Second Circuit Reaffirms Three-Year Limitations and Narrow Continuing-Violation Doctrine for Title IX Claims; Upholds Early Conversion to Summary Judgment in Pund v. St. Francis College

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order)

Date: October 16, 2025

Docket: 24-2750-cv

Introduction

In this summary order, the Second Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of New York’s entry of summary judgment against plaintiffs Becky and Charles Pund in a Title IX action arising from Becky Pund’s participation in St. Francis College’s women’s basketball program. The appeal raised five issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by converting defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment; (2) whether the Title IX claim was time-barred; (3) whether the court abused its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims; (4) whether the court abused its discretion by staying and declining to extend discovery; and (5) whether the court erred by deciding the motion without oral argument.

The panel (Judges Parker, Carney, and Nardini) affirmed on all grounds. The court’s order does not carry precedential effect under the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, but it confirms, applies, and synthesizes established principles governing Title IX limitations, the narrowness of the continuing-violation doctrine, and procedural discretion over conversion, discovery, and oral argument.

Summary of the Opinion

Conversion to Summary Judgment: The district court acted within its discretion to convert a 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion under Rule 12(d) after considering materials outside the pleadings (student transcript and registrar declaration), and after affording plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to present pertinent material. Plaintiffs provided only conclusory assertions and identified no specific evidence or discovery needed to create a genuine dispute.
Statute of Limitations (Title IX): Applying the three-year limitations period borrowed from New York’s personal injury statute (N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5)) and the Second Circuit’s decision in Purcell, the court held the Title IX claim was time-barred because the actionable events occurred between 2014 and 2016 and suit was not filed until February 2023. Plaintiffs’ “continuing effects” theory and invocation of the continuing-violation doctrine failed for lack of evidence of any discrete acts within the three-year window or any specific discriminatory policy.
Supplemental Jurisdiction: With the sole federal claim dismissed as untimely, the district court acted within its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Discovery: The district court did not abuse its discretion by staying and refusing to extend discovery where plaintiffs offered only speculative assertions that undiscovered materials might exist in defendants’ possession; they identified no specific discovery likely to create a material factual dispute on timeliness.
No Oral Argument Required: The district court permissibly decided the dispositive motion on the written submissions.
Pleading Additional Federal Claims: Plaintiffs’ generic references to “federal laws, statutes, and regulations,” and to NCAA requirements did not establish any additional federal question; NCAA rules are private, and vague allusions are insufficient to support federal jurisdiction.

Detailed Analysis

I. Precedents Cited and Their Role

In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P’ships Litig., 154 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1998): Provides that conversion of a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. This frames the deferential standard under which the panel assessed the district court’s decision to convert after considering material outside the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(d).
Covington Specialty Ins. Co. v. Indian Lookout Country Club, Inc., 62 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023): Confirms de novo review for grants of summary judgment. The panel reviewed the timeliness determination anew, applying the governing limitations and accrual rules.
Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2003): Provides abuse-of-discretion review for declining supplemental jurisdiction. The panel found the district court’s choice to dismiss the state claims following dismissal of the sole federal claim fully consistent with § 1367(c)(3).
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2008): Establishes abuse-of-discretion review for discovery management decisions, including stays. The panel relied on this in upholding the stay and denial of extended discovery.
AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 1999): Confirms that declining to hold oral argument lies within the district court’s discretion.
Purcell v. New York Inst. of Tech. – Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 931 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2019): The Second Circuit’s anchor for borrowing a state personal-injury limitations period for Title IX claims. In New York, that period is three years. The panel applied Purcell to fix the limitations period.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5): New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, borrowed for Title IX claims brought in New York.
Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999): Clarifies that a continuing violation is not established merely by continued effects of an earlier, time-barred act.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002): Distinguishes discrete discriminatory acts from continuing violations; discrete acts are not saved by the continuing-violation doctrine.
Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993): Emphasizes that the continuing-violation exception applies to specific discriminatory policies; unconnected incidents do not amount to a continuing violation.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3): Authorizes a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.
New York Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007): Restates the ordinary practice of dismissing state claims when federal claims are dismissed pre-trial.
In re Dana Corp., 574 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2009): Holds that discovery requests anchored in speculation are insufficient to forestall summary judgment; a bare assertion that evidence is in the opponent’s hands does not warrant denying summary judgment.
Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2005): Confirms that district courts may decide dispositive motions on the papers without oral argument.

II. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Conversion under Rule 12(d)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) permits conversion of a 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion where matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded, provided that parties have a reasonable opportunity to present all pertinent material. Here, defendants submitted the plaintiff’s transcript and a registrar’s declaration to address the timeliness of the Title IX claim. The district court—after finding the material relevant and after instructing plaintiffs how to oppose summary judgment, including by submitting evidence or explaining with specificity what discovery was needed and why—converted the motion.

Plaintiffs did not submit evidence creating a genuine factual dispute nor did they delineate specific discovery they needed and how it would be material to the limitations issue. Against that record, the Second Circuit held there was no abuse of discretion in converting the motion to summary judgment on the statute-of-limitations issue.

2. Title IX Statute of Limitations and Accrual

Title IX has no express statute of limitations. Under Second Circuit precedent, courts borrow the most analogous state limitations period—here, New York’s three-year period for personal injury claims. See Purcell; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). The actionable events occurred between 2014 and 2016, yet plaintiffs filed suit in February 2023. The court concluded the claim accrued well before February 2020 and is untimely.

Plaintiffs’ two timeliness theories failed:

Continuing effects are not continuing violations: Plaintiffs asserted that Ms. Pund continues to feel the effects of earlier conduct. Harris squarely forecloses relying on lingering effects to revive time-barred claims.
Narrow continuing-violation doctrine: Morgan and Lambert limit the doctrine to sustained practices or specific policies. Plaintiffs identified no discriminatory policy at St. Francis College (either institution-wide or within the basketball program) and pointed to no discrete acts within the three-year window. As a result, the continuing-violation doctrine did not apply.

3. Supplemental Jurisdiction over State-Law Claims

With the Title IX claim (the only federal question) dismissed as untimely, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims under § 1367(c)(3). The Second Circuit held this was a textbook exercise of discretion consistent with New York Mercantile Exchange v. ICE, which encourages dismissal of state claims when federal claims fall out before trial.

4. Discovery Stay and Denial of Extension

Plaintiffs argued that relevant discovery was “outstanding” and in defendants’ hands. The Second Circuit, applying In re Dana Corp., reiterated that speculation about what discovery might reveal does not justify denying summary judgment or extending discovery. Plaintiffs failed to identify specific materials they sought, explain how those materials would bear on the statute-of-limitations issue, or show a likelihood of creating a genuine dispute. The discovery stay and denial of more time were therefore within the district court’s discretion.

5. No Oral Argument Required

The district court decided the motion based on the submissions. Dotson v. Griesa recognizes that a district court may do so. The panel found no abuse of discretion.

6. Insufficient Pleading of Additional Federal Claims (Footnote Discussion)

Plaintiffs suggested they had pleaded other federal violations, referencing “federal laws, statutes, and regulations,” and NCAA requirements. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that such generic references are far too vague to invoke federal question jurisdiction, and that alleged violations of private association rules (NCAA) do not establish a federal claim. Accordingly, there was no additional federal hook to keep the case in federal court once Title IX fell out.

III. Impact and Practical Implications

1. Title IX Timeliness in New York

This decision underscores a consistent message in Second Circuit jurisprudence: Title IX claims in New York are governed by a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from C.P.L.R. § 214(5), and the court will enforce it strictly. Litigants must file within three years of accrual—typically when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury—and cannot rely on generalized assertions of continuing harm to avoid the time bar.

2. Narrow Use of the Continuing-Violation Doctrine

The continuing-violation doctrine remains a narrow exception reserved for specific discriminatory policies or an ongoing practice. Plaintiffs who hope to rely on this doctrine must identify evidence of such a policy and at least one act within the limitations period. Discrete acts that occurred years earlier—such as team-related decisions or incidents of alleged mistreatment—are not revived by the doctrine merely because their effects linger.

