Second Circuit reaffirms that vague internal complaints are not “protected activity” under Title VII and that comparators sharing the same protected traits undermine an inference of discriminatory motive
Introduction
In Richards v. New York City Health + Hospitals Corp. (No. 23-8033, decided October 14, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a non-precedential summary order, affirmed dismissal of a pro se employee’s Title VII and Fourteenth Amendment claims arising from the non-renewal of his two-year contract with Coney Island Hospital, a facility within New York City Health + Hospitals Corporation (NYCHH). The plaintiff, Alroy Richards, alleged race and national-origin discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation; he also advanced a state-law breach-of-contract claim.
The opinion addresses several recurring pleading issues in employment cases:
- What suffices at Rule 12(b)(6) to plausibly allege discriminatory intent under Title VII.
- How comparator allegations can undercut, rather than support, an inference of discrimination when comparators share the plaintiff’s protected traits.
- What constitutes “protected activity” for Title VII retaliation—and why vague internal complaints or lawsuits unrelated to Title VII do not qualify.
- Why hostile work environment claims must link the mistreatment to a protected characteristic.
- Procedural guardrails: the Monell framework for municipal liability under § 1983, supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, and New York’s NYHRL election-of-remedies bar.
The district court (E.D.N.Y., Judge Pamela K. Chen) dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state contract claim. The Second Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed.
Summary of the Opinion
The Second Circuit held:
- Title VII discrimination/hostile work environment: Even assuming an adverse employment action, Richards failed to plausibly allege discriminatory intent “because of” race or national origin. His own allegations showed that a colleague who shared his protected characteristics (Black and Jamaican-born) received better treatment in certain respects, undermining any inference that the employer acted out of animus toward those characteristics. For the same reason, the hostile work environment claim failed: Title VII requires mistreatment to occur because of a protected trait.
- Title VII retaliation: Richards did not plausibly allege engagement in protected activity. His internal complaints were too vague to show that he opposed practices made unlawful by Title VII with a reasonable, good-faith belief. A manager’s alleged threat tied to an unrelated lawsuit against the City was not a Title VII-protected activity. His EEOC and NYSDHR filings occurred after his contract ended and were not followed by any adverse action.
- § 1983/Fourteenth Amendment: Richards withdrew his Monell claims; he could not proceed directly under the Fourteenth Amendment against a municipal entity. Dismissal was proper.
- State-law claims: The district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining contract claim after dismissing all federal claims.
- New claims on appeal: Any newly asserted tort, disparate-impact, or ADEA claims raised for the first time on appeal would not be considered.
The judgment of dismissal was affirmed in full.
Analysis
Precedents Cited and Their Role
- Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024): Reiterates the de novo standard of review and the plausibility threshold under Rule 12(b)(6). The court applied the Twombly/Iqbal framework, emphasizing that conclusory legal assertions cannot carry a complaint.
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Establishes that courts accept well-pleaded facts as true but disregard legal conclusions. The panel leaned on Iqbal in examining whether the complaint plausibly alleged discriminatory motive and protected activity.
- Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023): Confirms liberal construction of pro se filings, which does not relieve a plaintiff of pleading non-conclusory facts establishing a plausible entitlement to relief.
- Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015): Provides the minimal pleading standard for Title VII disparate treatment at the motion-to-dismiss stage: membership in a protected class, qualification, adverse action, and “at least minimal support” for discriminatory intent. Also provides the retaliation prima facie framework (protected activity, employer knowledge, adverse action, causal connection).
- Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. 2023): Emphasizes that discrimination must be “because of” the protected trait and clarifies the ways plaintiffs can plead discriminatory intent—direct evidence or facts giving rise to a plausible inference.
- Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015): Articulates that a plaintiff may show “because of” intent directly or indirectly, and explains the plausibility route to an inference of discrimination at the pleading stage.
- Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam): Highlights the “sine qua non” requirement that adverse action be taken “because of” a protected characteristic—mere unfairness or harsh treatment is not actionable without that causal link.
- Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 2014): For hostile work environment, reiterates that the harassment must occur “because of” a protected characteristic; general incivility or workplace friction unconnected to protected traits is outside Title VII’s ambit.
- Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs P.C., 716 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2013): Defines what makes an internal complaint “protected activity”—the employee must have a good-faith, reasonable belief they are opposing unlawful discrimination, and the complaint must reasonably convey that it concerns discrimination prohibited by Title VII (e.g., tied to race, sex, national origin).
- Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (en banc): After Monell, a plaintiff cannot sue a municipality directly under the Constitution; § 1983 is the vehicle, and Monell’s “policy or custom” requirement applies.
- Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2006): Authorizes district courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal claims are dismissed early, reinforcing comity and efficiency principles.
- York v. Ass’n of Bar of the City of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002): Under New York’s election-of-remedies doctrine, NYHRL claims pursued in local administrative proceedings cannot be refiled as plenary actions in court.
- Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 838 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2016): Restates the general rule against considering issues raised for the first time on appeal.
Legal Reasoning
1) Discrimination: the “because of” requirement and comparator allegations
The core analytical move is the court’s insistence on a plausible link between the adverse actions and Richards’s protected characteristics (race and national origin). Title VII does not outlaw workplace unfairness writ large; it targets adverse decisions motivated “because of” a protected trait.
Richards alleged he was hired in a five-person cohort: himself (Black, Jamaican-born), two white women born in Russia, one Black woman born in the United States, and one Black woman born in Jamaica. He pleaded that only the two Jamaican-born employees (himself and the other Black colleague) did not have their two-year contracts renewed. He also alleged that his Jamaican-born colleague received a “send-off” while he was escorted out immediately after being told of the non-renewal.
The panel held that these allegations did not plausibly support discriminatory intent. It emphasized that Richards’s own pleadings showed that a colleague sharing his protected traits was treated more favorably in certain respects, which undermines the inference that the employer’s actions were “because of” those traits. Without direct evidence or sufficiently probative circumstantial facts tying the non-renewal or the manner of exit to race or national origin, the claim could not proceed past Rule 12(b)(6).
Notably, the court adopted a practical lens: at the pleadings stage, plaintiffs must do more than label conduct “discriminatory”; they must present facts that make a discriminatory motive plausible. Here, an allegation that a similarly situated comparator with the same protected characteristics was treated better makes a discriminatory inference less, not more, plausible.
Important nuance: The court did not hold that favorable treatment of a same-class comparator always defeats an inference. Discrimination can occur within a class (e.g., sub-group, intersectional bias) and need not affect every class member identically. But allegations must still coherently point to a discriminatory reason. Here, the juxtaposition—non-renewal for both Jamaican-born employees, yet markedly different send-off treatment—did not, in the panel’s view, bridge the gap between adverse action and prohibited motive.
2) Hostile work environment: the “because of” link
The hostile work environment claim faltered on the same causal element. Title VII requires that hostility be “because of” a protected characteristic. The panel did not reach “severe or pervasive” because Richards failed to plausibly link any hostility to race or national origin. Mistreatment unmoored from protected traits—however unpleasant—is not actionable under Title VII.
3) Retaliation: specificity and reasonableness of “protected activity”
The retaliation claim failed for want of protected activity. To constitute protected opposition, a complaint must, viewed objectively, communicate that the employee is protesting conduct he reasonably believes violates Title VII (e.g., conduct tied to race, national origin). Richards’s internal complaints, as described, were too vague and non-specific to show he was opposing Title VII-prohibited practices. Conclusory references to “discrimination” are insufficient where nothing indicates the employee or the employer understood the complaint to be about a protected characteristic.
The court also dispatched an alternative theory: a manager’s threat allegedly tied to Richards’s unrelated lawsuit against New York City. Because that litigation did not concern employment practices prohibited by Title VII, it did not qualify as protected activity. Finally, filings with the EEOC and the NYSDHR occurred after Richards’s employment ended and were not followed by any adverse employment action, defeating any post-termination retaliation theory.
4) § 1983/Fourteenth Amendment and Monell
Richards explicitly withdrew his Monell claims. As a matter of law, a plaintiff cannot sue a municipality directly under the Fourteenth Amendment; § 1983 is the proper vehicle, and municipal liability requires alleging a policy or custom that caused the constitutional injury. With no Monell claim in play, the Fourteenth Amendment claim could not proceed.
5) State-law claims and jurisdictional doctrines
The district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law breach-of-contract claim after dismissing all claims with original jurisdiction, a course of action reinforced by Kolari. The panel also acknowledged New York’s election-of-remedies doctrine (York), which would have barred the NYHRL claim in court once pursued administratively; in any event, the district court analyzed the NYHRL claim under Title VII standards and found it deficient on the merits.
Impact
Although this decision is a summary order without precedential effect, it is citable and practically significant for pleading standards in Title VII cases within the Second Circuit:
- Comparator allegations can cut both ways: Plaintiffs often invoke comparators to show disparate treatment. This decision underscores that when a comparator shares the plaintiff’s protected traits yet is treated better, those allegations may undermine rather than bolster a discriminatory inference. Plaintiffs should carefully select and describe comparators—“similarly situated in all material respects”—who differ in the protected trait at issue or articulate a coherent theory (e.g., sub-group or intersectional discrimination) supported by factual detail.
