Section 1515 Fee-Shifting Applies to All Title 13 Proceedings; Unsigned Separation Agreements Enforceable When Intent and Performance Are Clear — Goode v. Goode (Del. 2025)

Introduction

In Daniel Goode v. Sarina Goode, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a Family Court order granting specific performance of an unsigned marital separation agreement and awarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing ex-spouse. The decision resolves three core disputes:

Whether a petition for specific performance of a separation agreement is barred by res judicata or judicial estoppel following an earlier denial of a motion to reopen ancillary matters under Family Court Rule 60.
Whether an unsigned separation agreement, negotiated via emails and text messages and subsequently performed for nearly two years, is an enforceable contract despite signature lines and notarial language and despite a provision fixing child support.
Whether 13 Del. C. § 1515 authorizes fee-shifting beyond divorce actions to any proceeding under Title 13, including a § 507 enforcement action between former spouses post-divorce.

The Supreme Court held that neither res judicata nor judicial estoppel barred the ex-wife’s Petition for Specific Performance; the separation agreement was enforceable on the record presented; and attorneys’ fees were properly awarded under § 1515 because that statute applies broadly to “any proceeding under [Title 13].” The ruling offers significant guidance on the transactional approach to preclusion in domestic relations litigation, contract formation and definiteness in the family-law context, the limits of public policy invalidation of child support arrangements, and the scope of statutory fee-shifting in Family Court.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the Family Court’s post-trial decree ordering:

Specific performance of the parties’ written “Divorce Agreement” (the Separation Agreement), despite the absence of signatures, grounded in the parties’ email assent (“I’m okay with this. Let’s sign this this week.”) and two years of performance, including a $30,000 lump sum payment and monthly support payments.
A lump-sum monetary award of $137,500 (the parties resolved a separate dispute as to lump-sum versus monthly payments by stipulation) and an award of attorneys’ fees.

On the procedural defenses, the Court held:

Res judicata did not bar the Petition. The motion to reopen the divorce concerned equitable ancillary relief within a concluded divorce proceeding, whereas the Petition sought contractual enforcement under 13 Del. C. § 507; they do not arise from the same transaction under Delaware’s “transactional approach,” and, even if they did, it would not be fair to require the contract claim to have been asserted in the Rule 60 motion.
Judicial estoppel did not apply because the ex-wife’s positions were not inconsistent and, in any event, the Family Court did not adopt her prior position when it denied the Rule 60 motion “for all of the reasons set forth in [Ex-Husband]’s response.”

On the merits, the Court held that a valid, sufficiently definite contract existed despite the absence of signatures and notarization; the parties intended to be bound and performed accordingly; and unresolved issues such as 2021 taxes and the children’s private schooling were non-essential terms. The child support provision (fixed at $500/month) did not render the agreement facially void because the agreement preserved the ability to renegotiate upon changed circumstances, thereby not contracting away the children’s rights.

Finally, the Court held that 13 Del. C. § 1515 authorizes fee-shifting in “any proceeding under this title,” not just in divorce proceedings, and thus supported the Family Court’s fee award in this § 507 enforcement action.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Res judicata framework: LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185 (Del. 2009); RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Education Loan Trust IV, LLC, 87 A.3d 632 (Del. 2014); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24. These establish Delaware’s five-prong test and the “transactional approach,” focusing on relatedness in time, space, origin, motivation, and whether claims form a convenient trial unit.
Application in family-law settings: Green v. Green, 2016 WL 7212309 (Del. 2016) (ORDER); Div. of Child Support Enf’t ex rel. Blake v. Myrks, 606 A.2d 748 (Del. 1992); Brittingham v. Brown, 1989 WL 47247 (Del. 1989) (ORDER). These show res judicata can apply across related Family Court proceedings, but only when the transactional and fairness prongs are satisfied.
“Fairness” dimension of res judicata: Grunstein v. Silva, 2014 WL 4473641 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d, 2015 WL 1880664/1880672. The Court used Silva’s logic to hold that a party cannot reasonably assume that the outcome of a Rule 60 motion would resolve contract enforcement rights; the legal bases differ materially.
Judicial estoppel prerequisites: Motorola Inc. v. Amkor Tech., 958 A.2d 852 (Del. 2008); Motors Liquidation Co. DIP Lenders Tr. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3360976 (Del. 2018) (ORDER). Estoppel requires a truly inconsistent position and successful inducement of a court to adopt the earlier position—absent here.
Family Court jurisdiction to enforce agreements: Rockwell v. Rockwell, 681 A.2d 1017 (Del. 1996) (separation agreements enforced under ordinary contract law unless made a court order); 13 Del. C. § 507(a) (Family Court jurisdiction to enforce agreements among spouses/former spouses concerning support, alimony, and property).
Contract formation and intent to be bound: Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153 (Del. 2010); Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell (Eagle Force I), 187 A.3d 1209 (Del. 2018); (Eagle Force II), 235 A.3d 727 (Del. 2020); Shilling v. Shilling, 332 A.3d 453 (Del. 2024). These cases emphasize objective manifestations of assent and enforceability even where signatures are absent, provided terms are sufficiently definite and the parties intended to be bound.
Conditions precedent to contract effectiveness: Thompson Street Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Sonova United States Hearing Instruments, LLC, 340 A.3d 1151 (Del. 2025). A condition precedent must be stated clearly and unambiguously (e.g., “if,” “provided that,” “on condition that”). Mere signature lines or notarization references are not, without more, conditions precedent.
Nonessential terms and definiteness: Brady v. Huber, 2023 WL 3736371 (Del. Ch. 2023); Harrison v. Dixon, 2013 WL 4759681 (Del. Ch. 2013); Universal Prods. Co. v. Emerson, 179 A. 387 (Del. 1935). A contract may be enforced even if some non-essential matters are reserved for later discussion.
Child support public policy limits: Behrens v. Behrens, 2003 WL 21730131 (Del. 2003) (ORDER); G.W.F. v. G.P.F., 271 A.2d 38 (Del. 1970). Parents cannot by private contract prevent future judicial reassessment of adequate child support; provisions that lock in an amount without modifiability offend public policy.
Fee-shifting and statutory interpretation: 13 Del. C. § 1515 (“any proceeding under this title”); Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232 (Del. 1982) (different statutory terms signal different meanings); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Univ. of Delaware, 267 A.3d 996 (Del. 2021) (plain meaning controls when unambiguous). The Court also cited Woods v. Woods, 2016 WL 489904 (Del. 2016) (ORDER), and Talley v. Talley, 2013 WL 596456 (Del. 2013) (ORDER), acknowledging fee awards under § 1515 in non-divorce Title 13 contexts; and noted other fee statutes (13 Del. C. §§ 513, 731) and Rule 88 to show that § 1515’s breadth does not render other fee provisions surplusage.