3. Early Conversion and Case Management

The order affirms district courts’ authority to convert motions early when timeliness is dispositive and the court considers materials outside the pleadings. Plaintiffs opposing conversion or summary judgment must do more than disagree; they must submit evidence or, at minimum, specifically identify what discovery is necessary, why it is material to the dispositive issue (here, timeliness), and how it will create a genuine dispute of material fact. Generalized claims that evidence resides with the opposing party are insufficient.

4. Supplemental Jurisdiction—Expect Dismissal of State Claims

Once the sole federal claim is dismissed pretrial, parties should anticipate that district courts in the Second Circuit will commonly decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, prompting remand to state court or dismissal without prejudice. This affects litigation strategy and forum selection.

5. Pleading Federal Claims with Specificity

The court’s rejection of vague references to “federal laws” and to NCAA rules is a cautionary signal: federal question jurisdiction demands well-pleaded federal causes of action, not generic references. NCAA rules do not, without more, create federal claims.

6. Discovery and Oral Argument

The order confirms a district court’s broad discretion to regulate discovery and decide motions on the papers, particularly when discovery would not affect a threshold legal issue like limitations. Parties must frame any request for additional discovery with specificity and materiality; otherwise, courts will not postpone a merits decision.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Title IX Limitations Period: Title IX doesn’t specify a filing deadline. Courts “borrow” the closest state-law deadline; for New York, that’s three years (the personal-injury limitations period).
Accrual: A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the claim. Acts from 2014–2016 accrue then; filing in 2023 is outside a three-year window.
Continuing Violation vs. Continuing Effects: Continuing violation means an ongoing discriminatory policy or practice; continuing effects are the lingering consequences of past acts. Only the former can sometimes extend the filing deadline. The latter does not.
Rule 12(d) Conversion: If a court considers evidence beyond the complaint on a motion to dismiss and doesn’t exclude it, it may convert the motion into one for summary judgment—but must give the parties a fair chance to present relevant material.
Summary Judgment and Discovery: To delay summary judgment for more discovery, the nonmovant must identify specific evidence sought and show how it would create a genuine factual dispute on a material issue. Speculation is not enough.
Supplemental Jurisdiction: Federal courts can hear related state-law claims along with federal claims, but once federal claims are dismissed early, courts often dismiss the state claims as well.
Summary Order (Second Circuit): A summary order can be cited under FRAP 32.1 but does not have precedential effect under Local Rule 32.1.1. It may be persuasive but is not binding precedent.

V. Key Takeaways

Title IX claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from personal injury law (Purcell; C.P.L.R. § 214(5)).
Continuing effects of past conduct do not revive time-barred claims (Harris); plaintiffs must show a specific discriminatory policy or ongoing practice, with at least one act in the limitations period (Morgan; Lambert).
Courts may convert a motion to dismiss to summary judgment when considering materials outside the pleadings; parties must respond with evidence or targeted discovery requests tied to material issues.
Vague references to “federal laws” or to NCAA rules do not create a federal cause of action or sustain federal jurisdiction.
After dismissal of the sole federal claim, district courts routinely decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims (§ 1367(c)(3); NYMEX v. ICE).
Speculative discovery requests do not forestall summary judgment (In re Dana), and district courts may decide motions without oral argument (Dotson).

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Pund v. St. Francis College reaffirms settled law rather than breaking new ground. It reinforces a strict three-year limitations period for Title IX claims brought in New York, the narrow scope of the continuing-violation doctrine, and district courts’ wide procedural discretion to convert motions, limit discovery, bypass oral argument, and decline supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims are dismissed. For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of timely filing, pleading specific federal causes of action (rather than generic references), and articulating concrete, material discovery needs when opposing early summary judgment. While non-precedential, the order offers a clear and practical roadmap for how similar Title IX timeliness disputes are likely to be handled in the Second Circuit.