Self-Representation Requires a Knowing Waiver and Courtroom Decorum: Disruptive “Sovereign Citizen” Conduct Permits Counsel Appointment and Trial in the Defendant’s Absence

Introduction

United States v. Nathaniel Hilliard (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (unpublished) addresses how trial courts may respond when a defendant: (1) rejects appointed counsel yet refuses to cooperate in a Faretta colloquy, (2) disrupts proceedings with “sovereign citizen”-style jurisdictional challenges, and (3) then challenges removal from the courtroom, the sufficiency of proof against an entrapment defense, limits on impeachment of a paid informant, and sentencing rulings.

Hilliard was convicted of three heroin-distribution counts, felon-in-possession of a firearm, and failure to appear, and received a total sentence of 192 months. On appeal, he argued violations of his rights to self-representation, presence at trial, confrontation, and challenged the firearm conviction on entrapment grounds and his sentence (including a U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement and an upward variance).

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that the district court:

properly denied self-representation because Hilliard would not engage in the Faretta inquiry and affirmatively claimed he did not understand the questions, preventing a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel;
properly removed Hilliard from the courtroom after repeated warnings because his interruptions and refusal to follow court protocol made trial impossible with him present, and the court took substantial steps (video feed, repeated invitations to return) to preserve participation;
had sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find predisposition and reject entrapment on the firearm count;
did not violate confrontation rights by excluding impeachment with an 18-year-old conviction under Rule 609(b), given the presumption against “over-age” convictions and the ample other bias/credibility impeachment permitted;
did not clearly err in applying § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) where the gun and heroin transactions were negotiated as a combined deal and occurred in close temporal proximity; and
imposed a substantively reasonable upward variance based on § 3553(a) factors, including violent criminal history and the inadequacy of the Guidelines range to capture that history.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Self-representation and the limits of the Faretta right

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975): Establishes the constitutional right to self-representation, conditioned on a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. The panel treats Faretta as the baseline rule and emphasizes that waiver must be affirmatively demonstrated, not presumed.
Strozier v. Newsome, 926 F.2d 1100 (11th Cir. 1991): Describes the “ideal method” of ensuring voluntary waiver via a pretrial hearing warning of charges, procedures, and hazards. The opinion uses Strozier to underscore why the district judge attempted a colloquy—and why the effort failed due to Hilliard’s noncooperation.
United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc): Critical to the court’s approach to an uncooperative defendant. Garey recognizes that “[a] dialogue cannot be forced” and permits proceeding when the court is assured the defendant understands choices and dangers and has rejected counsel. Here, the panel distinguishes the case on the “assurance” requirement: Hilliard’s refusals and claimed non-understanding prevented the needed assurance.
United States v. Butler, 117 F.4th 1309 (11th Cir. 2024): Supplies the limiting principle: self-representation “presupposes a cooperative defendant” and is not a license to disrupt proceedings. The panel uses Butler to justify denying (and, in other cases, terminating) pro se status when obstruction and disrespect for courtroom rules predominate.

2) Presence at trial and removal for disruption

United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 2001): Identifies the three bases of the right to be present (Confrontation Clause, Due Process, Rule 43). The panel uses it to frame Hilliard’s “presence” claim as constitutional and procedural.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970): The central removal authority. Allen allows exclusion after warnings when a defendant remains “disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful” such that trial cannot proceed.
United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518 (11th Cir. 1996): Reinforces that removal requires warning and merits “great deference” to the trial judge’s necessity determination.
United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228 (11th Cir. 2013): Treats repeated interruptions and nonresponsive answers as disruptive behavior justifying exclusion; the panel analogizes Hilliard’s conduct to Sterling.
United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2001): Provides the review framework (voluntary waiver; then public interest in continuing). The panel uses Bradford to uphold proceeding in Hilliard’s absence.

3) Entrapment and predisposition

United States v. Harris, 7 F.4th 1276 (11th Cir. 2021): Defines entrapment’s two elements (inducement; lack of predisposition) and emphasizes predisposition as readiness absent government contact.
United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618 (11th Cir. 1995): Limits appellate review after a jury rejects entrapment to whether sufficient evidence supports predisposition.
United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012): States the sufficiency standard (view evidence in government’s favor; uphold if any reasonable construction supports verdict).
United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2014): Rejects a fixed list of predisposition factors and recognizes that ready commission and failure to back out support predisposition. The panel relies on these concepts in affirming the jury’s finding.

