Section 8130(a)(2) “Service Retirement Annuity” Electors Are Excluded from Section 8134 Surviving Spouse Annuities Absent an Express Statutory Extension

Case: Takako B. Guthrie and Joseph A. Guthrie, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Board of Trustees of the Government of Guam Retirement Fund

Citation: 2025 Guam 19 (Supreme Court of Guam, Dec. 31, 2025)

Posture: Administrative appeal (declaratory ruling by Fund Board) → Superior Court affirmed → Supreme Court affirmed.

Core holding / rule announced: A Government of Guam Retirement Fund participant who separated from service and elected a deferred “service retirement annuity” under 4 GCA § 8130(a)(2)—which is expressly “without choice of any of the optional survivors’ benefits hereinunder described”—does not thereby become a “retired member” for purposes of triggering a surviving spouse annuity under 4 GCA § 8134. Absent another statute that expressly extends § 8134 eligibility (e.g., § 8133 for certain inactive members, § 8101.2(b)(9) for qualified military service deaths), the spouse’s post-death entitlement is limited to the refund/death-benefit scheme in § 8132, not a continuing survivor annuity.

1. Introduction

The Opinion addresses a recurring interpretive problem in public pension statutes: whether a benefit label (“service retirement annuity”) necessarily carries the full bundle of retirement-and-survivorship rights, or whether the governing scheme draws sharp distinctions between (i) members who retire under the retirement-eligibility statutes and (ii) members who separate from employment and later receive a deferred annuity as an alternative to a refund of contributions.

Parties. Petitioners-Appellants Joseph A. Guthrie (a former GovGuam employee and Fund participant) and Takako B. Guthrie (his spouse and designated beneficiary) appeared pro se. Respondent-Appellee was the Board of Trustees of the Government of Guam Retirement Fund (“Board”).

Factual backdrop. Joseph accrued roughly 16 years and 9 months of government service, separated from GovGuam at age 60 (2007), and began receiving a deferred “service retirement annuity” under 4 GCA § 8130(a)(2). The Guthries sought a declaratory ruling on whether Takako would receive a surviving spouse annuity under 4 GCA § 8134 if Joseph predeceased her.

Key legal issue. Whether a spouse of a member receiving a § 8130(a)(2) deferred service retirement annuity is eligible for a continuing surviving spouse annuity under § 8134, notwithstanding § 8130(a)(2)’s explicit exclusion from “optional survivors’ benefits.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Guam affirmed. It held that, when the Defined Benefit Plan (DB Plan) is read as a whole and in light of its legislative history, § 8134 survivor annuities do not extend to spouses of members who separated from service and elected the deferred annuity option under § 8130(a)(2), unless another statute expressly extends eligibility. Joseph did not meet retirement-eligibility criteria under 4 GCA §§ 8119, 8120, 8120.1 (with § 8120.1 controlling for him) and did not fall within other extension provisions (e.g., § 8133, § 8101.2(b)(9)). Consequently, Takako’s entitlement—if any—would be under § 8132 (refund of remaining contributions plus a $1,000 death benefit), not a continuing surviving spouse annuity.

The Court also rejected the Guthries’ Chevron-deference framing, noting that Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo overruled Chevron and, in any event, the cited agency regulations did not expand statutory eligibility for survivor annuities.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Guam statutory-interpretation framework (ambiguity; scheme; legislative intent)

People v. Walliby, 2024 Guam 13: The Court relied heavily on Walliby for the modern sequencing of statutory interpretation—begin with text and context; if ambiguity remains, consult the broader statutory scheme and legislative history; and apply interpretive canons such as “give effect to all provisions,” “specific controls over general,” and comparative-text inferences (inclusion in one section, omission in another).
San Agustin v. Superior Court, 2024 Guam 2 and People v. Joshua, 2015 Guam 32: Used for the definition of ambiguity (“susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations”) and to justify looking beyond isolated phrases to statutory context.
Amerault v. Intelcom Support Servs., Inc., 2004 Guam 23 and In re Request of I Mina'Trentai Dos Na Liheslaturan Guåhan, 2014 Guam 24: Invoked to support whole-act interpretation and the requirement to “give effect to all provisions,” avoiding constructions that render other sections superfluous.
Camacho v. Est. of Gumataotao, 2010 Guam 1: Cited for the canon that “a narrower, more specific provision” prevails over a more general one on the same subject matter—critical to privileging § 8130(a)(2)’s express exclusion over a broad reading of § 8134.
In re D.S., 2023 Guam 13 and Sumitomo Constr., Co. v. Gov't of Guam, 2001 Guam 23: Used for the “absurd or impractical consequences” avoidance principle, reinforcing that the Court’s interpretation must not destabilize the Fund or generate untenable distinctions (e.g., rewarding minimal service with full survivor annuities).
In re Leon Guerrero, 2005 Guam 1: Cited for the permissibility of consulting legislative history when statutory ambiguity persists.
Barrett-Anderson v. Camacho, 2015 Guam 20 and Aguon v. Gutierrez, 2002 Guam 14: Deployed to reiterate that statutory language “cannot be read in isolation,” and must be interpreted alongside “other related statutes.”

