Second Circuit Reins in “Standard” Supervised Release Conditions: Family-Contact Restrictions Require On‑the‑Record Justification; SDNY Risk‑Notification Condition Struck; Suspicion‑Based Search Condition Upheld — United States v. Rodriguez (2d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Rodriguez, No. 22-3236-cr (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 2025) (summary order), a Second Circuit panel (Judges Bianco, Pérez, and Merriam) addressed three contested conditions of supervised release imposed after a wire fraud conviction arising from a multi-year, multi-alias scheme aimed at financially distressed homeowners. The appeal followed a guilty plea and a sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.

Although denominated a “summary order” without precedential effect under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision provides clear guidance on three recurring issues:

When a standard non-association condition effectively burdens an immediate family relationship (here, the defendant’s mother, a co-defendant), the district court must make an individualized, on-the-record justification; the matter cannot be left to the probation office.
The Southern District of New York’s standing order implementing United States v. Boles renders the “third-party risk notification” condition invalid; it must be struck from judgments.
A reasonable-suspicion search condition may be sustained on plain-error review even if the district court did not articulate reasons, where the necessity is self-evident from the record and the condition is adequately cabined.

The government conceded error as to the risk-notification condition and supported a limited remand on the family-contact issue. The Second Circuit affirmed the special search condition but vacated and remanded in part with instructions specific to the non-association and risk-notification conditions.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded:

Non-Association Condition (Standard Condition 8): Vacated and remanded for the district court either to justify applying the condition to the defendant’s communications with his mother (a co-defendant) or to exempt mother–son communications from the restriction. The panel emphasized that restrictions on family contact implicate a fundamental liberty interest and cannot be imposed (or delegated to probation) without an individualized explanation.
Risk-Notification Condition (Standard Condition 12): Vacated outright and ordered stricken from the judgment, in line with United States v. Boles and the Southern District’s standing order abolishing the condition. Because the condition must be removed, the panel did not reach the defendant’s argument that it was not orally pronounced.
Special Search Condition: Although the district court did not explain on the record why it imposed a suspicion-based search condition, the panel held that any error did not satisfy plain-error review. Given the scope and character of the fraud—including electronic and mail-based methods and defiance of a prior FTC injunction—the rationale for the search condition was self-evident and the condition was sufficiently tailored (limited to reasonable suspicion, time, and manner). The condition was affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Governing Framework for Supervised Release Conditions

Federal courts have “broad discretion” to impose supervised release conditions, but that discretion is bounded. A non-mandatory condition must be:

Reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; deterrence; protection of the public; and/or the defendant’s rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(d)(1); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1); United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018).
Impose no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve those purposes and be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)–(3); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(2); United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 123–25 (2d Cir. 2005).
Accompanied, for “special” conditions, by an individualized assessment with reasons stated on the record and supported by the case-specific facts. United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2024).

Delegation to probation officers is limited: courts may delegate minor details (e.g., provider selection), but may not delegate decisions that make a defendant’s liberty “contingent on a probation officer’s exercise of discretion.” United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Where a defendant fails to object to a condition that was noticed in the Presentence Report, appellate review is for plain error. United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 343 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2008). Under United States v. Miller, 954 F.3d 551, 557–58 (2d Cir. 2020), the error must be clear, affect substantial rights, and seriously affect the proceeding’s fairness or integrity.

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2005): A condition limiting a father’s contact with his child implicated a fundamental liberty interest requiring an articulated, record-supported purpose and tailoring. The panel used Myers to hold that—even for a “standard” condition—if family relationships are burdened, the district court must justify the restriction and ensure it is not broader than necessary.
United States v. Bryant, 976 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2020): Reinforced that restrictions on communications with immediate family require “thorough justification,” and decisions about whether to restrict such communications cannot be left to the probation office.
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Even if a district court fails to articulate reasons for a special condition, the condition can be affirmed when the rationale is “self-evident” from the record and the condition is reasonably related to sentencing objectives. This principle undergirded the affirmance of the search condition here.
United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2019): Invalidated the then-standard “third-party risk notification” condition as vague and an excessive delegation to probation. In response, the SDNY issued a standing order vacating and eliminating the condition in all judgments (Second Amended Standing Order M10‑468, No. 19‑mc‑218 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2019)), which the panel applied to strike the condition in Rodriguez.
United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2024): Reiterated the requirement that courts make individualized assessments and state reasons when imposing special conditions—setting the procedural baseline against which the search condition was evaluated.
United States v. Haverkamp, 958 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2020), and United States v. Rakhmatov, 2022 WL 16984536 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2022) (summary order): Approved reasonable-suspicion search conditions that are limited in time and manner as imposing no greater restraint than necessary—supporting the tailoring analysis here.
United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69 (2d Cir. 2025) (per curiam): Affirmed a suspicion-based search condition covering the defendant’s “person and property” in a wire fraud case, reinforcing that such conditions are congruent with fraud offenses that rely on physical and electronic media.
United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015), and United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001): Limited probation’s decisionmaking authority where liberty is at stake—informing the panel’s admonition that family-contact determinations cannot be delegated.
United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008), and United States v. Miller, 954 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 2020): Set the plain-error framework applicable to conditions not objected to at sentencing (as with the non-association and search conditions here).
United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2007): Addresses waiver by affirmative consent. The government invoked Quinones, but the panel declined to reach waiver, resolving the search-condition challenge on plain-error grounds.