4) Confrontation Clause and limiting impeachment

United States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2017): Reiterates confrontation includes cross-examination, but only an “opportunity for effective cross-examination,” not unlimited scope.
United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1994): Emphasizes exposing motive/bias as central to confrontation, especially with key government witnesses.
United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2011): Provide the governing test—confrontation is satisfied if the jury receives enough information to assess bias/credibility.
United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2009): Sets abuse-of-discretion review for limiting cross-examination.
United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1992) and United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1979): Establish a presumption against using convictions older than ten years under Rule 609(b), with admission “very rarely” and only in “exceptional circumstances.”
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Explains why former Fifth Circuit decisions like Cathey bind the Eleventh Circuit.

5) Sentencing: firearm-in-connection enhancement and variance review

United States v. Jackson, 997 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2021): Upholds § 2K2.1(b)(6) where a drug dealer negotiates a gun sale “at the same time” as a drug deal; the panel treats this as directly supporting enhancement even when logistical separation occurs.
United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82 (11th Cir. 2013): Defines “in connection with” for drug offenses (proximity or facilitation).
United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir. 2004): Provides the clear-error standard for factual findings.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Sets the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness and requires adequate explanation for variances.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Articulates when a sentence is substantively unreasonable and emphasizes district-court discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Confirms that upward variances are based on § 3553(a) factors, and appellate courts should not reweigh factors absent clear error of judgment.
United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014): Allow courts to rely on facts already reflected in the Guidelines when varying.
United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021): Approves giving substantial weight to criminal history, consistent with § 3553(a).
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Sets the “definite and firm conviction” benchmark for vacating as substantively unreasonable.
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008): Notes that a sentence well below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness.

Legal Reasoning

1) Denial of self-representation: “knowing waiver” plus “cooperative defendant”

The opinion treats Hilliard’s self-representation request as failing for two reinforcing reasons.

No knowing and intelligent waiver. The district court attempted a Faretta inquiry, but Hilliard refused to answer foundational questions (age, education, literacy) and did not affirm understanding of basic consequences of proceeding pro se—indeed he stated, “I don’t understand any of these questions.” Under United States v. Garey, a court may proceed with limited dialogue only when it is nevertheless “assured” the defendant understands the choice and dangers. The panel held that assurance was absent.
Misconduct inconsistent with the predicate of the right. Citing United States v. Butler (2024), the court emphasizes that self-representation is not absolute and presupposes willingness to comply with rules and courtroom protocol. Hilliard’s persistent interruptions, refusal to recognize proceedings, and jurisdictional provocations supported the conclusion that granting pro se status would function as a vehicle for obstruction rather than autonomy.

2) Removal from the courtroom: warnings, disruption, and reclaiming the right

Applying Illinois v. Allen, the panel upheld removal because the district court: (a) warned Hilliard multiple times, (b) identified concrete disruptive conduct (interruptions, refusing to respond, refusing to abide by processes), (c) removed him only after persistence in misconduct, and (d) kept the door open for return upon compliance—consistent with Allen’s “reclaim as soon as willing” principle.

The opinion also stresses practical safeguards: the video feed, repeated checks by counsel at breaks, and offering writing materials for communication. Those details supported both the “voluntary waiver by misconduct” finding and the discretionary decision to continue trial in his absence under United States v. Bradford.

3) Entrapment: predisposition inferred from ready commission and no backing out

Although Mitchell (the informant) initiated the gun topic and applied leverage (“no more heroin unless I get a gun”), the panel framed predisposition as a jury question supported by circumstantial evidence:

Hilliard repeatedly and willingly discussed obtaining a gun, agreed to procure one, and followed through by completing the firearm transaction;
he never protested that he was “not in that business” or otherwise refused;
he had opportunities to abandon the gun deal (including after Mitchell expressed disinterest), yet he encouraged continuation and integrated the gun into the next transaction.

Under United States v. Isnadin and United States v. Brown, that “ready commission” and failure to back out allowed a reasonable jury to find predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt, defeating entrapment.

4) Confrontation and Rule 609(b): stale convictions versus adequate bias impeachment

The defense sought to cross-examine Mitchell about an 18-year-old conviction for impersonating a federal law enforcement agent, arguing it demonstrated motive and credibility problems as a paid informant. The panel upheld exclusion on two interconnected grounds:

Rule 609(b) presumption. Under United States v. Pritchard and United States v. Cathey, “over-age” convictions are presumptively inadmissible and admitted only rarely. The panel held Hilliard did not show probative value that “substantially outweighs” prejudice, as required by Rule 609(b).
Confrontation satisfied by alternative avenues. Citing United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez and United States v. Barrington, the panel emphasized that the jury heard ample evidence of bias and motive: Mitchell was paid per completed transaction, initiated the gun request, and conditioned further drug buys on obtaining the gun. Audio/video evidence also allowed independent assessment. Thus, even without the stale conviction, cross-examination exposed sufficient facts for the jury to evaluate reliability.

