Section 3553(a) as an Independent, Dispositive Ground for Denying Compassionate Release; No Stay Pending Supreme Court Review of Amendment 814 Issues; Proper Post-Conviction Vehicles After Rivers v. Guerrero

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Third Circuit’s non-precedential, per curiam decision in United States v. Omar Sierre Folk (No. 25-2273, Oct. 30, 2025), summarily affirming the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s denial of two motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and the denial of a motion to reopen a “status quo” request premised on a then-pending Supreme Court case. The opinion sits at the intersection of three live issues in federal criminal practice:

How district courts’ § 3553(a) analyses can independently defeat compassionate release, rendering disputes over “extraordinary and compelling reasons” immaterial;
Whether appeals should be stayed pending Supreme Court review of Sentencing Commission Amendment 814 and related “change in law” debates; and
What vehicles are proper for collateral relief post–Rivers v. Guerrero regarding second-or-successive habeas constraints.

On the facts, Omar Sierre Folk was convicted by a jury in 2013 of drug distribution (21 U.S.C. § 841), two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and being a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). He was sentenced as a career offender to 264 months, well below a Guidelines range the district court described as 420 months to life. After the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 814—defining, among other things, an “unusually long sentence” basis for relief—Folk filed two pro se compassionate-release motions in 2024. He also filed a “Motion for Status Quo” tied to the Supreme Court’s then-pending review in Rivers, and later moved to reopen after the Court decided Rivers v. Guerrero (2025).

On appeal, Folk did not engage the district court’s merits rulings but instead sought a stay pending Supreme Court decisions (Rutherford, Carter, and Fernandez) that could reshape the “extraordinary and compelling” analysis. The Third Circuit declined to stay the case and affirmed on the ground that the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis independently foreclosed relief—thus mooting any potential change in the “extraordinary and compelling” framework. The court also affirmed denial of the motion to reopen for procedural defects and clarified the timeliness and jurisdictional posture of the appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit summarily affirmed the denial of Folk’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions. It held there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors—particularly the seriousness of Folk’s drug and firearms crimes, his substantial criminal history, and his already significant downward variance from a 420 months–to–life range—did not support a sentence reduction.
The court declined to stay the appeal pending Supreme Court review in Rutherford, Carter, and Fernandez. Even if those decisions altered what qualifies as “extraordinary and compelling,” the district court’s independent § 3553(a) rationale would still defeat relief.
The court affirmed the denial of Folk’s motion to reopen the order denying his “status quo” motion because the reopening request lacked any legal or factual support and because any Rivers-based challenge must be brought through proper procedural vehicles (e.g., Rule 60(b) or properly authorized second/successive applications under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255(h)).
On timeliness, the court noted that while a § 3582 appeal is governed by the criminal 14-day deadline (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)), that deadline is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule; because the Government did not invoke it, the court reached the merits.
Applying its summary action standards (3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6), the court concluded the appeal presented no substantial question.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2020): Sets the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing denials of compassionate release and underscores the breadth of district court discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors. The Folk panel relies on Pawlowski to frame its deferential review.
United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021): Held that nonretroactive changes in sentencing law are not, by themselves, “extraordinary and compelling” reasons. Folk invoked pending Supreme Court review that might “abrogate” Andrews; the Third Circuit refused to stay the appeal because § 3553(a) independently defeated relief.
United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 2024), and United States v. Carter, No. 24-1115, 2024 WL 5339852 (3d Cir. Dec. 2, 2024), cert granted sub nom. Rutherford and Carter: The Third Circuit reaffirmed Andrews and held U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (Amendment 814’s “change in law” clause) invalid insofar as it invites consideration of nonretroactive changes. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases. Folk argued that these grants counseled a stay. The Third Circuit disagreed because the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis was dispositive regardless of any change in the “extraordinary and compelling” landscape.
Fernandez v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2731 (2025) (cert. granted): Certiorari limited to whether a “combination” of reasons under § 3582(c)(1)(A) may include considerations that could also support relief under § 2255. The panel noted the grant but again found a stay unwarranted given the independent § 3553(a) ground.
United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2021): Cited for the proposition that district courts may deny compassionate release if any one of the statute’s preconditions is unsatisfied—(1) extraordinary and compelling reasons, (2) consistency with applicable policy statements, or (3) favorable § 3553(a) balancing. This supports the panel’s approach of affirming on § 3553(a) alone.
United States v. Arrango, 291 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam): A § 3582 proceeding is a continuation of the criminal case for appellate purposes, triggering the 14-day deadline in Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2010), and United States v. Muhammud, 701 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2012): Establish that Rule 4(b)’s 14-day limit is nonjurisdictional and may be forfeited if the Government does not invoke it. The panel used this to reach the merits despite Folk’s late notice of appeal.
Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2011): Provides the abuse-of-discretion standard for motions to reopen/Rule 60(b)-type requests.
Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443 (2025): Held that a second-in-time § 2254 petition filed while the first petition’s appeal is pending is “second or successive” under § 2244. The panel referenced Rivers to explain that any post-conviction relief premised on its rule must be pursued through the proper statutory channel, not via an undefined “status quo” motion.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning has three main components:

