Secondhand, Identified 911 Domestic-Violence Reports Plus On-Scene Corroboration Support Emergency-Aid Entry; Cost Shifting Requires Proof of Future Inability to Pay

Introduction

In Antron Cannon v. Walker Filip, et al. (7th Cir. Dec. 31, 2025), Antron Cannon sued the City of Aurora, Illinois, and several Aurora police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth Amendment violations from (1) a warrantless entry into his home and (2) his arrest for domestic battery. After the district court granted summary judgment for defendants and later taxed costs against Cannon, he appealed both rulings.

The case centers on two recurring civil-rights flashpoints: (a) how far police may rely on a domestic-violence 911 report—here, relayed through an aunt who was not on scene—when deciding to enter a home without a warrant under the emergency-aid doctrine; and (b) when indigency justifies denying costs to prevailing defendants.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held:

Warrantless entry: The officers’ entry was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment’s emergency-aid exception. Officers had dispatch information describing an ongoing domestic battery, plus on-scene facts (noise from inside and a neighbor indicating no one had left) supporting an immediate need to act.
Arrest: Probable cause existed to arrest Cannon for battery based on the complainant’s on-scene statements and observed/documented injuries, regardless of Cannon’s later account and regardless of whether the ultimate charge was “domestic battery” rather than another offense.
Costs: The district court did not abuse its discretion by taxing costs because Cannon failed to show not only current indigence but also inability to pay “in the future.” Only after that threshold showing may a court weigh equitable factors like good faith or closeness of issues.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and summary judgment framing

Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley: Used for the summary-judgment posture—facts taken in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Gaddis v. DeMattei: De novo review of summary judgment and inference-drawing for the nonmovant.
Yates v. City of Chicago, Illinois: Abuse-of-discretion review for cost awards.
Hampton v. Ford Motor Co.: Disputes over immaterial facts do not defeat summary judgment.

2) Warrantless home entry and the emergency-aid/exigency doctrine

Brigham City v. Stuart: Warrantless home searches are presumptively unreasonable, but emergency aid is a recognized exigency.
Kentucky v. King: “Ultimate touchstone” is reasonableness; exigent circumstances can make warrantless entry objectively reasonable; emergency-aid exception described.
Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee: Seventh Circuit articulation of emergency-aid: objective test; officers’ protective role; reasonable belief entry is necessary to render aid/prevent harm.
United States v. Maxwell: Requires an “objectively reasonable basis” to believe someone needs aid and there is a compelling need to act.
Fitzgerald v. Santoro: Emergency-aid assessed based on circumstances “at the moment of entry”; not post-entry information; cites United States v. Arch.
United States v. Jenkins: Exigency supported by 911 assault-in-progress context and on-scene indicators (noise); used here to analogize that contemporaneous cues plus dispatch information can justify entry.
United States v. Richardson: Identified 911 callers can provide sufficient basis for exigent action; police should “act, not speculate” in emergencies; also recognizes a limiting principle where additional information might make reliance unreasonable.
Georgia v. Randolph: Confirms police authority to enter to protect a resident from domestic violence when they have good reason to believe a threat exists.
Tierney v. Davidson: Cited for the “combustible” nature of domestic disputes and latitude for officers confronting potential danger.
United States v. Richmond: Rejects hindsight; reasonableness judged from perspective of a prudent officer at the time.
United States v. Delgado: Contrasts when a 911 report does not support entry because on-scene information does not indicate the emergency is inside the home.

3) Probable cause and false arrest

Maniscalco v. Simon: Probable cause is an absolute bar to Fourth Amendment false-arrest claims under § 1983.
Jump v. Vill. of Shorewood: Probable cause exists when a reasonable officer with the knowledge of on-scene officers would believe the suspect committed an offense defined by state law.
Hart v. Mannina: Probable cause is a “fluid” common-sense concept based on totality; does not require certainty.
Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Illinois: Probable cause can be decided on summary judgment where underlying facts are undisputed.
Johnson v. Myers: Probable cause judged based on information available at the time, not later developments.
Fox v. Hayes: Arrest is reasonable if there is probable cause for “some criminal offense,” even if not the specific offense charged; used to neutralize any “domestic battery vs. battery” labeling dispute.

4) Taxation of costs and indigency

Montanez v. Simon: Cost award reviewed for correct standards and avoidance of arbitrariness.
Rivera v. City of Chicago: Core rule applied—indigency can justify denial of costs only if the losing party shows inability to pay now and in the future; equitable factors (good faith, closeness) are secondary and considered only after that threshold.

5) Constitutional objections to summary judgment

Burks v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp.: Forecloses claims that summary judgment violates the Fifth or Seventh Amendments.

Legal Reasoning

I. Emergency-aid entry: what made the officers’ belief “objectively reasonable”

The court treated the question as strictly objective and time-bound: whether, given the facts confronting officers at the moment of entry, they reasonably believed entry was necessary to render aid or prevent imminent injury (drawing from Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, United States v. Maxwell, and Fitzgerald v. Santoro).

Three features drove the exigency finding:

Identified 911 call reporting ongoing domestic violence. Dispatch relayed that Cannon was “beating up a woman” and had “lost his mind,” based on information from someone who had been in the home. Under United States v. Richardson, such emergency reporting—especially from an identified caller—can justify immediate action.
Domestic-violence context increases urgency. The court emphasized the volatility of domestic incidents, citing Tierney v. Davidson and Georgia v. Randolph, reinforcing that officers may act quickly to prevent escalation and serious injury.
On-scene corroboration: officers heard loud noises inside, and a neighbor reported no one had left. Even if the noises later could be explained innocently, the Fourth Amendment analysis does not require officers to correctly diagnose the source in real time; Richardson cautions against requiring “calm deliberation” where lives may be at risk. The court contrasted this case with United States v. Delgado, where on-scene information did not indicate the emergency was inside the residence.

Cannon’s “swatting” theory and later testimony that the encounter was consensual sex were deemed legally irrelevant to exigency because they were not known at the time of entry (United States v. Richmond). Likewise, disputes about whether Cannon answered the door or barricaded it were immaterial under Hampton v. Ford Motor Co. because the undisputed, sufficient grounds for entry existed regardless.

Finally, the panel rejected the claim that the call was “facially suspect” merely because the aunt was not on scene and the original witness did not want to be involved. The court treated those circumstances as not inherently undermining reliability where the caller identified herself and explained the source of her information, and where on-scene conditions did not negate the reported emergency (consistent with Richardson’s caveat that only “additional information” making reliance unreasonable would change the calculus).

II. Probable cause: victim statements plus physical indicators were enough

For false arrest, the panel applied the settled rule that probable cause defeats a § 1983 false-arrest claim (Maniscalco v. Simon). It framed probable cause as a totality-of-circumstances assessment based on what a reasonable officer knew at the time (Jump v. Vill. of Shorewood; Hart v. Mannina; Johnson v. Myers).

The decisive inputs were:

Immediate statements by Taylor alleging choking, biting, hitting, loss of consciousness, and fear of being killed.
Observed injuries (bruising, welts, scratches) documented by photographs.
Consistency with the dispatch narrative of an ongoing battery.

Later deposition testimony (including claims of intoxication, memory gaps, or consensual “rough sex”) could not retroactively erase probable cause because the Fourth Amendment inquiry is not hindsight-driven (Johnson v. Myers). The court also neutralized any mismatch between the arrest charge and other possible offenses: if probable cause exists for any offense, the arrest is reasonable (Fox v. Hayes).

III. Costs: indigency requires evidence of future inability before equity matters

Applying Montanez v. Simon and especially Rivera v. City of Chicago, the panel reiterated a structured approach:

The losing party must first show incapacity to pay now and in the future.
Only after that threshold may the court consider equitable factors (good faith, closeness/difficulty).

Cannon showed current indigence (including recruited counsel), but he provided no record basis to find he would remain unable to pay “into the foreseeable future.” Under Rivera, that evidentiary gap meant the district court was not required to weigh good faith or issue closeness and did not abuse its discretion by awarding costs.

Impact

Domestic-violence 911 calls relayed through third parties: The opinion strengthens the proposition that an identified caller may relay secondhand information without making the report “facially suspect,” and that officers need not pause for additional investigation when on-scene conditions do not dispel the reported emergency. This is likely to be cited where dispatch information comes from family networks and not directly from a victim/witness.
“Swatting” allegations in civil suits: The decision signals that labeling a call “swatting” will not create a triable issue absent record support, and that the constitutional analysis stays anchored to what officers reasonably knew at the time.
Probable cause in DV/assault arrests: The opinion underscores how victim statements plus observed injury typically establish probable cause, and that later recantations or alternative explanations often go to ultimate guilt, not probable cause.
Costs as a post-judgment pressure point: The ruling reinforces a demanding evidentiary requirement for avoiding costs based on indigency—litigants must show not only present hardship but forward-looking inability to pay. This may influence § 1983 plaintiffs to build a record on future financial outlook if they anticipate a potential adverse judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Exigent circumstances / emergency-aid exception: A narrow Fourth Amendment rule allowing police to enter a home without a warrant when they reasonably believe someone inside needs immediate help or is in imminent danger. The focus is on what a reasonable officer would think at the time—not on what later turns out to be true.
Objective reasonableness: The court asks what a reasonable officer would do with the same information, not what these officers personally intended or what later evidence shows.
Probable cause: A practical, common-sense threshold—more than a hunch but less than proof—satisfied when available facts would lead a reasonable officer to believe a crime was committed.
Summary judgment: A pretrial decision for the moving party when there is no genuine dispute about material facts requiring a jury; disputes about facts that would not change the outcome do not prevent summary judgment.
Taxation of costs: After winning, a party may recover certain litigation expenses (often including deposition costs). Courts may deny costs for indigency, but in this circuit the loser must show inability to pay now and later, not merely present poverty.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision clarifies two operational rules. First, in domestic-violence emergencies, officers may reasonably rely on an identified 911 caller’s secondhand report—especially when on-scene cues do not dispel the threat—to make an emergency-aid entry without a warrant. Second, a losing party seeking relief from costs due to indigency must produce evidence of inability to pay both now and in the future; only then may courts weigh equitable considerations such as good faith or the closeness of the case. Together, these holdings reinforce deference to real-time police judgments in reported DV emergencies while also tightening the evidentiary burden for avoiding post-judgment costs in civil-rights litigation.