Segmented Application of King Factors to Post-Remand Fee Requests under ERISA
— Commentary on Keith W. Canter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. (6th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

In Keith W. Canter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., the Sixth Circuit examined whether a prevailing ERISA claimant was entitled to an additional tranche of attorney’s fees for work performed after an administrative remand had already been secured and paid. At stake was $65,000+ in so-called “post-remand” or “fees-for-fees” compensation. Mr. Canter (employee-plaintiff) had defeated the insurer’s benefit denial, obtained remand, received $85,022 in benefits, and recovered more than $200,000 in fees for the pre-remand phase. He then sought further fees for the battles that followed the remand: prejudgment-interest motions, objections to a magistrate’s report, and fee enforcement work. The district court declined that request, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, elaborating a new procedural nuance: district courts may dissect litigation into logical phases and apply the discretionary King factors separately to each phase when considering ERISA fee petitions.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit (Judge Ritz writing) affirmed the district court’s refusal to award post-remand attorney’s fees, holding that:

• A claimant who has already achieved “some degree of success on the merits” does not automatically receive fees for every subsequent motion filed.
• The district court acted within its broad discretion in segregating pre-remand and post-remand work and re-applying the Secretary of Labor v. King five-factor test solely to the latter.
• No abuse of discretion occurred in weighing those factors; the district court’s factual characterisations of the post-remand litigation were not clearly erroneous.

Consequently, the earlier fee award (≈ $205k) stands undisturbed, but no additional fees accrue for the post-remand stage.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010): Established that a party must achieve “some degree of success on the merits” before a court may award fees under ERISA §1132(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit emphasised Hardt’s footnote permitting, but not requiring, further consideration of the King factors.
• Secretary of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1985): Provides a five-factor guide (culpability, ability to pay, deterrence, common-benefit, merits) for discretionary fee awards. The panel reaffirmed that the factors remain a legitimate analytic tool post-Hardt.
• Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983): Cited for deference to district courts in fee matters and the concept of “degree of success.”
• Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011): Invoked to underscore that fee awards are about “rough justice,” not accounting exactitude.
• Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1979) & N.E. Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (2012): Recognised that “fees for fees” are sometimes recoverable, but only within the district court’s discretion.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Threshold Success Requirement Met – Mr. Canter’s earlier victory qualified him for potential fee awards.
2. Segmentation of Litigation Phases – The panel blessed the district court’s decision to treat pre-remand and post-remand work as distinct units. This flowed naturally from:
   • Plaintiff’s own earlier request to postpone post-remand fee analysis, thereby creating a procedural partition.
   • The principle that the court’s discretion under §1132(g)(1) is contextual and granular.
3. Application of King Factors to Post-Remand Work Alone – The district court found:
   • Factor 1 (culpability): No bad faith by BCBSMA after remand.
   • Factor 2 (ability to pay): Favoured Canter (insurer could pay).
   • Factor 3 (deterrence): Award would have little to no deterrent effect because the insurer had already paid benefits and interest.
   • Factor 4 (common benefit/legal question): Post-remand motions did not confer a plan-wide benefit or resolve novel ERISA questions.
   • Factor 5 (relative merits): Neutral; Canter achieved limited success (interest awarded, but at a far lower rate and after abandoning main theories).
   Balance tilted against additional fees.
4. No Factual or Legal Error – The Sixth Circuit concluded that even under de novo review the findings were supportable; under abuse-of-discretion review they were “unassailable.”

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

This decision subtly but significantly recalibrates fee litigation in ERISA cases within the Sixth Circuit:

• Phase-By-Phase Scrutiny: Lawyers must expect courts to carve litigation into discrete “success units.” Success in Phase 1 does not immunise fee requests in Phase 2.
• Strategic Fee Petitions: Counsel should contemporaneously document and justify why each post-success motion remains necessary and beneficial, anticipating a fresh King analysis.
• Deterrent-Benefit Inquiry Elevated: Courts will ask whether post-remand tasks advance broader ERISA purposes—mere fee enforcement may not suffice.
• Guidance Beyond ERISA: Although ERISA-specific, the segmented approach may influence statutory-fee regimes with discretionary elements (e.g., civil-rights, ADA) because it echoes Hensley’s “degree-of-success” ethos.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

ERISA

Federal statute regulating employer-sponsored benefit plans. Provides a cause of action and permits courts to award attorney’s fees to either party at their discretion (29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(1)).

Administrative Remand

When a court sends an ERISA benefits dispute back to the plan administrator (insurer) for reconsideration, rather than deciding entitlement itself.

“Some Degree of Success on the Merits”

Standard from Hardt requiring more than trivial success but less than total victory before fees may be considered.

King Factors

Five discretionary considerations—culpability, ability to pay, deterrence, common benefit, relative merits—used by Sixth Circuit courts to decide whether to award fees.

“Fees for Fees”

Attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting or defending a fee petition itself. Sometimes recoverable but not automatic.

Abuse of Discretion Standard

Appellate review giving deference to trial courts; reversal only if decision is arbitrary, based on erroneous law, or unsupported by evidence.

5. Conclusion

Canter v. BCBSMA reaffirms the Sixth Circuit’s commitment to a nuanced, discretionary framework for ERISA fee awards. The key takeaway: success opens the door to fees, but each subsequent stage of litigation requires its own justification. By endorsing phase-segmented application of the King factors, the Court signals that fee petitions must be as carefully targeted as the merits arguments themselves. Practitioners should therefore marshal evidence of culpability, deterrence, and broader benefit every time they seek additional fees—especially after a remand or interim victory. The decision promotes fiscal discipline, curbs automatic fee-escalation, and preserves judicial discretion at the heart of §1132(g)(1).