Compassionate release is discretionary and conjunctive. The statute requires:
- “Extraordinary and compelling reasons,”
- Consistency with applicable policy statements, and
- A favorable assessment under § 3553(a).
Citing Elias, the panel endorsed the principle that a court may deny relief if any one of these preconditions is not satisfied. That means a district court’s § 3553(a) analysis can be independently dispositive.
Independent § 3553(a) ground defeats the need to resolve unsettled “extraordinary and compelling” questions. The district court emphasized:
- The serious nature of Folk’s drug trafficking and firearm offenses;
- His extensive criminal history at the time of the offense;
- That he received a sentence “far below” the Guidelines range of 420 months to life, reducing concerns about unwarranted disparity.
The Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in that balancing. Because § 3553(a) resolved the motion, the panel declined to stay the appeal pending Supreme Court resolution of Rutherford, Carter, and Fernandez. Even if those cases alter the extraordinary-and-compelling analysis or validate aspects of Amendment 814, Folk would still lose on § 3553(a).
Procedural rulings:
- Timeliness: A § 3582 appeal is governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)’s 14-day period, but that deadline is nonjurisdictional. The Government did not invoke it, so the court reached the merits.
- Motion to reopen: The district court denied Folk’s request to reopen its “status quo” ruling as “procedurally flawed” for lack of legal or factual detail. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that any Rivers-based argument must be pursued through proper mechanisms (e.g., Rule 60(b) for civil judgments; properly authorized successive applications under §§ 2244, 2255(h)) rather than through an undefined “status quo” filing.

Interaction with Amendment 814 and Emerging Supreme Court Review

Amendment 814, effective November 1, 2023, revised U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to enumerate categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” including where a defendant has served at least 10 years of an “unusually long sentence” and a nonretroactive change in law would produce a “gross disparity” with the sentence a defendant would receive today. The Third Circuit, however, has held in Rutherford that § 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid to the extent it authorizes district courts to treat nonretroactive changes in law as extraordinary and compelling—a reaffirmation of Andrews.

Against that backdrop, Folk urged the Third Circuit to stay his appeal pending Supreme Court review in Rutherford, Carter, and Fernandez. The panel refused, for a pragmatic reason: even if the Supreme Court were to broaden the availability of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” (e.g., by embracing some or all of Amendment 814’s “change in law” approach), the district court’s independent § 3553(a) analysis would still foreclose relief. Thus, the compassionate-release denial would remain intact regardless of the outcome of those grants of certiorari.

Procedural Posture, Appellate Timeliness, and Jurisdiction

Continuation of the criminal case: A § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion is a continuation of the underlying criminal case, and thus appeals are governed by the 14-day criminal deadline (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)).
Nonjurisdictional deadline: Citing Martinez and Muhammud, the Third Circuit reiterated that Rule 4(b)’s deadline is nonjurisdictional and may be forfeited if the Government does not invoke it. Here, despite an untimely notice of appeal, the court reached the merits because the Government did not object.
Summary action: The court proceeded under Local Appellate Rule 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, finding no substantial question and affirming summarily.

Post-Conviction Vehicles After Rivers v. Guerrero and the “Status Quo” Motion

Folk filed a “Motion for Status Quo” tied to Rivers v. Lumpkin (the caption before decision), later decided as Rivers v. Guerrero. After Rivers held that a second-in-time § 2254 petition filed while an appeal of the first petition is pending is “second or successive” within § 2244, Folk sought to reopen. The district court denied his motion to reopen as procedurally defective because it contained no legal or factual substance; the Third Circuit affirmed.

The key lesson is that Rivers does not create a freestanding entitlement to “status quo” relief. Rather, it clarifies successive-petition rules for habeas practice. Any attempt to invoke Rivers must be channeled through proper procedural mechanisms:

In civil habeas contexts, Rule 60(b) for relief from judgment (subject to Gonzalez v. Crosby limitations), or
For new collateral attacks, compliance with § 2244(b) or § 2255(h)’s gatekeeping rules.