Legal Reasoning

A. Res Judicata: Transactional Approach and Fairness

Res judicata requires five elements, including that the “same cause of action” was (or could have been) litigated earlier. Applying the transactional approach, the Court looked beyond labels to the underlying transactions:

Motion to Reopen: A Rule 60(b) request to re-open the divorce to invoke equitable ancillary jurisdiction under 13 Del. C. § 1513, tied to the divorce decree.
Petition for Specific Performance: A contract enforcement action under § 507 seeking performance of a privately negotiated Separation Agreement that was never incorporated into the divorce decree.

Although the facts relate to the same relationship and time period, the Court agreed with the Family Court that these are distinct transactions: equitable resolution within the divorce vs. enforcement of a separate contract. Even if the transactions overlapped, the defense still failed the fairness component of the transactional test: given Delaware law recognizing contract enforcement of separation agreements under § 507 and ordinary contract principles, the ex-husband could not reasonably believe that denial of a Rule 60 motion would foreclose a separate contract remedy. The Court invoked Silva to underscore that the legal bases for relief were materially different, and the contract claim did not, “in fairness,” need to have been asserted in the Rule 60 proceeding.

B. Judicial Estoppel: No Inconsistent Position Adopted by the Court

Judicial estoppel requires (1) a truly inconsistent position and (2) judicial adoption of the prior position. The ex-wife’s Rule 60 motion did not deny the existence of an agreement; it expressly referenced the Separation Agreement as part of her explanation for not seeking ancillary jurisdiction initially. The Family Court did not adopt her position anyway—it denied her motion “for all of the reasons” advanced by the ex-husband. There was thus no inconsistent position adopted by the court, and estoppel did not apply.

C. Contract Formation: Intent to be Bound, Conditions Precedent, and Definiteness

Intent to be Bound: The Court emphasized objective manifestations, not subjective intent. The April 4 email—“I’m okay with this. Let’s sign this this week.”—attached the full agreement and was followed by two years of performance, including paying the $30,000 lump sum and monthly support. That conduct confirmed assent to the entire agreement, not merely to a child support figure.
No Signature-Based Condition Precedent: Signature blocks and notarial references did not amount to a clear, unambiguous condition precedent that the parties would not be bound until signature and notarization. The absence of “if/provided that/on condition that” or similar language, coupled with substantial performance before any signature, defeated the argument that execution was a prerequisite to enforceability.
Sufficient Definiteness and Non-Essential Terms: The ex-husband argued that unresolved issues (2021 taxes; private school attendance) rendered the agreement indefinite. The Court agreed with the Family Court that these were not essential terms in this context. The 2021 tax issue was not in the accepted draft and was not raised at acceptance; the private-school point surfaced only later and was expressly characterized by the ex-husband as something that “doesn’t need to go into a divorce agreement.” Nonessential open items do not defeat enforceability where the essential terms are settled.

D. Child Support Provision and Public Policy

The ex-husband argued the fixed $500/month child support term was void and defeated any meeting of the minds. Delaware law voids provisions that contract away a child’s right to adequate support, especially those purporting to bar future adjustment (Behrens; G.W.F.). Here, however, the agreement’s “Future Dispute” provision required good-faith renegotiation upon changed circumstances. The Court held the provision did not facially bar adjustment; the agreement was therefore not void on public policy grounds. Importantly, nothing in the decision suggests that parties can prevent future judicial review of child support—rather, the presence of a renegotiation mechanism helped avoid the public policy problem seen in Behrens.