5) Sentencing: “in connection with” and upward variance discretion

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement. The court treated the gun as connected to the drug felony because the parties negotiated a combined heroin-and-gun deal for May 25 and executed the transactions within minutes, despite changing locations. Under United States v. Carillo-Ayala (proximity/facilitation) and United States v. Jackson (negotiated gun sale alongside drug deal constitutes facilitation even if the firearm is not present at the initial exchange), the district court’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous.
Substantive reasonableness and the upward variance. The panel deferred under Gall v. United States and United States v. Rosales-Bruno, holding the district court permissibly emphasized Hilliard’s history (including violent convictions), seriousness of the offenses, and the view that the Guidelines underrepresented criminal history. It rejected the argument that the court “double-counted” by considering criminal history already in the Guidelines, relying on United States v. Williams and United States v. Dougherty. The sentence’s distance below the statutory maximum further supported reasonableness under United States v. Gonzalez.

Impact

Although unpublished and “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion is a practical synthesis of existing Eleventh Circuit doctrine that will likely influence trial-court handling of recurring scenarios:

“Sovereign citizen” disruption as a functional limiter on autonomy claims. The decision underscores that rejecting counsel while refusing reciprocal dialogue prevents a valid Faretta waiver and supports maintaining appointed counsel under United States v. Garey and United States v. Butler (2024).
Removal decisions backed by process will be afforded deference. Detailed warnings, clear findings of disruption, a path back to the courtroom, and accommodation measures (e.g., video feed) strengthen the record for affirmance under Illinois v. Allen, United States v. Beasley, and United States v. Sterling.
Entrapment disputes will turn on “ready commission” evidence. Even when informants apply pressure, a defendant’s repeated agreement, proactive facilitation, and failure to withdraw can sustain predisposition findings under United States v. Isnadin.
Rule 609(b) remains a high bar; confrontation focuses on sufficiency, not maximalism. The opinion reinforces that older convictions are “very rarely” admitted (United States v. Pritchard) and that confrontation is satisfied when bias and motive are otherwise well explored (United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez; United States v. Barrington).
“In connection with” can be satisfied by integrated negotiation and close timing even with multiple locations. Building on United States v. Jackson, the court signals that logistical separation does not defeat § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) when the firearm is part of the same negotiated criminal episode as the drug felony.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Faretta inquiry / knowing waiver: Before a defendant can represent himself, the judge must ensure he understands what he is giving up (a lawyer) and the risks (rules, evidence, strategy). If the defendant refuses to answer or claims not to understand, the judge may be unable to find a valid waiver.
Standby counsel: A lawyer who remains available to assist even if a defendant is allowed to proceed pro se; courts often prefer this to protect fairness and efficiency.
Removal from trial (“trial in absentia” by misconduct): A defendant can forfeit the right to be present if, after warnings, he continues behavior that prevents the trial from functioning (interruptions, refusals to comply). He can regain the right by agreeing to behave.
Entrapment / predisposition: Entrapment fails if the government proves the defendant was already willing to commit the crime; juries infer predisposition from quick agreement, active participation, and refusal to back out.
Confrontation Clause limits: The Constitution guarantees an opportunity to expose bias and motive, not unlimited questioning on every topic the defense prefers.
Rule 609(b) (old convictions): Convictions older than ten years are generally excluded for impeachment unless their value is exceptionally strong and outweighs unfair prejudice.
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) “in connection with”: The enhancement applies when a firearm is close to drugs or otherwise helps (“facilitates”) another felony—such as being sold as part of the same criminal deal with drug trafficking.
Upward variance / substantive reasonableness: A judge may sentence above the Guidelines if § 3553(a) factors justify it; appellate courts rarely reverse unless the sentence falls outside the range of reasonable choices.

Conclusion

United States v. Nathaniel Hilliard reaffirms that self-representation hinges on a demonstrable, knowing waiver and a defendant’s willingness to follow courtroom rules; persistent obstruction can justify both denying pro se status and removing a defendant from the courtroom after warnings. It also illustrates (1) how predisposition evidence defeats entrapment even amid informant pressure, (2) why Rule 609(b) strongly disfavors impeachment with stale convictions without exceptional justification, and (3) how negotiated, closely timed gun-and-drug dealings can satisfy the “in connection with” enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Finally, the decision underscores the breadth of district-court discretion to vary upward when § 3553(a) factors—especially violence in criminal history—support a higher sentence than the advisory range.