2) Comparative-text and omission/inclusion canons (used to infer legislative intent)

Craven v. Crout and Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. v. Superior Court: These California decisions were cited (through Walliby) to support a key inference: when the Legislature includes language in one provision (e.g., explicit extensions in § 8133 and § 8101.2(b)(9)) but omits it elsewhere, courts presume the omission reflects a deliberate choice.

3) Standard of review and administrative-law posture

Chargualaf v. Gov't of Guam Ret. Fund, 2021 Guam 17: Anchored de novo review for statutory interpretation, including an agency’s interpretation, and supplied the Court’s earlier articulation of when agency deference might apply under Guam law.
Guam Election Comm'n v. Responsible Choices for All Adults Coal., 2007 Guam 20: Quoted (via Chargualaf) to explain that where facts are undisputed and issues are purely legal, review is de novo even though mandamus rulings are typically discretionary.
Port Auth. of Guam v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n (Javelosa), 2018 Guam 9: Cited (via Chargualaf) on the prerequisites for Chevron-like deference in Guam: legislative intent to delegate ambiguity-resolution authority to the agency.

4) Vested pension rights and applying current statutory text

Tchrs.' Ret. Bd. v. Genest and Allen v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys.: California authority used to frame the “vested contractual rights” doctrine in public pensions and to justify applying the current statute so long as post-separation amendments are not a detrimental modification of vested rights.

5) Chevron, its overruling, and the post-Chevron landscape

Schafer v. Astrue and Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.: Cited to contextualize Chevron’s historical dominance.
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo: Central to the Court’s rejection of Chevron deference as a controlling framework; the Court used it to emphasize that statutory interpretation rests with courts even when ambiguity exists.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth.: Cited (through Loper Bright) for the narrower proposition that agency interpretations may be “especially informative” when they rest on factual expertise, while remaining nonbinding.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Court’s threshold move: identify and resolve ambiguity by whole-scheme interpretation.

The Court candidly acknowledged ambiguity in both § 8130(a)(2) and § 8134—notably the meaning of “member,” the scope of “optional survivors’ benefits,” and whether “surviving spouse” (defined to include spouses of “retired” members) sweeps in § 8130(a)(2) annuity recipients. Under the Court’s interpretive framework (drawn from People v. Walliby, San Agustin v. Superior Court, and related cases), that ambiguity triggered examination of the DB Plan’s structure and history.

2) Structural reconciliation: “separation” benefits are not “retirement” benefits.

The Opinion’s decisive conceptual distinction is between:

Retirement under the “retirement statutes” (§§ 8119, 8120, 8120.1)—for Joseph, § 8120.1 controlled and required age/service thresholds he did not meet; and
Deferred annuity as an alternative to a refund upon separation under § 8130(a)(2), which the statute frames in “Refund on Separation” and couples with a survivorship exclusion.

From this structure, the Court concluded Joseph was not a “retired member” in the sense relevant to § 8134. He was a separated member who elected a deferred annuity option that is expressly “without choice of any of the optional survivors’ benefits hereinunder described.”

3) Express statutory extensions matter—and their absence is dispositive.

The Court treated the DB Plan as an integrated set of targeted grants. It emphasized that the Legislature did expressly extend § 8134-type survivorship in certain scenarios (e.g., § 8101.2(b)(9) for qualified military service deaths; § 8133 for certain inactive members with at least 20 years’ service). The absence of a parallel extension for § 8130(a)(2) electors—combined with § 8130’s exclusionary language—supported an inference of legislative intent to withhold survivorship annuities for this category.

4) Absurdity/unreasonableness as a confirmatory check (not a free-standing rewrite).

The Court agreed with the Superior Court that the Guthries’ reading would create unreasonable outcomes: spouses of individuals with minimal service (as low as five years) could receive long-term survivor annuities if the member lived long enough to start payments, while spouses of inactive members with nearly 20 years of service could be denied if the member died before the first payment. This “untenable distinction” was especially problematic given the Fund’s fiscal stability concerns (reflected in 4 GCA § 8101.1 and the legislative purpose in § 8101).

5) The remedy channel: § 8132, not § 8134.

To avoid leaving survivors with nothing, the Court pointed to the statutory “backstop” for members who die while receiving annuity payments but leave “no person entitled to survivor annuities as provided in § 8134”: § 8132, which provides (i) a refund of contributions less annuity payments received, plus (ii) a $1,000 death benefit, payable to the designated beneficiary or estate. The Court thus located the Guthries’ situation inside a different statutory bargain than continuing survivor annuitization.