- Protected activity must be explicit enough to be recognized as Title VII opposition: Vague internal complaints about “unfairness,” “harassment,” or “discrimination” that do not identify a protected trait or otherwise make clear that the complaint concerns Title VII-prohibited conduct will not suffice. To survive dismissal, pleadings should describe the contents of complaints, when and to whom they were made, and how they conveyed a reasonable, good-faith belief of unlawful discrimination.
- Post-termination filings do not support retaliation without post-filing adverse action: Participation in EEOC/NYSDHR processes is protected, but absent a post-filing adverse action by the employer, there is no retaliation claim. Plaintiffs should plead the timing, employer knowledge, and causal nexus with specificity.
- Hostile work environment must be “because of” a protected trait: Mere workplace incivility or harsh management practices, without a link to protected characteristics, will not support Title VII liability.
- Municipal defendants and Monell: Claims against municipal entities must proceed via § 1983 with a Monell policy-or-custom theory. Direct constitutional claims against municipalities are foreclosed.
- Strategic choices on NYHRL claims: The election-of-remedies doctrine bars relitigation in court of NYHRL claims already filed with a local or state agency. Counsel should weigh administrative and judicial options with this preclusion in mind.
- Appellate preservation: New claims cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiffs should present all theories at the district court level or risk forfeiture.
For employers, the decision suggests several compliance takeaways: documenting legitimate reasons for non-renewals, ensuring clear and consistent treatment at separation, and responding to internal complaints in a manner that allows the employer (and later, a court) to discern whether the complaint alleges Title VII-prohibited conduct. For plaintiffs, it highlights the importance of contemporaneously framing internal complaints in terms that unmistakably relate to protected traits.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Adverse employment action (Title VII discrimination): A materially negative change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, such as termination, non-renewal of a contract, demotion, or a pay cut.
- “Because of” a protected trait: The adverse action must be motivated at least in part by the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Unfair treatment not tied to a protected trait is not actionable under Title VII.
- Comparator: A colleague outside the plaintiff’s protected class (or outside the plaintiff’s protected sub-group) who, despite being similarly situated in relevant respects (same supervisor, same rules, similar performance), received better treatment. Well-pled comparator facts can suggest discriminatory intent.
- Protected activity (retaliation): Opposing or complaining about discrimination prohibited by Title VII, or participating in a Title VII investigation or proceeding. The complaint must reasonably convey that the employee is raising discrimination tied to a protected trait; generalized workplace grievances are not enough.
- Hostile work environment: Harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment—and that occurs because of a protected trait.
- Monell liability: Municipal entities are not liable under § 1983 based on respondeat superior. A plaintiff must identify a municipal policy, custom, or practice that caused the violation.
- Election of remedies (NYHRL): If a plaintiff files a NYHRL claim with a local or state human rights agency (e.g., NYSDHR), he generally cannot later bring the same claim in court.
- Summary order: A non-precedential appellate disposition in the Second Circuit. It may be cited per FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1 but does not bind future panels.
Conclusion
Richards confirms, in a citable summary order, several practical pillars of Title VII pleading in the Second Circuit. Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that adverse actions occurred “because of” a protected characteristic, not merely that they were treated harshly or unfairly. Comparator facts must be chosen and framed with care: when a comparator shares the plaintiff’s protected trait and is treated more favorably, the inference of discriminatory motive weakens. Retaliation claims falter unless the plaintiff plausibly alleges a protected activity—an opposition or participation clearly tied to Title VII—and an ensuing adverse action with a causal link. Hostile work environment claims require the same “because of” connection. Procedurally, municipal liability must proceed via § 1983 and Monell; state-law claims may be dismissed without prejudice once federal claims are gone; and NYHRL claims are constrained by election-of-remedies.
While not precedential, the decision is a useful touchstone for litigants and courts screening discrimination and retaliation claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Its message is straightforward: plead facts that make discriminatory or retaliatory motive plausible—not merely possible—and ensure that internal complaints unmistakably communicate protected-trait-based opposition if retaliation protection is to attach.
Case Background Snapshot
- Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order; non-precedential).
- Panel: Circuit Judges Barrington D. Parker and Susan L. Carney.
- Date: October 14, 2025.
- Parties: Alroy Richards (pro se) v. New York City Health + Hospitals Corporation.
- Employment context: Hospital Care Investigator, two-year contract (2018–2020) at Coney Island Hospital (NYCHH).
- Claims: Title VII discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation; Fourteenth Amendment; NYHRL; state-law breach of contract.
- Disposition: Affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of federal claims; district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over contract claim affirmed.
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