Legal Reasoning and Application to Each Condition

1) Non-Association Condition (Standard 8) — Family-Contact Restrictions Require Individualized Justification

Standard Condition 8 bars the defendant from communicating with known felons without probation’s permission. As applied to Rodriguez’s mother—his co-defendant—the condition burdens a protected familial relationship and thus implicates a fundamental liberty interest under Myers and Bryant.

The district court did not address whether it intended to restrict mother–son contact or provide any justification for doing so. That omission is error when a fundamental right is implicated. The Second Circuit therefore:

Vacated the condition as applied to the mother and remanded so the district court can either exempt mother–son communications or, if it intends to restrict them, make an individualized, record-supported justification and ensure the restriction is no broader than necessary.
Rejected the defendant’s request to strike the restriction outright without remand, noting that in certain circumstances family-contact limits can be justified—especially where relatives jointly perpetrated the criminal conduct.
Emphasized that this determination is not a “minor detail” subject to probation’s discretion; it must be made by the court with articulated reasons. See Bryant, 976 F.3d at 184.

2) Risk-Notification Condition (Standard 12) — Invalid Under Boles and SDNY Standing Order

Standard Condition 12 (the “third-party risk notification” condition) authorizes probation to require a defendant to warn third parties if the officer determines the defendant poses a risk. In Boles, the Second Circuit found this condition vague and an undue delegation. Following Boles, the Southern District of New York issued a standing order (M10‑468) vacating and eliminating the condition from all judgments, immediately and permanently relieving sentenced defendants from it.

The government properly conceded that Rodriguez should not be subject to this condition. The Second Circuit accordingly vacated the condition and directed that it be stricken from the judgment. Because the condition must be removed in any event, the panel did not reach Rodriguez’s separate argument that the condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing.

3) Special Search Condition — Error to Omit Reasons, But No Plain Error; Condition Affirmed

The special condition authorized searches of Rodriguez’s person and property (including residence, vehicles, computers, other electronic communication devices, and cloud storage) by a probation officer upon reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct or a supervision violation, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. The district court did not explain why this special condition was imposed—contrary to Sims’ requirement for on-the-record reasons.

Nonetheless, because the defendant did not object at sentencing (and arguably consented to PSR-recommended conditions), review was for plain error. The panel concluded there was error but not “plain” error warranting reversal because:

The record made the rationale self-evident: Rodriguez and his mother orchestrated a large-scale, mass-marketing fraud extracting over $3.4 million from more than 1,200 homeowners via postal mailings and electronic communications.
He persisted despite an FTC injunction, reconstituting the operation via a relative and aliases—behavior suggesting that routine reporting requirements might not suffice to deter recidivism.
The condition was narrowly tailored: limited to searches supported by reasonable suspicion, conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner—parameters repeatedly upheld by the Second Circuit. See Haverkamp; Rakhmatov.
Recent cases (e.g., Lewis) confirm that in wire fraud prosecutions, a suspicion-based search of “person and property,” including electronic media, is typically congruent with the offense conduct.

Given these factors and the presentence report’s explicit rationale (to enable swift intervention if similar activity recurs and to protect the community), the panel held that the omission of an express explanation did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The search condition was therefore affirmed.

Standard of Review and Preservation Lessons

The non-association and search conditions were recommended in the PSR, affording notice. Because the defense did not object, the Second Circuit applied plain-error review and declined to disturb the search condition despite the district court’s failure to articulate reasons. By contrast, the family-contact issue triggered special scrutiny due to the fundamental liberty interest involved, leading to a limited remand notwithstanding the lack of contemporaneous objection.

