Second Circuit Holds LoLA’s Six‑Month Deadline Is a Non‑Jurisdictional Claim‑Processing Rule; Untimely Petitions Must Be Dismissed Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Second Circuit Holds LoLA’s Six‑Month Deadline Is a Non‑Jurisdictional Claim‑Processing Rule; Untimely Petitions Must Be Dismissed Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in In the Matter of the Complaint of Ed Seganti (No. 24-1519, decided Aug. 26, 2025), which resolves a recurring question in admiralty limitation practice: Is the Limitation of Liability Act’s six‑month filing deadline a jurisdictional bar or a non‑jurisdictional claim‑processing rule? The court answers decisively that 46 U.S.C. § 30529(a)’s six‑month deadline is non‑jurisdictional. As a result, an untimely limitation petition does not deprive a district court of subject‑matter jurisdiction; instead, it fails on the merits and should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The case arises from a May 29, 2022 boating collision in Nassau County, New York, involving petitioner‑owner Ed Seganti and claimant‑passenger Nancy Skolnik. After Skolnik’s counsel sent Seganti a letter in September 2022 announcing a personal injury claim arising from the collision, Seganti waited until November 1, 2023 to file a complaint seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability under the Limitation of Liability Act (LoLA). The district court dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, holding the petition was untimely under § 30529(a). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but modified the basis: the defect is not jurisdictional; it is a failure to state a claim because the six‑month clock had run.

Summary of the Judgment

  • The six‑month deadline in 46 U.S.C. § 30529(a) for filing a limitation petition is a non‑jurisdictional claim‑processing rule. It does not restrict the subject‑matter jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
  • Because the rule is mandatory once invoked, Seganti’s petition—filed more than six months after he received written notice of Skolnik’s claim—was untimely and fails to state a claim.
  • The district court erred by dismissing for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction. The correct disposition is dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). The Second Circuit therefore modified and affirmed the judgment, with prejudice.
  • The September 22, 2022 letter from claimant’s counsel provided sufficient “written notice of a claim” to trigger the six‑month limitations period under § 30529(a), applying the Second Circuit’s “whole tenor” standard for notice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court’s analysis is anchored in modern Supreme Court jurisprudence distinguishing jurisdictional rules from claim‑processing rules, alongside Second Circuit admiralty precedents defining “written notice” under LoLA and clarifying the source of admiralty jurisdiction.

  • Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006): Establishes the “clear statement” rule—Congress must clearly state that a rule is jurisdictional. Influenced the court’s insistence on statutory text explicitly tying a deadline to jurisdiction; § 30529(a) does not.
  • United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015): Clarifies that even emphatic, exception‑free deadlines are ordinarily non‑jurisdictional absent a clear jurisdictional statement; “something special” is required to make a time bar jurisdictional. The court quotes Wong to characterize § 30529(a) as “mundane statute‑of‑limitations language.”
  • Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U.S. 480 (2024); Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152 (2023); Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011); Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U.S. 145 (2013); Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016): A series of Supreme Court decisions reinforcing that most filing deadlines are non‑jurisdictional and that such rules can be forfeited or waived if not timely invoked. These cases collectively inform the Second Circuit’s framework.
  • Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019): Warns against “drive‑by jurisdictional rulings.” The court uses this to discount a 1951 Second Circuit reference to “jurisdiction” in this context (Spearin) as imprecise.
  • United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2021): Emphasizes that a provision is not jurisdictional when it “does not refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the courts,” a formulation applied to § 30529(a).
  • In re Petition of Germain, 824 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 2016); MLC Fishing, Inc. v. Velez, 667 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2011); Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2014): Confirm that admiralty jurisdiction flows from 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), not from LoLA itself. This separation of the jurisdictional grant from the filing deadline supports the non‑jurisdictional characterization.
  • Doxsee Sea Clam Co., Inc. v. Brown, 13 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Allen N. Spooner & Sons, Inc., 253 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1958); Complaint of Morania Barge No. 190, Inc., 690 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1982): Establish the “broad and flexible” notice standard under § 30529(a) (formerly codified elsewhere), emphasizing the “whole tenor” of the notice and that uncertainty about damages does not delay the six‑month clock.
  • Petition of Spearin, Preston & Burrows, Inc., 190 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1951): An older decision loosely describing timeliness as jurisdictional. The court treats this as a non‑precedential “drive‑by” use of the term “jurisdiction.”
  • Martz v. Horazdovsky, 33 F.4th 1157 (9th Cir. 2022); In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th 787 (5th Cir. 2021); Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. Carroll, 918 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2019): Sister‑circuit authority holding the same six‑month deadline (then codified at § 30511(a)) is non‑jurisdictional. The Second Circuit aligns with this consensus.
  • Donnelly v. CARRP, 37 F.4th 44 (2d Cir. 2022); Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112 (2d Cir. 2022): Explain the consequences of the jurisdictional/non‑jurisdictional distinction and the significance of dismissal grounds (e.g., with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6)).
  • United States v. Adams, 955 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2020); Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Staten Island R.R. Corp., 792 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1986): Recognize appellate authority to modify judgments and to affirm as modified—used here to convert a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal into a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Text and Structure: Section 30529(a) states that a vessel owner’s limitation action “must be brought within 6 months after a claimant gives the owner written notice of a claim.” The statute speaks to timeliness, not to the court’s power. It contains no jurisdictional language. Meanwhile, admiralty jurisdiction resides in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), not in LoLA. The separation between the jurisdictional grant and the deadline is a strong indicator that the deadline is non‑jurisdictional.
  2. Supreme Court Framework: Applying Arbaugh and Wong, the court demands a “clear statement” to make a condition jurisdictional. Because § 30529(a) contains “mundane statute‑of‑limitations language” and does “nothing special, beyond setting an exception‑free deadline,” it is an ordinary, non‑jurisdictional claim‑processing rule.
  3. Rejecting Older Loose Usage: The court declines to treat Spearin’s 1951 reference to “jurisdiction” as binding, characterizing it as a “drive‑by jurisdictional ruling.” Modern doctrine controls.
  4. Mandatory but Waivable: Although non‑jurisdictional, § 30529(a) remains mandatory once invoked by the opposing party. Here, Skolnik objected to timeliness, so the court was obliged to enforce the deadline. Because the petition was filed more than six months after written notice, it fails to state a claim.
  5. What Counts as “Written Notice”: Applying Doxsee and Spooner, the court reads notice letters in their entirety and considers their “whole tenor.” The September 22, 2022 letter:
    • Identified the claimant (Skolnik) and recipient (Seganti),
    • Specified the accident date and location,
    • Alleged negligence and personal injuries, and
    • Demanded preservation of evidence and referral to insurance.
    That was enough to signal “an actual or potential claim” subject to limitation and potentially exceeding the value of the vessel; precision about injury extent or damages is not required. The six‑month clock thus started in September 2022.
  6. Correct Remedy Matters: Because the defect is non‑jurisdictional, the proper disposition is Rule 12(b)(6), typically with prejudice when no amendment can cure untimeliness. The court modified the district court’s judgment accordingly and affirmed as modified.

Impact

This decision brings important procedural clarity to limitation practice in the Second Circuit and aligns it with the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.