An undefined “status quo” filing is not a recognized procedural mechanism and will be denied if it lacks concrete legal or factual grounds.

Impact and Practical Implications

Centrality of § 3553(a): This decision underscores that the § 3553(a) factors remain a powerful, independent basis to deny compassionate release. Defense counsel should treat the § 3553(a) presentation as co-equal with the “extraordinary and compelling” showing; a strong merits case under Amendment 814 or other authorities will not carry the day if § 3553(a) weighs against release.
Stay requests disfavored when § 3553(a) is dispositive: Where a district court’s denial rests on § 3553(a), appellate stays pending Supreme Court review of “extraordinary and compelling” questions are unlikely to be granted because such decisions will not affect the outcome.
District court best practices: Thorough § 3553(a) analyses not only guide just outcomes but also insulate denials from reversal even in rapidly evolving doctrinal environments (e.g., the validity and scope of Amendment 814).
Appellate timing: Practitioners should file notices of appeal within the 14-day Rule 4(b) window. While nonjurisdictional, the deadline can defeat appellate review if the Government invokes it. Where late filing is unavoidable, be prepared to address lack of prejudice and seek leniency, recognizing the Government’s decisive role in invoking (or not invoking) the bar.
Post-Rivers filing discipline: Collateral relief must proceed by recognized vehicles. Creative “status quo” motions lacking legal grounding will be denied. Counsel should evaluate whether Rule 60(b) or a new application subject to § 2244/§ 2255(h) gatekeeping is appropriate, and provide concrete legal and factual bases.
Not precedential but influential: Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion signals how panels may handle similar appeals—especially those attempting to pause proceedings pending Supreme Court resolution of Amendment 814 issues. It is a practical roadmap for how § 3553(a) can render those disputes academic.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Extraordinary and compelling reasons: A threshold showing in § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions. Amendment 814 lists six categories, including “unusually long sentence” with “gross disparity” due to changes in law. The Third Circuit currently limits use of nonretroactive legal changes as “extraordinary,” pending Supreme Court review.
Nonretroactive change in law: A later change in law that does not apply to past, final convictions. Andrews and Rutherford treat such changes as generally insufficient to justify compassionate release (subject to ongoing Supreme Court review).
§ 3553(a) factors: Statutory sentencing considerations including seriousness of the offense, defendant’s history and characteristics, deterrence, public protection, and avoiding unwarranted disparities. Courts may deny compassionate release solely on these grounds even if other prerequisites are arguendo met.
Career offender: A Guidelines status that enhances offense level and criminal history for certain defendants with qualifying prior convictions, often raising the advisory range substantially.
§ 924(c): Criminalizes use or carrying of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence, often with mandatory consecutive sentences.
Rule 4(b) timeliness: The 14-day deadline to appeal in criminal cases, including § 3582 orders. It is nonjurisdictional—courts may consider late appeals if the Government does not insist on the deadline.
Summary affirmance: Under Third Circuit procedures (L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6), the court may summarily affirm when the appeal “does not present a substantial question,” avoiding full merits briefing.
Second or successive habeas: After an initial habeas petition, later petitions are tightly restricted. Rivers v. Guerrero held that a second-in-time § 2254 petition filed while the first’s appeal is pending is “second or successive,” triggering § 2244’s gatekeeping rules. Federal prisoners under § 2255 face analogous gatekeeping in § 2255(h).

Conclusion

United States v. Folk is a pragmatic reaffirmation of trial courts’ broad discretion to deny compassionate release on § 3553(a) grounds alone, regardless of evolving debates over what qualifies as “extraordinary and compelling” under Amendment 814. By declining to stay the appeal pending Supreme Court review in Rutherford, Carter, and Fernandez, the Third Circuit emphasized that § 3553(a) can be dispositive and that an appellate stay is unwarranted where pending doctrinal shifts would not change the outcome.

The court’s procedural holdings are likewise instructive. Rule 4(b)’s 14-day deadline is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule that can be forfeited if the Government declines to invoke it, permitting merits review of otherwise late § 3582 appeals. And after Rivers v. Guerrero, litigants must pursue collateral relief through appropriate procedural channels; amorphous “status quo” motions lacking legal footing will not suffice.

While non-precedential, the opinion sends clear signals to practitioners. Defense counsel must rigorously address § 3553(a) in compassionate-release motions; Government counsel should be prepared to invoke Rule 4(b) when appropriate; and all parties should use proper post-conviction vehicles when invoking new Supreme Court decisions. In the broader legal context, Folk illustrates how careful § 3553(a) analysis can stabilize outcomes amid doctrinal flux over Amendment 814 and the scope of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons.