Introduction

In Zafar v. Bondi (No. 23-6312, Nov. 3, 2025), a summary order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court denied the petition for review filed by Muhammad Bilal Zafar, a Pakistani national, challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. Although summary orders carry no precedential effect under the Second Circuit’s rules, the court’s reasoning offers a clear, up-to-date application of established principles governing adverse credibility determinations, the use and reliability of credible fear interview records, and the role of corroboration in asylum proceedings.

The dispute centered on three interconnected issues:

• Whether inconsistencies between Zafar’s credible fear interview and later hearing testimony supported an adverse credibility finding under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);
• Whether the credible fear interview record bore “hallmarks of reliability” sufficient to be used substantively without violating due process; and
• Whether the petitioner’s corroboration—family letters and police reports—was sufficient to rehabilitate credibility once called into question.

The case arises from Zafar’s claim that he was targeted by the Mughal family in Pakistan due to their belief that his uncle killed Ashraf Mughal, with incidents alleged in 2008 and 2014, and ongoing threats tied to the uncle’s whereabouts. The panel—Chief Judge Debra Ann Livingston, and Circuit Judges Beth Robinson and Myrna Pérez—held that substantial evidence supported the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, which was dispositive of all forms of relief because they shared a common factual predicate.

Note: As a Second Circuit summary order, this disposition is nonprecedential. However, it expressly relies on binding circuit precedent—including the 2025 decision in Singh v. Bondi—clarifying the reliability assessment for credible fear interview records.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied Zafar’s petition for review, affirming the BIA’s decision. The court limited its review to the agency’s adverse credibility determination, applying the substantial evidence standard. It found that:

• Multiple inconsistencies between Zafar’s credible fear interview and his subsequent testimony—concerning the 2008 attack (number of assailants and whether he was going to or returning from school), the sequence of reporting and treatment in 2014 (police first vs. hospital first), and the uncle’s location (outside Pakistan vs. in Pakistan)—amply supported the IJ’s adverse credibility ruling.
• The credible fear interview record displayed “hallmarks of reliability” and could be used for credibility assessment without violating due process. The interview was detailed, conducted with an interpreter, recorded in typed Q&A, included open-ended questioning, and Zafar confirmed fair treatment and comprehension.
• Corroborating letters from family, as statements by interested witnesses unavailable for cross-examination, were entitled to diminished weight. Although police reports were discussed at the hearing, they did not reconcile the core inconsistencies or explain memory gaps on basic facts.
• Because asylum, withholding, and CAT relied on the same factual account, the adverse credibility determination was dispositive of all three forms of relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005): Clarifies that the court reviews the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, focusing here on credibility. This frames the scope of review limited to the adverse credibility issue.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B): Sets the deferential “substantial evidence” standard—agency fact-finding is conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The panel repeatedly emphasizes this high bar.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii): The REAL ID Act credibility provision allowing reliance on inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods under the totality of the circumstances, “without regard to whether” they go to the heart of the claim. The court uses this to validate reliance on the inconsistencies at issue.
• Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008): Confirms deference to IJ credibility findings under the totality framework; the court will not lightly disturb adverse credibility determinations.
• Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018): Reaffirms the substantial evidence standard and notes that credibility findings can be dispositive across asylum/withholding/CAT when claims share a factual predicate. The court invokes it both for standard of review and for dispositive effect.
• Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2020): Emphasizes that even a single inconsistency can suffice to uphold an adverse credibility finding; multiple inconsistencies bolster the determination.
• Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005): A petitioner’s explanation for inconsistencies must compel crediting the testimony; merely plausible explanations do not suffice. The panel applies this to reject Zafar’s explanations (confusion; verification later via police reports).
• Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715 (2d Cir. 2009): Establishes that credible fear interview records can be reliable evidence where they exhibit certain hallmarks (detail, translation, Q&A format, responsiveness, open-endedness), and nervousness alone does not undermine reliability. Central to rejecting Zafar’s due process claim.
• Singh v. Bondi, 139 F.4th 189 (2d Cir. 2025): Reinforces that IJs should assess interview accuracy and reliability based on the totality of the circumstances. The court relies on Singh to confirm and update the reliability framework for credible fear interviews.
• Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2004): Statements that the interview was comfortable and understood undercut claims of coercion; used here to reject the claim that the interview was improperly pressured.
• Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2007): Lack of corroboration can prevent rehabilitation of testimony already called into question; used to deem the corroboration inadequate after credibility sank.
• Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2013): Courts defer to agency weight assignments for documentary evidence; invoked to uphold diminished weight for letters from interested witnesses.
• Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2006): Presumption that the IJ considered all evidence unless the record compels a contrary conclusion; used to respond to the contention that police reports were ignored.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standard of Review and Scope

