-free record but found those considerations outweighed by the gravity of the offense.

3. Rehabilitation & § 4C1.1. Section 4C1.1’s empirical premise—zero-point offenders tend to recidivate less—was not ignored; the district court distinguished Suarez’s extensive fraud as atypical of the “first-offender” cohort. Appellate deference applied.

4. No Upward Variance Theory. Using Dillon, § 1B1.10(a)(3), and Chavez-Meza, the panel held that maintaining the original sentence is not imposing a new sentence and therefore not a variance. An “upward variance” can occur only during an original or full resentencing, not in a § 3582(c)(2) modification proceeding.

C. Impact on Future Cases

• Clarifies Explanation Requirements. District courts within the Third Circuit need not draft a fresh “variance” justification when denying § 3582(c)(2) relief, provided their opinion reveals adequate consideration of § 3553(a).
• Preserves Broad Discretion. The decision fortifies district-court discretion against challenges premised on the new zero-point offender guideline. Defendants cannot rely solely on § 4C1.1’s empirical recidivism data to compel a reduction.
• Appellate Review Parameters. By labeling the “variance” argument a categorical mischaracterization, the ruling limits fertile ground for abuse-of-discretion claims. Appellants must now show genuine procedural error or clearly unreasonable factor-weighing.
• Sentencing Commission Dialogue. The opinion implicitly invites the Commission—if it wants automatic reductions for zero-point offenders—to make Amendment 821 (Part A) retroactive and mandatory rather than discretionary.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) – A statute allowing courts to reduce a prison term when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the Guideline range applicable to the defendant.
• U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 – The policy statement that implements § 3582(c)(2). Step 1 of Dillon asks whether the defendant is eligible under this provision.
• Zero-Point Offender Amendment (§ 4C1.1) – Adopted in 2023, it subtracts two levels for defendants with no criminal-history points who meet additional criteria. Driven by data showing low recidivism.
• Variance – A sentence outside (above or below) the advisory Guideline range at an original sentencing. It must be justified under § 3553(a). Suarez clarifies that maintaining an earlier sentence in a § 3582(c)(2) posture is not a variance.
• Abuse of Discretion Review – Appellate courts reverse only if the lower court’s decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. They do not re-weigh factors.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Julio Suarez cements two practical teachings in Third Circuit jurisprudence:

1. District courts’ refusal to lower sentences under § 3582(c)(2) need not be justified as new upward variances; the original sentence remains presumptively lawful so long as § 3553(a) is conscientiously revisited.
2. The new zero-point offender guideline, while influential, does not trump judicial discretion when the underlying offense conduct or § 3553(a) considerations counsel against a reduction.

In the broader sentencing landscape, the decision reinforces the principle that post-sentencing modifications are an act of lenity, not entitlement. For practitioners, the message is clear: build a robust record of extraordinary post-conviction rehabilitation and connect it convincingly to the § 3553(a) framework—mere eligibility and lower advisory ranges will seldom suffice.