E. Specific Performance Elements

Applying Osborn, the Family Court found—and the Supreme Court affirmed—that the ex-wife proved by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a valid contract; (2) she was ready, willing, and able to perform; (3) the balance of equities favored her; and (4) no adequate legal remedy existed. The history of performance and the nature of the marital property/support arrangements supported the equitable remedy.

F. Attorneys’ Fees: Title-Wide Reach of 13 Del. C. § 1515

The Court read § 1515’s text—authorizing fee-shifting in “any proceeding under this title”—to mean exactly what it says: “this title” means Title 13, not merely Chapter 15 (divorce). The General Assembly elsewhere uses “this chapter” when it intends a chapter-specific reference; its choice of “this title” in § 1515 indicates broader reach. Prior Delaware decisions have awarded fees under § 1515 in non-divorce Title 13 matters (e.g., Woods; Talley). That other fee provisions in Title 13 (e.g., §§ 513, 731) exist does not render § 1515 surplusage; those provisions apply in different contexts with different considerations. Accordingly, the Family Court properly awarded fees under § 1515 in this § 507 contract-enforcement action.

Practical Impact and Future Implications

Preclusion in Family Litigation: Counsel should not assume that denial of a Rule 60 motion to reopen a divorce decree will preclude subsequent contract enforcement of a separation agreement under § 507. The transactional approach and fairness inquiry matter; different legal bases and remedies can avoid preclusion.
Unsigned Agreements Can Bind: Where emails/texts evidence assent and the parties perform, Delaware courts may enforce unsigned separation agreements notwithstanding signature blocks or notarial recitals, absent an explicit condition precedent to execution.
Drafting Conditions Precedent: If parties intend “no binding agreement until execution,” they must say so clearly (e.g., “No party shall be bound unless and until this Agreement is executed and delivered by both parties, which is an express condition precedent to enforceability”). Mere signature lines will not suffice.
Child Support Clauses: Fixed-amount support provisions are not per se void, but they cannot foreclose future adjustment in the best interests of the child. Including language recognizing modifiability or at least preserving renegotiation (and never purporting to bar court review) reduces public policy risk.
Fee-Shifting Leverage Under § 1515: The Court’s title-wide reading of § 1515 empowers Family Court to shift fees in any Title 13 proceeding, including post-divorce enforcement under § 507, custody/visitation proceedings (as recognized by Woods and Talley), and beyond—subject to the court’s discretionary factors. This may affect settlement dynamics and litigation strategy in domestic cases.
Strategic Pleading: Parties may plead, in the alternative, both Rule 60 reopening and contract enforcement claims. Although not required here, doing so can promote efficiency and reduce preclusion skirmishes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Res judicata (claim preclusion): A defense that bars repeat litigation of the same claim between the same parties. Delaware uses a “transactional approach”: if two claims arise from the same transaction and could have been litigated together, the second may be barred—unless fairness dictates otherwise.
Judicial estoppel: Prevents a party from taking a position inconsistent with one previously taken and successfully adopted by a court in a prior proceeding.
Condition precedent: A clearly stated event that must occur before a duty to perform arises. Without explicit conditional language, courts hesitate to treat execution or notarization as a condition precedent to contract formation.
Specific performance: An equitable remedy requiring a party to perform contractual obligations when monetary damages are inadequate and equities favor enforcement.
Title vs. Chapter in statutes: “This title” means the entire title of the Delaware Code (here, all of Title 13 – Domestic Relations). “This chapter” would mean just that chapter (e.g., Chapter 15 on divorce). The Supreme Court relied on this distinction to read § 1515 broadly.

Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Goode v. Goode crystallizes several important principles in Delaware family law:

Preclusion limits: A denied Rule 60 motion to reopen a divorce decree does not bar a later § 507 contract-enforcement action. The two are distinct transactions with different remedies and expectations.
Contract enforceability without signatures: Objective assent via email coupled with substantial performance can establish an enforceable separation agreement. Signature and notarial features do not create a condition precedent absent explicit language.
Definiteness and material terms: Unresolved items like a single tax-year allocation or later-raised private-school preferences may be nonessential; their absence does not defeat enforceability when core financial/support/property terms are settled.
Child support clauses: Fixed support terms are not facially void if the agreement preserves adjustment (e.g., via renegotiation) and does not purport to foreclose the child’s right to adequate support.
Fee-shifting under § 1515: The Supreme Court definitively interprets 13 Del. C. § 1515 to apply to “any proceeding under [Title 13],” including post-divorce enforcement—an important clarification that broadens fee-shifting availability in Family Court.

Collectively, these holdings offer clear guidance to practitioners: draft with precision if execution is a condition precedent; avoid language that could be construed as contracting away child support modifiability; consider alternative pleading strategies in post-decree disputes; and evaluate fee-shifting exposure or opportunities across all Title 13 proceedings. The decision strengthens predictability in enforcing privately negotiated family-law agreements while preserving the judiciary’s role in safeguarding children’s interests and ensuring equitable outcomes.