The court limits its review to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination as adopted by the BIA. Applying § 1252(b)(4)(B), the court asks whether any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion. This substantial evidence lens is highly deferential, particularly with credibility, which is uniquely tied to the IJ’s observation of testimony and evaluation of the record.

2) Totality-Based Credibility and Inconsistencies

Under § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), the IJ may consider inconsistencies across written/oral statements, interviews, and documents, without any requirement that they go to the heart of the claim. The court identifies three concrete inconsistencies:

• 2008 attack details: Testimony: attacked returning home from school by three family members plus 13–14 others. Interview: attacked on the way to school by three individuals only. This discrepancy goes to timing and the severity/scope of the attack.
• 2014 reporting and treatment sequence: Testimony: hospital first, then police report. Interview: police first, advised to go to hospital; hospital then directed him to Lahore. This contradicts the procedural narrative central to his claim of institutional obstruction.
• Uncle’s whereabouts: Testimony: uncle left for Italy, returned to Pakistan by 2013, in Pakistan through 2016 and at the 2018 hearing. Interview: uncle was outside Pakistan (stated “Italy,” and in a noted phrasing, “in India,” which the court does not rely upon). The key reliability point is that he indicated his uncle was not in Pakistan when Zafar claims he was targeted because the Mughals could not reach the uncle.

The court underscores that multiple inconsistencies “forcefully” support adverse credibility (citing Likai Gao). Importantly, the panel’s footnote clarifies it did not rely on the “India” notation; rather, the material inconsistency is the uncle’s being outside Pakistan versus the hearing testimony placing him in Pakistan—an inconsistency about a basic, persistent fact central to the persecution narrative.

3) Rejection of Explanations for Inconsistencies

Zafar’s explanations—confusion at the time of interview; later “verification” via police reports; claim he had not been asked about the uncle’s then-current location—did not compel a reasonable factfinder to credit them (Majidi). The court also notes the interview occurred closer in time to the events than the hearing, making it harder to accept that he misremembered “basic details” (e.g., number of attackers; route to/from school; uncle’s location).

4) Credible Fear Interview: Reliability and Due Process

The court finds the credible fear interview record sufficiently reliable under Ming Zhang and Singh v. Bondi. Hallmarks present here included:

• Typed, detailed Q&A format spanning 12 pages;
• Use of an interpreter;
• Open-ended questions designed to elicit an asylum narrative;
• Responsive answers;
• Petitioner’s acknowledgments that he was treated “very well,” understood his rights, had no interpreter issues, and that the officer’s summary was accurate with nothing further to add.

Claims that the record must be incomplete because the interview lasted 2.5 hours are deemed conclusory. The presence of an interpreter, pauses, and non-substantive prompts can account for duration. The panel cites Ramsameachire and Ming Zhang to reject the idea that nervousness or unspecified pressure inherently undermines reliability. On this record, admitting and crediting the interview did not violate due process.

5) Corroboration and Weight of Evidence

Once credibility is questioned, corroboration becomes crucial (Biao Yang). The IJ and BIA accorded diminished weight to letters from family members (interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination), consistent with Y.C. v. Holder. As for police reports, even assuming they were fully considered (Xiao Ji Chen presumption), they did not reconcile the contradictions or explain the memory lapses regarding fundamental details. The court thus endorses the agency’s conclusion that corroboration failed to rehabilitate the claim.