6) Versioning and vested-rights analysis: apply the current text because later amendments were not detrimental.

Although Joseph began receiving his annuity in 2007, and § 8134 was repealed/reenacted in 2012 (P.L. 31-192), the Court applied the current version because the Legislature expressly characterized the 2012 changes as consolidating/clarifying to “conform to the prior intent,” and because no post-separation change relevant to the dispute was shown to be a detrimental modification of vested rights (drawing on Tchrs.' Ret. Bd. v. Genest and Allen v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys.).

7) The P.L. 26-035 / 26-058 “member” definition controversy was sidestepped—without affecting the outcome.

The Guthries argued that P.L. 26-058 was void and therefore the short-lived P.L. 26-035 definition of “member” remained operative, purportedly sweeping Joseph into survivorship eligibility. The Court declined to decide the validity of P.L. 26-058, holding that even under the September definition, the operative exclusion in § 8130(a)(2) and the absence of an express § 8134 extension still defeated the claim.

8) Chevron deference: independently foreclosed, and also unhelpful on the merits.

The Court held Chevron arguments “misplaced” for three separate reasons: (i) Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo overruled Chevron; (ii) Guam’s own deference doctrine (as discussed in Chargualaf v. Gov't of Guam Ret. Fund and Port Auth. of Guam v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n (Javelosa)) requires legislative intent to delegate ambiguity resolution to the agency, which was absent here; and (iii) the cited regulations concerned service-credit calculations and could not override the statutory scheme that excludes survivorship annuities for § 8130(a)(2) electors.

C. Impact

1) Clarifies beneficiary expectations for § 8130(a)(2) electors.

The Opinion establishes a clear default: electing the § 8130(a)(2) deferred annuity after separation does not carry § 8134 surviving spouse annuities. Survivors should expect § 8132-type refunds/death benefits unless a separate statutory extension applies.

2) Reinforces category boundaries in the DB Plan.

By insisting that “retirement” eligibility is governed by §§ 8119–8120.1 (and disability by § 8123), the Court limits the ability of litigants to recharacterize separation-based deferred benefits as full retirement status for survivorship purposes.

3) Reduces fiscal risk and “cliff effects” created by member longevity.

The Court expressly rejected an interpretation that would make survivorship hinge on whether a separated member lived long enough to receive the first deferred payment, a rule that would generate disparate outcomes for similarly situated members and potentially expand long-term liabilities in ways the Legislature did not explicitly authorize.

4) Administrative-law signal: post-Loper Bright statutory interpretation is judicial work.

Even where a Guam agency administers a complex benefits code, courts will treat benefit eligibility questions as legal interpretation. Agencies may provide informative views, but they cannot fill eligibility gaps absent clear legislative delegation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Defined Benefit Plan (DB Plan). A pension plan promising benefits by formula (often tied to salary and service), rather than a personal account balance.
“Refund on Separation” vs “Retirement.” The DB Plan distinguishes leaving employment before qualifying for statutory retirement (§ 8130) from actually retiring under the retirement statutes (§§ 8119–8120.1). The label “service retirement annuity” in § 8130(a)(2) is a deferred benefit option within the separation/refund section, not proof of full retirement status.
Survivor annuity vs death benefit/refund. A survivor annuity is ongoing monthly/annual income to the spouse. A refund/death benefit (like § 8132) is typically a one-time payment (or limited refund) that does not create an ongoing pension stream.
“Reading the statute as a whole.” Courts interpret provisions together to avoid contradictions and to give meaning to each section—especially important where one section expressly excludes a benefit and another appears to grant it generally.
Absurdity doctrine. If one plausible reading produces outcomes the Legislature is unlikely to have intended (e.g., large survivor annuities for minimal service), courts favor a more reasonable construction consistent with the statutory purpose.
Chevron deference and Loper Bright. Chevron was a U.S. doctrine that often required courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo overruled Chevron, reaffirming that courts decide statutory meaning; agencies may still inform but do not control interpretation.

5. Conclusion

Guthrie v. Board of Trustees of the Government of Guam Retirement Fund resolves an ambiguity in Guam’s DB Plan by drawing a firm doctrinal line: a separated member’s deferred annuity election under 4 GCA § 8130(a)(2) does not confer surviving spouse annuity eligibility under § 8134. The Court reached this result through whole-scheme interpretation, legislative-history confirmation, and avoidance of unreasonable outcomes, while also signaling a post-Loper Bright approach that centers courts—not agencies—as the final arbiters of statutory benefit eligibility. The practical takeaway is equally clear: unless an explicit extension statute applies, survivors of § 8130(a)(2) electors should look to § 8132 (refund/death benefit), not § 8134 (continuing survivor annuity).