Practice point: Counsel who want to preserve robust appellate review should lodge targeted objections to proposed conditions before or at sentencing—especially where conditions implicate family relationships or authorize broad searches of digital media.

Impact and Implications

Immediate effect in SDNY: The “third-party risk notification” condition (Standard 12) should not appear in SDNY judgments. If it does, it must be struck, consistent with Boles and Standing Order M10‑468. AUSAs, probation, and courts should ensure templates and scripts reflect this removal.
Family-contact restrictions are not “plug-and-play”: Even when labeled “standard,” non-association conditions cannot be applied to immediate family members without specific findings. Courts must:
- Identify the sentencing goal(s) served (deterrence, public protection, etc.).
- Explain why lesser measures (e.g., notification, permission, monitoring) would be inadequate.
- Tailor any restriction to avoid greater deprivation than necessary (e.g., carve-outs, probation-approved schedules, or communication protocols).
Probation may not be delegated the authority to decide whether a defendant can speak with an immediate family member.
Search conditions in fraud cases: Suspicion-based search conditions that cover both physical and electronic media—especially including cloud storage—are likely to be upheld where the fraud exploited mail and digital channels or where there is evidence of evasion or recidivism. Courts should still articulate reasons, per Sims, to avoid procedural error and reliance on plain-error salvage.
Preservation matters: Failure to object can limit appellate relief. Defense counsel should:
- Request on-the-record findings for special conditions.
- Seek express carve-outs for immediate family or argue for tailored alternatives.
- Confirm that any condition not orally pronounced is not later added in the written judgment.
Beyond SDNY: While this is a non-precedential summary order, it tracks and applies binding Second Circuit decisions (Myers, Bryant, Boles, Sims, Betts). Judges across the Circuit will likely continue to scrutinize family-contact restrictions and disallow the Boles risk-notification condition where still embedded in local practice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Order: A decision without precedential effect under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1. It can be cited, but it does not bind future panels. It often applies established law to the facts at hand.
Supervised Release vs. Probation: Supervised release follows imprisonment and is overseen by probation officers; probation is an alternative to incarceration. Both can include conditions; supervised release conditions are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3.
Standard vs. Special Conditions: “Standard” conditions are commonly applied; “special” conditions are case-specific. Even “standard” conditions can be improper if, in context, they unreasonably restrict liberty or impinge on fundamental rights (e.g., family association).
Reasonable Suspicion (Search Condition): A specific, articulable basis to believe the defendant has committed a supervision violation or crime. It is a lower threshold than probable cause and acts as a safeguard against arbitrary searches.
No Greater Deprivation than Necessary: Conditions must be narrowly tailored to serve sentencing objectives; courts should consider less restrictive alternatives before imposing broader limits.
Delegation to Probation: Courts may delegate administrative details (like scheduling treatment) but cannot delegate core decisions that determine whether the defendant’s liberty is restricted, such as whether he can communicate with an immediate family member.
Plain-Error Review: When an issue was not preserved by objection, the appellant must show a clear error that affected substantial rights and seriously undermined the proceeding’s integrity. This stringent standard often results in affirmance even where the district court erred.
Oral Pronouncement vs. Written Judgment: The sentence pronounced orally controls; conditions added only in the written judgment can be invalid. The panel did not reach this issue for the risk-notification condition because it ordered the condition stricken on other grounds.

Conclusion

United States v. Rodriguez underscores three practical and doctrinal points in the Second Circuit’s supervised-release jurisprudence. First, courts must treat restrictions on immediate family contact as intrusions on a fundamental liberty interest, requiring clear, individualized justifications and careful tailoring; decisions about such restrictions cannot be delegated to probation. Second, the “third-party risk notification” condition is invalid in the Second Circuit post-Boles and has been eliminated in SDNY by standing order; if it appears in a judgment, it must be struck. Third, suspicion-based search conditions, especially in fraud cases that utilize mail and digital tools and involve evasive conduct, will typically be sustained if reasonably tailored—even where the district court did not expressly articulate its reasons—on plain-error review.

While non-precedential, this summary order consolidates and faithfully applies controlling authority (Myers, Bryant, Boles, Sims, Betts) and offers a roadmap for district courts to impose lawful, well-justified conditions—and for counsel to preserve objections where liberty interests are at stake.