  • Uniformity and Predictability: Practitioners can now rely on a consistent rule within the Second Circuit that the LoLA six‑month deadline is non‑jurisdictional. This reduces uncertainty about when and how courts may act sua sponte and what form dismissals should take.
  • Consequences for Motion Practice:
    • Untimeliness is a merits defect, not a jurisdictional one. It should be raised via Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1).
    • Claim‑processing defenses can be waived or forfeited if not timely asserted. Courts are not obliged to raise them sua sponte. Claimants who prefer to litigate outside a federal limitation forum must promptly object to untimely filings.
    • Dismissals for untimeliness are typically with prejudice when the timing defect cannot be cured by amendment, creating claim‑preclusive effects as to the limitation proceeding.
  • Substantive Practical Effects in Admiralty:
    • Saving to suitors and forum strategy: Because a timely LoLA petition triggers the consolidation and stay (“concursus”) in federal court, claimants seeking to stay in state court may expedite the six‑month period by sending early, clear written notice. Conversely, vessel owners must vigilantly treat early letters from claimants’ counsel as potential triggers and consider protective filings.
    • Notice Standard: The Second Circuit’s “whole tenor” approach means claimants need not specify dollar amounts or detailed medical diagnoses to start the clock. Identifying the accident, asserting negligence, and alleging personal injury can suffice.
    • Jurisdictional Clarity: District courts retain admiralty jurisdiction under § 1333(1) even if the limitation petition is untimely; the remedy is not jurisdictional dismissal. This avoids collateral confusion about the court’s power and the status of related orders.
  • Litigation Management:
    • When limitation is filed late and the claimant objects, the court should dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), generally with prejudice, dissolving any stays and allowing state or other proceedings to continue.
    • Because the rule is non‑jurisdictional, parties should brief any applicable defenses or doctrines (such as waiver or forfeiture) in the district court. The Second Circuit did not address equitable tolling in this case.
  • Alignment with Sister Circuits: By joining the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit reduces the risk of inter‑circuit divergences that could otherwise incentivize forum‑shopping in maritime cases with multijurisdictional contacts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Limitation of Liability Act (LoLA): A federal statute allowing a vessel owner to cap liability for certain maritime claims at the value of the vessel and pending freight, provided the owner complies with procedural requirements, including filing within six months of written notice of a claim.
  • Claim‑Processing Rule vs. Jurisdictional Rule:
    • Jurisdictional rules define a court’s power to hear a case. They cannot be waived or forfeited and may be raised at any time, even by a court sua sponte.
    • Claim‑processing rules direct how and when parties must act. They are mandatory if properly invoked but can be forfeited or waived if not timely asserted by the opposing party.
  • Written Notice of a Claim (for § 30529(a) purposes): A writing that, viewed in its entirety and “whole tenor,” informs the vessel owner of an actual or potential claim arising from a maritime incident and signals possible exposure that could implicate limitation—without needing exact damage amounts or full medical details.
  • Saving to Suitors Clause (28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)): Preserves claimants’ ability to seek common‑law remedies in state court, subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction and the special concursus procedures of limitation actions.
  • Concursus (Supplemental Rule F): When a limitation complaint is properly filed, the district court enjoins other suits and gathers claims into a single proceeding to adjudicate exoneration and limitation. Untimely limitation filings, when challenged, do not trigger or sustain this mechanism.
  • Practical Difference in Dismissal Grounds:
    • Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction): Dismissals are without prejudice and can be raised at any time.
    • Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim): Dismissals are generally with prejudice when the defect cannot be cured, and the defense can be forfeited if not raised.

Application to the Facts

Applying these principles, the Second Circuit held that Skolnik’s September 22, 2022 letter—identifying the parties, accident date and location, alleging negligence and personal injuries, and demanding preservation of evidence—was sufficient written notice. That notice started the six‑month clock. Seganti’s November 1, 2023 LoLA filing came 13 months later and was therefore untimely. Because Skolnik objected, the claim‑processing rule was enforced, and the petition failed to state a claim. The court modified the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice.

Practice Pointers

  • For vessel owners:
    • Treat any post‑incident letter from opposing counsel alleging injury and negligence—and identifying the incident—as the likely trigger for § 30529(a). Do not wait for a formal lawsuit or a quantified damages demand.
    • When in doubt, file a protective limitation action within six months and seek to manage claims via Supplemental Rule F.
  • For claimants:
    • Early, clear written notice can start the six‑month period, potentially preventing a later federal concursus if the owner misses the deadline.
    • Timeliness objections must be raised; courts need not raise claim‑processing defenses on their own.
  • For courts:
    • Analyze LoLA timeliness under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1). If untimely and incurable, dismissal with prejudice is ordinarily appropriate.
    • Continue to ground admiralty jurisdiction in § 1333(1); LoLA supplies a remedy and procedure, not jurisdiction.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision clarifies an important procedural threshold in maritime limitation practice: LoLA’s six‑month filing requirement in § 30529(a) is a non‑jurisdictional claim‑processing rule. District courts retain admiralty jurisdiction under § 1333(1) even when a limitation petition is late. However, once a claimant invokes untimeliness, the rule is mandatory; the proper disposition is a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, typically with prejudice if the defect cannot be cured. The court also reaffirms a claimant‑friendly, practical standard for what constitutes “written notice of a claim,” emphasizing the “whole tenor” of a letter alleging personal injuries from a specified incident.

By aligning with sister circuits and modern Supreme Court doctrine, the decision promotes uniformity, reduces procedural mislabeling, and provides concrete guidance to litigants. Its immediate effect is to sharpen the incentives: claimants can trigger the six‑month period with early, clear notice; vessel owners must respond quickly with protective filings to preserve limitation rights.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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