6) Dispositive Effect on All Relief

Because asylum, withholding, and CAT in this case all rest on the same factual account—persecution by the Mughal family connected to the uncle’s alleged crime—the adverse credibility determination is dispositive across the board (Hong Fei Gao).

Impact

While nonprecedential, this order meaningfully reinforces several important, practical points for future cases in the Second Circuit:

• Credible fear interviews retain robust evidentiary value post-Singh v. Bondi. Where the interview record shows detail, interpreter use, open-ended questioning, and petitioner acknowledgement of fairness, IJs may rely on it to assess credibility. Nervousness or speculation about omitted exchanges, without specifics, will not suffice to discredit the record.
• Totality-of-circumstances credibility is exacting. Inconsistencies need not go to the heart of the claim; even one can be enough. Applicants must proactively reconcile discrepancies between early statements and later testimony.
• Timing matters for credibility. Statements made closer to the events may be viewed as more reliable for “basic details,” especially where later explanations are generic (e.g., “confusion” or belated “verification”).
• Corroboration must be strategically strong. Letters from interested, unavailable witnesses carry limited weight. Documentary corroboration that does not engage the specific inconsistencies will not rehabilitate credibility.
• Adverse credibility sweeps broadly when claims share a predicate. If asylum, withholding, and CAT rest on the same account, losing credibility on that account usually defeats all forms of relief.
• Fairness safeguards are visible in the record. The panel’s choice not to rely on the “India” notation, because the petitioner had no chance to explain it, models caution that can diminish due process concerns while still allowing reliance on the noncontroversial contradiction (uncle outside vs. inside Pakistan).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adverse Credibility Determination: A finding that the applicant’s testimony is not believable, often due to inconsistencies or contradictions across statements and evidence.
• Substantial Evidence Standard: A deferential appellate standard. The court asks whether a reasonable adjudicator could have reached the agency’s conclusion; reversal occurs only if the opposite conclusion is compelled.
• Totality of the Circumstances (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)): IJs consider all factors—consistency within and across statements, consistency with other evidence, omissions, inaccuracies—without requiring that each inconsistency be central to the claim.
• Credible Fear Interview: An initial screening interview for individuals expressing fear of persecution if returned. Its record, when reliable, can be used by IJs to evaluate credibility.
• Hallmarks of Reliability (for interviews): Detailed, typed Q&A; competent interpretation; open-ended questioning; responsive answers; petitioner confirmations of understanding and fairness.
• Corroboration: Additional evidence (documents, witness letters, reports) supporting testimony. If credibility is questioned, corroboration should directly resolve the contradictions.
• Interested Witness Letters: Statements from family or close associates. Agencies may give them less weight if authors are unavailable for cross-examination.
• Dispositive Effect Across Relief: When asylum, withholding, and CAT claims rest on the same factual narrative, an adverse credibility finding generally defeats all three.

Conclusion

Zafar v. Bondi exemplifies the Second Circuit’s continued adherence to a rigorous, totality-based credibility framework and a pragmatic approach to the reliability of credible fear interview records. The court’s application of Ming Zhang and its express reliance on Singh v. Bondi confirm that well-documented credible fear interviews—especially those marked by detailed Q&A, qualified interpretation, and petitioner acknowledgments of fairness—may substantively ground adverse credibility determinations without offending due process.

The decision also underscores that applicants must meticulously reconcile early statements with later testimony and marshal corroboration that directly addresses identified contradictions. Letters from interested, unavailable witnesses will rarely carry the day, and generic explanations for inconsistencies will not compel crediting the testimony.

Ultimately, even as a nonprecedential summary order, the opinion reinforces stable doctrines that will shape practice in the Second Circuit: robust deference to IJ credibility findings; flexible but meaningful reliability checks for interview records; and the decisive role of credibility in asylum, withholding, and CAT cases built on a common factual predicate. For advocates, the message is clear—frontload consistency, anticipate the use of interview records, and assemble corroboration that squarely resolves any discrepancy the record may contain.