Second Circuit Re-Defines the Boundaries of De-Novo Resentencing Discretion After § 924(c) Vacatur When the Habeas Judge Has Recently Ruled on a § 3582(c)(1)(A) Motion

Introduction

United States v. Orena, 24-835(Con) (2d Cir. July 31, 2025) addresses what happens after a collateral attack vacates a single count of conviction—here, a § 924(c) firearms count—under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The appellant, former Colombo Family acting boss Victor “Little Vic” Orena, sought de novo resentencing on the eight surviving racketeering, murder-related, and loansharking counts after his § 924(c) conviction was set aside pursuant to United States v. Davis.

The Eastern District of New York (Komitee, J.) simply corrected the judgment—removing the five-year consecutive term—but otherwise left the life sentences untouched. Orena appealed, arguing that the Second Circuit’s then-recent decision in Kaziu v. United States 108 F.4th 86 (2d Cir. 2024) mandated full resentencing whenever the habeas judge: (1) was not the original sentencing judge, and (2) confronted meaningful post-sentence developments (health, prison conduct, changes in law, etc.).

The Court of Appeals (Robinson, Pérez & Nathan, JJ.) affirmed, carving out a significant limitation on Kaziu and expanding the discretionary space it had left open in United States v. Peña, 58 F.4th 613 (2d Cir. 2023). The panel held that where the same judge has recently undertaken a thorough § 3553(a) analysis in the context of a § 3582(c)(1)(A) (compassionate-release) motion, declining to repeat that analysis at a fresh resentencing is not an abuse of discretion—even if resentencing would otherwise be non-ministerial and the judge was not the original sentencer.

Summary of the Judgment

Vacatur of Orena’s § 924(c) count under Davis was undisputed.
The district court amended the judgment to remove that count but refused to hold a full resentencing.
The Second Circuit distinguished Kaziu, emphasized the recent § 3582 ruling, and found no abuse of discretion.
Arguments based on Booker (advisory Guidelines) and alleged FBI misconduct were rejected: the first had not driven the original sentence, the second was a collateral attack on convictions, not on the sentence.
Result: original life sentences (minus the five-year consecutive term) remain.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019)
Invalidated the residual clause of § 924(c)’s “crime of violence” definition, paving the way for vacatur of Orena’s gun count.
United States v. Peña, 58 F.4th 613 (2d Cir. 2023)
Held that resentencing after vacatur is not automatically required; left open when refusal would be an abuse of discretion. Peña was the doctrinal starting point for the present dispute.
Kaziu v. United States, 108 F.4th 86 (2d Cir. 2024)
Found abuse of discretion where the district court, without being the original sentencer and without recent § 3553(a) analysis, declined to resentence despite meaningful post-sentence rehabilitation evidence.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
Made the Guidelines advisory; invoked by Orena but deemed non-dispositive because Judge Weinstein had expressly disavowed Guidelines primacy in 1993.
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011)
Cited for the “sentencing package” doctrine and the need to respect original sentencing intent—an underpinning of the panel’s discretion analysis.

2. Court’s Legal Reasoning

Discretion under § 2255(b)
The statute gives four remedial options. Appellate review is for abuse of discretion; hence the panel focused on whether declining resentencing fell outside that range.
“Ministerial” vs. “Non-Ministerial” Yardstick Refined
Peña suggested that when resentencing would be ministerial (e.g., mandatory life left untouched) refusal is plainly permissible. Kaziu suggested that when it would be non-ministerial, refusal may be suspect, especially if (a) new judge, and (b) changed circumstances unreconciled with § 3553(a). Orena adds a third dimension: if the new judge has already just performed a rigorous § 3553(a) examination in a § 3582 setting, repeating the exercise is unnecessary.
Weight of the Recent § 3582 Decision
Judge Komitee had—eight months earlier—denied compassionate release after an exhaustive review of health, age, disciplinary record, and danger to the community. The panel treated that ruling as a functional surrogate for the analysis ordinarily performed at resentencing.
Booker Argument Rejected on the Facts
Judge Weinstein’s 1993 memorandum overtly downplayed the Guidelines, focusing on city-wide “human and economic devastation.” Hence, the mandatory/advisory shift did not undermine the sentencing rationale.
Collateral-Attack Material versus Sentencing Material
Alleged suppression of exculpatory evidence (Scarpa/DeVecchio misconduct, Sparaco disclosures) goes to guilt, not to § 3553(a) factors. Such claims require a fresh § 2255 petition, not resentencing.

3. Potential Impact of the Judgment

Narrows Kaziu’s Reach: Petitioners cannot rely solely on the Kaziu formula (new judge + changed circumstances) if the same judge has recently adjudicated a § 3582 motion.
Encourages Strategic Sequencing by Litigants: Counsel must consider whether filing a § 3582 motion first may later foreclose resentencing arguments.
Guidance for District Courts: Provides a checklist—original sentencing rationale, recency of § 3553(a) analysis, presence of non-sentencing collateral claims—to gauge when resentencing is “an empty formality.”
Influences Compassionate-Release Practice: Elevates the precedential weight of § 3582 rulings for subsequent § 2255 proceedings.
Organized-Crime Sentences: Signals that extraordinary health decline will rarely suffice to disturb life sentences for leadership-level organized crime violence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 2255 Petition: A “habeas-style” motion filed by a federal prisoner challenging conviction or sentence as unconstitutional, illegal, or otherwise subject to collateral attack.
De-Novo Resentencing: Starting over as if no previous sentence existed, recalculating Guidelines, re-weighing § 3553(a) factors, and pronouncing a fresh aggregate sentence.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) Motion (Compassionate Release): Allows courts to reduce a sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” but only after considering the same § 3553(a) factors used at sentencing.
Mandatory vs. Advisory Guidelines: Before Booker (2005) judges were bound by the Sentencing Guidelines; afterward they must “consider” the Guidelines but have discretion.
Ministerial Correction: A change that affects only clerical or mechanical aspects (e.g., deleting a vacated count) without altering the core sentencing analysis.

Conclusion

United States v. Orena adds a pivotal layer to Second Circuit doctrine on post-conviction resentencing. Together with Peña (no automatic resentencing) and Kaziu (limits on discretion when the sentencing mosaic materially shifts), Orena clarifies that:

When a habeas judge has already undertaken a full-blown § 3553(a) analysis in a recent § 3582 proceeding, declining to conduct yet another analysis at a § 2255-triggered resentencing falls comfortably within the court’s discretion, even though resentencing would be non-ministerial and the judge is not the original sentencer.

Practitioners must now treat compassionate-release litigation as a potential double-edged sword: the thorough record it produces on sentencing factors can be invoked later by the government to resist a fresh resentencing. For organized crime defendants serving life terms, Orena reiterates the Second Circuit’s reluctance to disturb sentences premised on extraordinary violence and social harm, notwithstanding age, infirmity, or post-Booker developments.

Key Takeaway: A recent, detailed § 3553(a) analysis in a different procedural posture may render a full resentencing “an empty formality,” thereby granting district courts broad discretion to opt for a simple judgment correction after § 924(c) vacatur.